From e73036c6845fd3cc16479a1b497db82a5ebb3897 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antoine Riard Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2020 20:47:02 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] Implement concurrent broadcast tolerance for distributed watchtowers With a distrbuted watchtowers deployment, where each monitor is plugged to its own chain view, there is no guarantee that block are going to be seen in same order. Watchtower may diverge in their acceptance of a submitted `commitment_signed` update due to a block timing-out a HTLC and provoking a subset but yet not seen by the other watchtower subset. Any update reject by one of the watchtower must block offchain coordinator to move channel state forward and release revocation secret for previous state. In this case, we want any watchtower from the rejection subset to still be able to claim outputs if the concurrent state, has accepted by the other subset, is confirming. This improve overall watchtower system fault-tolerance. This change stores local commitment transaction unconditionally and fail the update if there is knowledge of an already signed commitment transaction (ChannelMonitor.local_tx_signed=true). --- lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs | 31 ++++++++++++++---------------- lightning/src/ln/onchaintx.rs | 11 +---------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index d1707855..55943487 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -824,6 +824,10 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates. + // + // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we + // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another + // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view. holder_tx_signed: bool, // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is @@ -888,6 +892,11 @@ pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { /// /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS. + /// + /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, even if an Err is return, the new version + /// must be written to disk, as state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing + /// a commitment broadcast. This storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed + /// onchain by another watchtower, lagging behind on block processing. fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated @@ -1167,12 +1176,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { feerate_per_kw: initial_holder_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions }; - // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using - // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't - // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest holder valid commitment tx onchain - // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right - // now but we should consider it later. - onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx).unwrap(); + onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx); ChannelMonitor { latest_update_id: 0, @@ -1327,9 +1331,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated. /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called. pub(super) fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { - if self.holder_tx_signed { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A holder commitment tx has already been signed, no new holder commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty")); - } let txid = commitment_tx.txid(); let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64; let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64; @@ -1343,17 +1344,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs, }; - // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using - // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't - // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest holder valid commitment tx onchain - // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right - // now but we should consider it later. - if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx) { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Holder commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed")); - } + self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx); self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx); self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx); + if self.holder_tx_signed { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected")); + } Ok(()) } diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/onchaintx.rs b/lightning/src/ln/onchaintx.rs index 281bc919..cad5cc1b 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/onchaintx.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/onchaintx.rs @@ -877,18 +877,9 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler { } } - pub(super) fn provide_latest_holder_tx(&mut self, tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> Result<(), ()> { - // To prevent any unsafe state discrepancy between offchain and onchain, once holder - // commitment transaction has been signed due to an event (either block height for - // HTLC-timeout or channel force-closure), don't allow any further update of holder - // commitment transaction view to avoid delivery of revocation secret to counterparty - // for the aformentionned signed transaction. - if self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_some() || self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_some() { - return Err(()); - } + pub(super) fn provide_latest_holder_tx(&mut self, tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) { self.prev_holder_commitment = self.holder_commitment.take(); self.holder_commitment = Some(tx); - Ok(()) } fn sign_latest_holder_htlcs(&mut self) { -- 2.30.2