From: Jeffrey Czyz <jkczyz@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 16:35:05 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: Merge branch '2020-06-refactor-chain-listener-move-chainmonitor' into 2020-06-refacto... 
X-Git-Tag: v0.0.12~21^2
X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=6cd6816cd7efce593ef487d07adfff66cee0daa2;p=rust-lightning

Merge branch '2020-06-refactor-chain-listener-move-chainmonitor' into 2020-06-refactor-chain-listener
---

6cd6816cd7efce593ef487d07adfff66cee0daa2
diff --cc fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs
index b1cdd66fb,86265dfe3..1650e2e25
--- a/fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs
+++ b/fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs
@@@ -29,8 -29,8 +29,9 @@@ use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sh
  use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  
  use lightning::chain;
+ use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
 -use lightning::chain::chainmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent};
 +use lightning::chain::channelmonitor;
 +use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent};
  use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
  use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
@@@ -83,8 -83,8 +84,8 @@@ impl Writer for VecWriter 
  
  struct TestChainMonitor {
  	pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
- 	pub chain_monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>,
+ 	pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>,
 -	pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), chainmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
 +	pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
  	// If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
  	// logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
  	// monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
diff --cc fuzz/src/full_stack.rs
index 978302944,1ad79e2ed..1ed17b9ea
--- a/fuzz/src/full_stack.rs
+++ b/fuzz/src/full_stack.rs
@@@ -27,9 -27,9 +27,9 @@@ use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHa
  
  use lightning::chain;
  use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
- use lightning::chain::channelmonitor;
++use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
  use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
 -use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
  use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
  use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor};
  use lightning::routing::router::get_route;
diff --cc lightning/src/chain/chainmonitor.rs
index 000000000,8578b9f1c..d858c1267
mode 000000,100644..100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/chainmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/chainmonitor.rs
@@@ -1,0 -1,2843 +1,227 @@@
+ // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+ // history.
+ //
+ // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+ // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+ // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+ // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+ // licenses.
+ 
 -//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
 -//! here.
++//! Logic to connect off-chain channel management with on-chain transaction monitoring.
+ //!
 -//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
 -//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
 -//! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
++//! [`ChainMonitor`] is an implementation of [`chain::Watch`] used both to process blocks and to
++//! update [`ChannelMonitor`]s accordingly. If any on-chain events need further processing, it will
++//! make those available as [`MonitorEvent`]s to be consumed.
+ //!
 -//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
 -//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
 -//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
 -//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
 -//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
++//! `ChainMonitor` is parameterized by an optional chain source, which must implement the
++//! [`chain::Filter`] trait. This provides a mechanism to signal new relevant outputs back to light
++//! clients, such that transactions spending those outputs are included in block data.
+ //!
 -//! [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
++//! `ChainMonitor` may be used directly to monitor channels locally or as a part of a distributed
++//! setup to monitor channels remotely. In the latter case, a custom `chain::Watch` implementation
++//! would be responsible for routing each update to a remote server and for retrieving monitor
++//! events. The remote server would make use of `ChainMonitor` for block processing and for
++//! servicing `ChannelMonitor` updates from the client.
++//!
++//! [`ChainMonitor`]: struct.ChainMonitor.html
++//! [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
++//! [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
++//! [`ChannelMonitor`]: ../channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html
++//! [`MonitorEvent`]: ../channelmonitor/enum.MonitorEvent.html
+ 
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
 -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
 -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
 -use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
 -use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
 -use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
 -
 -use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 -use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 -use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
+ 
 -use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
 -use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 -use bitcoin::secp256k1;
 -
 -use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
 -use ln::chan_utils;
 -use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
 -use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
 -use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
+ use chain;
+ use chain::Filter;
+ use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
++use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent, MonitorUpdateError};
+ use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
 -use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
++use chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys;
+ use util::logger::Logger;
 -use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
 -use util::{byte_utils, events};
++use util::events;
+ use util::events::Event;
+ 
 -use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map};
++use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
+ use std::sync::Mutex;
 -use std::{cmp, mem};
+ use std::ops::Deref;
 -use std::io::Error;
 -
 -/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
 -/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
 -#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
 -#[derive(Clone)]
 -#[must_use]
 -pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 -	pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
 -	/// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
 -	/// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
 -	/// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
 -	///
 -	/// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
 -	/// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
 -	/// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
 -	pub update_id: u64,
 -}
 -
 -impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 -	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 -		self.update_id.write(w)?;
 -		(self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
 -		for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
 -			update_step.write(w)?;
 -		}
 -		Ok(())
 -	}
 -}
 -impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 -	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 -		let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 -		let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 -		let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
 -		for _ in 0..len {
 -			updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
 -		}
 -		Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
 -	}
 -}
 -
 -/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
 -#[derive(Clone)]
 -pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
 -	/// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
 -	/// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
 -	///
 -	/// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
 -	/// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
 -	/// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
 -	/// restore the channel to an operational state.
 -	///
 -	/// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
 -	/// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
 -	/// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
 -	///
 -	/// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
 -	/// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
 -	/// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
 -	/// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
 -	/// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
 -	/// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
 -	/// been "frozen".
 -	///
 -	/// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
 -	/// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
 -	/// operation.
 -	///
 -	/// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
 -	/// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
 -	/// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
 -	/// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
 -	/// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
 -	/// reload-time.
 -	///
 -	/// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
 -	/// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
 -	/// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
 -	TemporaryFailure,
 -	/// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
 -	/// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
 -	/// of this channel).
 -	///
 -	/// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
 -	/// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
 -	/// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
 -	/// update must be rejected.
 -	///
 -	/// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
 -	/// the channel monitor instance.
 -	///
 -	/// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
 -	/// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
 -	/// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
 -	///
 -	/// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
 -	/// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
 -	/// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
 -	/// lagging behind on block processing.
 -	PermanentFailure,
 -}
 -
 -/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
 -/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
 -/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
 -/// corrupted.
 -/// Contains a human-readable error message.
 -#[derive(Debug)]
 -pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
 -
 -/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
 -#[derive(PartialEq)]
 -pub enum MonitorEvent {
 -	/// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
 -	HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
 -
 -	/// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
 -	CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
 -}
 -
 -/// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
 -/// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
 -/// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
 -///
 -/// [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
 -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 -pub struct HTLCUpdate {
 -	pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 -	pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 -	pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
 -}
 -impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
+ 
+ /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`] for monitoring channels.
+ ///
+ /// Connected and disconnected blocks must be provided to `ChainMonitor` as documented by
+ /// [`chain::Watch`]. May be used in conjunction with [`ChannelManager`] to monitor channels locally
 -/// or used independently to monitor channels remotely.
++/// or used independently to monitor channels remotely. See the [module-level documentation] for
++/// details.
+ ///
 -/// [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
 -/// [`ChannelManager`]: ../channelmanager/struct.ChannelManager.html
++/// [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
++/// [`ChannelManager`]: ../../ln/channelmanager/struct.ChannelManager.html
++/// [module-level documentation]: index.html
+ pub struct ChainMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
+ 	where C::Target: chain::Filter,
+         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+         L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ 	/// The monitors
+ 	pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
+ 	chain_source: Option<C>,
+ 	broadcaster: T,
+ 	logger: L,
+ 	fee_estimator: F
+ }
+ 
+ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
+ 	where C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ 	      T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ 	      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ 	      L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ 	/// Dispatches to per-channel monitors, which are responsible for updating their on-chain view
+ 	/// of a channel and reacting accordingly based on transactions in the connected block. See
+ 	/// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`] for details. Any HTLCs that were resolved on chain will
+ 	/// be returned by [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
+ 	///
+ 	/// Calls back to [`chain::Filter`] if any monitor indicated new outputs to watch, returning
+ 	/// `true` if so. Subsequent calls must not exclude any transactions matching the new outputs
+ 	/// nor any in-block descendants of such transactions. It is not necessary to re-fetch the block
+ 	/// to obtain updated `txdata`.
+ 	///
 -	/// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_connected
 -	/// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
 -	/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../../chain/trait.Filter.html
++	/// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`]: ../channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_connected
++	/// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
++	/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
+ 	pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> bool {
+ 		let mut has_new_outputs_to_watch = false;
+ 		{
+ 			let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ 			for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
+ 				let mut txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
+ 				has_new_outputs_to_watch |= !txn_outputs.is_empty();
+ 
+ 				if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
+ 					for (txid, outputs) in txn_outputs.drain(..) {
+ 						for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ 							chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid, index: idx as u16 }, &output.script_pubkey);
+ 						}
+ 					}
+ 				}
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 		has_new_outputs_to_watch
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/// Dispatches to per-channel monitors, which are responsible for updating their on-chain view
+ 	/// of a channel based on the disconnected block. See [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`] for
+ 	/// details.
+ 	///
 -	/// [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_disconnected
++	/// [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`]: ../channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_disconnected
+ 	pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
+ 		let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ 		for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
+ 			monitor.block_disconnected(header, disconnected_height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/// Creates a new `ChainMonitor` used to watch on-chain activity pertaining to channels.
+ 	///
+ 	/// When an optional chain source implementing [`chain::Filter`] is provided, the chain monitor
+ 	/// will call back to it indicating transactions and outputs of interest. This allows clients to
+ 	/// pre-filter blocks or only fetch blocks matching a compact filter. Otherwise, clients may
+ 	/// always need to fetch full blocks absent another means for determining which blocks contain
+ 	/// transactions relevant to the watched channels.
+ 	///
 -	/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../../chain/trait.Filter.html
++	/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
+ 	pub fn new(chain_source: Option<C>, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> Self {
+ 		Self {
+ 			monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ 			chain_source,
+ 			broadcaster,
+ 			logger,
+ 			fee_estimator: feeest,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/// Adds the monitor that watches the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
+ 	///
+ 	/// Calls back to [`chain::Filter`] with the funding transaction and outputs to watch.
+ 	///
 -	/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../../chain/trait.Filter.html
++	/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
+ 	fn add_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ 		let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ 		let entry = match monitors.entry(outpoint) {
+ 			hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given outpoint is already present")),
+ 			hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
+ 		};
+ 		{
+ 			let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
+ 			log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ 
+ 			if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
+ 				chain_source.register_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
+ 				for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
+ 					for (idx, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ 						chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: idx as u16 }, &script_pubkey);
+ 					}
+ 				}
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 		entry.insert(monitor);
+ 		Ok(())
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/// Updates the monitor that watches the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
+ 	fn update_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ 		let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ 		match monitors.get_mut(&outpoint) {
+ 			Some(orig_monitor) => {
+ 				log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
+ 				orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
+ 			},
+ 			None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> chain::Watch for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
+ 	where C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ 	      T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ 	      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ 	      L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ 	type Keys = ChanSigner;
+ 
+ 	fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ 		match self.add_monitor(funding_txo, monitor) {
+ 			Ok(_) => Ok(()),
+ 			Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ 		match self.update_monitor(funding_txo, update) {
+ 			Ok(_) => Ok(()),
+ 			Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ 		let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::new();
+ 		for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
+ 			pending_monitor_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
+ 		}
+ 		pending_monitor_events
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
+ 	where C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ 	      T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ 	      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ 	      L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ 	fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
+ 		let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
+ 		for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
+ 			pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
+ 		}
+ 		pending_events
+ 	}
+ }
 -
 -/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
 -/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
 -pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
 -/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
 -/// HTLC-Success transaction.
 -/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
 -/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
 -pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
 -/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
 -/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
 -/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
 -/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
 -/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
 -/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
 -/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
 -/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
 -/// accurate block height.
 -/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
 -/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
 -/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
 -pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
 -/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
 -/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
 -/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
 -/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
 -/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
 -/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
 -pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
 -/// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
 -/// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
 -///
 -/// This is used for a few separate purposes:
 -/// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
 -///    waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
 -///    fail this HTLC,
 -/// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
 -///    condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
 -/// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
 -///    that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
 -///
 -/// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
 -/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
 -///
 -/// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
 -/// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
 -/// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
 -///
 -/// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
 -/// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
 -pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
 -
 -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 -struct HolderSignedTx {
 -	/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
 -	txid: Txid,
 -	revocation_key: PublicKey,
 -	a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 -	b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 -	delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 -	per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 -	feerate_per_kw: u32,
 -	htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
 -}
 -
 -/// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
 -/// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
 -#[derive(PartialEq)]
 -struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 -	counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 -	counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 -	on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
 -	per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
 -}
 -
 -impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 -	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 -		self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
 -		self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
 -		w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
 -		w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
 -		for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 -			w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 -			w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
 -			for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
 -				htlc.write(w)?;
 -			}
 -		}
 -		Ok(())
 -	}
 -}
 -impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 -	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 -		let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
 -			let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
 -			let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
 -			let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
 -			let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 -			let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
 -			for _  in 0..per_htlc_len {
 -				let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
 -				let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 -				let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
 -				for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 -					let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
 -					htlcs.push(htlc);
 -				}
 -				if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
 -					return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 -				}
 -			}
 -			CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 -				counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
 -				counterparty_htlc_base_key,
 -				on_counterparty_tx_csv,
 -				per_htlc,
 -			}
 -		};
 -		Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
 -	}
 -}
 -
 -/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
 -/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
 -/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
 -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 -pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
 -	Revoked {
 -		per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 -		counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 -		counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 -		per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
 -		input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
 -		amount: u64,
 -		htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
 -		on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
 -	},
 -	CounterpartyHTLC {
 -		per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 -		counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 -		counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 -		preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 -		htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
 -	},
 -	HolderHTLC {
 -		preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 -		amount: u64,
 -	},
 -	Funding {
 -		funding_redeemscript: Script,
 -	}
 -}
 -
 -impl Writeable for InputMaterial  {
 -	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 -		match self {
 -			&InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
 -				writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 -				per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
 -				counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
 -				counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
 -				writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
 -				input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
 -				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
 -				htlc.write(writer)?;
 -				on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
 -			},
 -			&InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
 -				writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 -				per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
 -				counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
 -				counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
 -				preimage.write(writer)?;
 -				htlc.write(writer)?;
 -			},
 -			&InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
 -				writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
 -				preimage.write(writer)?;
 -				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
 -			},
 -			&InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
 -				writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
 -				funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
 -			}
 -		}
 -		Ok(())
 -	}
 -}
 -
 -impl Readable for InputMaterial {
 -	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 -		let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 -			0 => {
 -				let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				InputMaterial::Revoked {
 -					per_commitment_point,
 -					counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
 -					counterparty_htlc_base_key,
 -					per_commitment_key,
 -					input_descriptor,
 -					amount,
 -					htlc,
 -					on_counterparty_tx_csv
 -				}
 -			},
 -			1 => {
 -				let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
 -					per_commitment_point,
 -					counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
 -					counterparty_htlc_base_key,
 -					preimage,
 -					htlc
 -				}
 -			},
 -			2 => {
 -				let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
 -					preimage,
 -					amount,
 -				}
 -			},
 -			3 => {
 -				InputMaterial::Funding {
 -					funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
 -				}
 -			}
 -			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 -		};
 -		Ok(input_material)
 -	}
 -}
 -
 -/// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
 -/// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
 -/// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
 -/// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
 -/// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
 -pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
 -	// Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
 -	// after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
 -	pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
 -	// Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
 -	// ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
 -	// Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
 -	// of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
 -	// Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
 -	pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
 -	// Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
 -	pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
 -	// Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
 -	// and satisfy witness program.
 -	pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
 -}
 -
 -/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
 -/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
 -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 -enum OnchainEvent {
 -	/// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
 -	/// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
 -	/// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
 -	HTLCUpdate {
 -		htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
 -	},
 -	MaturingOutput {
 -		descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
 -	},
 -}
 -
 -const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 -const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 -
 -#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
 -#[derive(Clone)]
 -pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 -	LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
 -		commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
 -		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
 -	},
 -	LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
 -		unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
 -		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
 -		commitment_number: u64,
 -		their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
 -	},
 -	PaymentPreimage {
 -		payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 -	},
 -	CommitmentSecret {
 -		idx: u64,
 -		secret: [u8; 32],
 -	},
 -	/// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
 -	/// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
 -	ChannelForceClosed {
 -		/// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
 -		/// think we've fallen behind!
 -		should_broadcast: bool,
 -	},
 -}
 -
 -impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 -	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 -		match self {
 -			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
 -				0u8.write(w)?;
 -				commitment_tx.write(w)?;
 -				(htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
 -				for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
 -					output.write(w)?;
 -					signature.write(w)?;
 -					source.write(w)?;
 -				}
 -			}
 -			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
 -				1u8.write(w)?;
 -				unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
 -				commitment_number.write(w)?;
 -				their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
 -				(htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
 -				for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
 -					output.write(w)?;
 -					source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
 -				}
 -			},
 -			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
 -				2u8.write(w)?;
 -				payment_preimage.write(w)?;
 -			},
 -			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
 -				3u8.write(w)?;
 -				idx.write(w)?;
 -				secret.write(w)?;
 -			},
 -			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
 -				4u8.write(w)?;
 -				should_broadcast.write(w)?;
 -			},
 -		}
 -		Ok(())
 -	}
 -}
 -impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 -	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 -		match Readable::read(r)? {
 -			0u8 => {
 -				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
 -					commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
 -					htlc_outputs: {
 -						let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 -						let mut res = Vec::new();
 -						for _ in 0..len {
 -							res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
 -						}
 -						res
 -					},
 -				})
 -			},
 -			1u8 => {
 -				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
 -					unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
 -					commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
 -					their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
 -					htlc_outputs: {
 -						let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 -						let mut res = Vec::new();
 -						for _ in 0..len {
 -							res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
 -						}
 -						res
 -					},
 -				})
 -			},
 -			2u8 => {
 -				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
 -					payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
 -				})
 -			},
 -			3u8 => {
 -				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
 -					idx: Readable::read(r)?,
 -					secret: Readable::read(r)?,
 -				})
 -			},
 -			4u8 => {
 -				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
 -					should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
 -				})
 -			},
 -			_ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 -		}
 -	}
 -}
 -
 -/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
 -/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
 -///
 -/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
 -/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
 -///
 -/// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
 -/// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
 -/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
 -/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
 -pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
 -	latest_update_id: u64,
 -	commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 -
 -	destination_script: Script,
 -	broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
 -	counterparty_payment_script: Script,
 -	shutdown_script: Script,
 -
 -	keys: ChanSigner,
 -	funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
 -	current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
 -	prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
 -
 -	counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
 -	funding_redeemscript: Script,
 -	channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 -	// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
 -	their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 -
 -	on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
 -
 -	commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 -	counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
 -	/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
 -	/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
 -	/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
 -	/// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
 -	/// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
 -	counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
 -	/// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
 -	/// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
 -	/// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
 -	/// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
 -	counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
 -
 -	// We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
 -	// some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
 -	// various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
 -	// transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
 -	prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
 -	current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
 -
 -	// Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
 -	// deserialization
 -	current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
 -	// Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
 -	// deserialization
 -	current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
 -
 -	payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
 -
 -	pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
 -	pending_events: Vec<Event>,
 -
 -	// Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
 -	// we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
 -	// actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
 -	onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
 -
 -	// If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
 -	// interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
 -	// be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
 -	// Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
 -	outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
 -
 -	#[cfg(test)]
 -	pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
 -	#[cfg(not(test))]
 -	onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
 -
 -	// This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
 -	// channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
 -	// updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
 -	lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
 -
 -	// Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
 -	// OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
 -	// may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
 -	//
 -	// In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
 -	// nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
 -	// remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
 -	holder_tx_signed: bool,
 -
 -	// We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
 -	// consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
 -	// (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
 -	// their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
 -	// the full block_connected).
 -	last_block_hash: BlockHash,
 -	secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 -}
 -
 -#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 -/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
 -/// underlying object
 -impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 -	fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
 -		if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
 -			self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
 -			self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
 -			self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
 -			self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
 -			self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
 -			self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
 -			self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
 -			self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
 -			self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
 -			self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
 -			self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
 -			self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
 -			self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
 -			self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
 -			self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
 -			self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
 -			self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
 -			self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
 -			self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
 -			self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
 -			self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
 -			self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
 -			self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
 -			self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
 -			self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
 -			self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
 -			self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
 -			self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
 -		{
 -			false
 -		} else {
 -			true
 -		}
 -	}
 -}
 -
 -impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 -	/// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
 -	///
 -	/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
 -	/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
 -	/// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
 -	/// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
 -	/// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
 -	pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
 -		//TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
 -		//serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
 -		writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 -		writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 -
 -		self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
 -
 -		// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
 -		U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
 -
 -		self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
 -		if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
 -			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 -			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
 -			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
 -			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
 -		} else {
 -			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 -		}
 -
 -		self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
 -		self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
 -
 -		self.keys.write(writer)?;
 -		writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
 -		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
 -		self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
 -		self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
 -		self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
 -
 -		self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
 -		self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
 -		self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
 -
 -		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 -			Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
 -				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
 -				writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
 -				match second_option {
 -					Some(second_pubkey) => {
 -						writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
 -					},
 -					None => {
 -						writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
 -					},
 -				}
 -			},
 -			None => {
 -				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
 -			},
 -		}
 -
 -		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
 -
 -		self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
 -
 -		macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
 -			($htlc_output: expr) => {
 -				writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
 -				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
 -				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
 -				writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
 -				$htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
 -		for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
 -			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 -			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
 -			for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
 -				serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 -				htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
 -		for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 -			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 -			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
 -			(txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
 -			for script in txouts.iter() {
 -				script.write(writer)?;
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
 -		for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
 -			writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
 -			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
 -		}
 -
 -		macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
 -			($holder_tx: expr) => {
 -				$holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
 -				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
 -				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 -				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 -				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
 -				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
 -
 -				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
 -				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
 -				for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 -					serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 -					if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
 -						1u8.write(writer)?;
 -						writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
 -					} else {
 -						0u8.write(writer)?;
 -					}
 -					htlc_source.write(writer)?;
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 -			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 -			serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
 -		} else {
 -			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 -		}
 -
 -		serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 -
 -		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
 -		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
 -
 -		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
 -		for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
 -			writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
 -		}
 -
 -		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
 -		for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
 -			match event {
 -				MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
 -					0u8.write(writer)?;
 -					upd.write(writer)?;
 -				},
 -				MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
 -		for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
 -			event.write(writer)?;
 -		}
 -
 -		self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
 -
 -		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
 -		for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
 -			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
 -			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
 -			for ev in events.iter() {
 -				match *ev {
 -					OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
 -						0u8.write(writer)?;
 -						htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
 -						htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
 -					},
 -					OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
 -						1u8.write(writer)?;
 -						descriptor.write(writer)?;
 -					},
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		(self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
 -		for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
 -			txid.write(writer)?;
 -			(output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
 -			for script in output_scripts.iter() {
 -				script.write(writer)?;
 -			}
 -		}
 -		self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
 -
 -		self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
 -		self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
 -
 -		Ok(())
 -	}
 -}
 -
 -impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 -	pub(crate) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
 -			on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
 -			counterparty_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
 -			on_holder_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 -			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 -			initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 -
 -		assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
 -		let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
 -		let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
 -		let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
 -		let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
 -
 -		let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: *counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: *counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
 -
 -		let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_holder_tx_csv);
 -
 -		let holder_tx_sequence = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
 -		let holder_tx_locktime = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
 -		let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
 -			txid: initial_holder_commitment_tx.txid(),
 -			revocation_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
 -			a_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
 -			b_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
 -			delayed_payment_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
 -			per_commitment_point: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
 -			feerate_per_kw: initial_holder_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
 -			htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
 -		};
 -		onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);
 -
 -		let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 -		outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![funding_info.1.clone()]);
 -
 -		ChannelMonitor {
 -			latest_update_id: 0,
 -			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
 -
 -			destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
 -			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
 -			counterparty_payment_script,
 -			shutdown_script,
 -
 -			keys,
 -			funding_info,
 -			current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
 -			prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
 -
 -			counterparty_tx_cache,
 -			funding_redeemscript,
 -			channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
 -			their_cur_revocation_points: None,
 -
 -			on_holder_tx_csv,
 -
 -			commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 -			counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 -			counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
 -			counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
 -
 -			prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 -			current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
 -			current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
 -			current_holder_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((holder_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (holder_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
 -
 -			payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
 -			pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
 -			pending_events: Vec::new(),
 -
 -			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
 -			outputs_to_watch,
 -
 -			onchain_tx_handler,
 -
 -			lockdown_from_offchain: false,
 -			holder_tx_signed: false,
 -
 -			last_block_hash: Default::default(),
 -			secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 -		}
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
 -	/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
 -	/// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
 -	pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
 -		if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
 -			return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
 -		}
 -
 -		// Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
 -		// events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
 -		if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
 -			for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
 -				*source = None;
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
 -			let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
 -			let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
 -			let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 -			let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
 -
 -			self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
 -				for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 -					if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 -						return true
 -					}
 -				}
 -				if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 -					for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 -						if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 -							return true
 -						}
 -					}
 -				}
 -				let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
 -					if *cn < min_idx {
 -						return true
 -					}
 -					true
 -				} else { false };
 -				if contains {
 -					counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
 -				}
 -				false
 -			});
 -		}
 -
 -		Ok(())
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
 -	/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
 -	/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
 -	/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
 -	pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
 -		// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 -		// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 -		// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
 -		// timeouts)
 -		for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
 -			self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
 -		}
 -
 -		let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
 -		log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
 -		log_trace!(logger, "New potential counterparty commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
 -		self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
 -		self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
 -		self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
 -		self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
 -		//TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
 -		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 -			Some(old_points) => {
 -				if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
 -					self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
 -				} else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
 -					if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
 -						self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
 -					} else {
 -						self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 -					}
 -				} else {
 -					self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 -				}
 -			},
 -			None => {
 -				self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 -			}
 -		}
 -		let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
 -		for htlc in htlc_outputs {
 -			if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
 -				htlcs.push(htlc.0);
 -			}
 -		}
 -		self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
 -	/// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
 -	/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 -	/// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
 -	/// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
 -	pub(super) fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
 -		let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 -		let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
 -		let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
 -		let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
 -			txid,
 -			revocation_key: commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
 -			a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
 -			b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
 -			delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
 -			per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
 -			feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
 -			htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
 -		};
 -		self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx);
 -		self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 -		mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 -		self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
 -		if self.holder_tx_signed {
 -			return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
 -		}
 -		Ok(())
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 -	/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
 -	pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
 -		self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
 -	}
 -
 -	pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
 -		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 -					L::Target: Logger,
 -	{
 -		for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
 -			broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
 -		}
 -		self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
 -	/// itself.
 -	///
 -	/// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
 -	pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
 -		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 -					L::Target: Logger,
 -	{
 -		if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
 -			panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
 -		}
 -		for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
 -			match update {
 -				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
 -					if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
 -					self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
 -				},
 -				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
 -					self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
 -				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
 -					self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
 -				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
 -					self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
 -				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
 -					self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
 -					if should_broadcast {
 -						self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
 -					} else {
 -						log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -		self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
 -		Ok(())
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
 -	/// ChannelMonitor.
 -	pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
 -		self.latest_update_id
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
 -	pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
 -		&self.funding_info
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
 -	/// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
 -	///
 -	/// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
 -	pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
 -		&self.outputs_to_watch
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
 -	/// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
 -	/// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
 -	/// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
 -	///
 -	/// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
 -	pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
 -		let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
 -		for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 -			for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 -				res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
 -			}
 -		}
 -		res
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
 -	/// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
 -	///
 -	/// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
 -	pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
 -		let mut ret = Vec::new();
 -		mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
 -		ret
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
 -	/// in the process.
 -	///
 -	/// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
 -	/// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
 -	/// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
 -	pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
 -		let mut ret = Vec::new();
 -		mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
 -		ret
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 -	pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 -		self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
 -	}
 -
 -	pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 -		self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
 -	}
 -
 -	pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
 -		self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
 -	}
 -
 -	pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
 -		self.current_holder_commitment_number
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
 -	/// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
 -	/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
 -	/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
 -	/// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
 -	/// revoked counterparty commitment tx
 -	fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
 -		// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 -		// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 -		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
 -		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 -
 -		let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
 -		let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
 -
 -		macro_rules! ignore_error {
 -			( $thing : expr ) => {
 -				match $thing {
 -					Ok(a) => a,
 -					Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
 -				}
 -			};
 -		}
 -
 -		let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 -		if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 -			let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 -			let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
 -			let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 -			let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
 -			let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
 -
 -			let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
 -			let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
 -
 -			// First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
 -			for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 -				if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
 -					let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
 -					claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
 -				}
 -			}
 -
 -			// Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
 -			if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 -				for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 -					if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
 -						if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 -								tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
 -							return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 -						}
 -						let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
 -						claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -
 -			// Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
 -			if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
 -				// We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
 -				log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
 -				watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
 -				self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
 -
 -				macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
 -					($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
 -						if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
 -							for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
 -								if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
 -									log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 -									match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
 -										hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
 -											let e = entry.get_mut();
 -											e.retain(|ref event| {
 -												match **event {
 -													OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
 -														return htlc_update.0 != **source
 -													},
 -													_ => true
 -												}
 -											});
 -											e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
 -										}
 -										hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
 -											entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
 -										}
 -									}
 -								}
 -							}
 -						}
 -					}
 -				}
 -				if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 -					check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
 -				}
 -				if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 -					check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
 -				}
 -				// No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
 -			}
 -		} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 -			// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
 -			// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
 -			// confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
 -			// upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
 -			// already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
 -			// not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
 -			// insert it here.
 -			watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
 -			self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
 -
 -			log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
 -
 -			macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
 -				($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
 -					if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
 -						$id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
 -							if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
 -								// Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
 -								// broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
 -								// fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
 -								// payment_preimage.
 -								// Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
 -								// commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
 -								// broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
 -								// cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
 -								// need to here.
 -								for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
 -									if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
 -										continue $id;
 -									}
 -								}
 -								log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
 -								match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
 -									hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
 -										let e = entry.get_mut();
 -										e.retain(|ref event| {
 -											match **event {
 -												OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
 -													return htlc_update.0 != **source
 -												},
 -												_ => true
 -											}
 -										});
 -										e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
 -									}
 -									hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
 -										entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
 -									}
 -								}
 -							}
 -						}
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -			if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 -				check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
 -			}
 -			if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 -				check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
 -			}
 -
 -			if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 -				let revocation_point_option =
 -					if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
 -					else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
 -						if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
 -					} else { None };
 -				if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
 -					self.counterparty_payment_script = {
 -						// Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
 -						// script_pubkey version
 -						let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
 -						Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
 -					};
 -
 -					// Then, try to find htlc outputs
 -					for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 -						if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
 -							if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 -									tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
 -								return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 -							}
 -							let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
 -							let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
 -							if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
 -								let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
 -								claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
 -							}
 -						}
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -		(claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
 -	fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 -		let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
 -		if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
 -			return (Vec::new(), None)
 -		}
 -
 -		macro_rules! ignore_error {
 -			( $thing : expr ) => {
 -				match $thing {
 -					Ok(a) => a,
 -					Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
 -				}
 -			};
 -		}
 -
 -		let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
 -		let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
 -		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 -
 -		log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
 -		let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key,  per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
 -		let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
 -		(claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
 -	}
 -
 -	fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
 -		let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
 -		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
 -
 -		let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
 -		let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
 -
 -		for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 -			if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
 -				claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
 -					witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
 -						preimage: if !htlc.offered {
 -								if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 -									Some(preimage.clone())
 -								} else {
 -									// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 -									continue;
 -								}
 -							} else { None },
 -						amount: htlc.amount_msat,
 -				}});
 -				watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		(claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
 -	/// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
 -	/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
 -	fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
 -		let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
 -		let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
 -		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 -
 -		macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
 -			($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
 -				log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 -				match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
 -					hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
 -						let e = entry.get_mut();
 -						e.retain(|ref event| {
 -							match **event {
 -								OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
 -									return htlc_update.0 != $source
 -								},
 -								_ => true
 -							}
 -						});
 -						e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
 -					}
 -					hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
 -						entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
 -			($updates: expr) => {
 -				claim_requests = $updates.0;
 -				watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
 -				self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		// HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
 -		let mut is_holder_tx = false;
 -
 -		if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 -			is_holder_tx = true;
 -			log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
 -			let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 -			append_onchain_update!(res);
 -		} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 -			if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 -				is_holder_tx = true;
 -				log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
 -				let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
 -				append_onchain_update!(res);
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
 -			($holder_tx: expr) => {
 -				for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
 -					if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
 -						if let &Some(ref source) = source {
 -							wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
 -						}
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		if is_holder_tx {
 -			fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 -			if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 -				fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		(claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
 -	/// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
 -	/// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
 -	/// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
 -	/// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
 -	/// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
 -	/// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
 -	/// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
 -	/// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
 -	pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 -		log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
 -		self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 -		if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 -			let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 -			let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 -			for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 -				if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 -					let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 -							if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 -								// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 -								continue;
 -							}
 -						} else { None };
 -					if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 -							&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 -						res.push(htlc_tx);
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -			// We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 -			// The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 -			return res
 -		}
 -		Vec::new()
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
 -	/// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
 -	/// revoked commitment transaction.
 -	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
 -	pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 -		log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
 -		if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 -			let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 -			let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 -			for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 -				if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 -					let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 -							if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 -								// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 -								continue;
 -							}
 -						} else { None };
 -					if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 -							&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 -						res.push(htlc_tx);
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -			return res
 -		}
 -		Vec::new()
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
 -	/// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
 -	/// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
 -	/// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
 -	/// - detect settled outputs for later spending
 -	/// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
 -	///
 -	/// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
 -	/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
 -	///
 -	/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
 -	pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
 -		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 -		      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 -					L::Target: Logger,
 -	{
 -		let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
 -		for tx in &txn_matched {
 -			let mut output_val = 0;
 -			for out in tx.output.iter() {
 -				if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
 -				output_val += out.value;
 -				if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		let block_hash = header.block_hash();
 -		log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
 -
 -		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 -		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
 -		for tx in &txn_matched {
 -			if tx.input.len() == 1 {
 -				// Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
 -				// commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
 -				// which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
 -				// filters.
 -				let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
 -				if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
 -					if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
 -						let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
 -						if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
 -							watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
 -						}
 -						if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
 -							let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
 -							if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
 -								watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
 -							}
 -							claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 -						}
 -						claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 -					}
 -				} else {
 -					if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
 -						let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
 -						claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 -						if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
 -							watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
 -						}
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -			// While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
 -			// can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
 -			// we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
 -			self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
 -
 -			self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
 -		}
 -		let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
 -		if should_broadcast {
 -			claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
 -		}
 -		if should_broadcast {
 -			self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 -			if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 -				self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 -				let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 -				if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 -					watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 -				}
 -				claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 -			}
 -		}
 -		if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
 -			for ev in events {
 -				match ev {
 -					OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
 -						log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
 -						self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 -							payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
 -							payment_preimage: None,
 -							source: htlc_update.0,
 -						}));
 -					},
 -					OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
 -						log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
 -						self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
 -							outputs: vec![descriptor]
 -						});
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
 -		self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
 -
 -		// Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
 -		// updating the latter in the process.
 -		watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
 -			let output_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect();
 -			self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts).is_none()
 -		});
 -		watch_outputs
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
 -	/// appropriately.
 -	pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
 -		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 -		      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 -		      L::Target: Logger,
 -	{
 -		let block_hash = header.block_hash();
 -		log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
 -
 -		if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
 -			//We may discard:
 -			//- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
 -			//- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
 -		}
 -
 -		self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
 -
 -		self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
 -	/// transactions thereof.
 -	fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
 -		let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
 -		txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
 -			let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
 -			for input in tx.input.iter() {
 -				if matches { break; }
 -				if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
 -					matches = true;
 -				}
 -			}
 -			if matches {
 -				matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
 -			}
 -			matches
 -		}).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
 -	fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
 -		for input in tx.input.iter() {
 -			if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
 -				for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 -					if idx == input.previous_output.vout as usize {
 -						return true;
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		false
 -	}
 -
 -	fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
 -		// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
 -		//  * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
 -		//    transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
 -		//  * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
 -		//    broadcast if we go on-chain.
 -		// Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
 -		// strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
 -		// to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
 -		// updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
 -		// easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
 -		macro_rules! scan_commitment {
 -			($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
 -				for ref htlc in $htlcs {
 -					// For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
 -					// chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
 -					// time out the HTLC first.
 -					// For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
 -					// concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
 -					// channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
 -					// counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
 -					// can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
 -					// chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
 -					// we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
 -					// on-chain for an expired HTLC.
 -					// Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
 -					// from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
 -					// corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
 -					// least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
 -					//  aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
 -					//      inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
 -					//      outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
 -					//      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
 -					//      CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
 -					//      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
 -					//  The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
 -					//  with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
 -					let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
 -					if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
 -					   (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
 -						log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
 -						return true;
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
 -
 -		if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 -			if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
 -				scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
 -			}
 -		}
 -		if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 -			if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
 -				scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		false
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
 -	/// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
 -	fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
 -		'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
 -			let mut payment_data = None;
 -			let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
 -				|| (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
 -			let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
 -			let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
 -
 -			macro_rules! log_claim {
 -				($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
 -					// We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
 -					// as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
 -					// to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
 -					// This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
 -					let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
 -					if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
 -							(outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
 -						log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
 -							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
 -							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
 -							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
 -					} else {
 -						log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
 -							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
 -							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
 -							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -
 -			macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
 -				($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
 -					if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
 -						for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
 -							if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
 -								if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
 -									log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
 -									payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
 -									break;
 -								}
 -							}
 -						}
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -
 -			macro_rules! scan_commitment {
 -				($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
 -					for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
 -						if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
 -							if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
 -								log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
 -								// We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
 -								// holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
 -								// transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
 -								// has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
 -								// resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
 -								payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
 -							} else if !$holder_tx {
 -									check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
 -								if payment_data.is_none() {
 -									check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
 -								}
 -							}
 -							if payment_data.is_none() {
 -								log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
 -								continue 'outer_loop;
 -							}
 -						}
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -
 -			if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
 -				scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
 -					"our latest holder commitment tx", true);
 -			}
 -			if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 -				if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
 -					scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
 -						"our previous holder commitment tx", true);
 -				}
 -			}
 -			if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
 -				scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
 -					"counterparty commitment tx", false);
 -			}
 -
 -			// Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
 -			// HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
 -			if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
 -				let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
 -				if accepted_preimage_claim {
 -					if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
 -						|update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
 -						payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
 -						self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 -							source,
 -							payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 -							payment_hash
 -						}));
 -					}
 -				} else if offered_preimage_claim {
 -					if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
 -						|update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
 -							upd.source == source
 -						} else { false }) {
 -						payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
 -						self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 -							source,
 -							payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 -							payment_hash
 -						}));
 -					}
 -				} else {
 -					log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 -					match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
 -						hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
 -							let e = entry.get_mut();
 -							e.retain(|ref event| {
 -								match **event {
 -									OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
 -										return htlc_update.0 != source
 -									},
 -									_ => true
 -								}
 -							});
 -							e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
 -						}
 -						hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
 -							entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
 -						}
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -	}
 -
 -	/// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
 -	fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
 -		let mut spendable_output = None;
 -		for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
 -			if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
 -				// While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
 -				// 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
 -				// in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
 -				// wishes to give us money for no reason.
 -				// Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
 -				// near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
 -				// scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
 -				// non-standard due to their size.
 -				// Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
 -				// us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
 -				// nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
 -				continue;
 -			}
 -			if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
 -				spendable_output =  Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
 -					outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 -					output: outp.clone(),
 -				});
 -				break;
 -			} else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
 -				if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
 -					spendable_output =  Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
 -						outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 -						per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
 -						to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
 -						output: outp.clone(),
 -						key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
 -						revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
 -					});
 -					break;
 -				}
 -			} else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
 -				spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
 -					outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 -					output: outp.clone(),
 -					key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
 -				});
 -				break;
 -			} else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
 -				spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
 -					outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 -					output: outp.clone(),
 -				});
 -			}
 -		}
 -		if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
 -			log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 -			match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
 -				hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
 -					let e = entry.get_mut();
 -					e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
 -				}
 -				hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
 -					entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -	}
 -}
 -
 -const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
 -
 -impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
 -	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 -		macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
 -			($key: expr) => {
 -				match $key {
 -					Ok(res) => res,
 -					Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
 -			return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
 -		}
 -
 -		let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 -
 -		let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 -			0 => {
 -				let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
 -			},
 -			1 => { None },
 -			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 -		};
 -		let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -
 -		let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		// Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
 -		// barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
 -		let outpoint = OutPoint {
 -			txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
 -			index: Readable::read(reader)?,
 -		};
 -		let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
 -		let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -
 -		let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -
 -		let their_cur_revocation_points = {
 -			let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 -			if first_idx == 0 {
 -				None
 -			} else {
 -				let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -				if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
 -					Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
 -				} else {
 -					Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
 -				}
 -			}
 -		};
 -
 -		let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -
 -		let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -
 -		macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
 -			() => {
 -				{
 -					let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -					let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -					let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -					let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -					let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -
 -					HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 -						offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
 -		for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
 -			let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -			let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -			let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
 -			for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 -				htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
 -			}
 -			if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
 -				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
 -		for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
 -			let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -			let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 -			let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
 -			let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
 -			for _ in 0..outputs_count {
 -				outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
 -			}
 -			if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
 -				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
 -		for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
 -			let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -			let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 -			if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
 -				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
 -			() => {
 -				{
 -					let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -					let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -					let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -					let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -					let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -					let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -					let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -
 -					let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -					let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
 -					for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
 -						let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
 -						let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 -							0 => None,
 -							1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
 -							_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 -						};
 -						htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
 -					}
 -
 -					HolderSignedTx {
 -						txid,
 -						revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
 -						htlc_outputs: htlcs
 -					}
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 -			0 => None,
 -			1 => {
 -				Some(read_holder_tx!())
 -			},
 -			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 -		};
 -		let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
 -
 -		let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 -		let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 -
 -		let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
 -		for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
 -			let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -			let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
 -			if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
 -				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
 -		for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
 -			let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 -				0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
 -				1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
 -				_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
 -			};
 -			pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
 -		}
 -
 -		let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
 -		for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
 -			if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
 -				pending_events.push(event);
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -
 -		let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
 -		for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
 -			let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -			let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -			let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
 -			for _ in 0..events_len {
 -				let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 -					0 => {
 -						let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -						let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -						OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
 -							htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
 -						}
 -					},
 -					1 => {
 -						let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -						OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
 -							descriptor
 -						}
 -					},
 -					_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 -				};
 -				events.push(ev);
 -			}
 -			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
 -		}
 -
 -		let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
 -		for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
 -			let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -			let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -			let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
 -			for _ in 0..outputs_len {
 -				outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
 -			}
 -			if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
 -				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 -			}
 -		}
 -		let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -
 -		let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -		let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -
 -		Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
 -			latest_update_id,
 -			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
 -
 -			destination_script,
 -			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
 -			counterparty_payment_script,
 -			shutdown_script,
 -
 -			keys,
 -			funding_info,
 -			current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
 -			prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
 -
 -			counterparty_tx_cache,
 -			funding_redeemscript,
 -			channel_value_satoshis,
 -			their_cur_revocation_points,
 -
 -			on_holder_tx_csv,
 -
 -			commitment_secrets,
 -			counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
 -			counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
 -			counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
 -
 -			prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
 -			current_holder_commitment_tx,
 -			current_counterparty_commitment_number,
 -			current_holder_commitment_number,
 -
 -			payment_preimages,
 -			pending_monitor_events,
 -			pending_events,
 -
 -			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
 -			outputs_to_watch,
 -
 -			onchain_tx_handler,
 -
 -			lockdown_from_offchain,
 -			holder_tx_signed,
 -
 -			last_block_hash,
 -			secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 -		}))
 -	}
 -}
 -
 -#[cfg(test)]
 -mod tests {
 -	use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
 -	use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
 -	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
 -	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
 -	use bitcoin::util::bip143;
 -	use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 -	use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 -	use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
 -	use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
 -	use hex;
 -	use chain::chainmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
 -	use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
 -	use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
 -	use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
 -	use ln::chan_utils;
 -	use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
 -	use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
 -	use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 -	use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
 -	use std::sync::Arc;
 -	use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
 -
 -	#[test]
 -	fn test_prune_preimages() {
 -		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 -		let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
 -
 -		let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 -		let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
 -
 -		let mut preimages = Vec::new();
 -		{
 -			for i in 0..20 {
 -				let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
 -				let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
 -				preimages.push((preimage, hash));
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
 -			($preimages_slice: expr) => {
 -				{
 -					let mut res = Vec::new();
 -					for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
 -						res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 -							offered: true,
 -							amount_msat: 0,
 -							cltv_expiry: 0,
 -							payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
 -							transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
 -						}, None));
 -					}
 -					res
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -		macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
 -			($preimages_slice: expr) => {
 -				{
 -					let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
 -					let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
 -					res
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
 -			($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
 -				for preimage in $preimages_slice {
 -					assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
 -				}
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
 -			&secp_ctx,
 -			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 -			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 -			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 -			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 -			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 -			[41; 32],
 -			0,
 -			(0, 0)
 -		);
 -
 -		// Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
 -		// old state.
 -		let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
 -			&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
 -			(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
 -			&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
 -			&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
 -			10, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
 -
 -		monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
 -		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
 -		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
 -		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
 -		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
 -		for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
 -			monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
 -		}
 -
 -		// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
 -		let mut secret = [0; 32];
 -		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 -		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 -		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
 -		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
 -		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
 -
 -		// Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
 -		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 -		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 -		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
 -		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
 -		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
 -
 -		// Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
 -		// previous commitment tx's preimages too
 -		monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
 -		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 -		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 -		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
 -		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
 -		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
 -
 -		// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
 -		monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
 -		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 -		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 -		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
 -		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
 -	}
 -
 -	#[test]
 -	fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
 -		// We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
 -		// not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
 -
 -		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 -		let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 -		let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
 -		let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 -
 -		macro_rules! sign_input {
 -			($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
 -				let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 -					offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
 -					amount_msat: 0,
 -					cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
 -					payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
 -					transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
 -				};
 -				let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
 -				let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
 -				let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
 -				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 -				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 -				sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
 -				if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
 -					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
 -				} else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
 -					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
 -				} else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
 -					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
 -				} else {
 -					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
 -				}
 -				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
 -				println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
 -				println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
 -				println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
 -			}
 -		}
 -
 -		let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
 -		let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
 -
 -		// Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
 -		let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
 -		for i in 0..4 {
 -			claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
 -				previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 -					txid,
 -					vout: i,
 -				},
 -				script_sig: Script::new(),
 -				sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 -				witness: Vec::new(),
 -			});
 -		}
 -		claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
 -			script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
 -			value: 0,
 -		});
 -		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
 -		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
 -		{
 -			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
 -			for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
 -				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
 -			}
 -		}
 -		assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 -
 -		// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
 -		claim_tx.input.clear();
 -		sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 -		for i in 0..4 {
 -			claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
 -				previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 -					txid,
 -					vout: i,
 -				},
 -				script_sig: Script::new(),
 -				sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 -				witness: Vec::new(),
 -			});
 -		}
 -		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
 -		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
 -		{
 -			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
 -			for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
 -				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
 -			}
 -		}
 -		assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 -
 -		// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
 -		claim_tx.input.clear();
 -		sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 -		claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
 -			previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 -				txid,
 -				vout: 0,
 -			},
 -			script_sig: Script::new(),
 -			sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 -			witness: Vec::new(),
 -		});
 -		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
 -		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
 -		{
 -			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
 -			for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
 -				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
 -			}
 -		}
 -		assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 -	}
 -
 -	// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
 -}
diff --cc lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index 5b1183570,000000000..feff39786
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@@ -1,2843 -1,0 +1,2661 @@@
 +// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
 +// history.
 +//
 +// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
 +// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
 +// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
 +// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
 +// licenses.
 +
 +//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
 +//! here.
 +//!
 +//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
 +//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
 +//! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
 +//!
 +//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
 +//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
 +//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
 +//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
 +//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
 +//!
 +//! [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
 +
 +use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
 +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
 +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
 +use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
 +use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
 +use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
 +
 +use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 +use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 +use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
 +
 +use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
 +use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 +use bitcoin::secp256k1;
 +
 +use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
 +use ln::chan_utils;
 +use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
 +use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
 +use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
- use chain;
- use chain::Filter;
 +use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
 +use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
 +use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
 +use util::logger::Logger;
 +use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
- use util::{byte_utils, events};
++use util::byte_utils;
 +use util::events::Event;
 +
 +use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map};
- use std::sync::Mutex;
 +use std::{cmp, mem};
 +use std::ops::Deref;
 +use std::io::Error;
 +
 +/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
 +/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
 +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
 +#[derive(Clone)]
 +#[must_use]
 +pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 +	pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
 +	/// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
 +	/// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
 +	/// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
 +	///
 +	/// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
 +	/// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
 +	/// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
 +	pub update_id: u64,
 +}
 +
 +impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 +	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 +		self.update_id.write(w)?;
 +		(self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
 +		for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
 +			update_step.write(w)?;
 +		}
 +		Ok(())
 +	}
 +}
 +impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 +	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 +		let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 +		let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 +		let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
 +		for _ in 0..len {
 +			updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
 +		}
 +		Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
 +#[derive(Clone)]
 +pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
 +	/// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
 +	/// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
 +	///
 +	/// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
 +	/// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
 +	/// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
 +	/// restore the channel to an operational state.
 +	///
 +	/// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
 +	/// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
 +	/// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
 +	///
 +	/// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
 +	/// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
 +	/// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
 +	/// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
 +	/// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
 +	/// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
 +	/// been "frozen".
 +	///
 +	/// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
 +	/// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
 +	/// operation.
 +	///
 +	/// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
 +	/// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
 +	/// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
 +	/// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
 +	/// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
 +	/// reload-time.
 +	///
 +	/// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
 +	/// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
 +	/// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
 +	TemporaryFailure,
 +	/// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
 +	/// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
 +	/// of this channel).
 +	///
 +	/// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
 +	/// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
 +	/// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
 +	/// update must be rejected.
 +	///
 +	/// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
 +	/// the channel monitor instance.
 +	///
 +	/// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
 +	/// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
 +	/// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
 +	///
 +	/// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
 +	/// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
 +	/// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
 +	/// lagging behind on block processing.
 +	PermanentFailure,
 +}
 +
 +/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
 +/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
 +/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
 +/// corrupted.
 +/// Contains a human-readable error message.
 +#[derive(Debug)]
 +pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
 +
 +/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
 +#[derive(PartialEq)]
 +pub enum MonitorEvent {
 +	/// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
 +	HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
 +
 +	/// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
 +	CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
 +}
 +
 +/// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
 +/// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
 +/// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
 +///
 +/// [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
 +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 +pub struct HTLCUpdate {
 +	pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 +	pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 +	pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
 +}
 +impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
 +
- /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`] for monitoring channels.
- ///
- /// Connected and disconnected blocks must be provided to `ChainMonitor` as documented by
- /// [`chain::Watch`]. May be used in conjunction with [`ChannelManager`] to monitor channels locally
- /// or used independently to monitor channels remotely.
- ///
- /// [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
- /// [`ChannelManager`]: ../../ln/channelmanager/struct.ChannelManager.html
- pub struct ChainMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
- 	where C::Target: chain::Filter,
-         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
-         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
-         L::Target: Logger,
- {
- 	/// The monitors
- 	pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
- 	chain_source: Option<C>,
- 	broadcaster: T,
- 	logger: L,
- 	fee_estimator: F
- }
- 
- impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
- 	where C::Target: chain::Filter,
- 	      T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- 	      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- 	      L::Target: Logger,
- {
- 	/// Dispatches to per-channel monitors, which are responsible for updating their on-chain view
- 	/// of a channel and reacting accordingly based on transactions in the connected block. See
- 	/// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`] for details. Any HTLCs that were resolved on chain will
- 	/// be returned by [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
- 	///
- 	/// Calls back to [`chain::Filter`] if any monitor indicated new outputs to watch, returning
- 	/// `true` if so. Subsequent calls must not exclude any transactions matching the new outputs
- 	/// nor any in-block descendants of such transactions. It is not necessary to re-fetch the block
- 	/// to obtain updated `txdata`.
- 	///
- 	/// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_connected
- 	/// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
- 	/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
- 	pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> bool {
- 		let mut has_new_outputs_to_watch = false;
- 		{
- 			let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- 			for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- 				let mut txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
- 				has_new_outputs_to_watch |= !txn_outputs.is_empty();
- 
- 				if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
- 					for (txid, outputs) in txn_outputs.drain(..) {
- 						for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- 							chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid, index: idx as u16 }, &output.script_pubkey);
- 						}
- 					}
- 				}
- 			}
- 		}
- 		has_new_outputs_to_watch
- 	}
- 
- 	/// Dispatches to per-channel monitors, which are responsible for updating their on-chain view
- 	/// of a channel based on the disconnected block. See [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`] for
- 	/// details.
- 	///
- 	/// [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_disconnected
- 	pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
- 		let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- 		for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- 			monitor.block_disconnected(header, disconnected_height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
- 		}
- 	}
- 
- 	/// Creates a new `ChainMonitor` used to watch on-chain activity pertaining to channels.
- 	///
- 	/// When an optional chain source implementing [`chain::Filter`] is provided, the chain monitor
- 	/// will call back to it indicating transactions and outputs of interest. This allows clients to
- 	/// pre-filter blocks or only fetch blocks matching a compact filter. Otherwise, clients may
- 	/// always need to fetch full blocks absent another means for determining which blocks contain
- 	/// transactions relevant to the watched channels.
- 	///
- 	/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
- 	pub fn new(chain_source: Option<C>, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> Self {
- 		Self {
- 			monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- 			chain_source,
- 			broadcaster,
- 			logger,
- 			fee_estimator: feeest,
- 		}
- 	}
- 
- 	/// Adds the monitor that watches the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
- 	///
- 	/// Calls back to [`chain::Filter`] with the funding transaction and outputs to watch.
- 	///
- 	/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
- 	fn add_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- 		let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- 		let entry = match monitors.entry(outpoint) {
- 			hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given outpoint is already present")),
- 			hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
- 		};
- 		{
- 			let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
- 			log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
- 
- 			if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
- 				chain_source.register_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
- 				for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
- 					for (idx, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- 						chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: idx as u16 }, &script_pubkey);
- 					}
- 				}
- 			}
- 		}
- 		entry.insert(monitor);
- 		Ok(())
- 	}
- 
- 	/// Updates the monitor that watches the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
- 	fn update_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- 		let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- 		match monitors.get_mut(&outpoint) {
- 			Some(orig_monitor) => {
- 				log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
- 				orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
- 			},
- 			None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
- 		}
- 	}
- }
- 
- impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> chain::Watch for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
- 	where C::Target: chain::Filter,
- 	      T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- 	      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- 	      L::Target: Logger,
- {
- 	type Keys = ChanSigner;
- 
- 	fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
- 		match self.add_monitor(funding_txo, monitor) {
- 			Ok(_) => Ok(()),
- 			Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
- 		}
- 	}
- 
- 	fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
- 		match self.update_monitor(funding_txo, update) {
- 			Ok(_) => Ok(()),
- 			Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
- 		}
- 	}
- 
- 	fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
- 		let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::new();
- 		for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
- 			pending_monitor_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
- 		}
- 		pending_monitor_events
- 	}
- }
- 
- impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
- 	where C::Target: chain::Filter,
- 	      T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- 	      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- 	      L::Target: Logger,
- {
- 	fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
- 		let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
- 		for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
- 			pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
- 		}
- 		pending_events
- 	}
- }
- 
 +/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
 +/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
 +pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
 +/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
 +/// HTLC-Success transaction.
 +/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
 +/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
 +pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
 +/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
 +/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
 +/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
 +/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
 +/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
 +/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
 +/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
 +/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
 +/// accurate block height.
 +/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
 +/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
 +/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
 +pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
 +/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
 +/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
 +/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
 +/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
 +/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
 +/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
 +pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
 +/// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
 +/// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
 +///
 +/// This is used for a few separate purposes:
 +/// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
 +///    waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
 +///    fail this HTLC,
 +/// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
 +///    condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
 +/// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
 +///    that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
 +///
 +/// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
 +/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
 +///
 +/// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
 +/// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
 +/// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
 +///
 +/// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
 +/// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
 +pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
 +
 +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 +struct HolderSignedTx {
 +	/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
 +	txid: Txid,
 +	revocation_key: PublicKey,
 +	a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 +	b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 +	delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 +	per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 +	feerate_per_kw: u32,
 +	htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
 +}
 +
 +/// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
 +/// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
 +#[derive(PartialEq)]
 +struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 +	counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 +	counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 +	on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
 +	per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
 +}
 +
 +impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 +	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 +		self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
 +		self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
 +		w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
 +		w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
 +		for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 +			w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 +			w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
 +			for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
 +				htlc.write(w)?;
 +			}
 +		}
 +		Ok(())
 +	}
 +}
 +impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 +	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 +		let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
 +			let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
 +			let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
 +			let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
 +			let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 +			let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
 +			for _  in 0..per_htlc_len {
 +				let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
 +				let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 +				let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
 +				for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 +					let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
 +					htlcs.push(htlc);
 +				}
 +				if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
 +					return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 +				}
 +			}
 +			CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 +				counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
 +				counterparty_htlc_base_key,
 +				on_counterparty_tx_csv,
 +				per_htlc,
 +			}
 +		};
 +		Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
 +/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
 +/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
 +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 +pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
 +	Revoked {
 +		per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 +		counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 +		counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 +		per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
 +		input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
 +		amount: u64,
 +		htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
 +		on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
 +	},
 +	CounterpartyHTLC {
 +		per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 +		counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 +		counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 +		preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 +		htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
 +	},
 +	HolderHTLC {
 +		preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 +		amount: u64,
 +	},
 +	Funding {
 +		funding_redeemscript: Script,
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +impl Writeable for InputMaterial  {
 +	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 +		match self {
 +			&InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
 +				writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 +				per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
 +				counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
 +				counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
 +				writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
 +				input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
 +				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
 +				htlc.write(writer)?;
 +				on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
 +			},
 +			&InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
 +				writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 +				per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
 +				counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
 +				counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
 +				preimage.write(writer)?;
 +				htlc.write(writer)?;
 +			},
 +			&InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
 +				writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
 +				preimage.write(writer)?;
 +				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
 +			},
 +			&InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
 +				writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
 +				funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
 +			}
 +		}
 +		Ok(())
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +impl Readable for InputMaterial {
 +	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 +		let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 +			0 => {
 +				let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				InputMaterial::Revoked {
 +					per_commitment_point,
 +					counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
 +					counterparty_htlc_base_key,
 +					per_commitment_key,
 +					input_descriptor,
 +					amount,
 +					htlc,
 +					on_counterparty_tx_csv
 +				}
 +			},
 +			1 => {
 +				let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
 +					per_commitment_point,
 +					counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
 +					counterparty_htlc_base_key,
 +					preimage,
 +					htlc
 +				}
 +			},
 +			2 => {
 +				let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
 +					preimage,
 +					amount,
 +				}
 +			},
 +			3 => {
 +				InputMaterial::Funding {
 +					funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
 +				}
 +			}
 +			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 +		};
 +		Ok(input_material)
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +/// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
 +/// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
 +/// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
 +/// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
 +/// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
 +pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
 +	// Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
 +	// after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
 +	pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
 +	// Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
 +	// ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
 +	// Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
 +	// of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
 +	// Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
 +	pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
 +	// Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
 +	pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
 +	// Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
 +	// and satisfy witness program.
 +	pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
 +}
 +
 +/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
 +/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
 +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 +enum OnchainEvent {
 +	/// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
 +	/// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
 +	/// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
 +	HTLCUpdate {
 +		htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
 +	},
 +	MaturingOutput {
 +		descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
 +	},
 +}
 +
 +const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 +const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 +
 +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
 +#[derive(Clone)]
 +pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 +	LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
 +		commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
 +		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
 +	},
 +	LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
 +		unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
 +		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
 +		commitment_number: u64,
 +		their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
 +	},
 +	PaymentPreimage {
 +		payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 +	},
 +	CommitmentSecret {
 +		idx: u64,
 +		secret: [u8; 32],
 +	},
 +	/// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
 +	/// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
 +	ChannelForceClosed {
 +		/// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
 +		/// think we've fallen behind!
 +		should_broadcast: bool,
 +	},
 +}
 +
 +impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 +	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 +		match self {
 +			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
 +				0u8.write(w)?;
 +				commitment_tx.write(w)?;
 +				(htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
 +				for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
 +					output.write(w)?;
 +					signature.write(w)?;
 +					source.write(w)?;
 +				}
 +			}
 +			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
 +				1u8.write(w)?;
 +				unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
 +				commitment_number.write(w)?;
 +				their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
 +				(htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
 +				for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
 +					output.write(w)?;
 +					source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
 +				}
 +			},
 +			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
 +				2u8.write(w)?;
 +				payment_preimage.write(w)?;
 +			},
 +			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
 +				3u8.write(w)?;
 +				idx.write(w)?;
 +				secret.write(w)?;
 +			},
 +			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
 +				4u8.write(w)?;
 +				should_broadcast.write(w)?;
 +			},
 +		}
 +		Ok(())
 +	}
 +}
 +impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 +	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 +		match Readable::read(r)? {
 +			0u8 => {
 +				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
 +					commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
 +					htlc_outputs: {
 +						let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 +						let mut res = Vec::new();
 +						for _ in 0..len {
 +							res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
 +						}
 +						res
 +					},
 +				})
 +			},
 +			1u8 => {
 +				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
 +					unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
 +					commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
 +					their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
 +					htlc_outputs: {
 +						let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 +						let mut res = Vec::new();
 +						for _ in 0..len {
 +							res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
 +						}
 +						res
 +					},
 +				})
 +			},
 +			2u8 => {
 +				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
 +					payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
 +				})
 +			},
 +			3u8 => {
 +				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
 +					idx: Readable::read(r)?,
 +					secret: Readable::read(r)?,
 +				})
 +			},
 +			4u8 => {
 +				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
 +					should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
 +				})
 +			},
 +			_ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 +		}
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
 +/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
 +///
 +/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
 +/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
 +///
 +/// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
 +/// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
 +/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
 +/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
 +pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
 +	latest_update_id: u64,
 +	commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 +
 +	destination_script: Script,
 +	broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
 +	counterparty_payment_script: Script,
 +	shutdown_script: Script,
 +
 +	keys: ChanSigner,
 +	funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
 +	current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
 +	prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
 +
 +	counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
 +	funding_redeemscript: Script,
 +	channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 +	// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
 +	their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 +
 +	on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
 +
 +	commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 +	counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
 +	/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
 +	/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
 +	/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
 +	/// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
 +	/// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
 +	counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
 +	/// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
 +	/// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
 +	/// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
 +	/// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
 +	counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
 +
 +	// We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
 +	// some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
 +	// various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
 +	// transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
 +	prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
 +	current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
 +
 +	// Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
 +	// deserialization
 +	current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
 +	// Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
 +	// deserialization
 +	current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
 +
 +	payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
 +
 +	pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
 +	pending_events: Vec<Event>,
 +
 +	// Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
 +	// we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
 +	// actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
 +	onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
 +
 +	// If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
 +	// interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
 +	// be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
 +	// Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
 +	outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
 +
 +	#[cfg(test)]
 +	pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
 +	#[cfg(not(test))]
 +	onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
 +
 +	// This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
 +	// channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
 +	// updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
 +	lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
 +
 +	// Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
 +	// OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
 +	// may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
 +	//
 +	// In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
 +	// nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
 +	// remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
 +	holder_tx_signed: bool,
 +
 +	// We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
 +	// consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
 +	// (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
 +	// their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
 +	// the full block_connected).
 +	last_block_hash: BlockHash,
 +	secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 +}
 +
 +#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 +/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
 +/// underlying object
 +impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 +	fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
 +		if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
 +			self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
 +			self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
 +			self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
 +			self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
 +			self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
 +			self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
 +			self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
 +			self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
 +			self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
 +			self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
 +			self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
 +			self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
 +			self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
 +			self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
 +			self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
 +			self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
 +			self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
 +			self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
 +			self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
 +			self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
 +			self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
 +			self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
 +			self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
 +			self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
 +			self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
 +			self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
 +			self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
 +			self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
 +		{
 +			false
 +		} else {
 +			true
 +		}
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 +	/// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
 +	///
 +	/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
 +	/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
 +	/// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
 +	/// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
 +	/// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
 +	pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
 +		//TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
 +		//serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
 +		writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 +		writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 +
 +		self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
 +
 +		// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
 +		U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
 +
 +		self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
 +		if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
 +			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 +			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
 +			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
 +			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
 +		} else {
 +			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 +		}
 +
 +		self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
 +		self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
 +
 +		self.keys.write(writer)?;
 +		writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
 +		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
 +		self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
 +		self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
 +		self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
 +
 +		self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
 +		self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
 +		self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
 +
 +		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 +			Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
 +				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
 +				writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
 +				match second_option {
 +					Some(second_pubkey) => {
 +						writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
 +					},
 +					None => {
 +						writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
 +					},
 +				}
 +			},
 +			None => {
 +				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
 +			},
 +		}
 +
 +		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
 +
 +		self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
 +
 +		macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
 +			($htlc_output: expr) => {
 +				writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
 +				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
 +				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
 +				writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
 +				$htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
 +		for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
 +			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 +			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
 +			for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
 +				serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 +				htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
 +		for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 +			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 +			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
 +			(txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
 +			for script in txouts.iter() {
 +				script.write(writer)?;
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
 +		for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
 +			writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
 +			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
 +		}
 +
 +		macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
 +			($holder_tx: expr) => {
 +				$holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
 +				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
 +				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 +				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 +				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
 +				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
 +
 +				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
 +				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
 +				for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 +					serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 +					if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
 +						1u8.write(writer)?;
 +						writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
 +					} else {
 +						0u8.write(writer)?;
 +					}
 +					htlc_source.write(writer)?;
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 +			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 +			serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
 +		} else {
 +			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 +		}
 +
 +		serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 +
 +		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
 +		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
 +
 +		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
 +		for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
 +			writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
 +		}
 +
 +		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
 +		for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
 +			match event {
 +				MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
 +					0u8.write(writer)?;
 +					upd.write(writer)?;
 +				},
 +				MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
 +		for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
 +			event.write(writer)?;
 +		}
 +
 +		self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
 +
 +		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
 +		for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
 +			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
 +			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
 +			for ev in events.iter() {
 +				match *ev {
 +					OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
 +						0u8.write(writer)?;
 +						htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
 +						htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
 +					},
 +					OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
 +						1u8.write(writer)?;
 +						descriptor.write(writer)?;
 +					},
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		(self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
 +		for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
 +			txid.write(writer)?;
 +			(output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
 +			for script in output_scripts.iter() {
 +				script.write(writer)?;
 +			}
 +		}
 +		self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
 +
 +		self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
 +		self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
 +
 +		Ok(())
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 +	pub(crate) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
 +			on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
 +			counterparty_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
 +			on_holder_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 +			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 +			initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 +
 +		assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
 +		let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
 +		let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
 +		let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
 +		let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
 +
 +		let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: *counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: *counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
 +
 +		let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_holder_tx_csv);
 +
 +		let holder_tx_sequence = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
 +		let holder_tx_locktime = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
 +		let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
 +			txid: initial_holder_commitment_tx.txid(),
 +			revocation_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
 +			a_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
 +			b_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
 +			delayed_payment_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
 +			per_commitment_point: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
 +			feerate_per_kw: initial_holder_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
 +			htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
 +		};
 +		onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);
 +
 +		let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 +		outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![funding_info.1.clone()]);
 +
 +		ChannelMonitor {
 +			latest_update_id: 0,
 +			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
 +
 +			destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
 +			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
 +			counterparty_payment_script,
 +			shutdown_script,
 +
 +			keys,
 +			funding_info,
 +			current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
 +			prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
 +
 +			counterparty_tx_cache,
 +			funding_redeemscript,
 +			channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
 +			their_cur_revocation_points: None,
 +
 +			on_holder_tx_csv,
 +
 +			commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 +			counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 +			counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
 +			counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
 +
 +			prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 +			current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
 +			current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
 +			current_holder_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((holder_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (holder_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
 +
 +			payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
 +			pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
 +			pending_events: Vec::new(),
 +
 +			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
 +			outputs_to_watch,
 +
 +			onchain_tx_handler,
 +
 +			lockdown_from_offchain: false,
 +			holder_tx_signed: false,
 +
 +			last_block_hash: Default::default(),
 +			secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
 +	/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
 +	/// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
 +	fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
 +		if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
 +			return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
 +		}
 +
 +		// Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
 +		// events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
 +		if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
 +			for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
 +				*source = None;
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
 +			let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
 +			let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
 +			let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 +			let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
 +
 +			self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
 +				for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 +					if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 +						return true
 +					}
 +				}
 +				if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 +					for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 +						if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 +							return true
 +						}
 +					}
 +				}
 +				let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
 +					if *cn < min_idx {
 +						return true
 +					}
 +					true
 +				} else { false };
 +				if contains {
 +					counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
 +				}
 +				false
 +			});
 +		}
 +
 +		Ok(())
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
 +	/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
 +	/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
 +	/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
 +	pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
 +		// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 +		// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 +		// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
 +		// timeouts)
 +		for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
 +			self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
 +		}
 +
 +		let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
 +		log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
 +		log_trace!(logger, "New potential counterparty commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
 +		self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
 +		self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
 +		self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
 +		self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
 +		//TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
 +		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 +			Some(old_points) => {
 +				if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
 +					self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
 +				} else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
 +					if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
 +						self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
 +					} else {
 +						self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 +					}
 +				} else {
 +					self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 +				}
 +			},
 +			None => {
 +				self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 +			}
 +		}
 +		let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
 +		for htlc in htlc_outputs {
 +			if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
 +				htlcs.push(htlc.0);
 +			}
 +		}
 +		self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
 +	/// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
 +	/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 +	/// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
 +	/// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
 +	fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
 +		let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 +		let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
 +		let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
 +		let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
 +			txid,
 +			revocation_key: commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
 +			a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
 +			b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
 +			delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
 +			per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
 +			feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
 +			htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
 +		};
 +		self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx);
 +		self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 +		mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 +		self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
 +		if self.holder_tx_signed {
 +			return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
 +		}
 +		Ok(())
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 +	/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
 +	pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
 +		self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
 +	}
 +
 +	pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
 +		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 +					L::Target: Logger,
 +	{
 +		for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
 +			broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
 +		}
 +		self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
 +	/// itself.
 +	///
 +	/// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
 +	pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
 +		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 +					L::Target: Logger,
 +	{
 +		if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
 +			panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
 +		}
 +		for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
 +			match update {
 +				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
 +					if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
 +					self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
 +				},
 +				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
 +					self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
 +				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
 +					self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
 +				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
 +					self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
 +				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
 +					self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
 +					if should_broadcast {
 +						self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
 +					} else {
 +						log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +		self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
 +		Ok(())
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
 +	/// ChannelMonitor.
 +	pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
 +		self.latest_update_id
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
 +	pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
 +		&self.funding_info
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
 +	/// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
 +	///
 +	/// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
 +	pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
 +		&self.outputs_to_watch
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
 +	/// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
 +	/// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
 +	/// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
 +	///
 +	/// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
 +	pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
 +		let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
 +		for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 +			for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 +				res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
 +			}
 +		}
 +		res
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
 +	/// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
 +	///
 +	/// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
 +	pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
 +		let mut ret = Vec::new();
 +		mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
 +		ret
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
 +	/// in the process.
 +	///
 +	/// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
 +	/// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
 +	/// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
 +	pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
 +		let mut ret = Vec::new();
 +		mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
 +		ret
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 +	fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 +		self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
 +	}
 +
 +	pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 +		self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
 +	}
 +
 +	pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
 +		self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
 +	}
 +
 +	pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
 +		self.current_holder_commitment_number
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
 +	/// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
 +	/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
 +	/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
 +	/// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
 +	/// revoked counterparty commitment tx
 +	fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
 +		// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 +		// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 +		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
 +		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 +
 +		let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
 +		let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
 +
 +		macro_rules! ignore_error {
 +			( $thing : expr ) => {
 +				match $thing {
 +					Ok(a) => a,
 +					Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
 +				}
 +			};
 +		}
 +
 +		let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 +		if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 +			let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 +			let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
 +			let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 +			let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
 +			let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
 +
 +			let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
 +			let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
 +
 +			// First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
 +			for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 +				if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
 +					let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
 +					claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
 +				}
 +			}
 +
 +			// Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
 +			if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 +				for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 +					if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
 +						if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 +								tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
 +							return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 +						}
 +						let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
 +						claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +
 +			// Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
 +			if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
 +				// We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
 +				log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
 +				watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
 +				self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
 +
 +				macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
 +					($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
 +						if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
 +							for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
 +								if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
 +									log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 +									match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
 +										hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
 +											let e = entry.get_mut();
 +											e.retain(|ref event| {
 +												match **event {
 +													OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
 +														return htlc_update.0 != **source
 +													},
 +													_ => true
 +												}
 +											});
 +											e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
 +										}
 +										hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
 +											entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
 +										}
 +									}
 +								}
 +							}
 +						}
 +					}
 +				}
 +				if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 +					check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
 +				}
 +				if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 +					check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
 +				}
 +				// No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
 +			}
 +		} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 +			// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
 +			// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
 +			// confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
 +			// upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
 +			// already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
 +			// not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
 +			// insert it here.
 +			watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
 +			self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
 +
 +			log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
 +
 +			macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
 +				($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
 +					if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
 +						$id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
 +							if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
 +								// Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
 +								// broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
 +								// fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
 +								// payment_preimage.
 +								// Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
 +								// commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
 +								// broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
 +								// cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
 +								// need to here.
 +								for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
 +									if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
 +										continue $id;
 +									}
 +								}
 +								log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
 +								match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
 +									hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
 +										let e = entry.get_mut();
 +										e.retain(|ref event| {
 +											match **event {
 +												OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
 +													return htlc_update.0 != **source
 +												},
 +												_ => true
 +											}
 +										});
 +										e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
 +									}
 +									hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
 +										entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
 +									}
 +								}
 +							}
 +						}
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +			if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 +				check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
 +			}
 +			if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 +				check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
 +			}
 +
 +			if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 +				let revocation_point_option =
 +					if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
 +					else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
 +						if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
 +					} else { None };
 +				if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
 +					self.counterparty_payment_script = {
 +						// Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
 +						// script_pubkey version
 +						let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
 +						Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
 +					};
 +
 +					// Then, try to find htlc outputs
 +					for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 +						if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
 +							if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 +									tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
 +								return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 +							}
 +							let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
 +							let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
 +							if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
 +								let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
 +								claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
 +							}
 +						}
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +		(claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
 +	fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 +		let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
 +		if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
 +			return (Vec::new(), None)
 +		}
 +
 +		macro_rules! ignore_error {
 +			( $thing : expr ) => {
 +				match $thing {
 +					Ok(a) => a,
 +					Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
 +				}
 +			};
 +		}
 +
 +		let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
 +		let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
 +		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 +
 +		log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
 +		let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key,  per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
 +		let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
 +		(claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
 +	}
 +
 +	fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
 +		let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
 +		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
 +
 +		let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
 +		let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
 +
 +		for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 +			if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
 +				claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
 +					witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
 +						preimage: if !htlc.offered {
 +								if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 +									Some(preimage.clone())
 +								} else {
 +									// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 +									continue;
 +								}
 +							} else { None },
 +						amount: htlc.amount_msat,
 +				}});
 +				watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		(claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
 +	/// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
 +	/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
 +	fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
 +		let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
 +		let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
 +		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 +
 +		macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
 +			($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
 +				log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 +				match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
 +					hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
 +						let e = entry.get_mut();
 +						e.retain(|ref event| {
 +							match **event {
 +								OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
 +									return htlc_update.0 != $source
 +								},
 +								_ => true
 +							}
 +						});
 +						e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
 +					}
 +					hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
 +						entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
 +			($updates: expr) => {
 +				claim_requests = $updates.0;
 +				watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
 +				self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		// HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
 +		let mut is_holder_tx = false;
 +
 +		if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 +			is_holder_tx = true;
 +			log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
 +			let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 +			append_onchain_update!(res);
 +		} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 +			if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 +				is_holder_tx = true;
 +				log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
 +				let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
 +				append_onchain_update!(res);
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
 +			($holder_tx: expr) => {
 +				for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
 +					if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
 +						if let &Some(ref source) = source {
 +							wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
 +						}
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		if is_holder_tx {
 +			fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 +			if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 +				fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		(claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
 +	/// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
 +	/// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
 +	/// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
 +	/// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
 +	/// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
 +	/// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
 +	/// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
 +	/// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
 +	pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 +		log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
 +		self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 +		if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 +			let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 +			let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 +			for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 +				if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 +					let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 +							if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 +								// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 +								continue;
 +							}
 +						} else { None };
 +					if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 +							&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 +						res.push(htlc_tx);
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +			// We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 +			// The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 +			return res
 +		}
 +		Vec::new()
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
 +	/// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
 +	/// revoked commitment transaction.
 +	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
 +	pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 +		log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
 +		if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 +			let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 +			let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 +			for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 +				if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 +					let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 +							if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 +								// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 +								continue;
 +							}
 +						} else { None };
 +					if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 +							&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 +						res.push(htlc_tx);
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +			return res
 +		}
 +		Vec::new()
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
 +	/// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
 +	/// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
 +	/// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
 +	/// - detect settled outputs for later spending
 +	/// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
 +	///
 +	/// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
 +	/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
 +	///
 +	/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
 +	pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
 +		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 +		      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 +					L::Target: Logger,
 +	{
 +		let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
 +		for tx in &txn_matched {
 +			let mut output_val = 0;
 +			for out in tx.output.iter() {
 +				if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
 +				output_val += out.value;
 +				if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		let block_hash = header.block_hash();
 +		log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
 +
 +		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 +		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
 +		for tx in &txn_matched {
 +			if tx.input.len() == 1 {
 +				// Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
 +				// commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
 +				// which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
 +				// filters.
 +				let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
 +				if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
 +					if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
 +						let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
 +						if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
 +							watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
 +						}
 +						if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
 +							let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
 +							if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
 +								watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
 +							}
 +							claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 +						}
 +						claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 +					}
 +				} else {
 +					if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
 +						let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
 +						claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 +						if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
 +							watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
 +						}
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +			// While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
 +			// can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
 +			// we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
 +			self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
 +
 +			self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
 +		}
 +		let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
 +		if should_broadcast {
 +			claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
 +		}
 +		if should_broadcast {
 +			self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 +			if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 +				self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 +				let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 +				if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 +					watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 +				}
 +				claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 +			}
 +		}
 +		if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
 +			for ev in events {
 +				match ev {
 +					OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
 +						log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
 +						self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 +							payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
 +							payment_preimage: None,
 +							source: htlc_update.0,
 +						}));
 +					},
 +					OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
 +						log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
 +						self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
 +							outputs: vec![descriptor]
 +						});
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
 +		self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
 +
 +		// Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
 +		// updating the latter in the process.
 +		watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
 +			let output_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect();
 +			self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts).is_none()
 +		});
 +		watch_outputs
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
 +	/// appropriately.
 +	pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
 +		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 +		      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 +		      L::Target: Logger,
 +	{
 +		let block_hash = header.block_hash();
 +		log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
 +
 +		if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
 +			//We may discard:
 +			//- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
 +			//- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
 +		}
 +
 +		self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
 +
 +		self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
 +	/// transactions thereof.
 +	fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
 +		let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
 +		txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
 +			let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
 +			for input in tx.input.iter() {
 +				if matches { break; }
 +				if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
 +					matches = true;
 +				}
 +			}
 +			if matches {
 +				matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
 +			}
 +			matches
 +		}).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
 +	fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
 +		for input in tx.input.iter() {
 +			if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
 +				for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 +					if idx == input.previous_output.vout as usize {
 +						return true;
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		false
 +	}
 +
 +	fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
 +		// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
 +		//  * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
 +		//    transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
 +		//  * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
 +		//    broadcast if we go on-chain.
 +		// Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
 +		// strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
 +		// to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
 +		// updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
 +		// easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
 +		macro_rules! scan_commitment {
 +			($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
 +				for ref htlc in $htlcs {
 +					// For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
 +					// chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
 +					// time out the HTLC first.
 +					// For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
 +					// concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
 +					// channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
 +					// counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
 +					// can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
 +					// chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
 +					// we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
 +					// on-chain for an expired HTLC.
 +					// Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
 +					// from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
 +					// corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
 +					// least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
 +					//  aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
 +					//      inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
 +					//      outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
 +					//      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
 +					//      CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
 +					//      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
 +					//  The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
 +					//  with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
 +					let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
 +					if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
 +					   (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
 +						log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
 +						return true;
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
 +
 +		if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 +			if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
 +				scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
 +			}
 +		}
 +		if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
 +			if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
 +				scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		false
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
 +	/// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
 +	fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
 +		'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
 +			let mut payment_data = None;
 +			let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
 +				|| (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
 +			let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
 +			let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
 +
 +			macro_rules! log_claim {
 +				($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
 +					// We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
 +					// as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
 +					// to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
 +					// This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
 +					let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
 +					if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
 +							(outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
 +						log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
 +							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
 +							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
 +							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
 +					} else {
 +						log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
 +							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
 +							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
 +							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +
 +			macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
 +				($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
 +					if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
 +						for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
 +							if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
 +								if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
 +									log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
 +									payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
 +									break;
 +								}
 +							}
 +						}
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +
 +			macro_rules! scan_commitment {
 +				($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
 +					for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
 +						if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
 +							if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
 +								log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
 +								// We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
 +								// holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
 +								// transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
 +								// has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
 +								// resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
 +								payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
 +							} else if !$holder_tx {
 +									check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
 +								if payment_data.is_none() {
 +									check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
 +								}
 +							}
 +							if payment_data.is_none() {
 +								log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
 +								continue 'outer_loop;
 +							}
 +						}
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +
 +			if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
 +				scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
 +					"our latest holder commitment tx", true);
 +			}
 +			if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 +				if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
 +					scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
 +						"our previous holder commitment tx", true);
 +				}
 +			}
 +			if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
 +				scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
 +					"counterparty commitment tx", false);
 +			}
 +
 +			// Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
 +			// HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
 +			if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
 +				let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
 +				if accepted_preimage_claim {
 +					if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
 +						|update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
 +						payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
 +						self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 +							source,
 +							payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 +							payment_hash
 +						}));
 +					}
 +				} else if offered_preimage_claim {
 +					if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
 +						|update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
 +							upd.source == source
 +						} else { false }) {
 +						payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
 +						self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 +							source,
 +							payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 +							payment_hash
 +						}));
 +					}
 +				} else {
 +					log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 +					match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
 +						hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
 +							let e = entry.get_mut();
 +							e.retain(|ref event| {
 +								match **event {
 +									OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
 +										return htlc_update.0 != source
 +									},
 +									_ => true
 +								}
 +							});
 +							e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
 +						}
 +						hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
 +							entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
 +						}
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	/// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
 +	fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
 +		let mut spendable_output = None;
 +		for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
 +			if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
 +				// While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
 +				// 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
 +				// in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
 +				// wishes to give us money for no reason.
 +				// Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
 +				// near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
 +				// scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
 +				// non-standard due to their size.
 +				// Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
 +				// us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
 +				// nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
 +				continue;
 +			}
 +			if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
 +				spendable_output =  Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
 +					outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 +					output: outp.clone(),
 +				});
 +				break;
 +			} else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
 +				if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
 +					spendable_output =  Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
 +						outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 +						per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
 +						to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
 +						output: outp.clone(),
 +						key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
 +						revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
 +					});
 +					break;
 +				}
 +			} else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
 +				spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
 +					outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 +					output: outp.clone(),
 +					key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
 +				});
 +				break;
 +			} else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
 +				spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
 +					outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 +					output: outp.clone(),
 +				});
 +			}
 +		}
 +		if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
 +			log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 +			match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
 +				hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
 +					let e = entry.get_mut();
 +					e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
 +				}
 +				hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
 +					entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
 +
 +impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
 +	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 +		macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
 +			($key: expr) => {
 +				match $key {
 +					Ok(res) => res,
 +					Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
 +			return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
 +		}
 +
 +		let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 +
 +		let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 +			0 => {
 +				let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
 +			},
 +			1 => { None },
 +			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 +		};
 +		let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +
 +		let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		// Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
 +		// barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
 +		let outpoint = OutPoint {
 +			txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
 +			index: Readable::read(reader)?,
 +		};
 +		let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
 +		let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +
 +		let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +
 +		let their_cur_revocation_points = {
 +			let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 +			if first_idx == 0 {
 +				None
 +			} else {
 +				let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +				if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
 +					Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
 +				} else {
 +					Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
 +				}
 +			}
 +		};
 +
 +		let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +
 +		let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +
 +		macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
 +			() => {
 +				{
 +					let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +					let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +					let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +					let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +					let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +
 +					HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 +						offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
 +		for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
 +			let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +			let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +			let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
 +			for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 +				htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
 +			}
 +			if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
 +				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
 +		for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
 +			let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +			let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 +			let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
 +			let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
 +			for _ in 0..outputs_count {
 +				outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
 +			}
 +			if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
 +				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
 +		for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
 +			let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +			let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 +			if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
 +				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
 +			() => {
 +				{
 +					let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +					let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +					let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +					let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +					let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +					let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +					let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +
 +					let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +					let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
 +					for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
 +						let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
 +						let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 +							0 => None,
 +							1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
 +							_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 +						};
 +						htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
 +					}
 +
 +					HolderSignedTx {
 +						txid,
 +						revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
 +						htlc_outputs: htlcs
 +					}
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 +			0 => None,
 +			1 => {
 +				Some(read_holder_tx!())
 +			},
 +			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 +		};
 +		let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
 +
 +		let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 +		let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 +
 +		let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
 +		for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
 +			let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +			let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
 +			if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
 +				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
 +		for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
 +			let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 +				0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
 +				1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
 +				_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
 +			};
 +			pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
 +		}
 +
 +		let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
 +		for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
 +			if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
 +				pending_events.push(event);
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +
 +		let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
 +		for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
 +			let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +			let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +			let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
 +			for _ in 0..events_len {
 +				let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 +					0 => {
 +						let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +						let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +						OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
 +							htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
 +						}
 +					},
 +					1 => {
 +						let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +						OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
 +							descriptor
 +						}
 +					},
 +					_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 +				};
 +				events.push(ev);
 +			}
 +			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
 +		}
 +
 +		let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
 +		for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
 +			let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +			let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +			let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
 +			for _ in 0..outputs_len {
 +				outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
 +			}
 +			if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
 +				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 +			}
 +		}
 +		let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +
 +		let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +		let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +
 +		Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
 +			latest_update_id,
 +			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
 +
 +			destination_script,
 +			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
 +			counterparty_payment_script,
 +			shutdown_script,
 +
 +			keys,
 +			funding_info,
 +			current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
 +			prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
 +
 +			counterparty_tx_cache,
 +			funding_redeemscript,
 +			channel_value_satoshis,
 +			their_cur_revocation_points,
 +
 +			on_holder_tx_csv,
 +
 +			commitment_secrets,
 +			counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
 +			counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
 +			counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
 +
 +			prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
 +			current_holder_commitment_tx,
 +			current_counterparty_commitment_number,
 +			current_holder_commitment_number,
 +
 +			payment_preimages,
 +			pending_monitor_events,
 +			pending_events,
 +
 +			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
 +			outputs_to_watch,
 +
 +			onchain_tx_handler,
 +
 +			lockdown_from_offchain,
 +			holder_tx_signed,
 +
 +			last_block_hash,
 +			secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 +		}))
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +#[cfg(test)]
 +mod tests {
 +	use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
 +	use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
 +	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
 +	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
 +	use bitcoin::util::bip143;
 +	use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 +	use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 +	use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
 +	use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
 +	use hex;
 +	use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
 +	use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
 +	use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
 +	use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
 +	use ln::chan_utils;
 +	use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
 +	use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
 +	use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 +	use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
 +	use std::sync::Arc;
 +	use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
 +
 +	#[test]
 +	fn test_prune_preimages() {
 +		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 +		let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
 +
 +		let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 +		let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
 +
 +		let mut preimages = Vec::new();
 +		{
 +			for i in 0..20 {
 +				let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
 +				let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
 +				preimages.push((preimage, hash));
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
 +			($preimages_slice: expr) => {
 +				{
 +					let mut res = Vec::new();
 +					for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
 +						res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 +							offered: true,
 +							amount_msat: 0,
 +							cltv_expiry: 0,
 +							payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
 +							transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
 +						}, None));
 +					}
 +					res
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +		macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
 +			($preimages_slice: expr) => {
 +				{
 +					let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
 +					let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
 +					res
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
 +			($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
 +				for preimage in $preimages_slice {
 +					assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
 +				}
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
 +			&secp_ctx,
 +			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 +			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 +			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 +			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 +			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 +			[41; 32],
 +			0,
 +			(0, 0)
 +		);
 +
 +		// Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
 +		// old state.
 +		let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
 +			&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
 +			(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
 +			&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
 +			&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
 +			10, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
 +
 +		monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
 +		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
 +		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
 +		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
 +		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
 +		for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
 +			monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
 +		}
 +
 +		// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
 +		let mut secret = [0; 32];
 +		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 +		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 +		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
 +		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
 +		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
 +
 +		// Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
 +		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 +		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 +		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
 +		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
 +		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
 +
 +		// Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
 +		// previous commitment tx's preimages too
 +		monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
 +		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 +		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 +		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
 +		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
 +		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
 +
 +		// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
 +		monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
 +		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 +		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 +		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
 +		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
 +	}
 +
 +	#[test]
 +	fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
 +		// We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
 +		// not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
 +
 +		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 +		let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 +		let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
 +		let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 +
 +		macro_rules! sign_input {
 +			($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
 +				let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 +					offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
 +					amount_msat: 0,
 +					cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
 +					payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
 +					transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
 +				};
 +				let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
 +				let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
 +				let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
 +				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 +				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 +				sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
 +				if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
 +					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
 +				} else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
 +					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
 +				} else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
 +					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
 +				} else {
 +					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
 +				}
 +				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
 +				println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
 +				println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
 +				println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +		let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
 +		let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
 +
 +		// Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
 +		let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
 +		for i in 0..4 {
 +			claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
 +				previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 +					txid,
 +					vout: i,
 +				},
 +				script_sig: Script::new(),
 +				sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 +				witness: Vec::new(),
 +			});
 +		}
 +		claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
 +			script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
 +			value: 0,
 +		});
 +		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
 +		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
 +		{
 +			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
 +			for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
 +				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
 +			}
 +		}
 +		assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 +
 +		// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
 +		claim_tx.input.clear();
 +		sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 +		for i in 0..4 {
 +			claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
 +				previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 +					txid,
 +					vout: i,
 +				},
 +				script_sig: Script::new(),
 +				sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 +				witness: Vec::new(),
 +			});
 +		}
 +		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
 +		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
 +		{
 +			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
 +			for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
 +				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
 +			}
 +		}
 +		assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 +
 +		// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
 +		claim_tx.input.clear();
 +		sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 +		claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
 +			previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 +				txid,
 +				vout: 0,
 +			},
 +			script_sig: Script::new(),
 +			sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 +			witness: Vec::new(),
 +		});
 +		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
 +		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
 +		{
 +			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
 +			for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
 +				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
 +			}
 +		}
 +		assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 +	}
 +
 +	// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
 +}
diff --cc lightning/src/chain/mod.rs
index 88128a139,b95863074..f7ddedef3
--- a/lightning/src/chain/mod.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/mod.rs
@@@ -13,12 -13,12 +13,13 @@@ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script
  use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
  use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
  
 +use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent};
  use chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys;
  use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
 -use chain::chainmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent};
  
  pub mod chaininterface;
+ pub mod chainmonitor;
 +pub mod channelmonitor;
  pub mod transaction;
  pub mod keysinterface;
  
diff --cc lightning/src/util/macro_logger.rs
index b42333bea,b42333bea..c2c5122d0
--- a/lightning/src/util/macro_logger.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/util/macro_logger.rs
@@@ -72,7 -72,7 +72,7 @@@ impl<'a, T> std::fmt::Display for Debug
  }
  macro_rules! log_funding_info {
  	($key_storage: expr) => {
--		::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingInfo(&$key_storage.funding_info)
++		::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingInfo($key_storage.get_funding_txo())
  	}
  }
  
diff --cc lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs
index 8ee69adda,eb637e3c9..0370c0e1a
--- a/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs
@@@ -10,8 -10,8 +10,9 @@@
  use chain;
  use chain::chaininterface;
  use chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget;
+ use chain::chainmonitor;
 -use chain::chainmonitor::MonitorEvent;
 +use chain::channelmonitor;
 +use chain::channelmonitor::MonitorEvent;
  use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  use chain::keysinterface;
  use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
@@@ -60,13 -60,13 +61,13 @@@ impl chaininterface::FeeEstimator for T
  }
  
  pub struct TestChainMonitor<'a> {
 -	pub added_monitors: Mutex<Vec<(OutPoint, chainmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>>,
 +	pub added_monitors: Mutex<Vec<(OutPoint, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>>,
  	pub latest_monitor_update_id: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], (OutPoint, u64)>>,
- 	pub chain_monitor: channelmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys, &'a TestChainSource, &'a chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface, &'a TestFeeEstimator, &'a TestLogger>,
+ 	pub chain_monitor: chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys, &'a TestChainSource, &'a chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface, &'a TestFeeEstimator, &'a TestLogger>,
 -	pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), chainmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
 +	pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
  	// If this is set to Some(), after the next return, we'll always return this until update_ret
  	// is changed:
 -	pub next_update_ret: Mutex<Option<Result<(), chainmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>>,
 +	pub next_update_ret: Mutex<Option<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>>,
  }
  impl<'a> TestChainMonitor<'a> {
  	pub fn new(chain_source: Option<&'a TestChainSource>, broadcaster: &'a chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface, logger: &'a TestLogger, fee_estimator: &'a TestFeeEstimator) -> Self {