X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FUnsignedChannelUpdate.java;h=ee0802b85be0a7c551dadc4b6617777a9ac10a8a;hb=2bb592fb946e316dba9f4d1123f8ac72ff4e9bf8;hp=91a5557d2843e32f96435c55b1a7794ad7879fed;hpb=99d1a3bd6dc5c7ed1499b30bfc2b4c66ffaf858a;p=ldk-java diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UnsignedChannelUpdate.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UnsignedChannelUpdate.java index 91a5557d..ee0802b8 100644 --- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UnsignedChannelUpdate.java +++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UnsignedChannelUpdate.java @@ -4,11 +4,14 @@ import org.ldk.impl.bindings; import org.ldk.enums.*; import org.ldk.util.*; import java.util.Arrays; +import java.lang.ref.Reference; import javax.annotation.Nullable; /** - * The unsigned part of a channel_update + * The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message. + * + * [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message */ @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { @@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public byte[] get_chain_hash() { byte[] ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_chain_hash(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -31,7 +35,9 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { * The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened */ public void set_chain_hash(byte[] val) { - bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_chain_hash(this.ptr, val); + bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_chain_hash(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(val, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } /** @@ -39,6 +45,7 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public long get_short_channel_id() { long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_short_channel_id(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -47,6 +54,8 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public void set_short_channel_id(long val) { bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_short_channel_id(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } /** @@ -54,6 +63,7 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public int get_timestamp() { int ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_timestamp(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -62,6 +72,8 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public void set_timestamp(int val) { bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_timestamp(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } /** @@ -69,6 +81,7 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public byte get_flags() { byte ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_flags(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -77,35 +90,40 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public void set_flags(byte val) { bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_flags(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } /** * The number of blocks such that if: * `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta` - * then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, cltv_expiry_delta determines - * the outgoing HTLC's minimum cltv_expiry value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a - * cltv_expiry of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a cltv_expiry_delta value of 10, - * then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's cltv_expiry value is at least 100010 before + * then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines + * the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a + * `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10, + * then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before * forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when * constructing the route. */ public short get_cltv_expiry_delta() { short ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } /** * The number of blocks such that if: * `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta` - * then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, cltv_expiry_delta determines - * the outgoing HTLC's minimum cltv_expiry value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a - * cltv_expiry of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a cltv_expiry_delta value of 10, - * then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's cltv_expiry value is at least 100010 before + * then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines + * the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a + * `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10, + * then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before * forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when * constructing the route. */ public void set_cltv_expiry_delta(short val) { bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } /** @@ -113,6 +131,7 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public long get_htlc_minimum_msat() { long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -121,6 +140,30 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public void set_htlc_minimum_msat(long val) { bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + } + + /** + * The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi. + * + * This used to be optional. + */ + public long get_htlc_maximum_msat() { + long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_htlc_maximum_msat(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi. + * + * This used to be optional. + */ + public void set_htlc_maximum_msat(long val) { + bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_htlc_maximum_msat(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } /** @@ -128,6 +171,7 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public int get_fee_base_msat() { int ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_fee_base_msat(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -136,6 +180,8 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public void set_fee_base_msat(int val) { bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_fee_base_msat(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } /** @@ -143,6 +189,7 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public int get_fee_proportional_millionths() { int ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -151,6 +198,61 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public void set_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) { bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + } + + /** + * Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how + * to decode. + * + * This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol. + * + * Returns a copy of the field. + */ + public byte[] get_excess_data() { + byte[] ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_excess_data(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how + * to decode. + * + * This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol. + */ + public void set_excess_data(byte[] val) { + bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_excess_data(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + } + + /** + * Constructs a new UnsignedChannelUpdate given each field + */ + public static UnsignedChannelUpdate of(byte[] chain_hash_arg, long short_channel_id_arg, int timestamp_arg, byte flags_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, long htlc_minimum_msat_arg, long htlc_maximum_msat_arg, int fee_base_msat_arg, int fee_proportional_millionths_arg, byte[] excess_data_arg) { + long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_new(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(chain_hash_arg, 32), short_channel_id_arg, timestamp_arg, flags_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, htlc_minimum_msat_arg, htlc_maximum_msat_arg, fee_base_msat_arg, fee_proportional_millionths_arg, excess_data_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_hash_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(short_channel_id_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(timestamp_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(flags_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(cltv_expiry_delta_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_minimum_msat_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_maximum_msat_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_base_msat_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_proportional_millionths_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(excess_data_arg); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + long clone_ptr() { + long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_clone_ptr(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; } /** @@ -158,17 +260,48 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public UnsignedChannelUpdate clone() { long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_clone(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } - UnsignedChannelUpdate ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new UnsignedChannelUpdate(null, ret); } - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Generates a non-cryptographic 64-bit hash of the UnsignedChannelUpdate. + */ + public long hash() { + long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_hash(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + @Override public int hashCode() { + return (int)this.hash(); + } + /** + * Checks if two UnsignedChannelUpdates contain equal inner contents. + * This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields. + * Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here. + */ + public boolean eq(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate b) { + boolean ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_eq(this.ptr, b == null ? 0 : b.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(b); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(b); }; + return ret; + } + + @Override public boolean equals(Object o) { + if (!(o instanceof UnsignedChannelUpdate)) return false; + return this.eq((UnsignedChannelUpdate)o); + } /** * Serialize the UnsignedChannelUpdate object into a byte array which can be read by UnsignedChannelUpdate_read */ public byte[] write() { byte[] ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_write(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -177,6 +310,7 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase { */ public static Result_UnsignedChannelUpdateDecodeErrorZ read(byte[] ser) { long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_UnsignedChannelUpdateDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_UnsignedChannelUpdateDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv;