From: Matt Corallo <649246+TheBlueMatt@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 7 May 2021 15:19:44 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Merge pull request #912 from TheBlueMatt/2021-05-more-chan-info X-Git-Tag: v0.0.98~30 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=7297e138716ec34147e591e125a96aa8a2cb2903;hp=-c;p=rust-lightning Merge pull request #912 from TheBlueMatt/2021-05-more-chan-info Add flags for if a channel is pub and funding txo in ChannelDetails --- 7297e138716ec34147e591e125a96aa8a2cb2903 diff --combined lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 52ea21f07,5441ab4b5..a9093b567 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@@ -563,7 -563,7 +563,7 @@@ pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7; /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound -/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour. +/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour. /// /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`] /// @@@ -572,16 -572,13 +572,16 @@@ // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more). -pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6; +pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7; pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments. /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least /// this value. -pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER; +// Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for +// any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while +// a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe. +pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3; // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within @@@ -593,7 -590,7 +593,7 @@@ #[allow(dead_code)] const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; -// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See +// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed. #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] @@@ -607,6 -604,12 +607,12 @@@ pub struct ChannelDetails /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the /// lifetime of the channel. pub channel_id: [u8; 32], + /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with + /// our counterparty already. + /// + /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to + /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`. + pub funding_txo: Option, /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened. pub short_channel_id: Option, @@@ -631,10 -634,21 +637,21 @@@ /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this. pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64, + /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us. + pub is_outbound: bool, + /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the + /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the + /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some + /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). + pub is_funding_locked: bool, /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b) - /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution. - pub is_live: bool, - + /// the peer is connected, (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution, and (d) the + /// channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown. + /// + /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`. + pub is_usable: bool, + /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced. + pub is_public: bool, /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding /// payments to us through this channel. pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option, @@@ -957,6 -971,7 +974,7 @@@ impl Vec { // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user @@@ -1746,17 -1765,13 +1768,17 @@@ /// only Tor Onion addresses. /// /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500). - pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec) { + pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); if addresses.len() > 500 { panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!"); } + // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that + // addresses be sorted for future compatibility. + addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id()); + let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement { features: NodeFeatures::known(), timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32, @@@ -2543,7 -2558,6 +2565,7 @@@ }, } if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable { + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid()); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); } if let Some(msg) = funding_locked { @@@ -2699,7 -2713,6 +2721,7 @@@ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid()); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx); Ok(()) } @@@ -2814,7 -2827,7 +2836,7 @@@ } }; if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx); } if let Some(chan) = chan_option {