From: Valentine Wallace Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2021 00:49:35 +0000 (-0500) Subject: Refactor out decode_next_hop util from ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc X-Git-Tag: v0.0.105~13^2~10 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=de1b62eacff9068a7d910c5b8e278c071af4a596;p=rust-lightning Refactor out decode_next_hop util from ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc This will be used in upcoming commit(s) to facilitate decoding multiple onion layers for multi-node payment receive --- diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 9a5fdcf08..1efd3aa04 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -24,10 +24,8 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; -use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine}; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; -use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq; use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; @@ -55,7 +53,6 @@ use util::config::UserConfig; use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer}; -use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader}; use util::logger::{Level, Logger}; use util::errors::APIError; @@ -63,7 +60,7 @@ use io; use prelude::*; use core::{cmp, mem}; use core::cell::RefCell; -use io::{Cursor, Read}; +use io::Read; use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard}; use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use core::time::Duration; @@ -2088,7 +2085,6 @@ impl ChannelMana arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]); arr }; - let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other @@ -2100,13 +2096,6 @@ impl ChannelMana return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4); } - let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(&mu); - hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); - hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]); - if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) { - return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5); - } - let mut channel_state = None; macro_rules! return_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { @@ -2124,164 +2113,122 @@ impl ChannelMana } } - let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]); - let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) }; - let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = { - match ::read(&mut chacha_stream) { - Err(err) => { - let error_code = match err { - msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte - msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature| - msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue| - msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload - _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen - }; - return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(msg) => { - let mut hmac = [0; 32]; - if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) { - return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]); - } - (msg, hmac) - }, - } + let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { + return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code); + }, + Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => { + return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]); + }, }; - let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] { - #[cfg(test)] - { - // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0. - // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever. - // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the - // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here - // as-is (and were originally 0s). - // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing - // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case. - let mut next_bytes = [0; 32]; - chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap(); - assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]); - chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap(); - assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]); - } - - // OUR PAYMENT! - // final_expiry_too_soon - // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure - // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. - // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our - // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a - // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 { - return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]); - } - // final_incorrect_htlc_amount - if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat { - return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)); - } - // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry - if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry { - return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); - } + let pending_forward_info = match next_hop { + onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => { + // OUR PAYMENT! + // final_expiry_too_soon + // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure + // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. + // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our + // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a + // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 { + return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]); + } + // final_incorrect_htlc_amount + if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat { + return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)); + } + // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry + if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry { + return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); + } - let routing = match next_hop_data.format { - msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]), - msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]), - msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => { - if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() { - return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]); - } else if let Some(data) = payment_data { - PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { - payment_data: data, - incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry, - } - } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage { - // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this - // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X - // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route - // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing - // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X. - let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash { - return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]); - } + let routing = match next_hop_data.format { + msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]), + msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]), + msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => { + if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() { + return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]); + } else if let Some(data) = payment_data { + PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { + payment_data: data, + incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry, + } + } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage { + // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this + // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X + // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route + // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing + // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X. + let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); + if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash { + return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]); + } - PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { - payment_preimage, - incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry, + PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { + payment_preimage, + incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry, + } + } else { + return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]); } - } else { - return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]); - } - }, - }; - - // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc - // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so - // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a - // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! - - PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing, - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value, - }) - } else { - let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65]; - let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap(); - #[cfg(debug_assertions)] - { - // Check two things: - // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV - // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic - // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data. - let mut t = [0; 1]; - debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0); - } - // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we - // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer. - chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]); - - let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(); + }, + }; - let blinding_factor = { - let mut sha = Sha256::engine(); - sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]); - sha.input(&shared_secret); - Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner() - }; + // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc + // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so + // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a + // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! + + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { + routing, + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), + incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, + amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value, + }) + }, + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => { + let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(); + + let blinding_factor = { + let mut sha = Sha256::engine(); + sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]); + sha.input(&shared_secret); + Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner() + }; - let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) { - Err(e) - } else { Ok(new_pubkey) }; + let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) { + Err(e) + } else { Ok(new_pubkey) }; - let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { - version: 0, - public_key, - hop_data: new_packet_data, - hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(), - }; + let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { + version: 0, + public_key, + hop_data: new_packet_bytes, + hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(), + }; - let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format { - msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id, - msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id, - msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => { - return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]); - }, - }; + let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format { + msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id, + msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id, + msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => { + return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]); + }, + }; - PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { - onion_packet: outgoing_packet, - short_channel_id, - }, - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value, - }) + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { + routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { + onion_packet: outgoing_packet, + short_channel_id, + }, + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), + incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, + amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value, + }) + } }; channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs index ec668045e..0dd6087f8 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource; use ln::msgs; use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate; use routing::router::RouteHop; -use util::chacha20::ChaCha20; +use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader}; use util::errors::{self, APIError}; use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, LengthCalculatingWriter}; use util::logger::Logger; @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; use bitcoin::secp256k1; use prelude::*; -use io::Cursor; +use io::{Cursor, Read}; use core::convert::TryInto; use core::ops::Deref; @@ -506,6 +506,114 @@ pub(super) fn process_onion_failure(secp_ctx: & } else { unreachable!(); } } +/// Data decrypted from the onion payload. +pub(crate) enum Hop { + /// This onion payload was for us, not for forwarding to a next-hop. Contains information for + /// verifying the incoming payment. + Receive(msgs::OnionHopData), + /// This onion payload needs to be forwarded to a next-hop. + Forward { + /// Onion payload data used in forwarding the payment. + next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, + /// HMAC of the next hop's onion packet. + next_hop_hmac: [u8; 32], + /// Bytes of the onion packet we're forwarding. + new_packet_bytes: [u8; 20*65], + }, +} + +/// Error returned when we fail to decode the onion packet. +pub(crate) enum OnionDecodeErr { + /// The HMAC of the onion packet did not match the hop data. + Malformed { + err_msg: &'static str, + err_code: u16, + }, + /// We failed to decode the onion payload. + Relay { + err_msg: &'static str, + err_code: u16, + }, +} + +pub(crate) fn decode_next_hop(shared_secret: [u8; 32], hop_data: &[u8], hmac_bytes: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result { + let (rho, mu) = gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); + let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(&mu); + hmac.input(hop_data); + hmac.input(&payment_hash.0[..]); + if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &hmac_bytes) { + return Err(OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { + err_msg: "HMAC Check failed", + err_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, + }); + } + + let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]); + let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&hop_data[..]) }; + match ::read(&mut chacha_stream) { + Err(err) => { + let error_code = match err { + msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte + msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature| + msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue| + msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload + _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen + }; + return Err(OnionDecodeErr::Relay { + err_msg: "Unable to decode our hop data", + err_code: error_code, + }); + }, + Ok(msg) => { + let mut hmac = [0; 32]; + if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) { + return Err(OnionDecodeErr::Relay { + err_msg: "Unable to decode our hop data", + err_code: 0x4000 | 22, + }); + } + if hmac == [0; 32] { + #[cfg(test)] + { + // In tests, make sure that the initial onion packet data is, at least, non-0. + // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever. + // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the + // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here + // as-is (and were originally 0s). + // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing + // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case. + let mut next_bytes = [0; 32]; + chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap(); + assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]); + chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap(); + assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]); + } + return Ok(Hop::Receive(msg)); + } else { + let mut new_packet_bytes = [0; 20*65]; + let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_bytes).unwrap(); + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + { + // Check two things: + // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV + // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic + // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data. + let mut t = [0; 1]; + debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0); + } + // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we + // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer. + chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_bytes[read_pos..]); + return Ok(Hop::Forward { + next_hop_data: msg, + next_hop_hmac: hmac, + new_packet_bytes, + }) + } + }, + } +} + #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use io;