From: Wilmer Paulino Date: Fri, 3 Nov 2023 19:43:06 +0000 (-0700) Subject: Refactor commitment broadcast to always go through OnchainTxHandler X-Git-Tag: v0.0.119~10^2~1 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=90f24a6a509157ad8f5027dab1f287b9a6acca08;p=rust-lightning Refactor commitment broadcast to always go through OnchainTxHandler Currently, our holder commitment broadcast only goes through the `OnchainTxHandler` for anchor outputs channels because we can actually bump the commitment transaction fees with it. For non-anchor outputs channels, we would just broadcast once directly via the `ChannelForceClosed` monitor update, without going through the `OnchainTxHandler`. As we add support for async signing, we need to be tolerable to signing failures. A signing failure of our holder commitment will currently panic, but once the panic is removed, we must be able to retry signing once the signer is available. We can easily achieve this via the existing `OnchainTxHandler::rebroadcast_pending_claims`, but this requires that we first queue our holder commitment as a claim. This commit ensures we do so everywhere we need to broadcast a holder commitment transaction, regardless of the channel type. Co-authored-by: Rachel Malonson --- diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index 472c768d3..e862b5cdd 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -2659,18 +2659,59 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } } - fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &WithChannelMonitor) - where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - L::Target: Logger, - { - let commit_txs = self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger); - let mut txs = vec![]; - for tx in commit_txs.iter() { - log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx)); - txs.push(tx); - } - broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs); + fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self) -> (Vec, Vec) { + let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build( + self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), + self.channel_value_satoshis, + self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone() + ); + let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package( + self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, + PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), + self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height() + ); + let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package]; self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0)); + // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed + // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject + // new channel updates. + self.holder_tx_signed = true; + let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); + // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is + // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in + // `transactions_confirmed`. + if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package + // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers + // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here. + let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims( + &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height() + ); + let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx(); + let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs( + &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx + ); + if !new_outputs.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); + } + claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); + } + (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs) + } + + pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast( + &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, logger: &WithChannelMonitor + ) + where + B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + { + let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests( + claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, + fee_estimator, logger + ); } fn update_monitor( @@ -2760,26 +2801,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain"); continue; } - self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger); - // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external - // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a - // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm. - if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build( - self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, - self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(), - ); - let best_block_height = self.best_block.height(); - let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package( - self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, - PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output), - best_block_height, best_block_height - ); - self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests( - vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height, - broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger, - ); - } + self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger); } else if !self.holder_tx_signed { log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast"); log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()); @@ -3689,29 +3711,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger); if should_broadcast { - let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()); - let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height()); - claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package); - self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0)); - // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed - // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject - // new channel updates. - self.holder_tx_signed = true; - // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is - // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in - // `transactions_confirmed`. - if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package - // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers - // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here. - let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()); - let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx(); - let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx); - if !new_outputs.is_empty() { - watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); - } - claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); - } + let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(); + claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); + watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs); } // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold. diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 979ef774e..5d8cc5997 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -2273,9 +2273,15 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); { let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]); + if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + } + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE); @@ -2284,7 +2290,6 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close: let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000); @@ -3556,7 +3561,7 @@ fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() { // connect_style. return; } - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3; route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000); nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); @@ -3565,11 +3570,12 @@ fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() { check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); - let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid()); + let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx); + check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]); - let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]); + let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]); connect_block(&nodes[1], &block); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); @@ -3626,7 +3632,7 @@ fn test_force_close_fail_back() { check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); - let tx = { + let commitment_tx = { let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go @@ -3635,7 +3641,7 @@ fn test_force_close_fail_back() { node_txn.remove(0) }; - mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx); // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]! check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); @@ -3647,15 +3653,16 @@ fn test_force_close_fail_back() { get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id) .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger); } - mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx); - let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid()); - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success + mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx); + let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 }); + let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid()); + assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success + assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success - check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx); + check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx); } #[test] @@ -8881,7 +8888,12 @@ fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]); } else { - assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2); + if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid()); + } else { + assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2); + } check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3); } } @@ -8897,15 +8909,16 @@ fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise, // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a // HTLC-output-claiming transaction. - let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); + let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); if broadcast_alice { assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]); assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight); } else { - assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2); - check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]); - assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight); + assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 }); + let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap(); + check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]); + assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight); } } } @@ -9381,8 +9394,12 @@ fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_t // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2); - assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid()); - check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]); + let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() { + &spending_txn[1] + } else { + &spending_txn[0] + }; + check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]); // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its // timelock is up). let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager); @@ -9392,7 +9409,7 @@ fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_t // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an // additional block built on top of the current chain. nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed( - &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1); + &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index 80119b557..74740a6f2 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -737,7 +737,7 @@ fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) { commitment_tx }; let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx)); - if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid()); @@ -1998,6 +1998,11 @@ fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool }; mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx); + if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid()); + } // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast. connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); @@ -2401,26 +2406,12 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred(); check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2); check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000); - let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = { - let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); - assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); - assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs - assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs - if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() { - check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3); - check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3); - (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone()) - } else { - check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3); - check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3); - (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone()) - } - }; // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees. assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len()); let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len()); for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() { let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64; @@ -2440,13 +2431,21 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { }; let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs + if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() { + check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3); + } else { + check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3); + } let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]); check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx); + + revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone()); anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone()); }; for node in &nodes { - mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]); + mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]); } check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2); check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true); @@ -2458,7 +2457,7 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4); - let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() { + let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() { (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }) } else { (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }) @@ -2466,10 +2465,10 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1); - check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a); + check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1); - check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b); + check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]); } // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs @@ -2549,7 +2548,7 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { sig }; htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]); - check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b); + check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]); htlc_tx }; @@ -2608,7 +2607,7 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { ).unwrap(); if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] { - check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b); + check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]); } else { check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap()); } @@ -2778,7 +2777,7 @@ fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterp // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions, // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction. - if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); } @@ -2796,11 +2795,7 @@ fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterp let htlc_timeout_tx = { let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); - let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() { - txn[0].clone() - } else { - txn[1].clone() - }; + let tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx); tx }; diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs index 01f595289..1b7041c9f 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ fn do_retry_with_no_persist(confirm_before_reload: bool) { let nodes_0_deserialized; let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2; + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let (_, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); // Serialize the ChannelManager prior to sending payments @@ -750,14 +750,21 @@ fn do_retry_with_no_persist(confirm_before_reload: bool) { assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1); mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_commitment_tx); - let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1); - check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_commitment_tx); + let bs_htlc_claim_txn = { + let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); + check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); + check_spends!(txn[1], as_commitment_tx); + txn.pop().unwrap() + }; if !confirm_before_reload { mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx); + let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), as_commitment_tx.txid()); } - mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn); expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, true, false); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV*4 + 20); let (first_htlc_timeout_tx, second_htlc_timeout_tx) = { @@ -767,7 +774,7 @@ fn do_retry_with_no_persist(confirm_before_reload: bool) { }; check_spends!(first_htlc_timeout_tx, as_commitment_tx); check_spends!(second_htlc_timeout_tx, as_commitment_tx); - if first_htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output == bs_htlc_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output { + if first_htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output == bs_htlc_claim_txn.input[0].previous_output { confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &second_htlc_timeout_tx); } else { confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &first_htlc_timeout_tx); @@ -919,19 +926,23 @@ fn do_test_completed_payment_not_retryable_on_reload(use_dust: bool) { // the HTLC-Timeout transaction beyond 1 conf). For dust HTLCs, the HTLC is considered resolved // after the commitment transaction, so always connect the commitment transaction. mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]); + if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + } mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_commitment_tx[0]); if !use_dust { connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + (MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32)); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + (MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32)); let as_htlc_timeout = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]); assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout.len(), 1); + check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]); mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout[0]); - // nodes[0] may rebroadcast (or RBF-bump) its HTLC-Timeout, so wipe the announced set. - nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear(); mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout[0]); } + if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + } // Create a new channel on which to retry the payment before we fail the payment via the // HTLC-Timeout transaction. This avoids ChannelManager timing out the payment due to us @@ -1049,32 +1060,36 @@ fn do_test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload(persist_manager_post_event: bool, co // Connect blocks until the CLTV timeout is up so that we get an HTLC-Timeout transaction connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1); - let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid()); - check_spends!(node_txn[1], funding_tx); - check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); - let timeout_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()]; + let (commitment_tx, htlc_timeout_tx) = { + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); + check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); + check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]); + (txn.remove(0), txn.remove(0)) + }; nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 10_000_000); - connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[1].clone()])); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); - let claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1); - check_spends!(claim_txn[0], node_txn[1]); + let htlc_success_tx = { + let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx); + txn.pop().unwrap() + }; - connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[1].clone()])); + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx); if confirm_commitment_tx { connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1); } - let claim_block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, if payment_timeout { timeout_txn } else { vec![claim_txn[0].clone()] }); + let claim_block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, if payment_timeout { vec![htlc_timeout_tx] } else { vec![htlc_success_tx] }); if payment_timeout { assert!(confirm_commitment_tx); // Otherwise we're spending below our CSV! diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/reload_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/reload_tests.rs index 223aa5dba..b3d52b78f 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/reload_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/reload_tests.rs @@ -1065,9 +1065,10 @@ fn do_forwarded_payment_no_manager_persistence(use_cs_commitment: bool, claim_ht confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &cs_commitment_tx[1]); } else { connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_expiry - nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1); - let bs_htlc_timeout_tx = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_tx.len(), 1); - confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_tx[0]); + let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 }); + let bs_htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); + confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_tx); } } else { confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);