From: Antoine Riard Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 00:51:19 +0000 (-0500) Subject: Fix bumping timer for claiming revoked HTLC outputs X-Git-Tag: v0.0.12~148^2 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=e832e365b48287c9c4a82fca5b46680f987e211d;p=rust-lightning Fix bumping timer for claiming revoked HTLC outputs Previously, we were using their_to_self_delay instead of our_to_self_delay which was falsifying test. --- diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index b9527f599..2f941cc09 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -2059,7 +2059,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }; let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone(); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening + let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32); log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer); let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }); diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 394e40da9..8b68bc972 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -6500,30 +6500,46 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() { // Connect three more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn let header_132 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 3, 129, true, header_129.bitcoin_hash()); - let node_txn = { + let penalty_local_tx; + { let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 2 bumped penalty txn on offered/received HTLC outputs of revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tx on to_local of revoked commitment tx + 2 bumped penalty tx on revoked HTLC txn + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 bumped penalty txn on offered/received HTLC outputs of revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tx on to_local of revoked commitment tx + 2 bumped penalty tx on revoked HTLC txn check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); - let mut penalty_local = ::std::usize::MAX; + check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); + + penalty_local_tx = node_txn[2].clone(); + node_txn.clear(); + }; + // Few more blocks to broadcast and confirm penalty_local_tx + let header_133 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_132, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_133, txdata: vec![penalty_local_tx] }, 133); + let header_135 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 2, 133, true, header_133.bitcoin_hash()); + { + let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); + node_txn.clear(); + } + let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 9, 135, true, header_135); + let node_txn = { + let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); + let mut penalty_offered = ::std::usize::MAX; let mut penalty_received = ::std::usize::MAX; { - let iter_txn = node_txn[2..].iter(); - for (i, tx) in iter_txn.enumerate() { - if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid() { - penalty_local = 2 + i; - } else if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[offered].txid() { - penalty_offered = 2+ i; + for (i, tx) in node_txn.iter().enumerate() { + if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[offered].txid() { + penalty_offered = i; } else if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[received].txid() { - penalty_received = 2 + i; + penalty_received = i; } } } - check_spends!(node_txn[penalty_local], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].output.len(), 1); @@ -6541,24 +6557,17 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() { let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[received].output[0].value - node_txn[penalty_received].output[0].value; let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[penalty_received].get_weight() as u64; assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_2 * 125); - let txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone()]; + let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]; node_txn.clear(); txn }; // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs - let header_133 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_132, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_133, txdata: node_txn }, 133); - let header_140 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 6, 134, true, header_133.bitcoin_hash()); - { - let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - node_txn.clear(); - } - - // Connect few more blocks and check only penalty transaction for to_local output have been issued - connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 7, 140, true, header_140); + let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn }, 145); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 20, 145, true, header_145.bitcoin_hash()); { let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //TODO: should be zero when we fix check_spend_remote_htlc + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //TODO: fix check_spend_remote_htlc lack of watch output node_txn.clear(); } check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);