From: Duncan Dean Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 10:15:24 +0000 (+0200) Subject: Move `Channel::channel_id` and some other methods to `ChannelContext` impl X-Git-Tag: v0.0.116-alpha1~10^2~21 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=ede8324397646ef7b06a42cfca8935059adfa1c4;p=rust-lightning Move `Channel::channel_id` and some other methods to `ChannelContext` impl This is one of a series of commits to make sure methods are moved by chunks so they are easily reviewable in diffs. Unfortunately they are not purely move-only as fields need to be updated for things to compile, but these should be quite clear. This commit also uses the `context` field where needed for compilation and tests to pass due to the above change. --- diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs index b1cd603f0..74ce190a4 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -830,6 +830,230 @@ impl ChannelContext { pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool { self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0) } + + // Public utilities: + + pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { + self.channel_id + } + + // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment. + // + // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115. + pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { + self.temporary_channel_id + } + + pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option { + self.minimum_depth + } + + /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special + /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel. + pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 { + self.user_id + } + + /// Gets the channel's type + pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures { + &self.channel_type + } + + /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus, + /// is_usable() returns true). + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option { + self.short_channel_id + } + + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option { + self.latest_inbound_scid_alias + } + + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 { + self.outbound_scid_alias + } + + /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0, + /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases. + pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) { + assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0); + self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias; + } + + /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by + /// get_outbound_funding_created. + pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option { + self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint + } + + /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed. + pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option { + self.funding_tx_confirmed_in + } + + /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction. + pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 { + if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 { + // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg. + return 0; + } + + height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1) + } + + fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { + self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay + } + + fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { + &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys + } + + pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option { + self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters + .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay) + } + + fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { + &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys + } + + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey { + self.counterparty_node_id + } + + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 { + self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat + } + + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent + pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option { + self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) + } + + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 { + return cmp::min( + // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts + // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases + // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS). + self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10, + + self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + ); + } + + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 { + self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat + } + + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent + pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option { + self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) + } + + fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option { + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| { + let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis; + cmp::min( + (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000, + party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + ) + }) + } + + pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 { + self.channel_value_satoshis + } + + pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 { + self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + } + + pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 { + cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) + } + + pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 { + self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat + } + + /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any. + pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option { + self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0) + } + + // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event. + pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool { + self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted + } + + // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event. + pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool { + self.channel_pending_event_emitted + } + + // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event. + pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) { + self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true; + } + + // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event. + pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool { + self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted + } + + // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event. + pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) { + self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true; + } + + /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once + /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will + /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs. + pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) { + if self.prev_config.is_none() { + return; + } + let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap(); + prev_config.1 += 1; + if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS { + self.prev_config = None; + } + } + + /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel. + pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig { + self.config.options + } + + /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update + /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message. + pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool { + let did_channel_update = + self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths || + self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat || + self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta; + if did_channel_update { + self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0)); + // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay + // policy change to propagate throughout the network. + self.update_time_counter += 1; + } + self.config.options = *config; + did_channel_update + } + + /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received. + pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool { + self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 + } } // Internal utility functions for channels @@ -1634,7 +1858,7 @@ impl Channel { log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), - get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound()), + get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound()), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw); macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment { @@ -1786,9 +2010,9 @@ impl Channel { let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote }; let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self }; let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local { - (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) + (self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) } else { - (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) + (self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) }; if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) { @@ -1922,9 +2146,9 @@ impl Channel { /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this? fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys { let per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.context.secp_ctx); - let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint; - let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; - let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys(); + let delayed_payment_base = &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint; + let htlc_basepoint = &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; + let counterparty_pubkeys = self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys(); TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.context.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint) } @@ -1936,9 +2160,9 @@ impl Channel { fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys { //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we //may see payments to it! - let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint; - let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; - let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys(); + let revocation_basepoint = &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint; + let htlc_basepoint = &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; + let counterparty_pubkeys = self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys(); TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.context.secp_ctx, &self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint) } @@ -1947,7 +2171,7 @@ impl Channel { /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()). /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script { - make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) + make_funding_redeemscript(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) } /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] @@ -1998,7 +2222,7 @@ impl Channel { InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => { if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason { } else { - log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed"); } return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {}; @@ -2051,7 +2275,7 @@ impl Channel { }, &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { - log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden. debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed"); @@ -2061,7 +2285,7 @@ impl Channel { _ => {} } } - log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state); + log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state); self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, }); @@ -2087,7 +2311,7 @@ impl Channel { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, }), @@ -2231,7 +2455,7 @@ impl Channel { _ => {} } } - log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, err_packet, @@ -2239,14 +2463,14 @@ impl Channel { return Ok(None); } - log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); { let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx]; htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone())); } Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, reason: err_packet })) @@ -2396,7 +2620,7 @@ impl Channel { log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), - encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned()); } @@ -2406,7 +2630,7 @@ impl Channel { let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust(); let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction(); log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}", - log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); + log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0; @@ -2416,7 +2640,7 @@ impl Channel { } fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey { - &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey + &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } pub fn funding_created( @@ -2467,7 +2691,7 @@ impl Channel { initial_commitment_tx, msg.signature, Vec::new(), - &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, + &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() ); @@ -2478,12 +2702,12 @@ impl Channel { let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound()); + let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound()); let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner()); let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id); monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters); let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer, - shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()), &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis, @@ -2497,7 +2721,7 @@ impl Channel { self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; - log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some(); self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); @@ -2539,7 +2763,7 @@ impl Channel { let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction(); log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}", - log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); + log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number); let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx; @@ -2548,7 +2772,7 @@ impl Channel { let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction(); let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis); // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish. - if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) { + if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())); } } @@ -2557,7 +2781,7 @@ impl Channel { initial_commitment_tx, msg.signature, Vec::new(), - &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, + &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() ); @@ -2566,14 +2790,14 @@ impl Channel { let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); - let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap(); + let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(); let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound()); + let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound()); let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner()); let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id); monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters); let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer, - shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script), &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis, @@ -2587,7 +2811,7 @@ impl Channel { self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; - log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some(); self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); @@ -2661,7 +2885,7 @@ impl Channel { self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point; self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point); - log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger)) } @@ -2849,17 +3073,17 @@ impl Channel { self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000) }; let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat; - if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 { + if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 { remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = - Some(self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)); + Some(self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)); dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000); } let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat; - if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 { + if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 { remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min( remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()), - self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat))); + self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat))); dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000); } @@ -3166,9 +3390,9 @@ impl Channel { let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis; if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats { let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat; - if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { + if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", - on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat()); + on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat()); pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7); } } @@ -3176,9 +3400,9 @@ impl Channel { let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis; if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats { let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat; - if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { + if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", - on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat()); + on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat()); pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7); } } @@ -3219,7 +3443,7 @@ impl Channel { if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat { // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing. - log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7); } } else { @@ -3347,7 +3571,7 @@ impl Channel { log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), - log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())); } @@ -3409,7 +3633,7 @@ impl Channel { for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() { if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index { let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, - self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), + self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key); let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys); @@ -3417,7 +3641,7 @@ impl Channel { let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]); log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), - encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())); } @@ -3439,7 +3663,7 @@ impl Channel { commitment_stats.tx, msg.signature, msg.htlc_signatures.clone(), - &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, + &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() ); @@ -3537,7 +3761,7 @@ impl Channel { } else { false }; log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.", - log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" }); + log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" }); self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)); } @@ -3558,7 +3782,7 @@ impl Channel { assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0); if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), - if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet! @@ -3585,7 +3809,7 @@ impl Channel { match e { ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => { log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", - log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should // be failed backwards. Failing to send here // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back @@ -3650,7 +3874,7 @@ impl Channel { monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates); log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.", - log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" }, + log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" }, update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len()); self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); @@ -3733,7 +3957,7 @@ impl Channel { self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived; } - log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new(); let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new(); let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new(); @@ -3862,7 +4086,7 @@ impl Channel { self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos); self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs); self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs); - log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))); } @@ -3887,11 +4111,11 @@ impl Channel { monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates); log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.", - log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()); + log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()); self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs); Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))) } else { - log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs); Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))) } @@ -3941,11 +4165,11 @@ impl Channel { // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`. let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat; let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat; - if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { + if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw); return None; } - if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { + if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw); return None; } @@ -4043,7 +4267,7 @@ impl Channel { self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None; self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32; - log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); } /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted. @@ -4116,7 +4340,7 @@ impl Channel { self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false; let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx); Some(msgs::ChannelReady { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), next_per_commitment_point, short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias), }) @@ -4152,7 +4376,7 @@ impl Channel { self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false; let order = self.context.resend_order.clone(); log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first", - log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" }, + log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" }, if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" }, match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"}); MonitorRestoreUpdates { @@ -4182,11 +4406,11 @@ impl Channel { let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None); let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat; let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat; - if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { + if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)", msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure))); } - if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { + if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)", msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure))); } @@ -4215,7 +4439,7 @@ impl Channel { for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() { if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state { update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id, amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat, payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash, @@ -4230,14 +4454,14 @@ impl Channel { match reason { &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => { update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id, reason: err_packet.clone() }); }, &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => { update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id, sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(), failure_code: failure_code.clone(), @@ -4245,7 +4469,7 @@ impl Channel { }, &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => { update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id, payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(), }); @@ -4256,13 +4480,13 @@ impl Channel { let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() { Some(msgs::UpdateFee { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0, }) } else { None }; log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds", - log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" }, + log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" }, update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()); msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, @@ -4366,7 +4590,7 @@ impl Channel { let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx); return Ok(ReestablishResponses { channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), next_per_commitment_point, short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias), }), @@ -4405,7 +4629,7 @@ impl Channel { // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx); Some(msgs::ChannelReady { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), next_per_commitment_point, short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias), }) @@ -4413,9 +4637,9 @@ impl Channel { if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number { if required_revoke.is_some() { - log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); } else { - log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); } Ok(ReestablishResponses { @@ -4426,9 +4650,9 @@ impl Channel { }) } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 { if required_revoke.is_some() { - log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); } else { - log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); } if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 { @@ -4695,7 +4919,7 @@ impl Channel { tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy - let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize(); + let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize(); let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize(); let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); @@ -4747,7 +4971,7 @@ impl Channel { } let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis); - match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) { + match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) { Ok(_) => {}, Err(_e) => { // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust @@ -4865,224 +5089,6 @@ impl Channel { } } - // Public utilities: - - pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { - self.context.channel_id - } - - // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment. - // - // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115. - pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { - self.context.temporary_channel_id - } - - pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option { - self.context.minimum_depth - } - - /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special - /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel. - pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 { - self.context.user_id - } - - /// Gets the channel's type - pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures { - &self.context.channel_type - } - - /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus, - /// is_usable() returns true). - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) - pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option { - self.context.short_channel_id - } - - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) - pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option { - self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias - } - - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) - pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 { - self.context.outbound_scid_alias - } - /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0, - /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases. - pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) { - assert_eq!(self.context.outbound_scid_alias, 0); - self.context.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias; - } - - /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by - /// get_outbound_funding_created. - pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option { - self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint - } - - /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed. - pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option { - self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in - } - - /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction. - pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 { - if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 { - // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg. - return 0; - } - - height.checked_sub(self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1) - } - - fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { - self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay - } - - fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { - &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys - } - - pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option { - self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters - .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay) - } - - fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { - &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys - } - - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) - pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey { - self.context.counterparty_node_id - } - - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) - pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 { - self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat - } - - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent - pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option { - self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) - } - - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) - pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 { - return cmp::min( - // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts - // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases - // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS). - self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10, - - self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - ); - } - - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) - pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 { - self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat - } - - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent - pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option { - self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) - } - - fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option { - self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| { - let holder_reserve = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis; - cmp::min( - (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000, - party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - ) - }) - } - - pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 { - self.context.channel_value_satoshis - } - - pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 { - self.context.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths - } - - pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 { - cmp::max(self.context.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) - } - - pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 { - self.context.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat - } - - /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any. - pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option { - self.context.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0) - } - - // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event. - pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool { - self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted - } - - // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event. - pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool { - self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted - } - - // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event. - pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) { - self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted = true; - } - - // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event. - pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool { - self.context.is_usable() && !self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted - } - - // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event. - pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) { - self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted = true; - } - - /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once - /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will - /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs. - pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) { - if self.context.prev_config.is_none() { - return; - } - let prev_config = self.context.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap(); - prev_config.1 += 1; - if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS { - self.context.prev_config = None; - } - } - - /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel. - pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig { - self.context.config.options - } - - /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update - /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message. - pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool { - let did_channel_update = - self.context.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths || - self.context.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat || - self.context.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta; - if did_channel_update { - self.context.prev_config = Some((self.context.config.options, 0)); - // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay - // policy change to propagate throughout the network. - self.context.update_time_counter += 1; - } - self.context.config.options = *config; - did_channel_update - } - fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config( &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig, ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> { @@ -5110,9 +5116,9 @@ impl Channel { pub fn htlc_satisfies_config( &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> { - self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config()) + self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config()) .or_else(|err| { - if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() { + if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() { self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config) } else { Err(err) @@ -5250,11 +5256,6 @@ impl Channel { .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) }) } - /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received. - pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool { - self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 - } - /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor. /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not @@ -5397,7 +5398,7 @@ impl Channel { NS::Target: NodeSigner, L::Target: Logger { - if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() { + if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() { for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() { // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is, // check that it pays the right amount to the right script. @@ -5448,7 +5449,7 @@ impl Channel { } for inp in tx.input.iter() { if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { - log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); } } @@ -5597,7 +5598,7 @@ impl Channel { } let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx); - let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys(); + let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys(); msgs::OpenChannel { chain_hash, @@ -5609,7 +5610,7 @@ impl Channel { channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32, - to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs, funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint, @@ -5667,7 +5668,7 @@ impl Channel { /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx); - let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys(); + let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys(); msgs::AcceptChannel { temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id, @@ -5676,7 +5677,7 @@ impl Channel { channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), - to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs, funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint, @@ -5784,17 +5785,17 @@ impl Channel { let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?); - let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id()); + let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice(); let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement { features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config), chain_hash, - short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), + short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id }, node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id }, - bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }), - bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }), + bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }), + bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }), excess_data: Vec::new(), }; @@ -5826,7 +5827,7 @@ impl Channel { return None; } - log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) { Ok(a) => a, Err(e) => { @@ -5851,8 +5852,8 @@ impl Channel { self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent; Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), - short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), + short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), node_signature: our_node_sig, bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig, }) @@ -5895,10 +5896,10 @@ impl Channel { let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]); - if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() { + if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!( "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", - &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id()))); + &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()))); } if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!( @@ -5948,15 +5949,15 @@ impl Channel { let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap(); let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap(); - log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); remote_last_secret } else { - log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); [0;32] }; self.mark_awaiting_response(); msgs::ChannelReestablish { - channel_id: self.channel_id(), + channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track @@ -6208,14 +6209,14 @@ impl Channel { log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}", encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction), &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()), - log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) { log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}", - encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)), + encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)), encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)), log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()), - log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id())); } } @@ -6386,7 +6387,7 @@ impl Channel { // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and // return them to fail the payment. let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len()); - let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id(); + let counterparty_node_id = self.context.get_counterparty_node_id(); for htlc_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) { match htlc_update { HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => { @@ -6395,7 +6396,7 @@ impl Channel { _ => {} } } - let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() { + let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() { // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent), // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid. @@ -6405,7 +6406,7 @@ impl Channel { // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more. if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 { self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID; - Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate { + Some((self.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate { update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }], })) @@ -7917,7 +7918,7 @@ mod tests { let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx]; let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw, - chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), + chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key); let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys); let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All }; diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 75b17caea..61fca301f 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -1473,9 +1473,9 @@ impl ChannelDetails { let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); ChannelDetails { - channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(), counterparty: ChannelCounterparty { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), features: latest_features, unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis, forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), @@ -1485,17 +1485,17 @@ impl ChannelDetails { // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`. outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.context.have_received_message() { - Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, - outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), + Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, + outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), }, - funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), + funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(), // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed. - channel_type: if channel.context.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, - short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), - outbound_scid_alias: if channel.context.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, - inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), - channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), + channel_type: if channel.context.have_received_message() { Some(channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, + short_channel_id: channel.context.get_short_channel_id(), + outbound_scid_alias: if channel.context.is_usable() { Some(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, + inbound_scid_alias: channel.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), + channel_value_satoshis: channel.context.get_value_satoshis(), feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()), unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, @@ -1503,17 +1503,17 @@ impl ChannelDetails { outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, - user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), - confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), - confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)), - force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), + user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(), + confirmations_required: channel.context.minimum_depth(), + confirmations: Some(channel.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)), + force_close_spend_delay: channel.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), is_outbound: channel.context.is_outbound(), is_channel_ready: channel.context.is_usable(), is_usable: channel.context.is_live(), is_public: channel.context.should_announce(), - inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), - inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), - config: Some(channel.config()), + inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), + inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), + config: Some(channel.context.config()), } } } @@ -1615,9 +1615,9 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal { ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{ - $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id()); + $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.context.channel_id()); let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); - if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() { + if let Some(short_id) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id); } else { // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the @@ -1626,10 +1626,10 @@ macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal { // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding // stage. - let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias()); + let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()); debug_assert!(alias_removed); } - short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias()); + short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()); }} } @@ -1647,7 +1647,7 @@ macro_rules! convert_chan_err { log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg); update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel); let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true); - (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(), + (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(), shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok())) }, } @@ -1697,18 +1697,18 @@ macro_rules! remove_channel { macro_rules! send_channel_ready { ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{ $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { - node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: $channel_ready_msg, }); // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to. let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); - let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id())); - assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()), + let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id())); + assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()), "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels"); - if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() { - let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id())); - assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()), + if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() { + let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id())); + assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()), "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels"); } }} @@ -1716,30 +1716,30 @@ macro_rules! send_channel_ready { macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event { ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => { - if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() { + if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() { $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending { - channel_id: $channel.channel_id(), - former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(), - counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(), - funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(), + channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(), + former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(), + counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), + user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(), + funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(), }, None)); - $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted(); + $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted(); } } } macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event { ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => { - if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() { - debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted()); + if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() { + debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted()); $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady { - channel_id: $channel.channel_id(), - user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(), - counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(), + channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(), + user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(), + counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), + channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(), }, None)); - $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted(); + $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted(); } } } @@ -1749,7 +1749,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion { let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger, &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration, $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); - let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id(); + let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(); let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() { // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a @@ -1765,7 +1765,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion { } else { None }; let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions - .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new()); + .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new()); let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption( &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa, @@ -1776,7 +1776,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion { $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); } - let channel_id = $chan.channel_id(); + let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id(); core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock); core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock); @@ -1804,16 +1804,16 @@ macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update { match $update_res { ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.", - log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..])); + log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..])); Ok(()) }, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => { log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", - log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..])); + log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..])); update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan); let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown( - "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(), - $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false), + "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(), + $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok())); $remove; res @@ -2057,7 +2057,7 @@ where }; let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone()); - let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id(); + let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id(); match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { if cfg!(fuzzing) { @@ -2171,14 +2171,14 @@ where match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() { Some(transaction) => { pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding { - channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction + channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(), transaction }, None)); }, None => {}, } pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed { - channel_id: channel.channel_id(), - user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), + channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(), + user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(), reason: closure_reason }, None)); } @@ -2197,7 +2197,7 @@ where let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo(); + let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo(); let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut() .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?; @@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ where }); } - Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) + Ok(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) } fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> { @@ -2656,7 +2656,7 @@ where // we don't allow forwards outbound over them. break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None)); } - if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() { + if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() { // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend // we don't have the channel here. @@ -2679,7 +2679,7 @@ where break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt)); } } - if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum + if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt)); } if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) { @@ -2771,10 +2771,10 @@ where action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError }); } - if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() { + if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() { return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}); } - log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id())); self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) } @@ -2790,8 +2790,8 @@ where /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); - let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id())); + let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) { None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), Some(id) => id, }; @@ -2799,8 +2799,8 @@ where self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan) } fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); - let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; + log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id())); + let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() { ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true, @@ -2814,11 +2814,11 @@ where short_channel_id, timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(), flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1), - cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(), - htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(), - htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(), + cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(), + htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(), + htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(), fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(), - fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(), + fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(), excess_data: Vec::new(), }; // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`. @@ -2869,7 +2869,7 @@ where if !chan.get().context.is_live() { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()}); } - let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(); + let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(); let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path: path.clone(), @@ -3106,7 +3106,7 @@ where let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger) .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e { - MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None) + MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None) } else { unreachable!(); }); match funding_res { Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan), @@ -3114,7 +3114,7 @@ where mem::drop(peer_state_lock); mem::drop(per_peer_state); - let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()); + let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() }); @@ -3131,16 +3131,16 @@ where }; peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); - match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?"); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); - if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() { + if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() { panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible"); } e.insert(chan); @@ -3218,7 +3218,7 @@ where let mut output_index = None; let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(); for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { - if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() { + if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() { if output_index.is_some() { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned() @@ -3282,16 +3282,16 @@ where } for channel_id in channel_ids { let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap(); - let mut config = channel.config(); + let mut config = channel.context.config(); config.apply(config_update); - if !channel.update_config(&config) { + if !channel.context.update_config(&config) { continue; } if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) { peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg }); } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); } @@ -3365,7 +3365,7 @@ where err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id)) }) } - chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) + chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) }, None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id) @@ -3591,7 +3591,7 @@ where let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get()); failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data), - HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id } + HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id } )); continue; } @@ -4067,7 +4067,7 @@ where _ => {}, } - chan.maybe_expire_prev_config(); + chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config(); if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() { log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}", @@ -4228,9 +4228,9 @@ where // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID. let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() { - chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) + chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) } else { - chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id()) + chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id()) }; if let Some(scid) = scid_pref { self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan) @@ -4492,7 +4492,7 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) { - let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); + let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(); let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger); if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res { @@ -4618,7 +4618,7 @@ where channel_ready: Option, announcement_sigs: Option) -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> { log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement", - log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), + log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" }, if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " }, @@ -4627,10 +4627,10 @@ where let mut htlc_forwards = None; - let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id(); + let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(); if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { - htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()), - channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards)); + htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()), + channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards)); } if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { @@ -4778,9 +4778,9 @@ where } if accept_0conf { channel.get_mut().set_0conf(); - } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() { + } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() { let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), } } @@ -4794,7 +4794,7 @@ where // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones. if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS { let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), } } @@ -4806,7 +4806,7 @@ where } peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { - node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id), }); } @@ -4845,8 +4845,8 @@ where ) -> usize { let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0; for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() { - if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 && - chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0 + if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 && + chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0 { num_unfunded_channels += 1; } @@ -4911,14 +4911,14 @@ where }, Ok(res) => res }; - match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.context.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels { - if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() { + if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { @@ -4932,7 +4932,7 @@ where counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis, push_msat: msg.push_msat, - channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(), + channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(), }, None)); } @@ -4955,7 +4955,7 @@ where match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan); - (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id()) + (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id()) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) } @@ -4996,14 +4996,14 @@ where Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { - match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) { + match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => { - i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id()); + i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); } } @@ -5053,7 +5053,7 @@ where hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan); - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor); + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor); let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res { // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on @@ -5083,7 +5083,7 @@ where let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id())); peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: announcement_sigs, @@ -5094,7 +5094,7 @@ where // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an // announcement_signatures. - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id())); if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) { peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), @@ -5134,7 +5134,7 @@ where if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" }); } - let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo(); + let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo(); let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry); dropped_htlcs = htlcs; @@ -5340,7 +5340,7 @@ where let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo(); + let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo(); let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan); if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt { let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update); @@ -5479,7 +5479,7 @@ where let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo(); + let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo(); let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan); let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt { let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update); @@ -5562,7 +5562,7 @@ where let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { if chan.get().context.should_announce() { // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide @@ -5571,7 +5571,7 @@ where } return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id)); } - let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; + let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0; if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one { return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist); @@ -5618,7 +5618,7 @@ where // they have the latest channel parameters. if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) { channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { - node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); } @@ -5699,9 +5699,9 @@ where }; self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason); pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { - msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } }, }); } @@ -5750,8 +5750,8 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock; for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { - let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id(); - let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo(); + let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(); + let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo(); let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) = chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger); if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() { @@ -5810,7 +5810,7 @@ where if let Some(msg) = msg_opt { has_update = true; pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, + node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); } if let Some(tx) = tx_opt { @@ -5833,7 +5833,7 @@ where Err(e) => { has_update = true; let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); + handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); !close_channel } } @@ -6164,7 +6164,7 @@ where } if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { - debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint); + debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint); if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() { log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor", log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..])); @@ -6420,7 +6420,7 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() { - if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) { + if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) { res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash))); } } @@ -6432,7 +6432,7 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist }); self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| { - if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() { + if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() { if funding_txo.txid == *txid { channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None)) } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) } @@ -6475,20 +6475,20 @@ where for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) { let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel); timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data), - HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() })); + HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() })); } if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt { send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready); if channel.context.is_usable() { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id())); if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); } } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id())); } } @@ -6498,9 +6498,9 @@ where } if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id())); pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: announcement_sigs, }); if let Some(height) = height_opt { @@ -6515,7 +6515,7 @@ where } } if channel.is_our_channel_ready() { - if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { + if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() { // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. @@ -6523,8 +6523,8 @@ where // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info // is always consistent. let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); - let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); - assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()), + let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id())); + assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()), "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels", fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW); } @@ -6542,9 +6542,9 @@ where let reason_message = format!("{}", reason); self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason); pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { - channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(), data: reason_message, } }, }); @@ -6910,7 +6910,7 @@ where let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| { - let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { + let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { if !chan.context.have_received_message() { // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now @@ -6919,13 +6919,13 @@ where false } else { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger), }); true } } else { true }; - if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) { if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { @@ -7553,7 +7553,7 @@ where } number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len(); for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() { - if !channel.is_funding_initiated() { + if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { unfunded_channels += 1; } } @@ -7565,7 +7565,7 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() { - if channel.is_funding_initiated() { + if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { channel.write(writer)?; } } @@ -7851,7 +7851,7 @@ where pub default_config: UserConfig, /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie - /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key). + /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key). /// /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This @@ -7941,14 +7941,14 @@ where let mut channel: Channel<::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, ( &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config) ))?; - let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; + let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone()); if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) { if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() { // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue: log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!"); log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", - log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id()); + log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id()); log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,"); log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!"); log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds."); @@ -7962,7 +7962,7 @@ where log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!"); log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast."); log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", - log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id()); + log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id()); let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true); if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update { pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { @@ -7971,8 +7971,8 @@ where } failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs); channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed { - channel_id: channel.channel_id(), - user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), + channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(), + user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(), reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager }, None)); for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() { @@ -7990,29 +7990,29 @@ where // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected. log_info!(args.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager", - log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); + log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id())); } } } else { log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}", - log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(), + log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id()); channel.complete_all_mon_updates_through(monitor.get_latest_update_id()); - if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { - short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); + if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id())); } - if channel.is_funding_initiated() { - id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id()); + if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { + id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); } - match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) { + match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let by_id_map = entry.get_mut(); - by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); + by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new(); - by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); + by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel); entry.insert(by_id_map); } } @@ -8023,12 +8023,12 @@ where // safely discard the channel. let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false); channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed { - channel_id: channel.channel_id(), - user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), + channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(), + user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(), reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, }, None)); } else { - log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id())); log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,"); log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!"); log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds."); @@ -8117,7 +8117,7 @@ where let peer_state = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap(); for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() { for update in chan.uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates() { - if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() { + if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.context.get_funding_txo() { log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for channel {}", update.update_id, log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id())); pending_background_events.push( @@ -8409,25 +8409,25 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { - if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 { + if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 { let mut outbound_scid_alias; loop { outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source); if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; } } - chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias); - } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) { + chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias); + } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) { // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. - log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); + log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } if chan.context.is_usable() { - if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() { + if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() { // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. - log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); + log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs index 6d980632d..79210068f 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs @@ -2237,10 +2237,10 @@ pub fn do_claim_payment_along_route<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id()) .unwrap().lock().unwrap(); let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0.channel_id).unwrap(); - if let Some(prev_config) = channel.prev_config() { + if let Some(prev_config) = channel.context.prev_config() { prev_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat } else { - channel.config().forwarding_fee_base_msat + channel.context.config().forwarding_fee_base_msat } }; expect_payment_forwarded!($node, $next_node, $prev_node, Some(fee as u64), false, false); diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 10225e099..58977e789 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -6172,7 +6172,7 @@ fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() { let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); - htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(); + htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(); } let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat); diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/onion_route_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/onion_route_tests.rs index 36e1bd753..1aa3420ca 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/onion_route_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/onion_route_tests.rs @@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ fn test_onion_failure() { let short_channel_id = channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id; let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap() - .get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1; + .context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1; let mut bogus_route = route.clone(); let route_len = bogus_route.paths[0].hops.len(); bogus_route.paths[0].hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward; diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs index f514fa1ed..ab010b5a7 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs @@ -607,9 +607,9 @@ fn do_retry_with_no_persist(confirm_before_reload: bool) { let mut peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) .unwrap().lock().unwrap(); let mut channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&chan_id_2).unwrap(); - let mut new_config = channel.config(); + let mut new_config = channel.context.config(); new_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 100_000; - channel.update_config(&new_config); + channel.context.update_config(&new_config); new_route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 100_000; } @@ -1409,7 +1409,7 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){ let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat( &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) , &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()), - channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() + channel_1.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() ); assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None); } @@ -1421,7 +1421,7 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){ let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat( &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) , &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), - channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() + channel_2.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() ); assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, None); @@ -1446,7 +1446,7 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){ let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat( &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) , &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()), - channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() + channel_1.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() ); // First hop accounts for expected 1000 msat fee assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, Some(501000)); @@ -1459,7 +1459,7 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){ let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat( &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) , &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), - channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() + channel_2.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() ); assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, Some(500000)); @@ -1485,7 +1485,7 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){ let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat( &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) , &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()), - channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() + channel_1.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() ); assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None); } @@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){ let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat( &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) , &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), - channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() + channel_2.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() ); assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, None); } @@ -1538,7 +1538,7 @@ fn test_holding_cell_inflight_htlcs() { let used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat( &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) , &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()), - channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() + channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() ); assert_eq!(used_liquidity, Some(2000000));