From: Antoine Riard Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2019 22:50:03 +0000 (-0400) Subject: Add more comments about timelock assumptions and security model X-Git-Tag: v0.0.12~206^2~2 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=963f002056d86365447dc1ce244251a449df5b6d;p=rust-lightning Add more comments about timelock assumptions and security model Rename HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY to ANTI_REORG_DELAY because we are going to rely on it also to remove bump candidates outpoint from tracker after claim get enough depth. Rename HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS because it's carrying more meaningfully that we are doing a favor to our peer instead of ruthlessly enforcing the contract. CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA should be > to LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + +CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS When we reached height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS and we have pending unsolved outbound HTLC, we fail onchain with our local commitment tx. At this point we expect to get in chain in a worst-case delay of CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER. When our HTLC-timeout is confirmed with ANTI_REORG_DELAY we may safely fail backward the corresponding inbound output. --- diff --git a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 201865d6..64a9f2eb 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ use secp256k1; use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError}; -use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY}; +use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY}; use ln::router::Route; use ln::msgs; use ln::onion_utils; @@ -351,20 +351,21 @@ pub struct ChannelManager { const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO? pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? -// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + -// HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within -// HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it -// backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel -// on-chain to time out the HTLC. +// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, +// ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within +// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain, +// then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and +// failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before +// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS. #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] -const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY; +const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed. #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] -const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; +const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; macro_rules! secp_call { ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => { @@ -820,7 +821,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] { // OUR PAYMENT! // final_expiry_too_soon - if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 { + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]); } // final_incorrect_htlc_amount @@ -912,8 +913,8 @@ impl ChannelManager { break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; - // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration - if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon + // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration + if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far diff --git a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index 2ddb2690..6e1b212e 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -303,12 +303,24 @@ const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12; pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6; /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our -/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). -pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; -/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a confirmed HTLC-Timeout or previous revoked commitment -/// transaction before we fail corresponding inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards -/// and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money. -pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6; +/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing +/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he +/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our +/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures +/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure. +/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on +/// accurate block height. +/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY +/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also +/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time. +pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; +/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound +/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money. +/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer. +/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already +/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not +/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint. +pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6; #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] enum Storage { @@ -353,7 +365,7 @@ enum InputDescriptors { } /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it -/// once they mature to enough confirmations (HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY) +/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY) #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] enum OnchainEvent { /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from @@ -1298,8 +1310,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) { for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() { if let &Some(ref source) = source_option { - log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { + log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let e = entry.get_mut(); e.retain(|ref event| { @@ -1396,7 +1408,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx); - match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { + match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let e = entry.get_mut(); e.retain(|ref event| { @@ -1788,8 +1800,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf { ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { + log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let e = entry.get_mut(); e.retain(|ref event| { @@ -2022,7 +2034,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) { - if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) { + if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) { //We may discard: //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output @@ -2059,16 +2071,16 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC. - // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv + // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion) - // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA + // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2. let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered; - if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) || + if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) || (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) { log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry); return true; @@ -2206,8 +2218,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]); htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash)); } else { - log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { + log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let e = entry.get_mut(); e.retain(|ref event| { diff --git a/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 2706627a..084b6bc5 100644 --- a/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor}; use chain::keysinterface; use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT}; use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; -use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY}; +use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY}; use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT}; use ln::onion_utils; use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop}; @@ -1695,7 +1695,7 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { { let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); - for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 { + for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1 { header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); } @@ -1871,7 +1871,7 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() { let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); - connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -1939,7 +1939,7 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); - connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -2241,7 +2241,7 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() { } nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1); - connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); @@ -2300,7 +2300,7 @@ fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() { let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); - connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); @@ -2453,7 +2453,7 @@ fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); - connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 2 }); @@ -3899,7 +3899,7 @@ fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() { check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone()); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200); - connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); @@ -4118,7 +4118,7 @@ fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, anno } else { nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); } - connect_blocks(&nodes[2].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[2].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2); @@ -4348,7 +4348,7 @@ fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) { // to "time out" the HTLC. let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 { + for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 { nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new()); header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash(); } @@ -4387,7 +4387,7 @@ fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no } let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 { + for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 { nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new()); header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash(); } @@ -4791,7 +4791,7 @@ fn test_onion_failure() { }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true})); run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { - let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1; + let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1; let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()})); @@ -4801,7 +4801,7 @@ fn test_onion_failure() { }, false, Some(PERM|15), None); run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { - let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1; + let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1; let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); }, || {}, true, Some(17), None); @@ -5515,7 +5515,7 @@ fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_upda } fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) { - // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY + // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA @@ -5577,7 +5577,7 @@ fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) { } assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); - connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); // Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); @@ -5655,7 +5655,7 @@ fn test_no_failure_dust_htlc_local_commitment() { } fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) { - // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY. + // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY. // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs @@ -5692,7 +5692,7 @@ fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) { } assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone()); - let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { @@ -5707,7 +5707,7 @@ fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) { assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash()); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { @@ -5727,7 +5727,7 @@ fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone()); - let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; if !revoked { let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); @@ -5743,7 +5743,7 @@ fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) { nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash()); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { @@ -5753,7 +5753,7 @@ fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } else { - // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked + // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked // commitment tx let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);