X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FUtilMethods.java;h=156d1e93eed3c58265b116cc2969b22b38f55ff0;hb=2bb592fb946e316dba9f4d1123f8ac72ff4e9bf8;hp=d2fb44384eaf1feb25d8cc49cb7560236b6451cd;hpb=f6c75b182a7786062a4966e8939701ef59092509;p=ldk-java diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UtilMethods.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UtilMethods.java index d2fb4438..156d1e93 100644 --- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UtilMethods.java +++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UtilMethods.java @@ -1,29 +1,81 @@ package org.ldk.structs; import org.ldk.impl.bindings; +import org.ldk.enums.*; +import org.ldk.util.*; import java.util.Arrays; +import java.lang.ref.Reference; import javax.annotation.Nullable; -import org.ldk.enums.*; public class UtilMethods { + /** + * Gets the 128-bit integer, as 16 little-endian bytes + */ + public static byte[] U128_le_bytes(org.ldk.util.UInt128 val) { + byte[] ret = bindings.U128_le_bytes(val.getLEBytes()); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Constructs a new U128 from 16 little-endian bytes + */ + public static UInt128 U128_new(byte[] le_bytes) { + byte[] ret = bindings.U128_new(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(le_bytes, 16)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(le_bytes); + org.ldk.util.UInt128 ret_conv = new org.ldk.util.UInt128(ret); + return ret_conv; + } + + /** + * Constructs a new COption_NoneZ containing a + */ + public static COption_NoneZ COption_NoneZ_some() { + COption_NoneZ ret = bindings.COption_NoneZ_some(); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Constructs a new COption_NoneZ containing nothing + */ + public static COption_NoneZ COption_NoneZ_none() { + COption_NoneZ ret = bindings.COption_NoneZ_none(); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Read a APIError from a byte array, created by APIError_write + */ + public static Result_COption_APIErrorZDecodeErrorZ APIError_read(byte[] ser) { + long ret = bindings.APIError_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_COption_APIErrorZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_APIErrorZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + /** * Creates a digital signature of a message given a SecretKey, like the node's secret. * A receiver knowing the PublicKey (e.g. the node's id) and the message can be sure that the signature was generated by the caller. * Signatures are EC recoverable, meaning that given the message and the signature the PublicKey of the signer can be extracted. */ - public static Result_StringErrorZ sign(byte[] msg, byte[] sk) { - long ret = bindings.sign(msg, sk); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_StringErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_StringErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + public static Result_StrSecp256k1ErrorZ sign(byte[] msg, byte[] sk) { + long ret = bindings.sign(msg, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(sk, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(msg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(sk); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_StrSecp256k1ErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_StrSecp256k1ErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Recovers the PublicKey of the signer of the message given the message and the signature. */ - public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ recover_pk(byte[] msg, java.lang.String sig) { + public static Result_PublicKeySecp256k1ErrorZ recover_pk(byte[] msg, java.lang.String sig) { long ret = bindings.recover_pk(msg, sig); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + Reference.reachabilityFence(msg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(sig); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PublicKeySecp256k1ErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeySecp256k1ErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -32,120 +84,290 @@ public class UtilMethods { * and the PublicKey. */ public static boolean verify(byte[] msg, java.lang.String sig, byte[] pk) { - boolean ret = bindings.verify(msg, sig, pk); + boolean ret = bindings.verify(msg, sig, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(pk, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(msg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(sig); + Reference.reachabilityFence(pk); return ret; } /** - * Read a C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ from a byte array, created by C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_write + * Construct the invoice's HRP and signatureless data into a preimage to be hashed. */ - public static Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_read(byte[] ser, KeysInterface arg) { - long ret = bindings.C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_read(ser, arg == null ? 0 : arg.ptr); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg); - return ret_hu_conv; + public static byte[] construct_invoice_preimage(byte[] hrp_bytes, UInt5[] data_without_signature) { + byte[] ret = bindings.construct_invoice_preimage(hrp_bytes, data_without_signature != null ? InternalUtils.convUInt5Array(data_without_signature) : null); + Reference.reachabilityFence(hrp_bytes); + Reference.reachabilityFence(data_without_signature); + return ret; } /** - * Read a C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ from a byte array, created by C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_write + * Read previously persisted [`ChannelMonitor`]s from the store. */ - public static Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_read(byte[] ser, KeysInterface arg_keys_manager, FeeEstimator arg_fee_estimator, Watch arg_chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface arg_tx_broadcaster, Logger arg_logger, UserConfig arg_default_config, ChannelMonitor[] arg_channel_monitors) { - long ret = bindings.C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_read(ser, bindings.ChannelManagerReadArgs_new(arg_keys_manager == null ? 0 : arg_keys_manager.ptr, arg_fee_estimator == null ? 0 : arg_fee_estimator.ptr, arg_chain_monitor == null ? 0 : arg_chain_monitor.ptr, arg_tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : arg_tx_broadcaster.ptr, arg_logger == null ? 0 : arg_logger.ptr, arg_default_config == null ? 0 : arg_default_config.ptr & ~1, arg_channel_monitors != null ? Arrays.stream(arg_channel_monitors).mapToLong(arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 -> arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 == null ? 0 : arg_channel_monitors_conv_16.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null)); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_keys_manager); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_fee_estimator); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_chain_monitor); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_tx_broadcaster); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_logger); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_default_config); - for (ChannelMonitor arg_channel_monitors_conv_16: arg_channel_monitors) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_channel_monitors_conv_16); }; + public static Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelMonitorZZIOErrorZ read_channel_monitors(org.ldk.structs.KVStore kv_store, org.ldk.structs.EntropySource entropy_source, org.ldk.structs.SignerProvider signer_provider) { + long ret = bindings.read_channel_monitors(kv_store.ptr, entropy_source.ptr, signer_provider.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(kv_store); + Reference.reachabilityFence(entropy_source); + Reference.reachabilityFence(signer_provider); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelMonitorZZIOErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelMonitorZZIOErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(kv_store); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(entropy_source); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(signer_provider); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** - * Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number + * Read a MonitorEvent from a byte array, created by MonitorEvent_write */ - public static byte[] build_commitment_secret(byte[] commitment_seed, long idx) { - byte[] ret = bindings.build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed, idx); - return ret; + public static Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ MonitorEvent_read(byte[] ser) { + long ret = bindings.MonitorEvent_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; } /** - * Build a closing transaction + * Read a C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelMonitorZ from a byte array, created by C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelMonitorZ_write */ - public static byte[] build_closing_transaction(long to_holder_value_sat, long to_counterparty_value_sat, byte[] to_holder_script, byte[] to_counterparty_script, OutPoint funding_outpoint) { - byte[] ret = bindings.build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat, to_holder_script, to_counterparty_script, funding_outpoint == null ? 0 : funding_outpoint.ptr & ~1); - // this.ptrs_to.add(funding_outpoint); - return ret; + public static Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelMonitorZ_read(byte[] ser, org.ldk.structs.EntropySource arg_a, org.ldk.structs.SignerProvider arg_b) { + long ret = bindings.C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelMonitorZ_read(ser, arg_a.ptr, arg_b.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_a); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_b); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_a); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_b); }; + return ret_hu_conv; } /** - * Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key) - * from the base secret and the per_commitment_point. + * Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning a [`PendingHTLCInfo`] that contains information + * about the intended next-hop for the HTLC. + * + * This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or + * acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for + * a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the + * channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]. * - * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly - * generated (ie our own). + * [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable + */ + public static Result_PendingHTLCInfoInboundHTLCErrZ peel_payment_onion(org.ldk.structs.UpdateAddHTLC msg, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, int cur_height, boolean accept_mpp_keysend, boolean allow_skimmed_fees) { + long ret = bindings.peel_payment_onion(msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr, node_signer.ptr, logger.ptr, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend, allow_skimmed_fees); + Reference.reachabilityFence(msg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(cur_height); + Reference.reachabilityFence(accept_mpp_keysend); + Reference.reachabilityFence(allow_skimmed_fees); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PendingHTLCInfoInboundHTLCErrZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PendingHTLCInfoInboundHTLCErrZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(msg); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by + * [`ChannelManager`]. + */ + public static InitFeatures provided_init_features(org.ldk.structs.UserConfig config) { + long ret = bindings.provided_init_features(config == null ? 0 : config.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(config); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.InitFeatures ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.InitFeatures(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Read a C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelManagerZ from a byte array, created by C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelManagerZ_write */ - public static Result_SecretKeyErrorZ derive_private_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] base_secret) { - long ret = bindings.derive_private_key(per_commitment_point, base_secret); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_SecretKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SecretKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + public static Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelManagerZ_read(byte[] ser, EntropySource arg_entropy_source, NodeSigner arg_node_signer, SignerProvider arg_signer_provider, FeeEstimator arg_fee_estimator, Watch arg_chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface arg_tx_broadcaster, Router arg_router, Logger arg_logger, UserConfig arg_default_config, ChannelMonitor[] arg_channel_monitors) { + long ret = bindings.C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelManagerZ_read(ser, bindings.ChannelManagerReadArgs_new(arg_entropy_source.ptr, arg_node_signer.ptr, arg_signer_provider.ptr, arg_fee_estimator.ptr, arg_chain_monitor.ptr, arg_tx_broadcaster.ptr, arg_router.ptr, arg_logger.ptr, arg_default_config == null ? 0 : arg_default_config.ptr, arg_channel_monitors != null ? Arrays.stream(arg_channel_monitors).mapToLong(arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 -> arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 == null ? 0 : arg_channel_monitors_conv_16.ptr).toArray() : null)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_entropy_source); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_node_signer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_signer_provider); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_fee_estimator); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_chain_monitor); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_tx_broadcaster); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_router); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_default_config); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_channel_monitors); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_entropy_source); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_node_signer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_signer_provider); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_fee_estimator); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_chain_monitor); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_tx_broadcaster); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_router); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_logger); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_default_config); }; + for (ChannelMonitor arg_channel_monitors_conv_16: arg_channel_monitors) { if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_channel_monitors_conv_16); }; }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** - * Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key) - * from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of - * derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys. + * Equivalent to [`crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment`], but no + * `ChannelManager` is required. Useful for generating invoices for [phantom node payments] without + * a `ChannelManager`. + * + * `keys` is generated by calling [`NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key_material`] and then + * calling [`ExpandedKey::new`] with its result. It is recommended to cache this value and not + * regenerate it for each new inbound payment. * - * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly - * generated (ie our own). + * `current_time` is a Unix timestamp representing the current time. + * + * Note that if `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable + * on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114. + * + * [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager + * [`NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key_material */ - public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ derive_public_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] base_point) { - long ret = bindings.derive_public_key(per_commitment_point, base_point); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + public static Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ create(org.ldk.structs.ExpandedKey keys, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.EntropySource entropy_source, long current_time, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) { + long ret = bindings.create(keys == null ? 0 : keys.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, entropy_source.ptr, current_time, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(entropy_source); + Reference.reachabilityFence(current_time); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(min_value_msat); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(entropy_source); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** - * Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts. + * Equivalent to [`crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash`], + * but no `ChannelManager` is required. Useful for generating invoices for [phantom node payments] + * without a `ChannelManager`. * - * Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked - * commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater - * and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster - * of the transaction spending with this key knowledge. + * See [`create`] for information on the `keys` and `current_time` parameters. * - * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly - * generated (ie our own). + * Note that if `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable + * on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114. + * + * [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager */ - public static Result_SecretKeyErrorZ derive_private_revocation_key(byte[] per_commitment_secret, byte[] countersignatory_revocation_base_secret) { - long ret = bindings.derive_private_revocation_key(per_commitment_secret, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_SecretKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SecretKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + public static Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ create_from_hash(org.ldk.structs.ExpandedKey keys, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z min_value_msat, byte[] payment_hash, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, long current_time, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) { + long ret = bindings.create_from_hash(keys == null ? 0 : keys.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), invoice_expiry_delta_secs, current_time, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(current_time); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(min_value_msat); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** - * Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is - * the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a - * public key instead of private keys. + * Parses an OnionV3 host and port into a [`SocketAddress::OnionV3`]. + * + * The host part must end with \".onion\". + */ + public static Result_SocketAddressSocketAddressParseErrorZ parse_onion_address(java.lang.String host, short port) { + long ret = bindings.parse_onion_address(host, port); + Reference.reachabilityFence(host); + Reference.reachabilityFence(port); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_SocketAddressSocketAddressParseErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SocketAddressSocketAddressParseErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction. + */ + public static long htlc_success_tx_weight(org.ldk.structs.ChannelTypeFeatures channel_type_features) { + long ret = bindings.htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features == null ? 0 : channel_type_features.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_type_features); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction. + */ + public static long htlc_timeout_tx_weight(org.ldk.structs.ChannelTypeFeatures channel_type_features) { + long ret = bindings.htlc_timeout_tx_weight(channel_type_features == null ? 0 : channel_type_features.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_type_features); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Check if a given input witness attempts to claim a HTLC. + */ + public static Option_HTLCClaimZ HTLCClaim_from_witness(byte[] witness) { + long ret = bindings.HTLCClaim_from_witness(witness); + Reference.reachabilityFence(witness); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.Option_HTLCClaimZ ret_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.Option_HTLCClaimZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number + */ + public static byte[] build_commitment_secret(byte[] commitment_seed, long idx) { + byte[] ret = bindings.build_commitment_secret(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(commitment_seed, 32), idx); + Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_seed); + Reference.reachabilityFence(idx); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Build a closing transaction + */ + public static byte[] build_closing_transaction(long to_holder_value_sat, long to_counterparty_value_sat, byte[] to_holder_script, byte[] to_counterparty_script, org.ldk.structs.OutPoint funding_outpoint) { + byte[] ret = bindings.build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat, to_holder_script, to_counterparty_script, funding_outpoint == null ? 0 : funding_outpoint.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(to_holder_value_sat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(to_counterparty_value_sat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(to_holder_script); + Reference.reachabilityFence(to_counterparty_script); + Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_outpoint); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key) + * from the base secret and the per_commitment_point. + */ + public static byte[] derive_private_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] base_secret) { + byte[] ret = bindings.derive_private_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(base_secret, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point); + Reference.reachabilityFence(base_secret); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts. * * Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked - * commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater - * and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster + * commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater + * and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster * of the transaction spending with this key knowledge. - * - * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly - * generated (ie our own). */ - public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ derive_public_revocation_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] countersignatory_revocation_base_point) { - long ret = bindings.derive_public_revocation_key(per_commitment_point, countersignatory_revocation_base_point); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); - return ret_hu_conv; + public static byte[] derive_private_revocation_key(byte[] per_commitment_secret, byte[] countersignatory_revocation_base_secret) { + byte[] ret = bindings.derive_private_revocation_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_secret, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory_revocation_base_secret, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_secret); + Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory_revocation_base_secret); + return ret; } /** @@ -153,8 +375,22 @@ public class UtilMethods { * key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain. * Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions. */ - public static byte[] get_revokeable_redeemscript(byte[] revocation_key, short contest_delay, byte[] broadcaster_delayed_payment_key) { - byte[] ret = bindings.get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key); + public static byte[] get_revokeable_redeemscript(org.ldk.structs.RevocationKey revocation_key, short contest_delay, org.ldk.structs.DelayedPaymentKey broadcaster_delayed_payment_key) { + byte[] ret = bindings.get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key == null ? 0 : revocation_key.ptr, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key == null ? 0 : broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(revocation_key); + Reference.reachabilityFence(contest_delay); + Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Returns the script for the counterparty's output on a holder's commitment transaction based on + * the channel type. + */ + public static byte[] get_counterparty_payment_script(org.ldk.structs.ChannelTypeFeatures channel_type_features, byte[] payment_key) { + byte[] ret = bindings.get_counterparty_payment_script(channel_type_features == null ? 0 : channel_type_features.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_key, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_type_features); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_key); return ret; } @@ -162,10 +398,11 @@ public class UtilMethods { * Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc * does not need to have its previous_output_index filled. */ - public static byte[] get_htlc_redeemscript(HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc, TxCreationKeys keys) { - byte[] ret = bindings.get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1, keys == null ? 0 : keys.ptr & ~1); - // this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); - // this.ptrs_to.add(keys); + public static byte[] get_htlc_redeemscript(org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc, org.ldk.structs.ChannelTypeFeatures channel_type_features, org.ldk.structs.TxCreationKeys keys) { + byte[] ret = bindings.get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr, channel_type_features == null ? 0 : channel_type_features.ptr, keys == null ? 0 : keys.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_type_features); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys); return ret; } @@ -174,7 +411,9 @@ public class UtilMethods { * Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter. */ public static byte[] make_funding_redeemscript(byte[] broadcaster, byte[] countersignatory) { - byte[] ret = bindings.make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster, countersignatory); + byte[] ret = bindings.make_funding_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster); + Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory); return ret; } @@ -187,9 +426,61 @@ public class UtilMethods { * Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the * commitment transaction). */ - public static byte[] build_htlc_transaction(byte[] commitment_txid, int feerate_per_kw, short contest_delay, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc, byte[] broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, byte[] revocation_key) { - byte[] ret = bindings.build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, contest_delay, htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, revocation_key); - // this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); + public static byte[] build_htlc_transaction(byte[] commitment_txid, int feerate_per_kw, short contest_delay, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc, org.ldk.structs.ChannelTypeFeatures channel_type_features, org.ldk.structs.DelayedPaymentKey broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, org.ldk.structs.RevocationKey revocation_key) { + byte[] ret = bindings.build_htlc_transaction(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(commitment_txid, 32), feerate_per_kw, contest_delay, htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr, channel_type_features == null ? 0 : channel_type_features.ptr, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key == null ? 0 : broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.ptr, revocation_key == null ? 0 : revocation_key.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_txid); + Reference.reachabilityFence(feerate_per_kw); + Reference.reachabilityFence(contest_delay); + Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_type_features); + Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key); + Reference.reachabilityFence(revocation_key); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend a HTLC input. + */ + public static byte[] build_htlc_input_witness(byte[] local_sig, byte[] remote_sig, org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ preimage, byte[] redeem_script, org.ldk.structs.ChannelTypeFeatures channel_type_features) { + byte[] ret = bindings.build_htlc_input_witness(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(local_sig, 64), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(remote_sig, 64), preimage.ptr, redeem_script, channel_type_features == null ? 0 : channel_type_features.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(local_sig); + Reference.reachabilityFence(remote_sig); + Reference.reachabilityFence(preimage); + Reference.reachabilityFence(redeem_script); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_type_features); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled. + */ + public static byte[] get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(byte[] payment_point) { + byte[] ret = bindings.get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_point, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_point); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key. + * The witness in the spending input must be: + * + * After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be: + * <> + * (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule) + */ + public static byte[] get_anchor_redeemscript(byte[] funding_pubkey) { + byte[] ret = bindings.get_anchor_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(funding_pubkey, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_pubkey); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend an anchor input. + */ + public static byte[] build_anchor_input_witness(byte[] funding_key, byte[] funding_sig) { + byte[] ret = bindings.build_anchor_input_witness(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(funding_key, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(funding_sig, 64)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_key); + Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_sig); return ret; } @@ -202,73 +493,472 @@ public class UtilMethods { * \"decrypt\" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain. */ public static long get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(byte[] broadcaster_payment_basepoint, byte[] countersignatory_payment_basepoint, boolean outbound_from_broadcaster) { - long ret = bindings.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(broadcaster_payment_basepoint, countersignatory_payment_basepoint, outbound_from_broadcaster); + long ret = bindings.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster_payment_basepoint, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory_payment_basepoint, 33), outbound_from_broadcaster); + Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_payment_basepoint); + Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory_payment_basepoint); + Reference.reachabilityFence(outbound_from_broadcaster); return ret; } /** - * Gets a keysend route from us (payer) to the given target node (payee). This is needed because - * keysend payments do not have an invoice from which to pull the payee's supported features, which - * makes it tricky to otherwise supply the `payee_features` parameter of `get_route`. + * Read a NetworkUpdate from a byte array, created by NetworkUpdate_write + */ + public static Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ NetworkUpdate_read(byte[] ser) { + long ret = bindings.NetworkUpdate_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`]. * - * Note that first_hops (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None + * Returns an error if it is invalid. */ - public static Result_RouteLightningErrorZ get_keysend_route(byte[] our_node_id, NetworkGraph network, byte[] payee, @Nullable ChannelDetails[] first_hops, RouteHint[] last_hops, long final_value_msat, int final_cltv, Logger logger) { - long ret = bindings.get_keysend_route(our_node_id, network == null ? 0 : network.ptr & ~1, payee, first_hops != null ? Arrays.stream(first_hops).mapToLong(first_hops_conv_16 -> first_hops_conv_16 == null ? 0 : first_hops_conv_16.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null, last_hops != null ? Arrays.stream(last_hops).mapToLong(last_hops_conv_11 -> last_hops_conv_11 == null ? 0 : last_hops_conv_11.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null, final_value_msat, final_cltv, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_RouteLightningErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_RouteLightningErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(network); - for (ChannelDetails first_hops_conv_16: first_hops) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(first_hops_conv_16); }; - for (RouteHint last_hops_conv_11: last_hops) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(last_hops_conv_11); }; - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); + public static Result_NoneLightningErrorZ verify_node_announcement(org.ldk.structs.NodeAnnouncement msg) { + long ret = bindings.verify_node_announcement(msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(msg); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_NoneLightningErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneLightningErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(msg); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`]. + * + * Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid. + */ + public static Result_NoneLightningErrorZ verify_channel_announcement(org.ldk.structs.ChannelAnnouncement msg) { + long ret = bindings.verify_channel_announcement(msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(msg); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_NoneLightningErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneLightningErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(msg); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** - * Gets a route from us (payer) to the given target node (payee). + * Finds a route from us (payer) to the given target node (payee). * - * If the payee provided features in their invoice, they should be provided via payee_features. + * If the payee provided features in their invoice, they should be provided via the `payee` field + * in the given [`RouteParameters::payment_params`]. * Without this, MPP will only be used if the payee's features are available in the network graph. * - * Private routing paths between a public node and the target may be included in `last_hops`. - * Currently, only the last hop in each path is considered. + * Private routing paths between a public node and the target may be included in the `payee` field + * of [`RouteParameters::payment_params`]. + * + * If some channels aren't announced, it may be useful to fill in `first_hops` with the results + * from [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]. If it is filled in, the view of these channels + * from `network_graph` will be ignored, and only those in `first_hops` will be used. + * + * The fees on channels from us to the next hop are ignored as they are assumed to all be equal. + * However, the enabled/disabled bit on such channels as well as the `htlc_minimum_msat` / + * `htlc_maximum_msat` *are* checked as they may change based on the receiving node. * - * If some channels aren't announced, it may be useful to fill in a first_hops with the - * results from a local ChannelManager::list_usable_channels() call. If it is filled in, our - * view of our local channels (from net_graph_msg_handler) will be ignored, and only those - * in first_hops will be used. + * # Panics * - * Panics if first_hops contains channels without short_channel_ids - * (ChannelManager::list_usable_channels will never include such channels). + * Panics if first_hops contains channels without `short_channel_id`s; + * [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`] will never include such channels. * - * The fees on channels from us to next-hops are ignored (as they are assumed to all be - * equal), however the enabled/disabled bit on such channels as well as the - * htlc_minimum_msat/htlc_maximum_msat *are* checked as they may change based on the receiving node. + * [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::list_usable_channels + * [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentPathFailed + * [`NetworkGraph`]: crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph * - * Note that payee_features (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None * Note that first_hops (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None */ - public static Result_RouteLightningErrorZ get_route(byte[] our_node_id, NetworkGraph network, byte[] payee, @Nullable InvoiceFeatures payee_features, @Nullable ChannelDetails[] first_hops, RouteHint[] last_hops, long final_value_msat, int final_cltv, Logger logger) { - long ret = bindings.get_route(our_node_id, network == null ? 0 : network.ptr & ~1, payee, payee_features == null ? 0 : payee_features.ptr & ~1, first_hops != null ? Arrays.stream(first_hops).mapToLong(first_hops_conv_16 -> first_hops_conv_16 == null ? 0 : first_hops_conv_16.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null, last_hops != null ? Arrays.stream(last_hops).mapToLong(last_hops_conv_11 -> last_hops_conv_11 == null ? 0 : last_hops_conv_11.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null, final_value_msat, final_cltv, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + public static Result_RouteLightningErrorZ find_route(byte[] our_node_pubkey, org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.NetworkGraph network_graph, @Nullable ChannelDetails[] first_hops, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.structs.ScoreLookUp scorer, org.ldk.structs.ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters score_params, byte[] random_seed_bytes) { + long ret = bindings.find_route(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(our_node_pubkey, 33), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, network_graph == null ? 0 : network_graph.ptr, first_hops != null ? Arrays.stream(first_hops).mapToLong(first_hops_conv_16 -> first_hops_conv_16 == null ? 0 : first_hops_conv_16.ptr).toArray() : null, logger.ptr, scorer.ptr, score_params == null ? 0 : score_params.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(random_seed_bytes, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(our_node_pubkey); + Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network_graph); + Reference.reachabilityFence(first_hops); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(scorer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(score_params); + Reference.reachabilityFence(random_seed_bytes); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_RouteLightningErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_RouteLightningErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(route_params); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(network_graph); }; + if (first_hops != null) { for (ChannelDetails first_hops_conv_16: first_hops) { if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(first_hops_conv_16); }; } }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(scorer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(score_params); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Construct a route from us (payer) to the target node (payee) via the given hops (which should + * exclude the payer, but include the payee). This may be useful, e.g., for probing the chosen path. + * + * Re-uses logic from `find_route`, so the restrictions described there also apply here. + */ + public static Result_RouteLightningErrorZ build_route_from_hops(byte[] our_node_pubkey, byte[][] hops, org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.NetworkGraph network_graph, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, byte[] random_seed_bytes) { + long ret = bindings.build_route_from_hops(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(our_node_pubkey, 33), hops != null ? Arrays.stream(hops).map(hops_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(hops_conv_8, 33)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, network_graph == null ? 0 : network_graph.ptr, logger.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(random_seed_bytes, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(our_node_pubkey); + Reference.reachabilityFence(hops); + Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network_graph); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(random_seed_bytes); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_RouteLightningErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_RouteLightningErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(network); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(payee_features); - for (ChannelDetails first_hops_conv_16: first_hops) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(first_hops_conv_16); }; - for (RouteHint last_hops_conv_11: last_hops) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(last_hops_conv_11); }; - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(route_params); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(network_graph); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Creates an unsigned [`PartiallySignedTransaction`] which spends the given descriptors to + * the given outputs, plus an output to the given change destination (if sufficient + * change value remains). The PSBT will have a feerate, at least, of the given value. + * + * The `locktime` argument is used to set the transaction's locktime. If `None`, the + * transaction will have a locktime of 0. It it recommended to set this to the current block + * height to avoid fee sniping, unless you have some specific reason to use a different + * locktime. + * + * Returns the PSBT and expected max transaction weight. + * + * Returns `Err(())` if the output value is greater than the input value minus required fee, + * if a descriptor was duplicated, or if an output descriptor `script_pubkey` + * does not match the one we can spend. + * + * We do not enforce that outputs meet the dust limit or that any output scripts are standard. + */ + public static Result_C2Tuple_CVec_u8Zu64ZNoneZ SpendableOutputDescriptor_create_spendable_outputs_psbt(SpendableOutputDescriptor[] descriptors, TxOut[] outputs, byte[] change_destination_script, int feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, org.ldk.structs.Option_u32Z locktime) { + long ret = bindings.SpendableOutputDescriptor_create_spendable_outputs_psbt(descriptors != null ? Arrays.stream(descriptors).mapToLong(descriptors_conv_27 -> descriptors_conv_27.ptr).toArray() : null, outputs != null ? Arrays.stream(outputs).mapToLong(outputs_conv_7 -> outputs_conv_7.ptr).toArray() : null, change_destination_script, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, locktime.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(descriptors); + Reference.reachabilityFence(outputs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(change_destination_script); + Reference.reachabilityFence(feerate_sat_per_1000_weight); + Reference.reachabilityFence(locktime); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_CVec_u8Zu64ZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_CVec_u8Zu64ZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + for (SpendableOutputDescriptor descriptors_conv_27: descriptors) { if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(descriptors_conv_27); }; }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(locktime); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Creates an [`OnionMessage`] with the given `contents` for sending to the destination of + * `path`. + * + * Returns the node id of the peer to send the message to, the message itself, and any addresses + * need to connect to the first node. + * + * Note that reply_path (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None + */ + public static Result_C3Tuple_PublicKeyOnionMessageCOption_CVec_SocketAddressZZZSendErrorZ create_onion_message(org.ldk.structs.EntropySource entropy_source, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.OnionMessagePath path, org.ldk.structs.OnionMessageContents contents, @Nullable org.ldk.structs.BlindedPath reply_path) { + long ret = bindings.create_onion_message(entropy_source.ptr, node_signer.ptr, path == null ? 0 : path.ptr, contents.ptr, reply_path == null ? 0 : reply_path.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(entropy_source); + Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(path); + Reference.reachabilityFence(contents); + Reference.reachabilityFence(reply_path); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C3Tuple_PublicKeyOnionMessageCOption_CVec_SocketAddressZZZSendErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C3Tuple_PublicKeyOnionMessageCOption_CVec_SocketAddressZZZSendErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(entropy_source); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(path); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(contents); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(reply_path); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Decode one layer of an incoming [`OnionMessage`]. + * + * Returns either the next layer of the onion for forwarding or the decrypted content for the + * receiver. + */ + public static Result_PeeledOnionNoneZ peel_onion_message(org.ldk.structs.OnionMessage msg, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.structs.CustomOnionMessageHandler custom_handler) { + long ret = bindings.peel_onion_message(msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr, node_signer.ptr, logger.ptr, custom_handler.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(msg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(custom_handler); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PeeledOnionNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PeeledOnionNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(msg); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(custom_handler); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Returns whether `tlv_type` corresponds to a TLV record for Offers. + */ + public static boolean OffersMessage_is_known_type(long tlv_type) { + boolean ret = bindings.OffersMessage_is_known_type(tlv_type); + Reference.reachabilityFence(tlv_type); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Create a one-hop blinded path for a payment. + */ + public static Result_C2Tuple_BlindedPayInfoBlindedPathZNoneZ BlindedPath_one_hop_for_payment(byte[] payee_node_id, org.ldk.structs.ReceiveTlvs payee_tlvs, org.ldk.structs.EntropySource entropy_source) { + long ret = bindings.BlindedPath_one_hop_for_payment(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payee_node_id, 33), payee_tlvs == null ? 0 : payee_tlvs.ptr, entropy_source.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payee_node_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payee_tlvs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(entropy_source); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_BlindedPayInfoBlindedPathZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_BlindedPayInfoBlindedPathZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(payee_tlvs); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(entropy_source); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** - * Writes the provided `ChannelManager` to the path provided at `FilesystemPersister` - * initialization, within a file called \"manager\". + * Create a blinded path for a payment, to be forwarded along `intermediate_nodes`. + * + * Errors if: + * a provided node id is invalid + * [`BlindedPayInfo`] calculation results in an integer overflow + * any unknown features are required in the provided [`ForwardTlvs`] + * + * [`ForwardTlvs`]: crate::blinded_path::payment::ForwardTlvs */ - public static Result_NoneErrorZ FilesystemPersister_persist_manager(java.lang.String data_dir, ChannelManager manager) { - long ret = bindings.FilesystemPersister_persist_manager(data_dir, manager == null ? 0 : manager.ptr & ~1); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_NoneErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(manager); + public static Result_C2Tuple_BlindedPayInfoBlindedPathZNoneZ BlindedPath_new_for_payment(ForwardNode[] intermediate_nodes, byte[] payee_node_id, org.ldk.structs.ReceiveTlvs payee_tlvs, long htlc_maximum_msat, org.ldk.structs.EntropySource entropy_source) { + long ret = bindings.BlindedPath_new_for_payment(intermediate_nodes != null ? Arrays.stream(intermediate_nodes).mapToLong(intermediate_nodes_conv_13 -> intermediate_nodes_conv_13 == null ? 0 : intermediate_nodes_conv_13.ptr).toArray() : null, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payee_node_id, 33), payee_tlvs == null ? 0 : payee_tlvs.ptr, htlc_maximum_msat, entropy_source.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(intermediate_nodes); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payee_node_id); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payee_tlvs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_maximum_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(entropy_source); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C2Tuple_BlindedPayInfoBlindedPathZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_BlindedPayInfoBlindedPathZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + for (ForwardNode intermediate_nodes_conv_13: intermediate_nodes) { if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(intermediate_nodes_conv_13); }; }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(payee_tlvs); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(entropy_source); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Read a PathFailure from a byte array, created by PathFailure_write + */ + public static Result_COption_PathFailureZDecodeErrorZ PathFailure_read(byte[] ser) { + long ret = bindings.PathFailure_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_COption_PathFailureZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_PathFailureZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Read a ClosureReason from a byte array, created by ClosureReason_write + */ + public static Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ ClosureReason_read(byte[] ser) { + long ret = bindings.ClosureReason_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Read a HTLCDestination from a byte array, created by HTLCDestination_write + */ + public static Result_COption_HTLCDestinationZDecodeErrorZ HTLCDestination_read(byte[] ser) { + long ret = bindings.HTLCDestination_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_COption_HTLCDestinationZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_HTLCDestinationZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Read a Event from a byte array, created by Event_write + */ + public static Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ Event_read(byte[] ser) { + long ret = bindings.Event_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Builds the necessary parameters to pay or pre-flight probe the given zero-amount + * [`Bolt11Invoice`] using [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] or + * [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`]. + * + * Prior to paying, you must ensure that the [`Bolt11Invoice::payment_hash`] is unique and the + * same [`PaymentHash`] has never been paid before. + * + * Will always succeed unless the invoice has an amount specified, in which case + * [`payment_parameters_from_invoice`] should be used. + * + * [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment + * [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes + */ + public static Result_C3Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesRecipientOnionFieldsRouteParametersZNoneZ payment_parameters_from_zero_amount_invoice(org.ldk.structs.Bolt11Invoice invoice, long amount_msat) { + long ret = bindings.payment_parameters_from_zero_amount_invoice(invoice == null ? 0 : invoice.ptr, amount_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amount_msat); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C3Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesRecipientOnionFieldsRouteParametersZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C3Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesRecipientOnionFieldsRouteParametersZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(invoice); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Builds the necessary parameters to pay or pre-flight probe the given [`Bolt11Invoice`] using + * [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] or [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`]. + * + * Prior to paying, you must ensure that the [`Bolt11Invoice::payment_hash`] is unique and the + * same [`PaymentHash`] has never been paid before. + * + * Will always succeed unless the invoice has no amount specified, in which case + * [`payment_parameters_from_zero_amount_invoice`] should be used. + * + * [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment + * [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes + */ + public static Result_C3Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesRecipientOnionFieldsRouteParametersZNoneZ payment_parameters_from_invoice(org.ldk.structs.Bolt11Invoice invoice) { + long ret = bindings.payment_parameters_from_invoice(invoice == null ? 0 : invoice.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_C3Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesRecipientOnionFieldsRouteParametersZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C3Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesRecipientOnionFieldsRouteParametersZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(invoice); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Utility to create an invoice that can be paid to one of multiple nodes, or a \"phantom invoice.\" + * See [`PhantomKeysManager`] for more information on phantom node payments. + * + * `phantom_route_hints` parameter: + * Contains channel info for all nodes participating in the phantom invoice + * Entries are retrieved from a call to [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints`] on each + * participating node + * It is fine to cache `phantom_route_hints` and reuse it across invoices, as long as the data is + * updated when a channel becomes disabled or closes + * Note that if too many channels are included in [`PhantomRouteHints::channels`], the invoice + * may be too long for QR code scanning. To fix this, `PhantomRouteHints::channels` may be pared + * down + * + * `payment_hash` can be specified if you have a specific need for a custom payment hash (see the difference + * between [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]). + * If `None` is provided for `payment_hash`, then one will be created. + * + * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for + * in excess of the current time. + * + * `duration_since_epoch` is the current time since epoch in seconds. + * + * You can specify a custom `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`, or let LDK default it to + * [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]. The provided expiry must be at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] - 3. + * Note that LDK will add a buffer of 3 blocks to the delta to allow for up to a few new block + * confirmations during routing. + * + * Note that the provided `keys_manager`'s `NodeSigner` implementation must support phantom + * invoices in its `sign_invoice` implementation ([`PhantomKeysManager`] satisfies this + * requirement). + * + * [`PhantomKeysManager`]: lightning::sign::PhantomKeysManager + * [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints + * [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment + * [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + * [`PhantomRouteHints::channels`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::PhantomRouteHints::channels + * [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DETLA`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA + * + * This can be used in a `no_std` environment, where [`std::time::SystemTime`] is not + * available and the current time is supplied by the caller. + */ + public static Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_phantom_invoice(org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z amt_msat, org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_hash, java.lang.String description, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, PhantomRouteHints[] phantom_route_hints, org.ldk.structs.EntropySource entropy_source, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta, long duration_since_epoch) { + long ret = bindings.create_phantom_invoice(amt_msat.ptr, payment_hash.ptr, description, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, phantom_route_hints != null ? Arrays.stream(phantom_route_hints).mapToLong(phantom_route_hints_conv_19 -> phantom_route_hints_conv_19 == null ? 0 : phantom_route_hints_conv_19.ptr).toArray() : null, entropy_source.ptr, node_signer.ptr, logger.ptr, network, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr, duration_since_epoch); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(phantom_route_hints); + Reference.reachabilityFence(entropy_source); + Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); + Reference.reachabilityFence(duration_since_epoch); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(amt_msat); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(payment_hash); }; + for (PhantomRouteHints phantom_route_hints_conv_19: phantom_route_hints) { if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(phantom_route_hints_conv_19); }; }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(entropy_source); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Utility to create an invoice that can be paid to one of multiple nodes, or a \"phantom invoice.\" + * See [`PhantomKeysManager`] for more information on phantom node payments. + * + * `phantom_route_hints` parameter: + * Contains channel info for all nodes participating in the phantom invoice + * Entries are retrieved from a call to [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints`] on each + * participating node + * It is fine to cache `phantom_route_hints` and reuse it across invoices, as long as the data is + * updated when a channel becomes disabled or closes + * Note that the route hints generated from `phantom_route_hints` will be limited to a maximum + * of 3 hints to ensure that the invoice can be scanned in a QR code. These hints are selected + * in the order that the nodes in `PhantomRouteHints` are specified, selecting one hint per node + * until the maximum is hit. Callers may provide as many `PhantomRouteHints::channels` as + * desired, but note that some nodes will be trimmed if more than 3 nodes are provided. + * + * `description_hash` is a SHA-256 hash of the description text + * + * `payment_hash` can be specified if you have a specific need for a custom payment hash (see the difference + * between [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]). + * If `None` is provided for `payment_hash`, then one will be created. + * + * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for + * in excess of the current time. + * + * `duration_since_epoch` is the current time since epoch in seconds. + * + * Note that the provided `keys_manager`'s `NodeSigner` implementation must support phantom + * invoices in its `sign_invoice` implementation ([`PhantomKeysManager`] satisfies this + * requirement). + * + * [`PhantomKeysManager`]: lightning::sign::PhantomKeysManager + * [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints + * [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment + * [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + * [`PhantomRouteHints::channels`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::PhantomRouteHints::channels + * + * This can be used in a `no_std` environment, where [`std::time::SystemTime`] is not + * available and the current time is supplied by the caller. + */ + public static Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_phantom_invoice_with_description_hash(org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z amt_msat, org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_hash, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.Sha256 description_hash, PhantomRouteHints[] phantom_route_hints, org.ldk.structs.EntropySource entropy_source, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta, long duration_since_epoch) { + long ret = bindings.create_phantom_invoice_with_description_hash(amt_msat.ptr, payment_hash.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, description_hash == null ? 0 : description_hash.ptr, phantom_route_hints != null ? Arrays.stream(phantom_route_hints).mapToLong(phantom_route_hints_conv_19 -> phantom_route_hints_conv_19 == null ? 0 : phantom_route_hints_conv_19.ptr).toArray() : null, entropy_source.ptr, node_signer.ptr, logger.ptr, network, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr, duration_since_epoch); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(phantom_route_hints); + Reference.reachabilityFence(entropy_source); + Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); + Reference.reachabilityFence(duration_since_epoch); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(amt_msat); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(payment_hash); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(description_hash); }; + for (PhantomRouteHints phantom_route_hints_conv_19: phantom_route_hints) { if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(phantom_route_hints_conv_19); }; }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(entropy_source); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -278,13 +968,154 @@ public class UtilMethods { * method stores the invoice's payment secret and preimage in `ChannelManager`, so (a) the user * doesn't have to store preimage/payment secret information and (b) `ChannelManager` can verify * that the payment secret is valid when the invoice is paid. + * + * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for + * in excess of the current time. + * + * You can specify a custom `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`, or let LDK default it to + * [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]. The provided expiry must be at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]. + * Note that LDK will add a buffer of 3 blocks to the delta to allow for up to a few new block + * confirmations during routing. + * + * [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DETLA`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA + */ + public static Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager(org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager channelmanager, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z amt_msat, java.lang.String description, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) { + long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr, node_signer.ptr, logger.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(amt_msat); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Utility to construct an invoice. Generally, unless you want to do something like a custom + * cltv_expiry, this is what you should be using to create an invoice. The reason being, this + * method stores the invoice's payment secret and preimage in `ChannelManager`, so (a) the user + * doesn't have to store preimage/payment secret information and (b) `ChannelManager` can verify + * that the payment secret is valid when the invoice is paid. + * Use this variant if you want to pass the `description_hash` to the invoice. + * + * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for + * in excess of the current time. + * + * You can specify a custom `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`, or let LDK default it to + * [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]. The provided expiry must be at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]. + * Note that LDK will add a buffer of 3 blocks to the delta to allow for up to a few new block + * confirmations during routing. + * + * [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DETLA`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA + */ + public static Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash(org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager channelmanager, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z amt_msat, org.ldk.structs.Sha256 description_hash, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) { + long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr, node_signer.ptr, logger.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description_hash == null ? 0 : description_hash.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(amt_msat); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(description_hash); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * See [`create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash`] + * This version can be used in a `no_std` environment, where [`std::time::SystemTime`] is not + * available and the current time is supplied by the caller. + */ + public static Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash_and_duration_since_epoch(org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager channelmanager, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z amt_msat, org.ldk.structs.Sha256 description_hash, long duration_since_epoch, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) { + long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash_and_duration_since_epoch(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr, node_signer.ptr, logger.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description_hash == null ? 0 : description_hash.ptr, duration_since_epoch, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(duration_since_epoch); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(amt_msat); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(description_hash); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * See [`create_invoice_from_channelmanager`] + * This version can be used in a `no_std` environment, where [`std::time::SystemTime`] is not + * available and the current time is supplied by the caller. + */ + public static Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager channelmanager, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z amt_msat, java.lang.String description, long duration_since_epoch, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) { + long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr, node_signer.ptr, logger.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description, duration_since_epoch, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description); + Reference.reachabilityFence(duration_since_epoch); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(amt_msat); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * See [`create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch`] + * This version allows for providing a custom [`PaymentHash`] for the invoice. + * This may be useful if you're building an on-chain swap or involving another protocol where + * the payment hash is also involved outside the scope of lightning. */ - public static Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager(ChannelManager channelmanager, KeysInterface keys_manager, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, Option_u64Z amt_msat, java.lang.String description) { - long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr & ~1, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager); + public static Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch_with_payment_hash(org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager channelmanager, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z amt_msat, java.lang.String description, long duration_since_epoch, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) { + long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch_with_payment_hash(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr, node_signer.ptr, logger.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description, duration_since_epoch, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description); + Reference.reachabilityFence(duration_since_epoch); + Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_Bolt11InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(amt_msat); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); }; return ret_hu_conv; }