From: Matt Corallo Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 03:06:02 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Validate NSec/3 records prove non-existence when handling C/DNAMEs X-Git-Tag: v0.5.4~39 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=e9d191edb546e1aac1194d7b50e8e535c7f54c69;p=dnssec-prover Validate NSec/3 records prove non-existence when handling C/DNAMEs When handling C/DNAME RRs we're required to validate that NSEC/3 records exist proving non-existence of the sought record itself. We do this here. --- diff --git a/src/validation.rs b/src/validation.rs index 16f1e50..75620b1 100644 --- a/src/validation.rs +++ b/src/validation.rs @@ -3,10 +3,11 @@ use alloc::borrow::ToOwned; use alloc::vec::Vec; use alloc::vec; -use core::cmp; +use core::cmp::{self, Ordering}; use ring::signature; +use crate::base32; use crate::crypto; use crate::rr::*; use crate::ser::write_name; @@ -96,7 +97,11 @@ where Keys: IntoIterator { for record in records.iter() { let record_labels = record.name().labels() as usize; let labels = sig.labels.into(); - if record_labels != labels { + // For NSec types, the name should already match the wildcard, so we don't do any + // filtering here. This is relied upon in `verify_rr_stream` to check whether an + // NSec record is matching via wildcard (as otherwise we'd allow a resolver to + // change the name out from under us and change the wildcard to something else). + if record.ty() != NSec::TYPE && record_labels != labels { if record_labels < labels { return Err(ValidationError::Invalid); } let signed_name = record.name().trailing_n_labels(sig.labels); debug_assert!(signed_name.is_some()); @@ -254,6 +259,53 @@ fn resolve_time(time: u32) -> u64 { } } +fn nsec_ord(a: &str, b: &str) -> Ordering { + let mut a_label_iter = a.rsplit("."); + let mut b_label_iter = b.rsplit("."); + loop { + match (a_label_iter.next(), b_label_iter.next()) { + (Some(_), None) => return Ordering::Greater, + (None, Some(_)) => return Ordering::Less, + (Some(a_label), Some(b_label)) => { + let mut a_bytes = a_label.bytes(); + let mut b_bytes = b_label.bytes(); + loop { + match (a_bytes.next(), b_bytes.next()) { + (Some(_), None) => return Ordering::Greater, + (None, Some(_)) => return Ordering::Less, + (Some(mut a), Some(mut b)) => { + if a >= 'A' as u8 && a <= 'Z' as u8 { + a += 'a' as u8 - 'A' as u8; + } + if b >= 'A' as u8 && b <= 'Z' as u8 { + b += 'a' as u8 - 'A' as u8; + } + if a != b { return a.cmp(&b); } + }, + (None, None) => break, + } + } + }, + (None, None) => return Ordering::Equal, + } + } +} +fn nsec_ord_extra(a: &(&str, T, U), b: &(&str, T, U)) -> Ordering { + nsec_ord(a.0, b.0) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +#[test] +fn rfc4034_sort_test() { + // Test nsec_ord based on RFC 4034 section 6.1's example + // Note that we replace the \200 example with \7f as I have no idea what \200 is + let v = vec!["example.", "a.example.", "yljkjljk.a.example.", "Z.a.example.", + "zABC.a.EXAMPLE.", "z.example.", "\001.z.example.", "*.z.example.", "\x7f.z.example."]; + let mut sorted = v.clone(); + sorted.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| nsec_ord(*a, *b)); + assert_eq!(sorted, v); +} + /// Verifies the given set of resource records. /// /// Given a set of arbitrary records, this attempts to validate DNSSEC data from the [`root_hints`] @@ -267,6 +319,7 @@ fn resolve_time(time: u32) -> u64 { pub fn verify_rr_stream<'a>(inp: &'a [RR]) -> Result, ValidationError> { let mut zone = "."; let mut res = Vec::new(); + let mut rrs_needing_non_existence_proofs = Vec::new(); let mut pending_ds_sets = Vec::with_capacity(1); let mut latest_inception = 0; let mut earliest_expiry = u64::MAX; @@ -325,6 +378,22 @@ pub fn verify_rr_stream<'a>(inp: &'a [RR]) -> Result, Valid } }, _ => { + if rrsig.labels != rrsig.name.labels() && rrsig.ty != NSec::TYPE { + if rrsig.ty == NSec3::TYPE { + // NSEC3 records should never appear on wildcards, so treat the + // whole proof as invalid + return Err(ValidationError::Invalid); + } + // If the RR used a wildcard, we need an NSEC/NSEC3 proof, which we + // check for at the end. Note that the proof should be for the + // "next closest" name, i.e. if the name here is a.b.c and it was + // signed as *.c, we want a proof for nothing being in b.c. + // Alternatively, if it was signed as *.b.c, we'd want a proof for + // a.b.c. + let proof_name = rrsig.name.trailing_n_labels(rrsig.labels + 1) + .ok_or(ValidationError::Invalid)?; + rrs_needing_non_existence_proofs.push((proof_name, &rrsig.key_name, rrsig.ty)); + } for record in signed_records { if !res.contains(&record) { res.push(record); } } @@ -349,14 +418,96 @@ pub fn verify_rr_stream<'a>(inp: &'a [RR]) -> Result, Valid return Err(ValidationError::Invalid); } } - if res.is_empty() { Err(ValidationError::Invalid) } - else if latest_inception >= earliest_expiry { Err(ValidationError::Invalid) } - else { - Ok(VerifiedRRStream { - verified_rrs: res, valid_from: latest_inception, expires: earliest_expiry, - max_cache_ttl: min_ttl, - }) + if res.is_empty() { return Err(ValidationError::Invalid) } + if latest_inception >= earliest_expiry { return Err(ValidationError::Invalid) } + + // First sort the proofs we're looking for so that the retains below avoid shifting. + rrs_needing_non_existence_proofs.sort_unstable_by(nsec_ord_extra); + 'proof_search_loop: while let Some((name, zone, ty)) = rrs_needing_non_existence_proofs.pop() { + let nsec_search = res.iter() + .filter_map(|rr| if let RR::NSec(nsec) = rr { Some(nsec) } else { None }) + .filter(|nsec| nsec.name.ends_with(zone.as_str())); + for nsec in nsec_search { + let name_matches = nsec.name.as_str() == name; + let name_contained = nsec_ord(&nsec.name, &name) != Ordering::Greater && + nsec_ord(&nsec.next_name, name) == Ordering::Greater; + if (name_matches && !nsec.types.contains_type(ty)) || name_contained { + rrs_needing_non_existence_proofs + .retain(|(n, _, t)| *n != name || (name_matches && nsec.types.contains_type(*t))); + continue 'proof_search_loop; + } + } + let nsec3_search = res.iter() + .filter_map(|rr| if let RR::NSec3(nsec3) = rr { Some(nsec3) } else { None }) + .filter(|nsec3| nsec3.name.ends_with(zone.as_str())); + + // Because we will only ever have two entries, a Vec is simpler than a map here. + let mut nsec3params_to_name_hash = Vec::new(); + for nsec3 in nsec3_search.clone() { + if nsec3.hash_iterations > 2500 { + // RFC 5115 places different limits on the iterations based on the signature key + // length, but we just use 2500 for all key types + continue; + } + if nsec3.hash_algo != 1 { continue; } + if nsec3params_to_name_hash.iter() + .any(|(iterations, salt, _)| *iterations == nsec3.hash_iterations && *salt == &nsec3.salt) + { continue; } + + let mut hasher = crypto::hash::Hasher::sha1(); + write_name(&mut hasher, &name); + hasher.update(&nsec3.salt); + for _ in 0..nsec3.hash_iterations { + let res = hasher.finish(); + hasher = crypto::hash::Hasher::sha1(); + hasher.update(res.as_ref()); + hasher.update(&nsec3.salt); + } + nsec3params_to_name_hash.push((nsec3.hash_iterations, &nsec3.salt, hasher.finish())); + + if nsec3params_to_name_hash.len() >= 2 { + // We only allow for up to two sets of hash_iterations/salt per zone. Beyond that + // we assume this is a malicious DoSing proof and give up. + break; + } + } + for nsec3 in nsec3_search { + if nsec3.flags != 0 { + // This is an opt-out NSEC3 (or has unknown flags set). Thus, we shouldn't rely on + // it as proof that some record doesn't exist. + continue; + } + if nsec3.hash_algo != 1 { continue; } + let name_hash = if let Some((_, _, hash)) = + nsec3params_to_name_hash.iter() + .find(|(iterations, salt, _)| *iterations == nsec3.hash_iterations && *salt == &nsec3.salt) + { + hash + } else { continue }; + + let (start_hash_base32, _) = nsec3.name.split_once(".") + .unwrap_or_else(|| { debug_assert!(false); ("", "")}); + let start_hash = if let Ok(start_hash) = base32::decode(start_hash_base32) { + start_hash + } else { continue }; + if start_hash.len() != 20 || nsec3.next_name_hash.len() != 20 { continue; } + + let hash_matches = &start_hash[..] == name_hash.as_ref(); + let hash_contained = + &start_hash[..] <= name_hash.as_ref() && &nsec3.next_name_hash[..] > name_hash.as_ref(); + if (hash_matches && !nsec3.types.contains_type(ty)) || hash_contained { + rrs_needing_non_existence_proofs + .retain(|(n, _, t)| *n != name || (hash_matches && nsec3.types.contains_type(*t))); + continue 'proof_search_loop; + } + } + return Err(ValidationError::Invalid); } + + Ok(VerifiedRRStream { + verified_rrs: res, valid_from: latest_inception, expires: earliest_expiry, + max_cache_ttl: min_ttl, + }) } impl<'a> VerifiedRRStream<'a> {