From 8e9980032952e04e4951df027bf86a8a69733719 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Corallo Date: Sun, 27 Sep 2020 18:05:28 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Drop now-unused Vec of outpoints in remote-commitment-tx-tracking This nearly fully reverts 6f08779b0439e7e4367a75f4ee88de093dfb68cb, removing the extra data storage that it added. --- lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs | 31 ++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index 3adf3e0e..0a9cf699 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions. - counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap)>, + counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap, /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster. /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small). @@ -824,13 +824,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?; - for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { + for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?; - (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?; - for script in txouts.iter() { - script.write(writer)?; - } + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?; } writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?; @@ -1217,12 +1213,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because // its trivial to do, double-check that here. - for (txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { - let watched_outputs = self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered"); - assert_eq!(watched_outputs.len(), outputs.len()); - for (watched, output) in watched_outputs.iter().zip(outputs.iter()) { - assert_eq!(watched, output); - } + for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { + self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered"); } &self.outputs_to_watch } @@ -1328,7 +1320,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction! log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len()); watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); - self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); + self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); macro_rules! check_htlc_fails { ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { @@ -1375,7 +1367,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and // insert it here. watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); - self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); + self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid); @@ -1713,7 +1705,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); } } else { - if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { + if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger); claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option { @@ -2205,12 +2197,7 @@ impl Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len { let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?; let commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; - let outputs_count = ::read(reader)?; - let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8)); - for _ in 0..outputs_count { - outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?); - } - if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) { + if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } -- 2.30.2