From: Matt Corallo Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 03:35:52 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Update logging in channel and channelmanager to better levels X-Git-Tag: v0.0.99~12^2~4 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=7eff56b12f1f9cccb80e7b8b8efc69e569f89985;p=rust-lightning Update logging in channel and channelmanager to better levels This updates a number of log sites in channel and channelmanager to * Be a bit more verbose at the TRACE level, * Move some error/useful messages to the ERROR/WARN/INFO level, * Add new logs to always log once at the DEBUG level when we send/receive a commitment_signed (with some extra data), * Include the channel id being operated on in more log messages. --- diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs index f8c8c15be..26dd61d68 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -909,7 +909,10 @@ impl Channel { let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0; let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0; - log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw); + log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", + commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), + get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), + log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw); macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment { ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => { @@ -1291,7 +1294,7 @@ impl Channel { _ => {} } } - log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state); + log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state); self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, }); @@ -1305,7 +1308,7 @@ impl Channel { debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to"); return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))); } - log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0)); + log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id)); htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone())); } @@ -1391,7 +1394,7 @@ impl Channel { _ => {} } } - log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell", htlc_id_arg); + log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, err_packet, @@ -1399,7 +1402,7 @@ impl Channel { return Ok(None); } - log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message", htlc_id_arg); + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); { let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx]; htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone())); @@ -1531,7 +1534,10 @@ impl Channel { let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction(); let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis); // They sign the holder commitment transaction... - log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script)); + log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.", + log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), + encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), + encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned()); } @@ -1540,7 +1546,8 @@ impl Channel { let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust(); let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction(); - log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); + log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}", + log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0; @@ -1616,6 +1623,8 @@ impl Channel { self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; + log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + Ok((msgs::FundingSigned { channel_id: self.channel_id, signature @@ -1644,7 +1653,8 @@ impl Channel { let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust(); let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction(); - log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); + log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}", + log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?; let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0; @@ -1686,10 +1696,12 @@ impl Channel { self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; + log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap())) } - pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> { + pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())); } @@ -1719,6 +1731,9 @@ impl Channel { self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point; self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point); + + log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + Ok(()) } @@ -2028,7 +2043,7 @@ impl Channel { if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat { // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing. - log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation"); + log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7); } } else { @@ -2160,7 +2175,10 @@ impl Channel { let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction(); let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis); - log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script)); + log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}", + log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), + log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), + log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) { return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()))); } @@ -2207,7 +2225,9 @@ impl Channel { let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw); let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys); let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]); - log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript)); + log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.", + log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), + encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) { return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()))); } @@ -2257,6 +2277,8 @@ impl Channel { Some(forward_info.clone()) } else { None }; if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward { + log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.", + log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id)); htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info); need_commitment = true; } @@ -2265,6 +2287,8 @@ impl Channel { if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state { Some(fail_reason.take()) } else { None } { + log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.", + log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id)); htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason); need_commitment = true; } @@ -2290,6 +2314,8 @@ impl Channel { self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id; monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates); } + log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", + log_bytes!(self.channel_id)); // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and // re-send the message on restoration) return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned()))); @@ -2309,6 +2335,9 @@ impl Channel { (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator)) } else { (None, None) }; + log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.", + log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" }); + Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id: self.channel_id, per_commitment_secret, @@ -2331,7 +2360,8 @@ impl Channel { fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0); if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { - log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }); + log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), + if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet! @@ -2357,7 +2387,8 @@ impl Channel { Err(e) => { match e { ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => { - log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg); + log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should // be failed backwards. Failing to send here // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back @@ -2421,6 +2452,10 @@ impl Channel { self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id; monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates); + log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.", + log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" }, + update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len()); + Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, @@ -2496,7 +2531,7 @@ impl Channel { self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point); self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; - log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA..."); + log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new(); let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new(); let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new(); @@ -2619,6 +2654,7 @@ impl Channel { } self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos); self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs); + log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new())) } @@ -2649,6 +2685,8 @@ impl Channel { self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id; monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates); + log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.", + log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()); Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -2658,6 +2696,7 @@ impl Channel { commitment_signed }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail)) } else { + log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail)) } } @@ -2756,7 +2795,7 @@ impl Channel { } self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32; - log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); } /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further @@ -2823,10 +2862,9 @@ impl Channel { self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false; self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false; let order = self.resend_order.clone(); - log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first", - if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" }, - if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, - if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" }, + log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first", + log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" }, + if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" }, match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"}); (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) } @@ -2904,8 +2942,8 @@ impl Channel { } } - log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds", - update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()); + log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds", + log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()); msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee: None, @@ -3590,12 +3628,13 @@ impl Channel { // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which // may have already happened for this block). if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) { + log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id)); return Ok(Some(funding_locked)); } } for inp in tx.input.iter() { if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { - log_trace!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: self.channel_id(), data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned() @@ -3618,7 +3657,8 @@ impl Channel { /// /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed /// back. - pub fn best_block_updated(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> { + pub fn best_block_updated(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L) + -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger { let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new(); let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER; self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| { @@ -3636,6 +3676,7 @@ impl Channel { self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time); if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) { + log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id)); return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs)); } @@ -3668,7 +3709,7 @@ impl Channel { /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks. - pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&mut self) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> { + pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger { if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 { // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1. @@ -3677,7 +3718,7 @@ impl Channel { // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last // time we saw and it will be ignored. let best_time = self.update_time_counter; - match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time) { + match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) { Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => { assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?"); assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?"); @@ -3933,13 +3974,13 @@ impl Channel { let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap(); let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap(); - log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret)); + log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret, my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey }) } else { - log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret"); + log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey, @@ -4206,18 +4247,17 @@ impl Channel { signature = res.0; htlc_signatures = res.1; - log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}", + log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}", encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction), - &counterparty_commitment_txid, - encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()), - log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..])); + &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()), + log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) { - log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", + log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}", encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)), encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)), log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()), - log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..])); + log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); } } diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index cddb402d9..84e500c54 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ macro_rules! convert_chan_err { (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone())) }, ChannelError::Close(msg) => { - log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg); + log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg); if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() { $short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } @@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ impl ChannelMana #[inline] fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) { let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res; - log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len()); + log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len()); for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); } @@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ impl ChannelMana return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); } }; - log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); + log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true)); if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1671,6 +1671,7 @@ impl ChannelMana return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); } + log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { @@ -2060,7 +2061,7 @@ impl ChannelMana onion_packet, .. }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, prev_funding_outpoint } => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id); let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, @@ -2100,11 +2101,11 @@ impl ChannelMana panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward"); }, HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id); match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) { Err(e) => { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg); } else { panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met"); } @@ -2158,6 +2159,8 @@ impl ChannelMana handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))); continue; } + log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}", + add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { @@ -2664,6 +2667,8 @@ impl ChannelMana } } if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs { + log_debug!(self.logger, "Caliming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", + log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { @@ -2927,7 +2932,7 @@ impl ChannelMana if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan); + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) { log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our @@ -3433,6 +3438,7 @@ impl ChannelMana if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { unimplemented!(); } + log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { @@ -3809,7 +3815,7 @@ where *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height) } - self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger)); } } @@ -3845,7 +3851,7 @@ where *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); - self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger)); macro_rules! max_time { ($timestamp: expr) => { @@ -3887,7 +3893,7 @@ where self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| { if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() { if funding_txo.txid == *txid { - channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new())) + channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new())) } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) } } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) } }); diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 6298f6549..04490656e 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -1694,7 +1694,8 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; - nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation".to_string(), 1); + nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), + format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); } @@ -6234,8 +6235,9 @@ fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() { // us to surface its failure to the user. chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0); - nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates".to_string(), 1); - let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", log_bytes!(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat); + nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1); + let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}", + hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2)); nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1); // Check that the payment failed to be sent out. @@ -6314,8 +6316,9 @@ fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() { // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed. chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0); - nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates".to_string(), 1); - let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", log_bytes!(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat); + nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1); + let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}", + hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2)); nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1); // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.