From: Wilmer Paulino Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 20:39:46 +0000 (-0700) Subject: Add test yielding anchor-related events X-Git-Tag: v0.0.114-beta~52^2 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=660165ce67e2939f36082b56cf5f0ad6c9db65d4;p=rust-lightning Add test yielding anchor-related events --- diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index c19ef72f8..088cf8661 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -9,17 +9,29 @@ //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations. +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance}; use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator; use crate::ln::channel; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::ln::chan_utils; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId}; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::util::config::UserConfig; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::util::events::BumpTransactionEvent; use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use bitcoin::{Amount, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime}; use bitcoin::Transaction; use crate::prelude::*; @@ -1666,3 +1678,141 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); } + +#[cfg(anchors)] +#[test] +fn test_yield_anchors_events() { + // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over + // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will + // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK, + // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be + // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be + // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions. + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default(); + anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; + anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value( + &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000 + ).2; + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000); + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000); + + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true); + assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty()); + + get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage( + &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, + &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger + ); + + let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1); + let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() { + Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. }) => { + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 6); + let mut anchor_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![ + TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() }, + TxIn { ..Default::default() }, + ], + output: vec![TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), + }], + }; + let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( + anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id, + ); + let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap(); + anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness( + &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig + ); + (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the + // best block is being updated prior to the confirmed transactions. + match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() { + ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => { + assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3); + if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {} + else { panic!("unexpected event"); } + + }, + _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2), + }; + let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2); + for event in holder_events { + match event { + Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, .. }) => { + assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1); + let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0]; + let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( + htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id + ); + let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp); + let mut htlc_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: if htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered { + PackedLockTime(htlc_descriptor.htlc.cltv_expiry) + } else { + PackedLockTime::ZERO + }, + input: vec![ + htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input + TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input + ], + output: vec![ + htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp), // HTLC output + TxOut { // Fee input change + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), + } + ] + }; + let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, 0, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap(); + let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp); + htlc_tx.input[0].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script); + htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32); + + let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3); + for event in holder_events { + match event { + Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing. + nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); +}