From: Evan Feenstra Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2023 23:51:14 +0000 (-0700) Subject: peel_payment_onion static fn in channelmanager X-Git-Tag: v0.0.119~48^2~2 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=4b5db8c3ce;p=rust-lightning peel_payment_onion static fn in channelmanager --- diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index fe050de91..0cc11b5f4 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -106,47 +106,63 @@ use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript; // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent. +/// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion. #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug -pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting { +pub enum PendingHTLCRouting { + /// A forwarded HTLC. Forward { + /// BOLT 4 onion packet. onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module. short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero eventually when we bump MSRV }, + /// An HTLC paid to an invoice we generated. Receive { + /// Payment secret and total msat received. payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, + /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info. payment_metadata: Option>, - incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed + /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed. + incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, + /// Optional shared secret for phantom node. phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info. custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec)>, }, + /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV). ReceiveKeysend { /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades. payment_data: Option, + /// Preimage for this onion payment. payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, + /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info. payment_metadata: Option>, + /// CLTV expiry of the incoming HTLC. incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info. custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec)>, }, } +/// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info. #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug -pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo { - pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting, - pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32], +pub struct PendingHTLCInfo { + /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received. + pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting, + /// Shared secret from the previous hop. + pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, /// Amount received - pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option, // Added in 0.0.113 + pub incoming_amt_msat: Option, // Added in 0.0.113 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received /// may overshoot this in either case) - pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64, - pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32, + pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64, + /// Outgoing CLTV height. + pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32, /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed. - pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option, + pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option, } #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug @@ -378,7 +394,8 @@ impl HTLCSource { } } -struct InboundOnionErr { +/// Invalid inbound onion payment. +pub struct InboundOnionErr { err_code: u16, err_data: Vec, msg: &'static str, @@ -2903,192 +2920,15 @@ where } } - fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info( - &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32], - new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32], - next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option> - ) -> Result { - debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some()); - let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { - version: 0, - public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)), - hop_data: new_packet_bytes, - hmac: hop_hmac, - }; - - let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data { - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } => - (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value), - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } => - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", - err_code: 0x4000 | 22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - }), - }; - - Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { - onion_packet: outgoing_packet, - short_channel_id, - }, - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash, - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat), - outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value, - skimmed_fee_msat: None, - }) - } - - fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info( - &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, - amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool, - counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option, - ) -> Result { - let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data { - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { - payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, .. - } => - (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata), - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { - amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, .. - } => { - let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat }; - (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None) - } - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", - }) - }, - }; - // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry - if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender", - err_code: 18, - err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec() - }) - } - // final_expiry_too_soon - // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure - // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. - // - // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our - // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a - // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); - if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 { - let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12); - err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes()); - err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes()); - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data, - msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", - }); - } - if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) || - (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > - amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0))) - { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 19, - err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(), - msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", - }); - } - - let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage { - // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this - // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X - // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route - // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing - // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X. - let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - if hashed_preimage != payment_hash { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", - }); - } - if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments", - }); - } - PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { - payment_data, - payment_preimage, - payment_metadata, - incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, - custom_tlvs, - } - } else if let Some(data) = payment_data { - PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { - payment_data: data, - payment_metadata, - incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, - phantom_shared_secret, - custom_tlvs, - } - } else { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "We require payment_secrets", - }); - }; - Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing, - payment_hash, - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat), - outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat, - outgoing_cltv_value, - skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, - }) - } - fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion( &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC - ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option>), HTLCFailureMsg> { - macro_rules! return_malformed_err { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { - { - log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); - return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(), - failure_code: $err_code, - })); - } - } - } - - if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key { - return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6); - } + ) -> Result< + (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option>), HTLCFailureMsg + > { + let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion( + msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx + )?; - let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh( - Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None - ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); - - if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { - //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other - //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, - //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the - //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the - //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the - //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... - return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4); - } macro_rules! return_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { { @@ -3103,36 +2943,12 @@ where } } - let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop( - shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, - msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer - ) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { - return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code); - }, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => { - return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]); - }, - }; - let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop { - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { - next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { - short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value - }, .. - } => { - let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, - msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret); - (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk)) - }, - // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the - // inbound channel's state. - onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)), - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } | - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } => - { - return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]); - } + let NextPacketDetails { + next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value + } = match next_packet_details_opt { + Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details, + // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks + None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)), }; // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we @@ -3209,38 +3025,22 @@ where } chan_update_opt } else { - if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { - // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not - // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update - // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure. - break Some(( - "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", - 0x2000 | 2, None, - )); - } None }; let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1; - // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, - // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see - // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon - break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt)); - } - if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far - break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None)); - } - // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our - // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with - // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and - // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline. - // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure - // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it, - // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our - // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments. - if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { - break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt)); + + if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv( + cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry + ) { + if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() { + // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not + // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update + // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure. + break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None)) + } + let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None }; + break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt)); } break None; @@ -3270,7 +3070,7 @@ where } return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]); } - Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) + Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey))) } fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>( @@ -3293,8 +3093,10 @@ where match decoded_hop { onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => { // OUR PAYMENT! - match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, - msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat) + let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, + msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, + current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend) { Ok(info) => { // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc @@ -3307,7 +3109,7 @@ where } }, onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => { - match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, + match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) { Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info), Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data) @@ -4333,9 +4135,11 @@ where }; match next_hop { onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => { - match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, + let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, - outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None) + outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None, + current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend) { Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])), Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) @@ -7906,6 +7710,348 @@ where } } +fn create_fwd_pending_htlc_info( + msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32], + new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32], + next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option> +) -> Result { + debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some()); + let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { + version: 0, + public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)), + hop_data: new_packet_bytes, + hmac: hop_hmac, + }; + + let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data { + msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } => + (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value), + msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } => + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", + err_code: 0x4000 | 22, + err_data: Vec::new(), + }), + }; + + Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { + routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { + onion_packet: outgoing_packet, + short_channel_id, + }, + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash, + incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, + incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat), + outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value, + skimmed_fee_msat: None, + }) +} + +fn create_recv_pending_htlc_info( + hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, + amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool, + counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option, current_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool, +) -> Result { + let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data { + msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { + payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, .. + } => + (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata), + msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { + amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, .. + } => { + let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat }; + (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None) + } + msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 0x4000|22, + err_data: Vec::new(), + msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", + }) + }, + }; + // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry + if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender", + err_code: 18, + err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec() + }) + } + // final_expiry_too_soon + // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure + // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. + // + // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our + // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a + // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). + if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 { + let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12); + err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes()); + err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes()); + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data, + msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", + }); + } + if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) || + (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > + amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0))) + { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 19, + err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(), + msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", + }); + } + + let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage { + // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this + // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X + // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route + // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing + // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X. + let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); + if hashed_preimage != payment_hash { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 0x4000|22, + err_data: Vec::new(), + msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", + }); + } + if !accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 0x4000|22, + err_data: Vec::new(), + msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments", + }); + } + PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { + payment_data, + payment_preimage, + payment_metadata, + incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, + custom_tlvs, + } + } else if let Some(data) = payment_data { + PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { + payment_data: data, + payment_metadata, + incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, + phantom_shared_secret, + custom_tlvs, + } + } else { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3, + err_data: Vec::new(), + msg: "We require payment_secrets", + }); + }; + Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { + routing, + payment_hash, + incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, + incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat), + outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat, + outgoing_cltv_value, + skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, + }) +} + +/// Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning [`PendingHTLCInfo`] (either Forward or Receive). +/// This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or +/// acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for +/// a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the +/// channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]. +pub fn peel_payment_onion( + msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, + cur_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool, +) -> Result +where + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + L::Target: Logger, +{ + let (hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = + decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, node_signer, logger, secp_ctx + ).map_err(|e| { + let (err_code, err_data) = match e { + HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(m) => (m.failure_code, Vec::new()), + HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(r) => (0x4000 | 22, r.reason.data), + }; + let msg = "Failed to decode update add htlc onion"; + InboundOnionErr { msg, err_code, err_data } + })?; + Ok(match hop { + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => { + let NextPacketDetails { + next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat: _, outgoing_scid: _, outgoing_cltv_value + } = match next_packet_details_opt { + Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details, + // Forward should always include the next hop details + None => return Err(InboundOnionErr { + msg: "Failed to decode update add htlc onion", + err_code: 0x4000 | 22, + err_data: Vec::new(), + }), + }; + + if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv( + cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry + ) { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + msg: err_msg, + err_code: code, + err_data: Vec::new(), + }); + } + create_fwd_pending_htlc_info( + msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, + Some(next_packet_pubkey) + )? + }, + onion_utils::Hop::Receive(received_data) => { + create_recv_pending_htlc_info( + received_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, + None, false, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend, + )? + } + }) +} + +struct NextPacketDetails { + next_packet_pubkey: Result, + outgoing_scid: u64, + outgoing_amt_msat: u64, + outgoing_cltv_value: u32, +} + +fn decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion( + msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, +) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option), HTLCFailureMsg> +where + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + L::Target: Logger, +{ + macro_rules! return_malformed_err { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { + { + log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(), + failure_code: $err_code, + })); + } + } + } + + if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key { + return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6); + } + + let shared_secret = node_signer.ecdh( + Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None + ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); + + if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { + //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other + //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, + //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the + //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the + //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the + //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... + return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4); + } + macro_rules! return_err { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { + { + log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec()) + .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None), + })); + } + } + } + + let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop( + shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, + msg.payment_hash, node_signer + ) { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { + return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code); + }, + Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => { + return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]); + }, + }; + + let next_packet_details = match next_hop { + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { + next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { + short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value + }, .. + } => { + let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(secp_ctx, + msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret); + NextPacketDetails { + next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id, + outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value + } + }, + // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the + // inbound channel's state. + onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)), + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } | + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } => + { + return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]); + } + }; + + Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details))) +} + +fn check_incoming_htlc_cltv( + cur_height: u32, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, cltv_expiry: u32 +) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> { + if (cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { + return Err(( + "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", + 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry + )); + } + // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, + // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see + // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). + if cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon + return Err(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14)); + } + if cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far + return Err(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21)); + } + // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our + // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with + // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and + // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline. + // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure + // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it, + // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our + // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments. + if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { + return Err(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14)); + } + + Ok(()) +} + impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager where M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, @@ -10770,11 +10916,12 @@ mod tests { use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; use crate::ln::ChannelId; - use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId}; + use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId}; + use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures}; use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction}; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; - use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route}; + use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route}; use crate::util::errors::APIError; use crate::util::test_utils; use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate}; @@ -11772,9 +11919,11 @@ mod tests { }; // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender // intended amount, we fail the payment. + let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) = - node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), - sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)) + create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), + sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat), + current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend) { assert_eq!(err_code, 19); } else { panic!(); } @@ -11790,8 +11939,10 @@ mod tests { }), custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), }; - assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), - sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok()); + let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), + sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat), + current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok()); } #[test] @@ -11801,7 +11952,8 @@ mod tests { let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]); let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr); - let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { + let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { amt_msat: 100, outgoing_cltv_value: 22, payment_metadata: None, @@ -11810,7 +11962,8 @@ mod tests { payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100, }), custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), - }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None); + }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height, + node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend); // Should not return an error as this condition: // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334 @@ -12044,6 +12197,137 @@ mod tests { check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); } } + + #[test] + fn test_peel_payment_onion() { + use super::*; + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + + let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42); + let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key()); + let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42); + let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key()); + + let (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash, + prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk); + + let path = Path { + hops: hops, + blinded_tail: None, + }; + + let (amount_msat, cltv_expiry, onion) = create_payment_onion( + &secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height, + payment_hash, Some(preimage), prng_seed + ).unwrap(); + + let msg = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, onion); + let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("bob".to_string()); + + let peeled = peel_payment_onion(&msg, &&bob, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true) + .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap(); + + let next_onion = match peeled.routing { + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: _ } => { + onion_packet + }, + _ => panic!("expected a forwarded onion"), + }; + + let msg2 = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, next_onion); + let peeled2 = peel_payment_onion(&msg2, &&charlie, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true) + .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap(); + + match peeled2.routing { + PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, .. } => { + assert_eq!(payment_preimage, preimage); + assert_eq!(peeled2.outgoing_amt_msat, recipient_amount); + assert_eq!(incoming_cltv_expiry, peeled2.outgoing_cltv_value); + let msgs::FinalOnionHopData{total_msat, payment_secret} = payment_data.unwrap(); + assert_eq!(total_msat, total_amt_msat); + assert_eq!(payment_secret, pay_secret); + }, + _ => panic!("expected a received keysend"), + }; + } + + fn make_update_add_msg( + amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash, + onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket + ) -> msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { + msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { + channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0; 32]), + htlc_id: 0, + amount_msat, + cltv_expiry, + payment_hash, + onion_routing_packet, + skimmed_fee_msat: None, + } + } + + fn payment_onion_args(hop_pk: PublicKey, recipient_pk: PublicKey) -> ( + SecretKey, u64, u32, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, [u8; 32], + Vec, u64, PaymentSecret, + ) { + let session_priv_bytes = [42; 32]; + let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes).unwrap(); + let total_amt_msat = 1000; + let cur_height = 1000; + let pay_secret = PaymentSecret([99; 32]); + let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret); + let preimage_bytes = [43; 32]; + let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes); + let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).into_inner(); + let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes); + let prng_seed = [44; 32]; + + // make a route alice -> bob -> charlie + let hop_fee = 1; + let recipient_amount = total_amt_msat - hop_fee; + let hops = vec![ + RouteHop { + pubkey: hop_pk, + fee_msat: hop_fee, + cltv_expiry_delta: 42, + short_channel_id: 1, + node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), + channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), + maybe_announced_channel: false, + }, + RouteHop { + pubkey: recipient_pk, + fee_msat: recipient_amount, + cltv_expiry_delta: 42, + short_channel_id: 2, + node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), + channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), + maybe_announced_channel: false, + } + ]; + + (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash, + prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) + } + + pub fn create_payment_onion( + secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, total_msat: u64, + recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, best_block_height: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash, + keysend_preimage: Option, prng_seed: [u8; 32] + ) -> Result<(u64, u32, msgs::OnionPacket), ()> { + let onion_keys = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv).map_err(|_| ())?; + let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = super::onion_utils::build_onion_payloads( + &path, + total_msat, + recipient_onion, + best_block_height + 1, + &keysend_preimage, + ).map_err(|_| ())?; + let onion_packet = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_packet( + onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash + )?; + Ok((htlc_msat, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)) + } } #[cfg(ldk_bench)] diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/msgs.rs b/lightning/src/ln/msgs.rs index 6043bf35b..c2ea1ae8b 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/msgs.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/msgs.rs @@ -1674,17 +1674,21 @@ pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*; #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*; -#[derive(Clone)] -pub(crate) struct OnionPacket { - pub(crate) version: u8, +/// BOLT 4 onion packet including hop data for the next peer. +#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct OnionPacket { + /// BOLT 4 version number. + pub version: u8, /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd /// like. - pub(crate) public_key: Result, - pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65], - pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32], + pub public_key: Result, + /// 1300 bytes encrypted payload for the next hop. + pub hop_data: [u8; 20*65], + /// HMAC to verify the integrity of hop_data. + pub hmac: [u8; 32], } impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket { @@ -1699,18 +1703,6 @@ impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket { } } -impl Eq for OnionPacket { } -impl PartialEq for OnionPacket { - fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool { - for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) { - if i != j { return false; } - } - self.version == other.version && - self.public_key == other.public_key && - self.hmac == other.hmac - } -} - impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))