X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelManager.java;h=ea569eb0f3c0a3c479d4335bfeb608abc5c61b2c;hb=ff3dacec3be60f870d81f6df11bd9fff92aa6047;hp=d0de49a291672f50455df9016f68909808a12c49;hpb=7cede693022f65adf9b93bfda7a462481e30c1ef;p=ldk-java diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java index d0de49a2..ea569eb0 100644 --- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java +++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import org.ldk.impl.bindings; import org.ldk.enums.*; import org.ldk.util.*; import java.util.Arrays; +import java.lang.ref.Reference; +import javax.annotation.Nullable; /** @@ -36,7 +38,7 @@ import java.util.Arrays; * ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid * spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been * offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call - * timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect. + * timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect. * * Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager * a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but @@ -67,37 +69,78 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting * from after `params.latest_hash`. */ - public static ChannelManager constructor_new(FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, LDKNetwork params_network_arg, byte[] params_latest_hash_arg, long params_latest_height_arg) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, bindings.ChainParameters_new(params_network_arg, params_latest_hash_arg, params_latest_height_arg)); - ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = new ChannelManager(null, ret); + public static ChannelManager of(FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, ChainParameters params) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, params == null ? 0 : params.ptr & ~1); + Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_est); + Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_monitor); + Reference.reachabilityFence(tx_broadcaster); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(config); + Reference.reachabilityFence(params); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelManager(null, ret); } ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as + */ + public UserConfig get_current_default_configuration() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_current_default_configuration(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + UserConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new UserConfig(null, ret); } + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value. * - * user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and - * FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which - * create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you - * may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here. + * `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events + * correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0 + * for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here. + * `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise + * ignored. + * + * Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is + * greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`. + * + * Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no + * connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in + * the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload). + * + * Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in + * [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after + * [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for + * one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel + * immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]. * - * If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll - * PeerManager::process_events afterwards. + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id + * [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id * - * Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is - * greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000. + * Note that override_config (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None */ - public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, long user_id, UserConfig override_config) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr & ~1); - Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); - this.ptrs_to.add(override_config); + public Result__u832APIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, long user_channel_id, @Nullable UserConfig override_config) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(their_network_key, 33), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr & ~1); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(their_network_key); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_value_satoshis); + Reference.reachabilityFence(push_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(override_config); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result__u832APIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result__u832APIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -107,10 +150,12 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public ChannelDetails[] list_channels() { long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels(this.ptr); - ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length]; - for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) { + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length; + ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len]; + for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) { long ret_conv_16 = ret[q]; - ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); + ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); } ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv; } @@ -121,15 +166,18 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to * get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used. * - * These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for - * ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are. + * These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the + * documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria + * are. */ public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() { long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr); - ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length]; - for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) { + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length; + ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len]; + for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) { long ret_conv_16 = ret[q]; - ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); + ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); } ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv; } @@ -141,10 +189,56 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain. * + * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and + * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee + * estimate. + * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing + * transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which + * would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our + * counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however. + * * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. + * + * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis + * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background + * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id); + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs + * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all + * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain. + * + * `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated + * the channel being closed or not: + * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing + * transaction. The upper-bound is set by + * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee + * estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater). + * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure + * transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which + * will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower). + * + * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. + * + * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis + * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background + * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal + */ + public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_target_feerate(byte[] channel_id, int target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_target_feerate(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -154,7 +248,10 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager. */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_channel(byte[] channel_id) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id); + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -165,6 +262,7 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public void force_close_all_channels() { bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); } /** @@ -207,48 +305,155 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature * bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route, * we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set. + * + * Note that payment_secret (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None + */ + public Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_hash, @Nullable byte[] payment_secret) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(route); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + this.ptrs_to.add(route); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Retries a payment along the given [`Route`]. + * + * Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see + * [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the + * retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment + * for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if + * further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`]. + * + * [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] + * [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] */ - public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, payment_hash, payment_secret); + public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ retry_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_id) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_retry_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(route); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); this.ptrs_to.add(route); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur. + * + * After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id` + * will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated, + * an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining + * pending HTLCs for this payment. + * + * Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still + * wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to + * determine the ultimate status of a payment. + * + * [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment + * [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed + * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent + */ + public void abandon_payment(byte[] payment_id) { + bindings.ChannelManager_abandon_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id); + } + + /** + * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have + * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify + * the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node + * would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will + * never reach the recipient. + * + * See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function. + * + * Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See + * [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage. + * + * Note that `route` must have exactly one path. + * + * [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment + * + * Note that payment_preimage (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None + */ + public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(Route route, @Nullable byte[] payment_preimage) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(route); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + this.ptrs_to.add(route); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + /** * Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel. * - * Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs - * or your counterparty can steal your funds! + * Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs + * or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]. + * + * Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided + * for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`]. + * + * May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other + * channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction + * keys per-channel). * - * Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel. + * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our + * counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the + * [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed. * - * May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should - * be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel). + * Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does + * not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead, + * create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction. + * + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady + * [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed */ - public void funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, OutPoint funding_txo) { - bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, temporary_channel_id, funding_txo == null ? 0 : funding_txo.ptr & ~1); - this.ptrs_to.add(funding_txo); + public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] funding_transaction) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), funding_transaction); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_transaction); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; } /** - * Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a - * BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have - * seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open). + * Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given + * arguments, providing them in corresponding events via + * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed + * on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node + * announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and + * our network addresses. * - * RGB is a node \"color\" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node - * to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning. + * `rgb` is a node \"color\" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this + * node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning. * - * addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts - * incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these - * addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain - * only Tor Onion addresses. + * `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node + * accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly + * tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy, + * addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses. * - * Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500). + * Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500). + * + * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events */ public void broadcast_node_announcement(byte[] rgb, byte[] alias, NetAddress[] addresses) { - bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, rgb, alias, Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(addresses_conv_12 -> addresses_conv_12.ptr).toArray()); - /* TODO 2 NetAddress */; + bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(rgb, 3), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(alias, 32), addresses != null ? Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(addresses_conv_12 -> addresses_conv_12.ptr).toArray() : null); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(rgb); + Reference.reachabilityFence(alias); + Reference.reachabilityFence(addresses); } /** @@ -259,19 +464,24 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public void process_pending_htlc_forwards() { bindings.ChannelManager_process_pending_htlc_forwards(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); } /** - * If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'. - * After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate - * to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels. + * Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter. * - * This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute. + * This currently includes: + * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels, + * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more + * than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over + * the channel. * - * Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call. + * Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate + * estimate fetches. */ - public void timer_chan_freshness_every_min() { - bindings.ChannelManager_timer_chan_freshness_every_min(this.ptr); + public void timer_tick_occurred() { + bindings.ChannelManager_timer_tick_occurred(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); } /** @@ -281,30 +491,34 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the * HTLC backwards has been started. */ - public boolean fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) { - boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, payment_hash, payment_secret); + public boolean fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash) { + boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); return ret; } /** - * Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and - * generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you - * should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true! + * Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any + * [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment. * - * You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs - * available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several - * reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the - * payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain - * privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to - * motivated attackers. + * Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or + * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived` + * event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide + * the sender \"proof-of-payment\" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment. * - * Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret - * set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay. + * Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now + * pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]. * - * May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event. + * [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived + * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events */ - public boolean claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage, byte[] payment_secret, long expected_amount) { - boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, payment_preimage, payment_secret, expected_amount); + public boolean claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage) { + boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage); return ret; } @@ -313,34 +527,210 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public byte[] get_our_node_id() { byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_our_node_id(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } /** - * Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a - * ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update - * operation. + * Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been + * triggered. + * + * The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted. + * + * For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in + * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond + * with which `accept_inbound_channel` call. + * + * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest + * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id + */ + public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel(byte[] temporary_channel_id, long user_channel_id) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), user_channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing + * to pay us. + * + * This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the + * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you. + * + * The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which + * will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be + * passed directly to [`claim_funds`]. + * + * See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements. + * + * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by + * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. + * + * # Note + * + * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then + * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received. + * + * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. + * + * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds + * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived + * [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage + * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + */ + public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ create_inbound_payment(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share + * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier. + * + * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year. + * + * # Note + * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon. + * + * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + */ + public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_legacy(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_legacy(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is + * stored external to LDK. + * + * A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a + * payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least + * the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided. + * + * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though + * note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound + * payments. + * + * `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment + * received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat` + * before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the + * sender \"proof-of-payment\" unless they have paid the required amount. + * + * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for + * in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice. + * After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to + * pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for + * invoices when no timeout is set. + * + * Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin + * to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will + * accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry. + * If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of + * [`PaymentReceived`]. + * + * Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry` + * set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`]. + * + * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by + * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. + * + * # Note + * + * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then + * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received. + * + * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. + * + * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived + */ + public Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share + * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier. + * + * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year. + * + * # Note + * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon. + * + * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + */ + public Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were + * previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. * - * All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been - * fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors. + * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + */ + public Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ get_payment_preimage(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_payment_preimage(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids + * are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints. * - * Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the - * current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple - * ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field - * exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls. + * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager + */ + public long get_phantom_scid() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_scid(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. * - * Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level: - * 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager, - * 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of - * said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures - * any time it cannot do so instantly, - * 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor, - * 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that - * completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled. + * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager */ - public void channel_monitor_updated(OutPoint funding_txo, long highest_applied_update_id) { - bindings.ChannelManager_channel_monitor_updated(this.ptr, funding_txo == null ? 0 : funding_txo.ptr & ~1, highest_applied_update_id); - this.ptrs_to.add(funding_txo); + public PhantomRouteHints get_phantom_route_hints() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_route_hints(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + PhantomRouteHints ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new PhantomRouteHints(null, ret); } + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + return ret_hu_conv; } /** @@ -349,6 +739,8 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public MessageSendEventsProvider as_MessageSendEventsProvider() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_MessageSendEventsProvider(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } MessageSendEventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new MessageSendEventsProvider(null, ret); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); return ret_hu_conv; @@ -360,6 +752,8 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public EventsProvider as_EventsProvider() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_EventsProvider(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } EventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new EventsProvider(null, ret); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); return ret_hu_conv; @@ -371,27 +765,24 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public Listen as_Listen() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Listen(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Listen ret_hu_conv = new Listen(null, ret); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); return ret_hu_conv; } /** - * Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block. - */ - public void block_connected(byte[] header, TwoTuple[] txdata, int height) { - bindings.ChannelManager_block_connected(this.ptr, header, Arrays.stream(txdata).mapToLong(txdata_conv_24 -> bindings.C2Tuple_usizeTransactionZ_new(txdata_conv_24.a, txdata_conv_24.b)).toArray(), height); - /* TODO 2 TwoTuple */; - } - - /** - * Updates channel state based on a disconnected block. - * - * If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate - * in the shutdown. + * Constructs a new Confirm which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. + * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Confirm must be freed before this_arg is */ - public void block_disconnected(byte[] header) { - bindings.ChannelManager_block_disconnected(this.ptr, header); + public Confirm as_Confirm() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Confirm(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Confirm ret_hu_conv = new Confirm(null, ret); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + return ret_hu_conv; } /** @@ -399,10 +790,13 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { * indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on * `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken * up. - * Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function. + * + * Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature. */ public boolean await_persistable_update_timeout(long max_wait) { boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update_timeout(this.ptr, max_wait); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(max_wait); return ret; } @@ -413,6 +807,20 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public void await_persistable_update() { bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + } + + /** + * Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or + * [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces. + */ + public BestBlock current_best_block() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_current_best_block(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + BestBlock ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new BestBlock(null, ret); } + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + return ret_hu_conv; } /** @@ -421,6 +829,8 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public ChannelMessageHandler as_ChannelMessageHandler() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_ChannelMessageHandler(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } ChannelMessageHandler ret_hu_conv = new ChannelMessageHandler(null, ret); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); return ret_hu_conv; @@ -431,7 +841,21 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { */ public byte[] write() { byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_write(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } + /** + * Constructs a new Payer which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. + * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Payer must be freed before this_arg is + */ + public Payer as_Payer() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Payer(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Payer ret_hu_conv = new Payer(null, ret); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + }