From 61401b16f0e59967e665998440d1aee0ebf253e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Corallo <git@bluematt.me>
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2021 20:12:50 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Make ChannelMonitor clonable again

In general, we'd been moving away from ChannelMonitor being clonable,
   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXx
---
 lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs | 15 +++++++++++----
 lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs      |  5 +++--
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index e79e50172..a12662eac 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
 
 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
 	counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 	counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
 /// transaction causing it.
 ///
 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 struct OnchainEventEntry {
 	txid: Txid,
 	height: u32,
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
 
 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 enum OnchainEvent {
 	/// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
 	///  * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ pub enum Balance {
 }
 
 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
 	commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
 	/// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
@@ -685,6 +685,13 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
 	inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
 }
 
+impl<Signer: Sign> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+	fn clone(&self) -> Self {
+		Self { inner: Mutex::new(self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone()) }
+	}
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	latest_update_id: u64,
 	commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs b/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs
index 0f2edff5e..0f8ebd5dc 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
 /// transaction causing it.
 ///
 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 struct OnchainEventEntry {
 	txid: Txid,
 	height: u32,
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ impl OnchainEventEntry {
 
 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 enum OnchainEvent {
 	/// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
 	/// bump-txn candidate buffer.
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ impl Writeable for Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> {
 
 /// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
 /// do RBF bumping if possible.
+#[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
 	destination_script: Script,
 	holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
-- 
2.39.5