From: Matt Corallo Date: Sat, 4 Nov 2023 20:37:21 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Avoid re-allocating to encrypt gossip messages when forwarding X-Git-Tag: v0.0.119~57^2~3 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=969085bf1e77ebe5b4e7cb0523311e9905fa20f3;p=rust-lightning Avoid re-allocating to encrypt gossip messages when forwarding When we forward gossip messages, we store them in a separate buffer before we encrypt them (and commit to the order in which they'll appear on the wire). Rather than storing that buffer encoded with no headroom, requiring re-allocating to add the message length and two MAC blocks, we here add the headroom prior to pushing it into the gossip buffer, avoiding an allocation. --- diff --git a/fuzz/src/peer_crypt.rs b/fuzz/src/peer_crypt.rs index 4f9684987..3acf4d664 100644 --- a/fuzz/src/peer_crypt.rs +++ b/fuzz/src/peer_crypt.rs @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these // licenses. -use lightning::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::PeerChannelEncryptor; +use lightning::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor, MessageBuf}; use lightning::util::test_utils::TestNodeSigner; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, PublicKey, SecretKey}; @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) { let mut buf = [0; 65536 + 16]; loop { if get_slice!(1)[0] == 0 { - crypter.encrypt_buffer(get_slice!(slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2)))); + crypter.encrypt_buffer(MessageBuf::from_encoded(&get_slice!(slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2))))); } else { let len = match crypter.decrypt_length_header(get_slice!(16+2)) { Ok(len) => len, diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/peer_channel_encryptor.rs b/lightning/src/ln/peer_channel_encryptor.rs index 8b276990c..8569fa60f 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/peer_channel_encryptor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/peer_channel_encryptor.rs @@ -427,16 +427,20 @@ impl PeerChannelEncryptor { Ok(self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone()) } - /// Encrypts the given pre-serialized message, returning the encrypted version. - /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 or Noise handshake has not finished. - pub fn encrypt_buffer(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Vec { - if msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN { + /// Builds sendable bytes for a message. + /// + /// `msgbuf` must begin with 16 + 2 dummy/0 bytes, which will be filled with the encrypted + /// message length and its MAC. It should then be followed by the message bytes themselves + /// (including the two byte message type). + /// + /// For effeciency, the [`Vec::capacity`] should be at least 16 bytes larger than the + /// [`Vec::len`], to avoid reallocating for the message MAC, which will be appended to the vec. + fn encrypt_message_with_header_0s(&mut self, msgbuf: &mut Vec) { + let msg_len = msgbuf.len() - 16 - 2; + if msg_len > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN { panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!"); } - let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2); - res.resize(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2, 0); - match self.noise_state { NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => { if *sn >= 1000 { @@ -446,16 +450,21 @@ impl PeerChannelEncryptor { *sn = 0; } - Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg.len() as u16).to_be_bytes()); + Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut msgbuf[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg_len as u16).to_be_bytes()); *sn += 1; - Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[16+2..], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], msg); + Self::encrypt_in_place_with_ad(msgbuf, 16+2, *sn, sk, &[0; 0]); *sn += 1; }, _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"), } + } - res + /// Encrypts the given pre-serialized message, returning the encrypted version. + /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 or Noise handshake has not finished. + pub fn encrypt_buffer(&mut self, mut msg: MessageBuf) -> Vec { + self.encrypt_message_with_header_0s(&mut msg.0); + msg.0 } /// Encrypts the given message, returning the encrypted version. @@ -468,29 +477,7 @@ impl PeerChannelEncryptor { res.0.resize(16 + 2, 0); wire::write(message, &mut res).expect("In-memory messages must never fail to serialize"); - let msg_len = res.0.len() - 16 - 2; - if msg_len > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN { - panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!"); - } - - match self.noise_state { - NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => { - if *sn >= 1000 { - let (new_sck, new_sk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(sck, sk); - *sck = new_sck; - *sk = new_sk; - *sn = 0; - } - - Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res.0[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg_len as u16).to_be_bytes()); - *sn += 1; - - Self::encrypt_in_place_with_ad(&mut res.0, 16+2, *sn, sk, &[0; 0]); - *sn += 1; - }, - _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"), - } - + self.encrypt_message_with_header_0s(&mut res.0); res.0 } @@ -557,9 +544,30 @@ impl PeerChannelEncryptor { } } +/// A buffer which stores an encoded message (including the two message-type bytes) with some +/// padding to allow for future encryption/MACing. +pub struct MessageBuf(Vec); +impl MessageBuf { + /// Creates a new buffer from an encoded message (i.e. the two message-type bytes followed by + /// the message contents). + /// + /// Panics if the message is longer than 2^16. + pub fn from_encoded(encoded_msg: &[u8]) -> Self { + if encoded_msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN { + panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!"); + } + // In addition to the message (continaing the two message type bytes), we also have to add + // the message length header (and its MAC) and the message MAC. + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(encoded_msg.len() + 16*2 + 2); + res.resize(encoded_msg.len() + 16 + 2, 0); + res[16 + 2..].copy_from_slice(&encoded_msg); + Self(res) + } +} + #[cfg(test)] mod tests { - use super::LN_MAX_MSG_LEN; + use super::{MessageBuf, LN_MAX_MSG_LEN}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; @@ -775,7 +783,7 @@ mod tests { for i in 0..1005 { let msg = [0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f]; - let mut res = outbound_peer.encrypt_buffer(&msg); + let mut res = outbound_peer.encrypt_buffer(MessageBuf::from_encoded(&msg)); assert_eq!(res.len(), 5 + 2*16 + 2); let len_header = res[0..2+16].to_vec(); @@ -811,7 +819,7 @@ mod tests { fn max_message_len_encryption() { let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors(); let msg = [4u8; LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 1]; - outbound_peer.encrypt_buffer(&msg); + outbound_peer.encrypt_buffer(MessageBuf::from_encoded(&msg)); } #[test] diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/peer_handler.rs b/lightning/src/ln/peer_handler.rs index 34110a73a..006538651 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/peer_handler.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/peer_handler.rs @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, LightningError, SocketAddress, Onio #[cfg(not(c_bindings))] use crate::ln::channelmanager::{SimpleArcChannelManager, SimpleRefChannelManager}; use crate::util::ser::{VecWriter, Writeable, Writer}; -use crate::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor, NextNoiseStep, MSG_BUF_ALLOC_SIZE}; +use crate::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor, NextNoiseStep, MessageBuf, MSG_BUF_ALLOC_SIZE}; use crate::ln::wire; use crate::ln::wire::{Encode, Type}; #[cfg(not(c_bindings))] @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ struct Peer { /// prioritize channel messages over them. /// /// Note that these messages are *not* encrypted/MAC'd, and are only serialized. - gossip_broadcast_buffer: VecDeque>, + gossip_broadcast_buffer: VecDeque, awaiting_write_event: bool, pending_read_buffer: Vec, @@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ impl) { + fn enqueue_encoded_gossip_broadcast(&self, peer: &mut Peer, encoded_message: MessageBuf) { peer.msgs_sent_since_pong += 1; debug_assert!(peer.gossip_broadcast_buffer.len() <= OUTBOUND_BUFFER_LIMIT_DROP_GOSSIP); peer.gossip_broadcast_buffer.push_back(encoded_message); @@ -1800,7 +1800,7 @@ impl { @@ -1827,7 +1827,7 @@ impl { @@ -1849,7 +1849,7 @@ impl debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't attempt to forward anything but gossip messages"),