fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>,
}
-macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
- ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
- HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: $offered,
- amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
- cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
- payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
- transaction_output_index: 0
- }
- }
-}
-
/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
AddHTLC {
/// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
/// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
/// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
+ /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
+ /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
+ /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
+ /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
#[inline]
- fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
+ fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
let txins = {
};
let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
- let mut unincluded_htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)> = Vec::new();
+ let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
+ macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
+ ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
+ HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered: $offered,
+ amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
+ cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
+ transaction_output_index: None
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr) => {
if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
+ let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
- let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
txouts.push((TxOut {
script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
}, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
} else {
- if let Some(source) = $source {
- unincluded_htlc_sources.push(($htlc.payment_hash, source, None));
- }
+ included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
}
} else {
+ let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
- let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
}, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
} else {
- if let Some(source) = $source {
- unincluded_htlc_sources.push(($htlc.payment_hash, source, None));
- }
+ included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
}
}
}
transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
- let mut htlcs_included: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
- let mut htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + unincluded_htlc_sources.len());
- for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
+ let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
+ for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
outputs.push(out.0);
- if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1 {
- htlc.transaction_output_index = idx as u32;
- if let Some(source) = source_option {
- htlc_sources.push((htlc.payment_hash, source, Some(idx as u32)));
- }
- htlcs_included.push(htlc);
+ if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
+ htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
+ htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
}
}
- htlc_sources.append(&mut unincluded_htlc_sources);
+ let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
+ htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
(Transaction {
version: 2,
lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
input: txins,
output: outputs,
- }, htlcs_included, htlc_sources)
+ }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
}
#[inline]
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx.clone()];
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
let mut local_commitment_tx = {
let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
- let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc_source| (htlc_source.0, htlc_source.1.clone(), htlc_source.2)).collect();
+ let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
(commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
};
let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
//If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
if update_fee {
- let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1.len();
+ let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
}
}
- if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
+ if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
}
- let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len() + 1);
+ let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1 + 1);
self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
- let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len());
- for (idx, htlc) in local_commitment_tx.1.drain(..).enumerate() {
- let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
- let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
- let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
- let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, &htlc, &local_keys)?;
- new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
- htlc_sig
+ let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
+ for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
+ if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
+ let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
+ let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
+ let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, &htlc, &local_keys)?;
+ new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
+ htlc_sig
+ } else {
+ self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, &htlc, &local_keys)?.1
+ };
+ htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some((msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig)), source));
} else {
- self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, &htlc, &local_keys)?.1
- };
- htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
+ htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
+ }
}
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
self.monitor_pending_order = None;
}
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs, local_commitment_tx.2);
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
}
}
- let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
- Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, mut htlc_sources))) => {
+ let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
+ Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
- let htlc_sources_no_ref = htlc_sources.drain(..).map(|htlc_source| (htlc_source.0, htlc_source.1.clone(), htlc_source.2)).collect();
- (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources_no_ref)
+ let htlcs_no_ref = htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
+ (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
},
Err(e) => return Err(e),
};
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
}
/// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
/// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
- fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)), ChannelError> {
+ fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
- let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
-
- for ref htlc in remote_commitment_tx.1.iter() {
- let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
- let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
- let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
- htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
+ let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.1);
+ for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
+ if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
+ let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
+ let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
+ htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
+ }
}
Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
signature: our_sig,
htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
- }, remote_commitment_tx))
+ }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
}
/// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
macro_rules! test_commitment {
( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
unsigned_tx = {
- let res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
- (res.0, res.1)
+ let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
+ .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
+ .collect();
+ (res.0, htlcs)
};
let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
feerate_per_kw: u64,
- htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
- htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>,
+ htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
- remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)>,
+ remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
// TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap().1 = Vec::new();
+ for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
+ *source = None;
+ }
}
}
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
// timeouts)
- for ref htlc in &htlc_outputs {
+ for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
}
*prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
*current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
}
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, (htlc_outputs, htlc_sources));
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
//TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
/// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
/// case of onchain HTLC tx
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
feerate_per_kw,
htlc_outputs,
- htlc_sources,
});
if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
+ macro_rules! write_option {
+ ($thing: expr) => {
+ match $thing {
+ &Some(ref t) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ t.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, current_remote_commitment_txid, prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
},
}
- if let Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
+ write_option!(current_remote_commitment_txid);
+ write_option!(prev_remote_commitment_txid);
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
+ write_option!(&$htlc_output.transaction_output_index);
}
}
- macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source {
- ($htlc_source: expr) => {
- $htlc_source.0.write(writer)?;
- $htlc_source.1.write(writer)?;
- if let &Some(ref txo) = &$htlc_source.2 {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- txo.write(writer)?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
- }
- }
-
-
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, &(ref htlc_infos, ref htlc_sources)) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
- for ref htlc_output in htlc_infos.iter() {
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- }
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
- for ref htlc_source in htlc_sources.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
+ write_option!(htlc_source);
}
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
- writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
- }
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
- for ref htlc_source in $local_tx.htlc_sources.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
+ if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
+ writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
+ } else {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ write_option!(htlc_source);
}
}
}
let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
};
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
}
}
- if let Some(&(ref per_commitment_data, _)) = per_commitment_option {
+ if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
- for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
- values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
- total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
- }),
+ for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
};
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ inputs.push(input);
+ htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
+ values.push(tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value);
+ total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+ } else {
+ let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
+ }),
+ };
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ }
}
}
}
// on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
- if let Some(&(_, ref outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in outpoints.iter() {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
- htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
+ if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
+ for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
+ htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
+ }
}
}
}
// on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
- if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
- $id: for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
- // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
- // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
- // payment_preimage.
- // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
- // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
- // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
- // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
- // need to here.
- for &(_, ref broadcast_source, ref output_idx) in per_commitment_data.1.iter() {
- if output_idx.is_some() && source == broadcast_source {
- continue $id;
+ if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
+ $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
+ // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
+ // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
+ // payment_preimage.
+ // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
+ // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
+ // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
+ // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
+ // need to here.
+ for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
+ if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
+ continue $id;
+ }
}
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
+ htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
}
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
- htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
}
}
}
{
let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$input.sequence as usize];
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
}
}
- for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.0.iter().enumerate() {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
- total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ inputs.push(input);
+ values.push((tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
+ total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+ } else {
+ let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
+ }),
+ };
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ if !htlc.offered {
+ // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
+ // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: idx as u32,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
+ lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
input: vec![input],
output: vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
}),
};
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
}
}
- if !htlc.offered {
- // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
- // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
- txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
- }
}
if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
}
}
- for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if htlc.offered {
- let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
+ if htlc.offered {
+ log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
+ let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
- add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
- res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
- } else {
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
+ res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
+ } else {
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
+ let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
- add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
- res.push(htlc_success_tx);
- }
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
+ res.push(htlc_success_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
+ } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
}
- watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
}
(res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
// weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s).
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
}
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
}
pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
- // TODO: We need to consider HTLCs which weren't included in latest local commitment
- // transaction (or in any of the latest two local commitment transactions). This probably
- // needs to use the same logic as the revoked-tx-announe logic - checking the last two
- // remote commitment transactions. This probably has implications for what data we need to
- // store in local commitment transactions.
- // TODO: We need to consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
+ // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
+ // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
+ // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
+ // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
+ // broadcast if we go on-chain.
+ // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
// strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
// to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
// updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
// easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
+ macro_rules! scan_commitment {
+ ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
+ for ref htlc in $htlcs {
+ // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
+ // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
+ // time out the HTLC first.
+ // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
+ // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
+ // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
+ // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
+ // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
+ // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
+ // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
+ // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
+ // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
+ // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
+ // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
+ // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
+ // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
+ // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
+ // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+ // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
+ // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
+ let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
+ if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
+ (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
+ log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
- // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
- // time out the HTLC first.
- // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
- // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
- // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
- // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
- // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
- // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
- // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
- // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
- // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
- // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
- // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
- // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
- // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
- // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
- if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
- (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
- return true;
+ scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
+ }
+
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
+ }
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
}
}
}
+
false
}
let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
macro_rules! log_claim {
- ($source: expr, $local_tx: expr, $outbound_htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
+ ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
// We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
// as we have no corresponding source. This implies either it is an
// inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
+ let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
- ($outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
+ (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
- $source, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if $outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($payment_hash.0),
+ $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
} else {
log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
- $source, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if $outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($payment_hash.0),
+ $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
}
}
}
macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr, $source: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, ref vout) in $htlc_sources.iter() {
- if &Some(input.previous_output.vout) == vout {
- log_claim!($source, $local_tx, true, payment_hash, true);
- // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
- // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
- // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
- // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
- // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
- payment_data = Some((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
- }
- }
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs {
- if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
- log_claim!($source, $local_tx, $local_tx == htlc_output.offered, htlc_output.payment_hash, false);
+ ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
+ for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
+ if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
+ // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
+ // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
+ // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
+ // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
+ // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
+ payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
+ } else {
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
continue 'outer_loop;
}
}
if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a),
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources,
+ scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
"our latest local commitment tx", true);
}
}
if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a),
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources,
+ scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
"our previous local commitment tx", true);
}
}
- if let Some(&(ref htlc_outputs, ref htlc_sources)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources, "remote commitment tx", false);
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
+ "remote commitment tx", false);
}
// Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
}
}
}
+ macro_rules! read_option { () => {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ } }
let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
index: Readable::read(reader)?,
};
let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
- let current_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let prev_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
+ let current_remote_commitment_txid = read_option!();
+ let prev_remote_commitment_txid = read_option!();
Storage::Local {
revocation_base_key,
htlc_base_key,
let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = read_option!();
HTLCOutputInCommitment {
offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
}
}
- macro_rules! read_htlc_source {
- () => {
- {
- (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?,
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- )
- }
- }
- }
-
let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..outputs_count {
- outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
+ let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
+ htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), read_option!().map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
}
- let sources_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(sources_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..sources_count {
- sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
- }
- if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, (outputs, sources)) {
+ if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
- let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
- let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
- htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1));
- }
-
- let htlc_sources_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..htlc_sources_len {
- htlc_sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
+ let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
+ let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
+ let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, read_option!()));
}
LocalSignedTx {
txid: tx.txid(),
- tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, htlc_sources
+ tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
+ htlc_outputs: htlcs
}
}
}
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
+ use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
use std::sync::Arc;
fn test_prune_preimages() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
- let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
macro_rules! dummy_keys {
{
let mut res = Vec::new();
for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
offered: true,
amount_msat: 0,
cltv_expiry: 0,
payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
- transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
- });
+ transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
+ }, None));
}
res
}
($preimages_slice: expr) => {
{
let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
- let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
+ let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
res
}
}
let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]), Vec::new());
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), Vec::new(), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
}
// Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]), Vec::new());
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]), Vec::new());
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff