X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelManager.java;h=e8560640d2b8fda371e23b8a5aa58c58e2dc9cbd;hb=3c60e0fd0da579be9932801c1be2b32014c944a5;hp=6f5e447ecef0482a84a5bb4860cebe280407a38b;hpb=7d6be8a5ef72a4ebfe07660cce55f43f6cc30b80;p=ldk-java diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java index 6f5e447e..e8560640 100644 --- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java +++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import org.ldk.impl.bindings; import org.ldk.enums.*; import org.ldk.util.*; import java.util.Arrays; +import java.lang.ref.Reference; import javax.annotation.Nullable; @@ -62,24 +63,29 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * * Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator. * - * panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`! - * * Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or * disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting * from after `params.latest_hash`. */ public static ChannelManager of(FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, ChainParameters params) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, params == null ? 0 : params.ptr & ~1); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = new ChannelManager(null, ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(params); + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr, params == null ? 0 : params.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_est); + Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_monitor); + Reference.reachabilityFence(tx_broadcaster); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(config); + Reference.reachabilityFence(params); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(params); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -88,38 +94,54 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public UserConfig get_current_default_configuration() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_current_default_configuration(this.ptr); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - UserConfig ret_hu_conv = new UserConfig(null, ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.UserConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UserConfig(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value. * - * user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow - * tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the - * user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for - * user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and - * otherwise ignored. - * - * If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll - * PeerManager::process_events afterwards. + * `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events + * correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0 + * for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here. + * `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise + * ignored. * - * Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is - * greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000. + * Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is + * greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`. * * Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no * connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in - * the channel eventually being silently forgotten. + * the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload). + * + * Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in + * [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after + * [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for + * one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel + * immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]. + * + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id + * [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id * * Note that override_config (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None */ - public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, long user_id, @Nullable UserConfig override_config) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr & ~1); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); - this.ptrs_to.add(override_config); + public Result__u832APIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, long user_channel_id, @Nullable UserConfig override_config) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(their_network_key, 33), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(their_network_key); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_value_satoshis); + Reference.reachabilityFence(push_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(override_config); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result__u832APIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result__u832APIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(override_config); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -129,31 +151,37 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public ChannelDetails[] list_channels() { long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels(this.ptr); - ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length]; - for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) { + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length; + ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len]; + for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) { long ret_conv_16 = ret[q]; - ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); - ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); } + if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv; } return ret_conv_16_arr; } /** - * Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to - * get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used. + * Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`] + * to ensure non-announced channels are used. * * These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the * documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria * are. + * + * [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route */ public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() { long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr); - ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length]; - for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) { + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length; + ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len]; + for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) { long ret_conv_16 = ret[q]; - ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); - ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); } + if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv; } return ret_conv_16_arr; @@ -178,9 +206,12 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal */ - public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -206,20 +237,47 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal */ - public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_target_feerate(byte[] channel_id, int target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_target_feerate(this.ptr, channel_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_target_feerate(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, int target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_target_feerate(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** - * Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to - * the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager. + * Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and + * rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to + * the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding + * channel. */ - public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_channel(byte[] channel_id) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting + * the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the + * `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel. + * + * You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from + * [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`]. + */ + public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -228,8 +286,18 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction * for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each. */ - public void force_close_all_channels() { - bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels(this.ptr); + public void force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn() { + bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + } + + /** + * Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest + * local transaction(s). + */ + public void force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn() { + bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); } /** @@ -275,14 +343,63 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * * Note that payment_secret (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None */ - public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_hash, @Nullable byte[] payment_secret) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, payment_hash, payment_secret); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + public Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_hash, @Nullable byte[] payment_secret) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(route); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Retries a payment along the given [`Route`]. + * + * Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see + * [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the + * retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment + * for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if + * further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`]. + * + * [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] + * [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] + */ + public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ retry_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_id) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_retry_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(route); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); - this.ptrs_to.add(route); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); }; return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur. + * + * After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id` + * will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated, + * an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining + * pending HTLCs for this payment. + * + * Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still + * wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to + * determine the ultimate status of a payment. + * + * [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment + * [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed + * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent + */ + public void abandon_payment(byte[] payment_id) { + bindings.ChannelManager_abandon_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id); + } + /** * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify @@ -301,11 +418,29 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * * Note that payment_preimage (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None */ - public Result_PaymentHashPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(Route route, @Nullable byte[] payment_preimage) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, payment_preimage); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_PaymentHashPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentHashPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); - this.ptrs_to.add(route); + public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(Route route, @Nullable byte[] payment_preimage) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(route); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the + * [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows + * us to easily discern them from real payments. + */ + public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ send_probe(RouteHop[] hops) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_probe(this.ptr, hops != null ? Arrays.stream(hops).mapToLong(hops_conv_10 -> hops_conv_10 == null ? 0 : hops_conv_10.ptr).toArray() : null); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(hops); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + for (RouteHop hops_conv_10: hops) { if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(hops_conv_10); }; }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -315,7 +450,11 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs * or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]. * - * Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel. + * Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation + * across the p2p network. + * + * Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided + * for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`]. * * May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other * channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction @@ -329,11 +468,21 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead, * create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction. * + * Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend + * the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as + * implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See + * for more details. + * * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady + * [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed */ - public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] funding_transaction) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[] funding_transaction) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), funding_transaction); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_transaction); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -354,12 +503,52 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy, * addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses. * - * Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500). + * Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 100). * * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events */ public void broadcast_node_announcement(byte[] rgb, byte[] alias, NetAddress[] addresses) { - bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, rgb, alias, addresses != null ? Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(addresses_conv_12 -> addresses_conv_12.ptr).toArray() : null); + bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(rgb, 3), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(alias, 32), addresses != null ? Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(addresses_conv_12 -> addresses_conv_12.ptr).toArray() : null); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(rgb); + Reference.reachabilityFence(alias); + Reference.reachabilityFence(addresses); + } + + /** + * Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels. + * + * Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel + * ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`], + * or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated + * containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network. + * + * Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect + * `counterparty_node_id` is provided. + * + * Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value + * below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]. + * + * If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied. + * + * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + * [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat + * [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta + * [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate + * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate + * [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable + * [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError + */ + public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ update_channel_config(byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[][] channel_ids, ChannelConfig config) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_update_channel_config(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), channel_ids != null ? Arrays.stream(channel_ids).map(channel_ids_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_ids_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_ids); + Reference.reachabilityFence(config); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(config); }; + return ret_hu_conv; } /** @@ -370,6 +559,7 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public void process_pending_htlc_forwards() { bindings.ChannelManager_process_pending_htlc_forwards(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); } /** @@ -380,44 +570,62 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more * than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over * the channel. + * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs + * with the current `ChannelConfig`. * * Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate * estimate fetches. */ public void timer_tick_occurred() { bindings.ChannelManager_timer_tick_occurred(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); } /** * Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect * after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources * along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it). - * Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the - * HTLC backwards has been started. + * + * Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have + * already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a + * second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment + * may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time. + * + * While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling + * [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for + * [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on + * startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed. */ - public boolean fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash) { - boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, payment_hash); - return ret; + public void fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash) { + bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); } /** - * Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and - * generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you - * should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true! + * Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any + * [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment. + * + * Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You + * must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be + * provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called. * * Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived` * event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide * the sender \"proof-of-payment\" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment. * - * May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event. - * + * [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived + * [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed + * [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events */ - public boolean claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage) { - boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, payment_preimage); - return ret; + public void claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage) { + bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage); } /** @@ -425,34 +633,68 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public byte[] get_our_node_id() { byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_our_node_id(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } /** - * Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a - * ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update - * operation. + * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]. + * + * The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted, + * and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open + * the channel. * - * All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been - * fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors. + * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in + * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond + * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call. * - * Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the - * current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple - * ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field - * exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls. + * Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support + * for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be + * used to accept such channels. * - * Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level: - * 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager, - * 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of - * said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures - * any time it cannot do so instantly, - * 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor, - * 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that - * completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled. + * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest + * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id */ - public void channel_monitor_updated(OutPoint funding_txo, long highest_applied_update_id) { - bindings.ChannelManager_channel_monitor_updated(this.ptr, funding_txo == null ? 0 : funding_txo.ptr & ~1, highest_applied_update_id); - this.ptrs_to.add(funding_txo); + public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, long user_channel_id) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), user_channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating + * it as confirmed immediately. + * + * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in + * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond + * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call. + * + * Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel + * and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately. + * + * This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding + * transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm. + * + * If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction + * does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*. + * + * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest + * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id + */ + public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, long user_channel_id) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), user_channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; } /** @@ -460,7 +702,7 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * to pay us. * * This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the - * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second. + * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you. * * The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which * will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be @@ -468,20 +710,50 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * * See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements. * + * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by + * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. + * + * # Note + * + * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then + * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received. + * + * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. + * * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived * [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash */ - public TwoTuple create_inbound_payment(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, long user_payment_id) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - byte[] ret_a = bindings.LDKC2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZ_get_a(ret); - byte[] ret_b = bindings.LDKC2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZ_get_b(ret); - TwoTuple ret_conv = new TwoTuple(ret_a, ret_b, () -> { - bindings.C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZ_free(ret); - }); - return ret_conv; + public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ create_inbound_payment(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share + * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier. + * + * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year. + * + * # Note + * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon. + * + * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + */ + public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_legacy(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_legacy(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; } /** @@ -492,14 +764,9 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least * the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided. * - * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This - * method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending. - * - * `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to - * allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and - * [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply - * copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events - * with invoice metadata stored elsewhere. + * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though + * note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound + * payments. * * `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment * received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat` @@ -518,35 +785,107 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of * [`PaymentReceived`]. * - * Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this - * [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and - * space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation. - * - * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year. - * * Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry` * set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`]. * + * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by + * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. + * + * # Note + * + * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then + * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received. + * + * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. + * * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived - * [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id */ - public Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, long user_payment_id) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, payment_hash, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + public Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share + * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier. + * + * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year. + * + * # Note + * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon. + * + * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + */ + public Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were + * previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. + * + * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + */ + public Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ get_payment_preimage(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_payment_preimage(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids + * are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints. + * + * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager + */ + public long get_phantom_scid() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_scid(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. + * + * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager + */ + public PhantomRouteHints get_phantom_route_hints() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_route_hints(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + /** * Constructs a new MessageSendEventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned MessageSendEventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is */ public MessageSendEventsProvider as_MessageSendEventsProvider() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_MessageSendEventsProvider(this.ptr); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } MessageSendEventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new MessageSendEventsProvider(null, ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -556,9 +895,10 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public EventsProvider as_EventsProvider() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_EventsProvider(this.ptr); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } EventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new EventsProvider(null, ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -568,9 +908,10 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public Listen as_Listen() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Listen(this.ptr); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Listen ret_hu_conv = new Listen(null, ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -580,9 +921,10 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public Confirm as_Confirm() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Confirm(this.ptr); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Confirm ret_hu_conv = new Confirm(null, ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -591,10 +933,13 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on * `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken * up. - * Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function. + * + * Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature. */ public boolean await_persistable_update_timeout(long max_wait) { boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update_timeout(this.ptr, max_wait); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(max_wait); return ret; } @@ -605,6 +950,7 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public void await_persistable_update() { bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); } /** @@ -613,9 +959,10 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public BestBlock current_best_block() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_current_best_block(this.ptr); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - BestBlock ret_hu_conv = new BestBlock(null, ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.BestBlock ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.BestBlock(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -625,9 +972,10 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public ChannelMessageHandler as_ChannelMessageHandler() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_ChannelMessageHandler(this.ptr); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } ChannelMessageHandler ret_hu_conv = new ChannelMessageHandler(null, ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -636,7 +984,21 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public byte[] write() { byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_write(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } + /** + * Constructs a new Payer which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. + * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Payer must be freed before this_arg is + */ + public Payer as_Payer() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Payer(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Payer ret_hu_conv = new Payer(null, ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + }