X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FUtilMethods.java;h=7c53034ab6b3f49978075c0c580af1c7be17b7cf;hb=ff3dacec3be60f870d81f6df11bd9fff92aa6047;hp=2d80e29bf190198f307edec583235b615d378ee7;hpb=1b870a3ffab1c0024411e30102bc6d198300f095;p=ldk-java diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UtilMethods.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UtilMethods.java index 2d80e29b..7c53034a 100644 --- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UtilMethods.java +++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UtilMethods.java @@ -1,13 +1,117 @@ package org.ldk.structs; import org.ldk.impl.bindings; +import org.ldk.enums.*; +import org.ldk.util.*; import java.util.Arrays; +import java.lang.ref.Reference; +import javax.annotation.Nullable; public class UtilMethods { + /** + * Constructs a new COption_NoneZ containing a + */ + public static COption_NoneZ COption_NoneZ_some() { + COption_NoneZ ret = bindings.COption_NoneZ_some(); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Constructs a new COption_NoneZ containing nothing + */ + public static COption_NoneZ COption_NoneZ_none() { + COption_NoneZ ret = bindings.COption_NoneZ_none(); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Read a ClosureReason from a byte array, created by ClosureReason_write + */ + public static Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ ClosureReason_read(byte[] ser) { + long ret = bindings.ClosureReason_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Read a Event from a byte array, created by Event_write + */ + public static Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ Event_read(byte[] ser) { + long ret = bindings.Event_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Creates a digital signature of a message given a SecretKey, like the node's secret. + * A receiver knowing the PublicKey (e.g. the node's id) and the message can be sure that the signature was generated by the caller. + * Signatures are EC recoverable, meaning that given the message and the signature the PublicKey of the signer can be extracted. + */ + public static Result_StringErrorZ sign(byte[] msg, byte[] sk) { + long ret = bindings.sign(msg, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(sk, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(msg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(sk); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_StringErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_StringErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Recovers the PublicKey of the signer of the message given the message and the signature. + */ + public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ recover_pk(byte[] msg, java.lang.String sig) { + long ret = bindings.recover_pk(msg, sig); + Reference.reachabilityFence(msg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(sig); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Verifies a message was signed by a PrivateKey that derives to a given PublicKey, given a message, a signature, + * and the PublicKey. + */ + public static boolean verify(byte[] msg, java.lang.String sig, byte[] pk) { + boolean ret = bindings.verify(msg, sig, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(pk, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(msg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(sig); + Reference.reachabilityFence(pk); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Construct the invoice's HRP and signatureless data into a preimage to be hashed. + */ + public static byte[] construct_invoice_preimage(byte[] hrp_bytes, UInt5[] data_without_signature) { + byte[] ret = bindings.construct_invoice_preimage(hrp_bytes, data_without_signature != null ? InternalUtils.convUInt5Array(data_without_signature) : null); + Reference.reachabilityFence(hrp_bytes); + Reference.reachabilityFence(data_without_signature); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Read a MonitorEvent from a byte array, created by MonitorEvent_write + */ + public static Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ MonitorEvent_read(byte[] ser) { + long ret = bindings.MonitorEvent_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + /** * Read a C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ from a byte array, created by C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_write */ - public static Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ constructor_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_read(byte[] ser, KeysInterface arg) { + public static Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_read(byte[] ser, KeysInterface arg) { long ret = bindings.C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_read(ser, arg == null ? 0 : arg.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg); return ret_hu_conv; @@ -16,16 +120,485 @@ public class UtilMethods { /** * Read a C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ from a byte array, created by C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_write */ - public static Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ constructor_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_read(byte[] ser, KeysInterface arg_keys_manager, FeeEstimator arg_fee_estimator, Watch arg_chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface arg_tx_broadcaster, Logger arg_logger, UserConfig arg_default_config, ChannelMonitor[] arg_channel_monitors) { - long ret = bindings.C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_read(ser, bindings.ChannelManagerReadArgs_new(arg_keys_manager == null ? 0 : arg_keys_manager.ptr, arg_fee_estimator == null ? 0 : arg_fee_estimator.ptr, arg_chain_monitor == null ? 0 : arg_chain_monitor.ptr, arg_tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : arg_tx_broadcaster.ptr, arg_logger == null ? 0 : arg_logger.ptr, arg_default_config == null ? 0 : arg_default_config.ptr & ~1, Arrays.stream(arg_channel_monitors).mapToLong(arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 -> arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 == null ? 0 : arg_channel_monitors_conv_16.ptr & ~1).toArray())); + public static Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_read(byte[] ser, KeysInterface arg_keys_manager, FeeEstimator arg_fee_estimator, Watch arg_chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface arg_tx_broadcaster, Logger arg_logger, UserConfig arg_default_config, ChannelMonitor[] arg_channel_monitors) { + long ret = bindings.C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_read(ser, bindings.ChannelManagerReadArgs_new(arg_keys_manager == null ? 0 : arg_keys_manager.ptr, arg_fee_estimator == null ? 0 : arg_fee_estimator.ptr, arg_chain_monitor == null ? 0 : arg_chain_monitor.ptr, arg_tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : arg_tx_broadcaster.ptr, arg_logger == null ? 0 : arg_logger.ptr, arg_default_config == null ? 0 : arg_default_config.ptr & ~1, arg_channel_monitors != null ? Arrays.stream(arg_channel_monitors).mapToLong(arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 -> arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 == null ? 0 : arg_channel_monitors_conv_16.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_keys_manager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_fee_estimator); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_chain_monitor); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_tx_broadcaster); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_default_config); + Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_channel_monitors); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_keys_manager); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_fee_estimator); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_chain_monitor); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_tx_broadcaster); ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_logger); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_default_config); - /* TODO 2 ChannelMonitor */; + ; + for (ChannelMonitor arg_channel_monitors_conv_16: arg_channel_monitors) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_channel_monitors_conv_16); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction. + */ + public static long htlc_success_tx_weight(boolean opt_anchors) { + long ret = bindings.htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors); + Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction. + */ + public static long htlc_timeout_tx_weight(boolean opt_anchors) { + long ret = bindings.htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors); + Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number + */ + public static byte[] build_commitment_secret(byte[] commitment_seed, long idx) { + byte[] ret = bindings.build_commitment_secret(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(commitment_seed, 32), idx); + Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_seed); + Reference.reachabilityFence(idx); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Build a closing transaction + */ + public static byte[] build_closing_transaction(long to_holder_value_sat, long to_counterparty_value_sat, byte[] to_holder_script, byte[] to_counterparty_script, OutPoint funding_outpoint) { + byte[] ret = bindings.build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat, to_holder_script, to_counterparty_script, funding_outpoint == null ? 0 : funding_outpoint.ptr & ~1); + Reference.reachabilityFence(to_holder_value_sat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(to_counterparty_value_sat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(to_holder_script); + Reference.reachabilityFence(to_counterparty_script); + Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_outpoint); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key) + * from the base secret and the per_commitment_point. + * + * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly + * generated (ie our own). + */ + public static Result_SecretKeyErrorZ derive_private_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] base_secret) { + long ret = bindings.derive_private_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(base_secret, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point); + Reference.reachabilityFence(base_secret); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_SecretKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SecretKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key) + * from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of + * derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys. + * + * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly + * generated (ie our own). + */ + public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ derive_public_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] base_point) { + long ret = bindings.derive_public_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(base_point, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point); + Reference.reachabilityFence(base_point); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts. + * + * Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked + * commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater + * and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster + * of the transaction spending with this key knowledge. + * + * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly + * generated (ie our own). + */ + public static Result_SecretKeyErrorZ derive_private_revocation_key(byte[] per_commitment_secret, byte[] countersignatory_revocation_base_secret) { + long ret = bindings.derive_private_revocation_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_secret, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory_revocation_base_secret, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_secret); + Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory_revocation_base_secret); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_SecretKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SecretKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is + * the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a + * public key instead of private keys. + * + * Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked + * commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater + * and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster + * of the transaction spending with this key knowledge. + * + * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly + * generated (ie our own). + */ + public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ derive_public_revocation_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] countersignatory_revocation_base_point) { + long ret = bindings.derive_public_revocation_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory_revocation_base_point, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point); + Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory_revocation_base_point); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * A script either spendable by the revocation + * key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain. + * Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions. + */ + public static byte[] get_revokeable_redeemscript(byte[] revocation_key, short contest_delay, byte[] broadcaster_delayed_payment_key) { + byte[] ret = bindings.get_revokeable_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(revocation_key, 33), contest_delay, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(revocation_key); + Reference.reachabilityFence(contest_delay); + Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc + * does not need to have its previous_output_index filled. + */ + public static byte[] get_htlc_redeemscript(HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc, boolean opt_anchors, TxCreationKeys keys) { + byte[] ret = bindings.get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1, opt_anchors, keys == null ? 0 : keys.ptr & ~1); + Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc); + Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys. + * Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter. + */ + public static byte[] make_funding_redeemscript(byte[] broadcaster, byte[] countersignatory) { + byte[] ret = bindings.make_funding_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster); + Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC + * parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the + * transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is + * broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature. + * + * Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the + * commitment transaction). + */ + public static byte[] build_htlc_transaction(byte[] commitment_txid, int feerate_per_kw, short contest_delay, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc, boolean opt_anchors, byte[] broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, byte[] revocation_key) { + byte[] ret = bindings.build_htlc_transaction(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(commitment_txid, 32), feerate_per_kw, contest_delay, htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1, opt_anchors, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(revocation_key, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_txid); + Reference.reachabilityFence(feerate_per_kw); + Reference.reachabilityFence(contest_delay); + Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc); + Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors); + Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key); + Reference.reachabilityFence(revocation_key); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key. + * The witness in the spending input must be: + * + * After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be: + * <> + * (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule) + */ + public static byte[] get_anchor_redeemscript(byte[] funding_pubkey) { + byte[] ret = bindings.get_anchor_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(funding_pubkey, 33)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_pubkey); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a + * shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment + * transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed. + * + * This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to + * \"decrypt\" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain. + */ + public static long get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(byte[] broadcaster_payment_basepoint, byte[] countersignatory_payment_basepoint, boolean outbound_from_broadcaster) { + long ret = bindings.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster_payment_basepoint, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory_payment_basepoint, 33), outbound_from_broadcaster); + Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_payment_basepoint); + Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory_payment_basepoint); + Reference.reachabilityFence(outbound_from_broadcaster); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Read a NetworkUpdate from a byte array, created by NetworkUpdate_write + */ + public static Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ NetworkUpdate_read(byte[] ser) { + long ret = bindings.NetworkUpdate_read(ser); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Finds a route from us (payer) to the given target node (payee). + * + * If the payee provided features in their invoice, they should be provided via `params.payee`. + * Without this, MPP will only be used if the payee's features are available in the network graph. + * + * Private routing paths between a public node and the target may be included in `params.payee`. + * + * If some channels aren't announced, it may be useful to fill in `first_hops` with the results + * from [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]. If it is filled in, the view of our local + * channels from [`NetworkGraph`] will be ignored, and only those in `first_hops` will be used. + * + * The fees on channels from us to the next hop are ignored as they are assumed to all be equal. + * However, the enabled/disabled bit on such channels as well as the `htlc_minimum_msat` / + * `htlc_maximum_msat` *are* checked as they may change based on the receiving node. + * + * # Note + * + * May be used to re-compute a [`Route`] when handling a [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`]. Any + * adjustments to the [`NetworkGraph`] and channel scores should be made prior to calling this + * function. + * + * # Panics + * + * Panics if first_hops contains channels without short_channel_ids; + * [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`] will never include such channels. + * + * [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::list_usable_channels + * [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentPathFailed + * + * Note that first_hops (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None + */ + public static Result_RouteLightningErrorZ find_route(byte[] our_node_pubkey, RouteParameters route_params, NetworkGraph network, @Nullable ChannelDetails[] first_hops, Logger logger, Score scorer, byte[] random_seed_bytes) { + long ret = bindings.find_route(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(our_node_pubkey, 33), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr & ~1, network == null ? 0 : network.ptr & ~1, first_hops != null ? Arrays.stream(first_hops).mapToLong(first_hops_conv_16 -> first_hops_conv_16 == null ? 0 : first_hops_conv_16.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, scorer == null ? 0 : scorer.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(random_seed_bytes, 32)); + Reference.reachabilityFence(our_node_pubkey); + Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(first_hops); + Reference.reachabilityFence(logger); + Reference.reachabilityFence(scorer); + Reference.reachabilityFence(random_seed_bytes); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_RouteLightningErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_RouteLightningErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(route_params); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(network); + for (ChannelDetails first_hops_conv_16: first_hops) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(first_hops_conv_16); }; + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(scorer); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Writes the provided `ChannelManager` to the path provided at `FilesystemPersister` + * initialization, within a file called \"manager\". + */ + public static Result_NoneErrorZ FilesystemPersister_persist_manager(java.lang.String data_dir, ChannelManager manager) { + long ret = bindings.FilesystemPersister_persist_manager(data_dir, manager == null ? 0 : manager.ptr & ~1); + Reference.reachabilityFence(data_dir); + Reference.reachabilityFence(manager); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_NoneErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(manager); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Write the provided `NetworkGraph` to the path provided at `FilesystemPersister` + * initialization, within a file called \"network_graph\" + */ + public static Result_NoneErrorZ FilesystemPersister_persist_network_graph(java.lang.String data_dir, NetworkGraph network_graph) { + long ret = bindings.FilesystemPersister_persist_network_graph(data_dir, network_graph == null ? 0 : network_graph.ptr & ~1); + Reference.reachabilityFence(data_dir); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network_graph); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_NoneErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(network_graph); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Utility to create an invoice that can be paid to one of multiple nodes, or a \"phantom invoice.\" + * See [`PhantomKeysManager`] for more information on phantom node payments. + * + * `phantom_route_hints` parameter: + * Contains channel info for all nodes participating in the phantom invoice + * Entries are retrieved from a call to [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints`] on each + * participating node + * It is fine to cache `phantom_route_hints` and reuse it across invoices, as long as the data is + * updated when a channel becomes disabled or closes + * Note that if too many channels are included in [`PhantomRouteHints::channels`], the invoice + * may be too long for QR code scanning. To fix this, `PhantomRouteHints::channels` may be pared + * down + * + * `payment_hash` and `payment_secret` come from [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment`] or + * [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. These values can be retrieved from any + * participating node. + * + * Note that the provided `keys_manager`'s `KeysInterface` implementation must support phantom + * invoices in its `sign_invoice` implementation ([`PhantomKeysManager`] satisfies this + * requirement). + * + * [`PhantomKeysManager`]: lightning::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager + * [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints + * [`PhantomRouteHints::channels`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::PhantomRouteHints::channels + */ + public static Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_phantom_invoice(Option_u64Z amt_msat, java.lang.String description, byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret, PhantomRouteHints[] phantom_route_hints, KeysInterface keys_manager, org.ldk.enums.Currency network) { + long ret = bindings.create_phantom_invoice(amt_msat.ptr, description, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32), phantom_route_hints != null ? Arrays.stream(phantom_route_hints).mapToLong(phantom_route_hints_conv_19 -> phantom_route_hints_conv_19 == null ? 0 : phantom_route_hints_conv_19.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret); + Reference.reachabilityFence(phantom_route_hints); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Utility to create an invoice that can be paid to one of multiple nodes, or a \"phantom invoice.\" + * See [`PhantomKeysManager`] for more information on phantom node payments. + * + * `phantom_route_hints` parameter: + * Contains channel info for all nodes participating in the phantom invoice + * Entries are retrieved from a call to [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints`] on each + * participating node + * It is fine to cache `phantom_route_hints` and reuse it across invoices, as long as the data is + * updated when a channel becomes disabled or closes + * Note that if too many channels are included in [`PhantomRouteHints::channels`], the invoice + * may be too long for QR code scanning. To fix this, `PhantomRouteHints::channels` may be pared + * down + * + * `description_hash` is a SHA-256 hash of the description text + * + * `payment_hash` and `payment_secret` come from [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment`] or + * [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. These values can be retrieved from any + * participating node. + * + * Note that the provided `keys_manager`'s `KeysInterface` implementation must support phantom + * invoices in its `sign_invoice` implementation ([`PhantomKeysManager`] satisfies this + * requirement). + * + * [`PhantomKeysManager`]: lightning::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager + * [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints + * [`PhantomRouteHints::channels`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::PhantomRouteHints::channels + */ + public static Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_phantom_invoice_with_description_hash(Option_u64Z amt_msat, Sha256 description_hash, byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret, PhantomRouteHints[] phantom_route_hints, KeysInterface keys_manager, org.ldk.enums.Currency network) { + long ret = bindings.create_phantom_invoice_with_description_hash(amt_msat.ptr, description_hash == null ? 0 : description_hash.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32), phantom_route_hints != null ? Arrays.stream(phantom_route_hints).mapToLong(phantom_route_hints_conv_19 -> phantom_route_hints_conv_19 == null ? 0 : phantom_route_hints_conv_19.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret); + Reference.reachabilityFence(phantom_route_hints); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Utility to construct an invoice. Generally, unless you want to do something like a custom + * cltv_expiry, this is what you should be using to create an invoice. The reason being, this + * method stores the invoice's payment secret and preimage in `ChannelManager`, so (a) the user + * doesn't have to store preimage/payment secret information and (b) `ChannelManager` can verify + * that the payment secret is valid when the invoice is paid. + */ + public static Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager(ChannelManager channelmanager, KeysInterface keys_manager, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, Option_u64Z amt_msat, java.lang.String description) { + long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr & ~1, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Utility to construct an invoice. Generally, unless you want to do something like a custom + * cltv_expiry, this is what you should be using to create an invoice. The reason being, this + * method stores the invoice's payment secret and preimage in `ChannelManager`, so (a) the user + * doesn't have to store preimage/payment secret information and (b) `ChannelManager` can verify + * that the payment secret is valid when the invoice is paid. + * Use this variant if you want to pass the `description_hash` to the invoice. + */ + public static Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash(ChannelManager channelmanager, KeysInterface keys_manager, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, Option_u64Z amt_msat, Sha256 description_hash) { + long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr & ~1, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description_hash == null ? 0 : description_hash.ptr & ~1); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description_hash); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * See [`create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash`] + * This version can be used in a `no_std` environment, where [`std::time::SystemTime`] is not + * available and the current time is supplied by the caller. + */ + public static Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash_and_duration_since_epoch(ChannelManager channelmanager, KeysInterface keys_manager, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, Option_u64Z amt_msat, Sha256 description_hash, long duration_since_epoch) { + long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash_and_duration_since_epoch(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr & ~1, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description_hash == null ? 0 : description_hash.ptr & ~1, duration_since_epoch); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description_hash); + Reference.reachabilityFence(duration_since_epoch); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager); + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * See [`create_invoice_from_channelmanager`] + * This version can be used in a `no_std` environment, where [`std::time::SystemTime`] is not + * available and the current time is supplied by the caller. + */ + public static Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(ChannelManager channelmanager, KeysInterface keys_manager, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, Option_u64Z amt_msat, java.lang.String description, long duration_since_epoch) { + long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr & ~1, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description, duration_since_epoch); + Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager); + Reference.reachabilityFence(network); + Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat); + Reference.reachabilityFence(description); + Reference.reachabilityFence(duration_since_epoch); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager); + ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager); return ret_hu_conv; }