X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelManager.java;h=ea569eb0f3c0a3c479d4335bfeb608abc5c61b2c;hb=ff3dacec3be60f870d81f6df11bd9fff92aa6047;hp=beadcad71efe2317f9fa22a72af23e3fb81c1d16;hpb=110f2f104ba8fc34caa7e34e04737f36f064b050;p=ldk-java

diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java
index beadcad7..ea569eb0 100644
--- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java
+++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java
@@ -4,127 +4,858 @@ import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
 import org.ldk.enums.*;
 import org.ldk.util.*;
 import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.lang.ref.Reference;
+import javax.annotation.Nullable;
 
+
+/**
+ * Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
+ * channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
+ * 
+ * Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
+ * to individual Channels.
+ * 
+ * Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
+ * all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
+ * serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
+ * called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
+ * 
+ * Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
+ * ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
+ * returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
+ * happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
+ * the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
+ * ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
+ * ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
+ * 
+ * Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
+ * tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+ * the \"reorg path\" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
+ * block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
+ * object!
+ * 
+ * Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
+ * ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
+ * spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
+ * offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
+ * timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
+ * 
+ * Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
+ * a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
+ * essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
+ * SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
+ * you're using lightning-net-tokio.
+ */
 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
 public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
 	ChannelManager(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
 	@Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
 	protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
 		super.finalize();
-		bindings.ChannelManager_free(ptr);
+		if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelManager_free(ptr); }
 	}
 
-	public static ChannelManager constructor_new(LDKNetwork network, FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, long current_blockchain_height) {
-		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(network, fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, current_blockchain_height);
-		ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = new ChannelManager(null, ret);
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
+	 * 
+	 * This is the main \"logic hub\" for all channel-related actions, and implements
+	 * ChannelMessageHandler.
+	 * 
+	 * Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
+	 * 
+	 * panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
+	 * 
+	 * Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
+	 * disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
+	 * from after `params.latest_hash`.
+	 */
+	public static ChannelManager of(FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, ChainParameters params) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, params == null ? 0 : params.ptr & ~1);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_est);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_monitor);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(tx_broadcaster);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(config);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(params);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelManager(null, ret); }
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est);
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor);
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster);
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger);
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config);
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	// Skipped ChannelManager_create_channel
+	/**
+	 * Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels,  as
+	 */
+	public UserConfig get_current_default_configuration() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_current_default_configuration(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		UserConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new UserConfig(null, ret); }
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
+	 * 
+	 * `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
+	 * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
+	 * correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
+	 * for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
+	 * `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
+	 * ignored.
+	 * 
+	 * Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
+	 * greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
+	 * connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
+	 * the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
+	 * 
+	 * Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
+	 * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
+	 * [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
+	 * [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
+	 * one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
+	 * immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
+	 * 
+	 * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
+	 * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
+	 * [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
+	 * 
+	 * Note that override_config (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+	 */
+	public Result__u832APIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, long user_channel_id, @Nullable UserConfig override_config) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(their_network_key, 33), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr & ~1);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(their_network_key);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_value_satoshis);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(push_msat);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(override_config);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result__u832APIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result__u832APIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
+	 * more information.
+	 */
 	public ChannelDetails[] list_channels() {
 		long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels(this.ptr);
-		ChannelDetails[] arr_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length];
-		for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) {
-			long arr_conv_16 = ret[q];
-			ChannelDetails arr_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, arr_conv_16);
-			arr_conv_16_arr[q] = arr_conv_16_hu_conv;
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+		ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+		for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
+			long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
+			ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
+			ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+			ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
 		}
-		return arr_conv_16_arr;
+		return ret_conv_16_arr;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
+	 * get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
+	 * 
+	 * These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
+	 * documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
+	 * are.
+	 */
 	public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() {
 		long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr);
-		ChannelDetails[] arr_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length];
-		for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) {
-			long arr_conv_16 = ret[q];
-			ChannelDetails arr_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, arr_conv_16);
-			arr_conv_16_arr[q] = arr_conv_16_hu_conv;
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+		ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+		for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
+			long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
+			ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
+			ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+			ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
 		}
-		return arr_conv_16_arr;
+		return ret_conv_16_arr;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+	 * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+	 * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+	 * 
+	 * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+	 * estimate.
+	 * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
+	 * transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
+	 * would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
+	 * counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
+	 * 
+	 * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+	 * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+	 * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	// Skipped ChannelManager_close_channel
-	public void force_close_channel(byte[] channel_id) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id);
+	/**
+	 * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+	 * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+	 * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+	 * 
+	 * `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
+	 * the channel being closed or not:
+	 * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
+	 * transaction. The upper-bound is set by
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+	 * estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
+	 * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
+	 * transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
+	 * will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
+	 * 
+	 * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+	 * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+	 * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_target_feerate(byte[] channel_id, int target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_target_feerate(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
+	 * the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_channel(byte[] channel_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
+	 * for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
+	 */
 	public void force_close_all_channels() {
 		bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 	}
 
-	// Skipped ChannelManager_send_payment
-	public void funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, OutPoint funding_txo) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, temporary_channel_id, funding_txo == null ? 0 : funding_txo.ptr & ~1);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(funding_txo);
+	/**
+	 * Sends a payment along a given route.
+	 * 
+	 * Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
+	 * fields for more info.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
+	 * payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
+	 * next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
+	 * specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
+	 * payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent \"proof of
+	 * payment\") and prevent double-sends yourself.
+	 * 
+	 * May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
+	 * 
+	 * Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
+	 * each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
+	 * PaymentSendFailure for more info.
+	 * 
+	 * In general, a path may raise:
+	 * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
+	 * node public key) is specified.
+	 * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
+	 * (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
+	 * failure).
+	 * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
+	 * relevant updates.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
+	 * irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
+	 * different route unless you intend to pay twice!
+	 * 
+	 * payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
+	 * the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
+	 * newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
+	 * must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
+	 * payment_secret.
+	 * If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
+	 * bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
+	 * we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that payment_secret (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+	 */
+	public Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_hash, @Nullable byte[] payment_secret) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		this.ptrs_to.add(route);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
+	 * 
+	 * Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
+	 * [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
+	 * retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
+	 * for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
+	 * further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
+	 * 
+	 * [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
+	 * [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
+	 */
+	public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ retry_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_retry_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		this.ptrs_to.add(route);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
+	 * 
+	 * After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
+	 * will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
+	 * an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
+	 * pending HTLCs for this payment.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
+	 * wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
+	 * determine the ultimate status of a payment.
+	 * 
+	 * [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
+	 * [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
+	 * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+	 */
+	public void abandon_payment(byte[] payment_id) {
+		bindings.ChannelManager_abandon_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
+	 * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
+	 * the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
+	 * would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
+	 * never reach the recipient.
+	 * 
+	 * See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
+	 * 
+	 * Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
+	 * [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
+	 * 
+	 * [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
+	 * 
+	 * Note that payment_preimage (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+	 */
+	public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(Route route, @Nullable byte[] payment_preimage) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		this.ptrs_to.add(route);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
+	 * 
+	 * Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
+	 * or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
+	 * 
+	 * Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
+	 * for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
+	 * 
+	 * May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
+	 * channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
+	 * keys per-channel).
+	 * 
+	 * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
+	 * counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
+	 * [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
+	 * not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
+	 * create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
+	 * 
+	 * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
+	 * [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] funding_transaction) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), funding_transaction);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_transaction);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
+	 * arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
+	 * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
+	 * on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
+	 * announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
+	 * our network addresses.
+	 * 
+	 * `rgb` is a node \"color\" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
+	 * node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
+	 * 
+	 * `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
+	 * accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
+	 * tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
+	 * addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
+	 * 
+	 * Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
+	 * 
+	 * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
+	 */
 	public void broadcast_node_announcement(byte[] rgb, byte[] alias, NetAddress[] addresses) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, rgb, alias, Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(arr_conv_12 -> arr_conv_12.conv_to_c()).toArray());
-		/* TODO 2 NetAddress  */;
+		bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(rgb, 3), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(alias, 32), addresses != null ? Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(addresses_conv_12 -> addresses_conv_12.ptr).toArray() : null);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(rgb);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(alias);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(addresses);
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
+	 * 
+	 * Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
+	 * Will likely generate further events.
+	 */
 	public void process_pending_htlc_forwards() {
 		bindings.ChannelManager_process_pending_htlc_forwards(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 	}
 
-	public void timer_chan_freshness_every_min() {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_timer_chan_freshness_every_min(this.ptr);
+	/**
+	 * Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
+	 * 
+	 * This currently includes:
+	 * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
+	 * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
+	 * than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
+	 * the channel.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
+	 * estimate fetches.
+	 */
+	public void timer_tick_occurred() {
+		bindings.ChannelManager_timer_tick_occurred(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 	}
 
-	public boolean fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
-		boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, payment_hash, payment_secret);
+	/**
+	 * Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
+	 * after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
+	 * along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
+	 * Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
+	 * HTLC backwards has been started.
+	 */
+	public boolean fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash) {
+		boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	public boolean claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage, byte[] payment_secret, long expected_amount) {
-		boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, payment_preimage, payment_secret, expected_amount);
+	/**
+	 * Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
+	 * [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
+	 * event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
+	 * the sender \"proof-of-payment\" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
+	 * 
+	 * Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
+	 * pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
+	 * 
+	 * [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+	 * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
+	 */
+	public boolean claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage) {
+		boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
+	 */
 	public byte[] get_our_node_id() {
 		byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_our_node_id(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
+	 * triggered.
+	 * 
+	 * The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
+	 * 
+	 * For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+	 * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+	 * with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
+	 * 
+	 * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+	 * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel(byte[] temporary_channel_id, long user_channel_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), user_channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
+	 * to pay us.
+	 * 
+	 * This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
+	 * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
+	 * 
+	 * The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
+	 * will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
+	 * passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
+	 * 
+	 * See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+	 * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+	 * 
+	 * # Note
+	 * 
+	 * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+	 * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+	 * 
+	 * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+	 * 
+	 * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+	 * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
+	 * [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+	 */
+	public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ create_inbound_payment(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+	 * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
+	 * 
+	 * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
+	 * 
+	 * # Note
+	 * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
+	 * 
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+	 */
+	public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_legacy(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_legacy(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
+	 * stored external to LDK.
+	 * 
+	 * A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
+	 * payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
+	 * the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
+	 * 
+	 * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
+	 * note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
+	 * payments.
+	 * 
+	 * `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
+	 * received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
+	 * before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
+	 * sender \"proof-of-payment\" unless they have paid the required amount.
+	 * 
+	 * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
+	 * in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
+	 * After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
+	 * pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
+	 * invoices when no timeout is set.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
+	 * to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
+	 * accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
+	 * If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
+	 * [`PaymentReceived`].
+	 * 
+	 * Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
+	 * set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
+	 * 
+	 * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+	 * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+	 * 
+	 * # Note
+	 * 
+	 * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+	 * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+	 * 
+	 * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+	 * 
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+	 * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
+	 */
+	public Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+	 * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
+	 * 
+	 * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
+	 * 
+	 * # Note
+	 * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
+	 * 
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+	 */
+	public Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
+	 * previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
+	 * 
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+	 */
+	public Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ get_payment_preimage(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_payment_preimage(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
+	 * are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
+	 * 
+	 * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
+	 */
+	public long get_phantom_scid() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_scid(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	public void channel_monitor_updated(OutPoint funding_txo, long highest_applied_update_id) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_channel_monitor_updated(this.ptr, funding_txo == null ? 0 : funding_txo.ptr & ~1, highest_applied_update_id);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(funding_txo);
+	/**
+	 * Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
+	 * 
+	 * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
+	 */
+	public PhantomRouteHints get_phantom_route_hints() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_route_hints(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		PhantomRouteHints ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new PhantomRouteHints(null, ret); }
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new MessageSendEventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+	 * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned MessageSendEventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is
+	 */
 	public MessageSendEventsProvider as_MessageSendEventsProvider() {
 		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_MessageSendEventsProvider(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 		MessageSendEventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new MessageSendEventsProvider(null, ret);
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new EventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+	 * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned EventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is
+	 */
 	public EventsProvider as_EventsProvider() {
 		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_EventsProvider(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 		EventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new EventsProvider(null, ret);
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	public void block_connected(byte[] header, TwoTuple<Long, Transaction>[] txdata, int height) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_block_connected(this.ptr, header, Arrays.stream(txdata).mapToLong(arr_conv_29 -> /*TODO b*/0).toArray(), height);
-		/* TODO 2 TwoTuple<Long, Transaction>  */;
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new Listen which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+	 * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Listen must be freed before this_arg is
+	 */
+	public Listen as_Listen() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Listen(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Listen ret_hu_conv = new Listen(null, ret);
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	public void block_disconnected(byte[] header) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_block_disconnected(this.ptr, header);
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new Confirm which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+	 * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Confirm must be freed before this_arg is
+	 */
+	public Confirm as_Confirm() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Confirm(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Confirm ret_hu_conv = new Confirm(null, ret);
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
+	 * indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
+	 * `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
+	 * up.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
+	 */
+	public boolean await_persistable_update_timeout(long max_wait) {
+		boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update_timeout(this.ptr, max_wait);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(max_wait);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
+	 * `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
+	 * up.
+	 */
+	public void await_persistable_update() {
+		bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
+	 * [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
+	 */
+	public BestBlock current_best_block() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_current_best_block(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		BestBlock ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new BestBlock(null, ret); }
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new ChannelMessageHandler which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+	 * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned ChannelMessageHandler must be freed before this_arg is
+	 */
 	public ChannelMessageHandler as_ChannelMessageHandler() {
 		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_ChannelMessageHandler(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 		ChannelMessageHandler ret_hu_conv = new ChannelMessageHandler(null, ret);
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Serialize the ChannelManager object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelManager_read
+	 */
+	public byte[] write() {
+		byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_write(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new Payer which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+	 * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Payer must be freed before this_arg is
+	 */
+	public Payer as_Payer() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Payer(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Payer ret_hu_conv = new Payer(null, ret);
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
 }