From: Dimitris Apostolou Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:41:51 +0000 (+0200) Subject: Fix typos X-Git-Tag: v0.0.12~236^2 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=ab10b050754e4e51b57cd87da8ff588d36565dd0;p=rust-lightning Fix typos --- diff --git a/.editorconfig b/.editorconfig index b19ed0f50..e355fadfa 100644 --- a/.editorconfig +++ b/.editorconfig @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# see https://editorconfig.org for more options, and setup instructions for yours editor +# see https://editorconfig.org for more options, and setup instructions for your editor [*] indent_style = tab diff --git a/src/chain/chaininterface.rs b/src/chain/chaininterface.rs index 7b5e0d074..ef09cbbaa 100644 --- a/src/chain/chaininterface.rs +++ b/src/chain/chaininterface.rs @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ //! blockchain. //! //! Includes traits for monitoring and receiving notifications of new blocks and block -//! disconnections, transactio broadcasting, and feerate information requests. +//! disconnections, transaction broadcasting, and feerate information requests. use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ impl ChainWatchedUtil { } #[cfg(not(test))] { - let _tx_unused = txid; // Its used in cfg(test), though + let _tx_unused = txid; // It's used in cfg(test), though self.watched_txn.insert(script_pub_key.clone()) } } @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ impl ChainWatchedUtil { self.watched_outpoints.insert(outpoint) } - /// Sets us to match all transactions, returning true if this is a new setting anf false if + /// Sets us to match all transactions, returning true if this is a new setting and false if /// we'd already been set to match everything. pub fn watch_all(&mut self) -> bool { if self.watch_all { return false; } diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs index ec6718e81..52ec66402 100644 --- a/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/lib.rs @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ //! //! A full-featured but also flexible lightning implementation, in library form. This allows the //! user (you) to decide how they wish to use it instead of being a fully self-contained daemon. -//! This means there is no built-in threading/execution environment and its up to the user to +//! This means there is no built-in threading/execution environment and it's up to the user to //! figure out how best to make networking happen/timers fire/things get written to disk/keys get //! generated/etc. This makes it a good candidate for tight integration into an existing wallet //! instead of having a rather-separate lightning appendage to a wallet. diff --git a/src/ln/channel.rs b/src/ln/channel.rs index 326df90dc..c6dc595f6 100644 --- a/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -93,14 +93,14 @@ enum OutboundHTLCState { /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we - /// revoke, but we dont really care about that: + /// revoke, but we don't really care about that: /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on) - /// money back (though we wont), and, + /// money back (though we won't), and, /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement - /// doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but + /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but /// we'll never get out of sync). - /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as its rather large and we don't want to blow up + /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit LocalAnnounced(Box), Committed, @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee) /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this - /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roudtrip where we may not see a full + /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback. funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option, @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ impl Channel { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit")); } if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Miminum htlc value is full channel value")); + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value")); } Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?; @@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ impl Channel { } /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an - /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimate must be set! + /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimage must be set! fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result { if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!"); @@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ impl Channel { /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met. fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option, Option), ChannelError> { - // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any + // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us, // either. @@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ impl Channel { }, _ => { debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to"); - return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matchd the given HTLC ID")); + return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID")); } } pending_idx = idx; @@ -1352,10 +1352,10 @@ impl Channel { return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period")); } if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel")); + return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel")); } if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483")); + return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483")); } // Now check against optional parameters as set by config... @@ -1433,7 +1433,7 @@ impl Channel { } if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) { // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT - // remember the channel, so its safe to just send an error_message here and drop the + // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the // channel. return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!")); } @@ -1826,8 +1826,8 @@ impl Channel { for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) { // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over - // the limit. In case its less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit - // handling this case better and maybe fufilling some of the HTLCs while attempting + // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit + // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting // to rebalance channels. if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel) self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update); @@ -1869,8 +1869,8 @@ impl Channel { } } } - //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if its a fee issue or similar we may want to - //fail it back the route, if its a temporary issue we can ignore it... + //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to + //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it... match err { None => { if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() { @@ -2022,7 +2022,7 @@ impl Channel { } } else { if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee { - // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signed's in a row without getting a + // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the @@ -2479,7 +2479,7 @@ impl Channel { assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0); // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to - // 34 bytes in length, so dont let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script. + // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script. if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer")); } @@ -3119,7 +3119,7 @@ impl Channel { /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed. /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel - /// If an Err is returned, its a ChannelError::Ignore! + /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore! pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result, ChannelError> { if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) { return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down")); @@ -3376,7 +3376,7 @@ impl Channel { }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)) } - /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependant transactions for relay (forcing + /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters). /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards @@ -3930,7 +3930,7 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn test_max_funding_satoshis() { assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000, - "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis on existence"); + "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence"); } struct Keys { diff --git a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index fd6387547..b824b99b2 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { pub(super) next_forward: Instant, /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency - /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short + /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo! pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap>, /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ pub struct ChannelManager { /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the -/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more). +/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more). const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO? pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, - //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the + //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... @@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay. /// - /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event. + /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event. /// Will likely generate further events. pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) { let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); @@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { // messages when we can. // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our - // update_fail_htlc in time, its not our problem. + // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem. } } }, @@ -1480,7 +1480,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { None => { // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's - // why its missing. + // why it's missing. return } }; @@ -1490,7 +1490,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => { if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option { if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { - unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event... + unimplemented!();// but def don't push the event... } } if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs { @@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get // on-chain confirmations. - // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test + // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test // should be written. if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.remove(&short_id); @@ -1848,7 +1848,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { // //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are - //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that, + //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that, //but we should prevent it anyway. let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); @@ -2272,7 +2272,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager { fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { - // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a + // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events! { @@ -2297,7 +2297,7 @@ impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager { impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager { fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { - // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a + // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events! { @@ -2897,7 +2897,7 @@ pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> { /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key). /// /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will - /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This + /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned. /// diff --git a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index 8e1ba12f2..3b5905e70 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor res } - /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key. + /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key. pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); match monitors.get_mut(&key) { @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a confirmed HTLC-Timeout or previous revoked commitment /// transaction before we fail corresponding inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards /// and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money. -//TODO: We currently dont actually use this...we should +//TODO: We currently don't actually use this...we should pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6; #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] @@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let our_funding_info = funding_info; if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage { if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } - // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially + // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey. if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!")); @@ -1445,7 +1445,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated) } - /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key + /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option, Option) { if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 { return (None, None) @@ -1615,7 +1615,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds. fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec, Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec)) { let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); - // TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the + // TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that weren't included in the // broadcast commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because they // weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s). if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { @@ -1669,7 +1669,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it - // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction + // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction } } } diff --git a/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs b/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs index 03f265a70..4ce090a28 100644 --- a/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs +++ b/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs @@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ pub fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0); } - // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance: + // We don't yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance: assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0)); diff --git a/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 1e6f99d43..f9a8ac65a 100644 --- a/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ fn fake_network_test() { #[test] fn duplicate_htlc_test() { // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that - // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other + // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other let mut nodes = create_network(6); // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2 @@ -1682,7 +1682,7 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]); assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]); assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger + assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcasted by ChannelManger assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); @@ -1721,7 +1721,7 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { #[test] fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { - // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to + // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path. // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past. @@ -1750,7 +1750,7 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain - // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain + // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1); check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone()); @@ -1888,8 +1888,8 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { #[test] fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() { - // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to - // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is + // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to + // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path. // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout) // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx @@ -1909,7 +1909,7 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() { let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; - // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain + // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone()); nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0); @@ -1936,7 +1936,7 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() { check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); - // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain + // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200); let timeout_tx; @@ -2223,7 +2223,7 @@ fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); - // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something + // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something // that we should update our routing table for. assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 }); for event in events { @@ -3037,7 +3037,7 @@ fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() { #[test] fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() { - // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor + // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor let mut nodes = create_network(4); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0); @@ -4056,7 +4056,7 @@ fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) { let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - // As far as A is concerened, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment + // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that // to "time out" the HTLC. @@ -4156,12 +4156,12 @@ fn run_onion_failure_test(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec, } // test_case -// 0: node1 fail backward -// 1: final node fail backward -// 2: payment completed but the user reject the payment -// 3: final node fail backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0) -// 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returnning fail_htlc -// 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returnning fail_htlc +// 0: node1 fails backward +// 1: final node fails backward +// 2: payment completed but the user rejects the payment +// 3: final node fails backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0) +// 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returning fail_htlc +// 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returning fail_htlc fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option, expected_channel_update: Option) where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC), F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC), @@ -4392,7 +4392,7 @@ fn test_onion_failure() { // trigger error msg.amount_msat -= 1; }, |msg| { - // and tamper returing error message + // and tamper returning error message let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]); @@ -4400,7 +4400,7 @@ fn test_onion_failure() { // final node failure run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| { - // and tamper returing error message + // and tamper returning error message let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]); diff --git a/src/ln/msgs.rs b/src/ln/msgs.rs index 62c4bb0d2..f6e89524a 100644 --- a/src/ln/msgs.rs +++ b/src/ln/msgs.rs @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ //! //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the -//! source node_id of the mssage, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth +//! source node_id of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send @@ -337,25 +337,25 @@ pub struct AnnouncementSignatures { /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)] pub enum NetAddress { - /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listenting. + /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening. IPv4 { /// The 4-byte IPv4 address addr: [u8; 4], - /// The port on which the node is listenting + /// The port on which the node is listening port: u16, }, - /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listenting. + /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening. IPv6 { /// The 16-byte IPv6 address addr: [u8; 16], - /// The port on which the node is listenting + /// The port on which the node is listening port: u16, }, /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening. OnionV2 { /// The bytes (usually encoded in base32 with ".onion" appended) addr: [u8; 10], - /// The port on which the node is listenting + /// The port on which the node is listening port: u16, }, /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening. @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ pub enum NetAddress { checksum: u16, /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec. version: u8, - /// The port on which the node is listenting + /// The port on which the node is listening port: u16, }, } diff --git a/src/ln/peer_channel_encryptor.rs b/src/ln/peer_channel_encryptor.rs index 720af7e4b..f13b886d7 100644 --- a/src/ln/peer_channel_encryptor.rs +++ b/src/ln/peer_channel_encryptor.rs @@ -569,8 +569,8 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_ephemeral_key(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]); let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec(); - // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but its the same as the one - // from trasport-initiator successful handshake + // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one + // from transport-initiator successful handshake assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).unwrap().serialize()[..], hex::decode("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa").unwrap()[..]); match inbound_peer.noise_state { @@ -695,8 +695,8 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_ephemeral_key(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]); let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec(); - // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but its the same as the one - // from trasport-initiator successful handshake + // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one + // from transport-initiator successful handshake assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).unwrap().serialize()[..], hex::decode("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa").unwrap()[..]); match inbound_peer.noise_state { diff --git a/src/ln/peer_handler.rs b/src/ln/peer_handler.rs index e0a1f6f2d..cfdc6f1cb 100644 --- a/src/ln/peer_handler.rs +++ b/src/ln/peer_handler.rs @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ struct Peer { } impl Peer { - /// Returns true if the the channel announcements/updates for the given channel should be + /// Returns true if the channel announcements/updates for the given channel should be /// forwarded to this peer. /// If we are sending our routing table to this peer and we have not yet sent channel /// announcements/updates for the given channel_id then we will send it when we get to that @@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ impl PeerManager { match e { msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false }), msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => { - log_debug!(self, "Got a channel/node announcement with an known required feature flag, you may want to udpate!"); + log_debug!(self, "Got a channel/node announcement with an known required feature flag, you may want to update!"); continue; }, msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue => { @@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn test_disconnect_peer() { // Simple test which builds a network of PeerManager, connects and brings them to NoiseState::Finished and - // push an DisconnectPeer event to remove the node flagged by id + // push a DisconnectPeer event to remove the node flagged by id let mut peers = create_network(2); establish_connection(&peers[0], &peers[1]); assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 1); diff --git a/src/ln/router.rs b/src/ln/router.rs index f4a702fb7..1d932ea99 100644 --- a/src/ln/router.rs +++ b/src/ln/router.rs @@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ impl RoutingMessageHandler for Router { match network.channels.entry(NetworkMap::get_key(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.chain_hash)) { BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => { //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional - //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though its unclear + //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear //exactly how... if checked_utxo { // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider @@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ impl Router { } /// Marks a node as having failed a route. This will avoid re-using the node in routes for now, - /// with an expotnential decay in node "badness". Note that there is deliberately no + /// with an exponential decay in node "badness". Note that there is deliberately no /// mark_channel_bad as a node may simply lie and suggest that an upstream channel from it is /// what failed the route and not the node itself. Instead, setting the blamed_upstream_node /// boolean will reduce the penalty, returning the node to usability faster. If the node is diff --git a/src/util/events.rs b/src/util/events.rs index de9dd4286..8f8e7a52c 100644 --- a/src/util/events.rs +++ b/src/util/events.rs @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ //! Events are returned from various bits in the library which indicate some action must be taken //! by the client. //! -//! Because we don't have a built-in runtime, its up to the client to call events at a time in the +//! Because we don't have a built-in runtime, it's up to the client to call events at a time in the //! future, as well as generate and broadcast funding transactions handle payment preimages and a //! few other things. //!