From 849c00853e801136888db44075a166e0653e39d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Corallo Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 04:22:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Initial checkin --- Cargo.toml | 13 + src/lib.rs | 884 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 897 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Cargo.toml create mode 100644 src/lib.rs diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..948991c --- /dev/null +++ b/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +[package] +name = "dnssec-prover" +version = "0.1.0" +edition = "2021" +rust-version = "1.60.0" + +[dependencies] +ring = { version = "0.17", default-features = false, features = ["alloc"] } +hex_lit = { version = "0.1", default-features = false, features = ["rust_v_1_46"] } + +[dev-dependencies] +hex-conservative = { version = "0.1", default-features = false, features = ["alloc"] } +base64 = "0.21" diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f39be7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,884 @@ +//! The DNS provides a single, global, hierarchical namespace with (when DNSSEC is used) +//! cryptographic guarantees on all of its data. +//! +//! This makes it incredibly powerful for resolving human-readable names into arbitrary, secured +//! data. +//! +//! Unlike TLS, this cryptographic security provides transferable proofs which can convince an +//! offline device, using simple cryptographic primitives and a single root trusted key, of the +//! validity of DNS data. +//! +//! This crate implements the creation and validation of such proofs, using the format from RFC +//! 9102 to create transferable proofs of DNS entries. +//! +//! It is no-std (but requires `alloc`) and seeks to have minimal dependencies and a reasonably +//! conservative MSRV policy, allowing it to be used in as many places as possible. + +#![allow(deprecated)] // XXX +#![deny(missing_docs)] + +#![no_std] +extern crate alloc; + +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use alloc::vec; +use alloc::string::String; +use alloc::borrow::ToOwned; + +use ring::signature; + +/// Gets the trusted root anchors +/// +/// These are available at +pub fn root_hints() -> Vec { + #[allow(unused_mut)] + let mut res = vec![DS { + name: ".".try_into().unwrap(), key_tag: 19036, alg: 8, digest_type: 2, + digest: hex_lit::hex!("49AAC11D7B6F6446702E54A1607371607A1A41855200FD2CE1CDDE32F24E8FB5").to_vec(), + }, DS { + name: ".".try_into().unwrap(), key_tag: 20326, alg: 8, digest_type: 2, + digest: hex_lit::hex!("E06D44B80B8F1D39A95C0B0D7C65D08458E880409BBC683457104237C7F8EC8D").to_vec(), + }]; + // In tests, add the trust anchor from RFC 9102 + #[cfg(test)] + res.push(DS { + name: ".".try_into().unwrap(), key_tag: 47005, alg: 13, digest_type: 2, + digest: hex_lit::hex!("2eb6e9f2480126691594d649a5a613de3052e37861634641bb568746f2ffc4d4").to_vec(), + }); + res +} + +/// A valid domain name. +/// +/// It must end with a ".", be no longer than 255 bytes, consist of only printable ASCII +/// characters and each label may be no longer than 63 bytes. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)] +pub struct Name(String); +impl core::ops::Deref for Name { + type Target = str; + fn deref(&self) -> &str { &self.0 } +} +impl TryFrom for Name { + type Error = (); + fn try_from(s: String) -> Result { + if s.is_empty() { return Err(()); } + if *s.as_bytes().last().unwrap_or(&0) != b"."[0] { return Err(()); } + if s.len() > 255 { return Err(()); } + if s.chars().any(|c| !c.is_ascii_graphic() && c != '.' && c != '-') { return Err(()); } + for label in s.split(".") { + if label.len() > 63 { return Err(()); } + } + + Ok(Name(s)) + } +} +impl TryFrom<&str> for Name { + type Error = (); + fn try_from(s: &str) -> Result { + Self::try_from(s.to_owned()) + } +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)] +/// A supported Resource Record +/// +/// Note that we only currently support a handful of RR types as needed to generate and validate +/// TXT or TLSA record proofs. +pub enum RR { + /// A text resource record + Txt(Txt), + /// A TLS Certificate Association resource record + TLSA(TLSA), + /// A DNS (Public) Key resource record + DnsKey(DnsKey), + /// A Delegated Signer resource record + DS(DS), + /// A Resource Record Signature record + RRSig(RRSig), +} +impl RR { + /// Gets the name this record refers to. + pub fn name(&self) -> &Name { + match self { + RR::Txt(rr) => &rr.name, + RR::TLSA(rr) => &rr.name, + RR::DnsKey(rr) => &rr.name, + RR::DS(rr) => &rr.name, + RR::RRSig(rr) => &rr.name, + } + } + fn ty(&self) -> u16 { + match self { + RR::Txt(_) => Txt::TYPE, + RR::TLSA(_) => TLSA::TYPE, + RR::DnsKey(_) => DnsKey::TYPE, + RR::DS(_) => DS::TYPE, + RR::RRSig(_) => RRSig::TYPE, + } + } + fn write_u16_len_prefixed_data(&self, out: &mut Vec) { + match self { + RR::Txt(rr) => StaticRecord::write_u16_len_prefixed_data(rr, out), + RR::TLSA(rr) => StaticRecord::write_u16_len_prefixed_data(rr, out), + RR::DnsKey(rr) => StaticRecord::write_u16_len_prefixed_data(rr, out), + RR::DS(rr) => StaticRecord::write_u16_len_prefixed_data(rr, out), + RR::RRSig(rr) => StaticRecord::write_u16_len_prefixed_data(rr, out), + } + } +} +impl From for RR { fn from(txt: Txt) -> RR { RR::Txt(txt) } } +impl From for RR { fn from(tlsa: TLSA) -> RR { RR::TLSA(tlsa) } } +impl From for RR { fn from(dnskey: DnsKey) -> RR { RR::DnsKey(dnskey) } } +impl From for RR { fn from(ds: DS) -> RR { RR::DS(ds) } } +impl From for RR { fn from(rrsig: RRSig) -> RR { RR::RRSig(rrsig) } } + +trait StaticRecord : Ord { + // http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/dns-parameters.xhtml#dns-parameters-4 + const TYPE: u16; + fn name(&self) -> &Name; + fn write_u16_len_prefixed_data(&self, out: &mut Vec); +} +/// A trait describing a resource record (including the [`RR`] enum). +pub trait Record : Ord + { + /// The resource record type, as maintained by IANA. + /// + /// Current assignments can be found at + /// + fn ty(&self) -> u16; + /// The name this record is at. + fn name(&self) -> &Name; + /// Writes the data of this record, prefixed by a u16 length, to the given `Vec`. + fn write_u16_len_prefixed_data(&self, out: &mut Vec); +} +impl Record for RR { + fn ty(&self) -> u16 { RR::TYPE } + fn name(&self) -> &Name { RR::name(self) } + fn write_u16_len_prefixed_data(&self, out: &mut Vec) { + RR::write_u16_len_prefixed_data(self, out) + } +} +impl Record for RR { + fn ty(&self) -> u16 { self.ty() } + fn name(&self) -> &Name { self.name() } + fn write_u16_len_prefixed_data(&self, out: &mut Vec) { + self.write_u16_len_prefixed_data(out) + } +} + +fn read_u8(inp: &mut &[u8]) -> Result { + let res = *inp.get(0).ok_or(())?; + *inp = &inp[1..]; + Ok(res) +} +fn read_u16(inp: &mut &[u8]) -> Result { + if inp.len() < 2 { return Err(()); } + let mut bytes = [0; 2]; + bytes.copy_from_slice(&inp[..2]); + *inp = &inp[2..]; + Ok(u16::from_be_bytes(bytes)) +} +fn read_u32(inp: &mut &[u8]) -> Result { + if inp.len() < 4 { return Err(()); } + let mut bytes = [0; 4]; + bytes.copy_from_slice(&inp[..4]); + *inp = &inp[4..]; + Ok(u32::from_be_bytes(bytes)) +} + +fn read_name(inp: &mut &[u8]) -> Result { + let mut name = String::with_capacity(1024); + loop { + let len = read_u8(inp)? as usize; + if len == 0 { + if name.is_empty() { name += "."; } + break; + } + if inp.len() <= len { return Err(()); } + name += core::str::from_utf8(&inp[..len]).map_err(|_| ())?; + name += "."; + *inp = &inp[len..]; + if name.len() > 1024 { return Err(()); } + } + Ok(name.try_into()?) +} + +trait Writer { fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]); } +impl Writer for Vec { fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) { self.extend_from_slice(buf); } } +impl Writer for ring::digest::Context { fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) { self.update(buf); } } +fn write_name(out: &mut W, name: &str) { + let canonical_name = name.to_ascii_lowercase(); + if canonical_name == "." { + out.write(&[0]); + } else { + for label in canonical_name.split(".") { + out.write(&(label.len() as u8).to_be_bytes()); + out.write(label.as_bytes()); + } + } +} +fn name_len(name: &Name) -> u16 { + if name.0 == "." { + 1 + } else { + let mut res = 0; + for label in name.split(".") { + res += 1 + label.len(); + } + res as u16 + } +} + +fn parse_rr(inp: &mut &[u8]) -> Result { + let name = read_name(inp)?; + let ty = read_u16(inp)?; + let class = read_u16(inp)?; + if class != 1 { return Err(()); } // We only support the INternet + let _ttl = read_u32(inp)?; + let data_len = read_u16(inp)? as usize; + if inp.len() < data_len { return Err(()); } + let mut data = &inp[..data_len]; + *inp = &inp[data_len..]; + + match ty { + Txt::TYPE => { + let mut parsed_data = Vec::with_capacity(data_len - 1); + while !data.is_empty() { + let len = read_u8(&mut data)? as usize; + if data.len() < len { return Err(()); } + parsed_data.extend_from_slice(&data[..len]); + data = &data[len..]; + } + Ok(RR::Txt(Txt { name, data: parsed_data })) + } + TLSA::TYPE => { + if data_len <= 3 { return Err(()); } + Ok(RR::TLSA(TLSA { + name, cert_usage: read_u8(&mut data)?, selector: read_u8(&mut data)?, + data_ty: read_u8(&mut data)?, data: data.to_vec(), + })) + }, + DnsKey::TYPE => { + Ok(RR::DnsKey(DnsKey { + name, flags: read_u16(&mut data)?, protocol: read_u8(&mut data)?, + alg: read_u8(&mut data)?, pubkey: data.to_vec(), + })) + }, + DS::TYPE => { + Ok(RR::DS(DS { + name, key_tag: read_u16(&mut data)?, alg: read_u8(&mut data)?, + digest_type: read_u8(&mut data)?, digest: data.to_vec(), + })) + }, + RRSig::TYPE => { + Ok(RR::RRSig(RRSig { + name, ty: read_u16(&mut data)?, alg: read_u8(&mut data)?, + labels: read_u8(&mut data)?, orig_ttl: read_u32(&mut data)?, + expiration: read_u32(&mut data)?, inception: read_u32(&mut data)?, + key_tag: read_u16(&mut data)?, key_name: read_name(&mut data)?, + signature: data.to_vec(), + })) + }, + _ => Err(()), + } +} +/// Parse a stream of [`RR`]s from the format described in [RFC 9102](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9102.html). +/// +/// Note that this is only the series of `AuthenticationChain` records, and does not read the +/// `ExtSupportLifetime` field at the start of a `DnssecChainExtension`. +pub fn parse_rr_stream(mut inp: &[u8]) -> Result, ()> { + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(32); + while !inp.is_empty() { + res.push(parse_rr(&mut inp)?); + } + Ok(res) +} + +/// Writes the given resource record in its wire encoding to the given `Vec`. +/// +/// An [RFC 9102](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9102.html) `AuthenticationChain` is simply a +/// series of such records with no additional bytes in between. +pub fn write_rr(rr: &RR, ttl: u32, out: &mut Vec) { + write_name(out, rr.name()); + out.extend_from_slice(&rr.ty().to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&1u16.to_be_bytes()); // The INternet class + out.extend_from_slice(&ttl.to_be_bytes()); + rr.write_u16_len_prefixed_data(out); +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)] // TODO: ord is wrong cause need to consider len first, maybe +/// A text resource record, containing arbitrary text data +pub struct Txt { + /// The name this record is at. + pub name: Name, + /// The text record itself. + /// + /// While this is generally UTF-8-valid, there is no specific requirement that it be, and thus + /// is an arbitrary series of bytes here. + data: Vec, +} +impl StaticRecord for Txt { + const TYPE: u16 = 16; + fn name(&self) -> &Name { &self.name } + fn write_u16_len_prefixed_data(&self, out: &mut Vec) { + let len = (self.data.len() + self.data.len() / 255 + 1) as u16; + out.extend_from_slice(&len.to_be_bytes()); + + let mut data_write = &self.data[..]; + out.extend_from_slice(&[data_write.len().try_into().unwrap_or(255)]); + while !data_write.is_empty() { + let split_pos = core::cmp::min(255, data_write.len()); + out.extend_from_slice(&data_write[..split_pos]); + data_write = &data_write[split_pos..]; + if !data_write.is_empty() { + out.extend_from_slice(&[data_write.len().try_into().unwrap_or(255)]); + } + } + } +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)] +/// A TLS Certificate Association resource record containing information about the TLS certificate +/// which should be expected when communicating with the host at the given name. +/// +/// See for more +/// info. +pub struct TLSA { + /// The name this record is at. + pub name: Name, + /// The type of constraint on the TLS certificate(s) used which should be enforced by this + /// record. + pub cert_usage: u8, + /// Whether to match on the full certificate, or only the public key. + pub selector: u8, + /// The type of data included which is used to match the TLS certificate(s). + pub data_ty: u8, + /// The certificate data or hash of the certificate data itself. + pub data: Vec, +} +impl StaticRecord for TLSA { + const TYPE: u16 = 52; + fn name(&self) -> &Name { &self.name } + fn write_u16_len_prefixed_data(&self, out: &mut Vec) { + let len = 3 + self.data.len(); + out.extend_from_slice(&(len as u16).to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&[self.cert_usage, self.selector, self.data_ty]); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.data); + } +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)] +/// A public key resource record which can be used to validate [`RRSig`]s. +pub struct DnsKey { + /// The name this record is at. + pub name: Name, + /// Flags which constrain the usage of this public key. + pub flags: u16, + /// The protocol this key is used for (protocol `3` is DNSSEC). + pub protocol: u8, + /// The algorithm which this public key uses to sign data. + pub alg: u8, + /// The public key itself. + pub pubkey: Vec, +} +impl StaticRecord for DnsKey { + const TYPE: u16 = 48; + fn name(&self) -> &Name { &self.name } + fn write_u16_len_prefixed_data(&self, out: &mut Vec) { + let len = 2 + 1 + 1 + self.pubkey.len(); + out.extend_from_slice(&(len as u16).to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.flags.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.protocol.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.alg.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.pubkey); + } +} +impl DnsKey { + /// A short (non-cryptographic) digest which can be used to refer to this [`DnsKey`]. + pub fn key_tag(&self) -> u16 { + let mut res = u32::from(self.flags); + res += u32::from(self.protocol) << 8; + res += u32::from(self.alg); + for (idx, b) in self.pubkey.iter().enumerate() { + if idx % 2 == 0 { + res += u32::from(*b) << 8; + } else { + res += u32::from(*b); + } + } + res += (res >> 16) & 0xffff; + (res & 0xffff) as u16 + } +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)] +/// A Delegation Signer resource record which indicates that some alternative [`DnsKey`] can sign +/// for records in the zone which matches [`DS::name`]. +pub struct DS { + /// The name this record is at. + /// + /// This is also the zone that a [`DnsKey`] which matches the [`Self::digest`] can sign for. + pub name: Name, + /// A short tag which describes the matching [`DnsKey`]. + /// + /// This matches the [`DnsKey::key_tag`] for the [`DnsKey`] which is referred to by this + /// [`DS`]. + pub key_tag: u16, + /// The algorithm which the [`DnsKey`] referred to by this [`DS`] uses. + /// + /// This matches the [`DnsKey::alg`] field in the referred-to [`DnsKey`]. + pub alg: u8, + /// The type of digest used to hash the referred-to [`DnsKey`]. + pub digest_type: u8, + /// The digest itself. + pub digest: Vec, +} +impl StaticRecord for DS { + const TYPE: u16 = 43; + fn name(&self) -> &Name { &self.name } + fn write_u16_len_prefixed_data(&self, out: &mut Vec) { + let len = 2 + 1 + 1 + self.digest.len(); + out.extend_from_slice(&(len as u16).to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.key_tag.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.alg.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.digest_type.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.digest); + } +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)] +/// A Resource Record (set) Signature resource record. This contains a signature over all the +/// resources records of the given type at the given name. +pub struct RRSig { + /// The name this record is at. + /// + /// This is also the name of any records which this signature is covering (ignoring wildcards). + pub name: Name, + /// The resource record type which this [`RRSig`] is signing. + /// + /// All resources records of this type at the same name as [`Self::name`] must be signed by + /// this [`RRSig`]. + pub ty: u16, + /// The algorithm which is being used to sign. + /// + /// This must match the [`DnsKey::alg`] field in the [`DnsKey`] being used to sign. + pub alg: u8, + /// The number of labels in the name of the records that this signature is signing. + // TODO: Describe this better in terms of wildcards + pub labels: u8, + /// The TTL of the records which this [`RRSig`] is signing. + pub orig_ttl: u32, + /// The expiration (as a UNIX timestamp) of this signature. + pub expiration: u32, + /// The time (as a UNIX timestamp) at which this signature becomes valid. + pub inception: u32, + /// A short tag which describes the matching [`DnsKey`]. + /// + /// This matches the [`DnsKey::key_tag`] for the [`DnsKey`] which created this signature. + pub key_tag: u16, + /// The [`DnsKey::name`] in the [`DnsKey`] which created this signature. + /// + /// This must be a parent of the [`Self::name`]. + pub key_name: Name, + /// The signature itself. + pub signature: Vec, +} +impl StaticRecord for RRSig { + const TYPE: u16 = 46; + fn name(&self) -> &Name { &self.name } + fn write_u16_len_prefixed_data(&self, out: &mut Vec) { + let len = 2 + 1 + 1 + 4*3 + 2 + name_len(&self.key_name) + self.signature.len() as u16; + out.extend_from_slice(&len.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.ty.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.alg.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.labels.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.orig_ttl.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.expiration.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.inception.to_be_bytes()); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.key_tag.to_be_bytes()); + write_name(out, &self.key_name); + out.extend_from_slice(&self.signature); + } +} + +#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)] +/// An error when validating DNSSEC signatures or other data +pub enum ValidationError { + /// An algorithm used in signing was not supported. + /// + /// In general DNS usage the resulting data should be used anyway, as we were able to verify + /// that a zone wished to use the unsupported algorithm. + /// + /// However, in cases where signing is mandatory, this can be treated as an error. + UnsupportedAlgorithm, + /// The provided data was invalid or signatures did not validate. + Invalid, +} + +fn bytes_to_rsa_pk<'a>(pubkey: &'a [u8]) +-> Result, ValidationError> { + if pubkey.len() <= 3 { return Err(ValidationError::Invalid); } + + let mut pos = 0; + let exponent_length; + if pubkey[0] == 0 { + exponent_length = ((pubkey[1] as usize) << 8) | (pubkey[2] as usize); + pos += 3; + } else { + exponent_length = pubkey[0] as usize; + pos += 1; + } + + if pubkey.len() <= pos + exponent_length { return Err(ValidationError::Invalid); } + Ok(signature::RsaPublicKeyComponents { + n: &pubkey[pos + exponent_length..], + e: &pubkey[pos..pos + exponent_length] + }) +} + +// TODO: return the validity period +fn verify_rrsig<'a, RR: Record, Keys>(sig: &RRSig, dnskeys: Keys, mut records: Vec<&RR>) +-> Result<(), ValidationError> +where Keys: IntoIterator { + for record in records.iter() { + if sig.ty != record.ty() { return Err(ValidationError::Invalid); } + } + for dnskey in dnskeys.into_iter() { + if dnskey.key_tag() == sig.key_tag { + // Protocol must be 3, otherwise its not DNSSEC + if dnskey.protocol != 3 { continue; } + // The ZONE flag must be set if we're going to validate RRs with this key. + if dnskey.flags & 0b1_0000_0000 == 0 { continue; } + if dnskey.alg != sig.alg { continue; } + + // TODO: Check orig_ttl somehow? + + let mut signed_data = Vec::with_capacity(2048); + signed_data.extend_from_slice(&sig.ty.to_be_bytes()); + signed_data.extend_from_slice(&sig.alg.to_be_bytes()); + signed_data.extend_from_slice(&sig.labels.to_be_bytes()); // Check this somehow? + signed_data.extend_from_slice(&sig.orig_ttl.to_be_bytes()); + signed_data.extend_from_slice(&sig.expiration.to_be_bytes()); // Return this and inception + signed_data.extend_from_slice(&sig.inception.to_be_bytes()); + signed_data.extend_from_slice(&sig.key_tag.to_be_bytes()); + write_name(&mut signed_data, &sig.key_name); + + records.sort(); + + for record in records.iter() { + // TODO: Handle wildcards + write_name(&mut signed_data, record.name()); + signed_data.extend_from_slice(&record.ty().to_be_bytes()); + signed_data.extend_from_slice(&1u16.to_be_bytes()); // The INternet class + signed_data.extend_from_slice(&sig.orig_ttl.to_be_bytes()); + record.write_u16_len_prefixed_data(&mut signed_data); + } + + match sig.alg { + 8|10 => { + let alg = if sig.alg == 8 { + &signature::RSA_PKCS1_1024_8192_SHA256_FOR_LEGACY_USE_ONLY + } else { + &signature::RSA_PKCS1_1024_8192_SHA512_FOR_LEGACY_USE_ONLY + }; + bytes_to_rsa_pk(&dnskey.pubkey)? + .verify(alg, &signed_data, &sig.signature) + .map_err(|_| ValidationError::Invalid)?; + }, + 13|14 => { + let alg = if sig.alg == 13 { + &signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_FIXED + } else { + &signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_FIXED + }; + + // Add 0x4 identifier to the ECDSA pubkey as expected by ring. + let mut key = Vec::with_capacity(dnskey.pubkey.len() + 1); + key.push(0x4); + key.extend_from_slice(&dnskey.pubkey); + + signature::UnparsedPublicKey::new(alg, &key) + .verify(&signed_data, &sig.signature) + .map_err(|_| ValidationError::Invalid)?; + }, + 15 => { + signature::UnparsedPublicKey::new(&signature::ED25519, &dnskey.pubkey) + .verify(&signed_data, &sig.signature) + .map_err(|_| ValidationError::Invalid)?; + }, + _ => return Err(ValidationError::UnsupportedAlgorithm), + } + + return Ok(()); + } + } + Err(ValidationError::Invalid) +} + +fn verify_dnskey_rrsig<'a, T, I>(sig: &RRSig, dses: T, records: Vec<&DnsKey>) +-> Result<(), ValidationError> +where T: IntoIterator, I: Iterator + Clone { + let mut validated_dnskeys = Vec::with_capacity(records.len()); + let dses = dses.into_iter(); + + let mut had_known_digest_type = false; + let mut had_ds = false; + for ds in dses.clone() { + had_ds = true; + if ds.digest_type == 2 || ds.digest_type == 4 { + had_known_digest_type = true; + break; + } + } + if !had_ds { return Err(ValidationError::Invalid); } + if !had_known_digest_type { return Err(ValidationError::UnsupportedAlgorithm); } + + for dnskey in records.iter() { + for ds in dses.clone() { + if ds.digest_type != 2 && ds.digest_type != 4 { continue; } + if ds.alg != dnskey.alg { continue; } + if dnskey.key_tag() == ds.key_tag { + let alg = match ds.digest_type { + 2 => &ring::digest::SHA256, + 4 => &ring::digest::SHA384, + _ => continue, + }; + let mut ctx = ring::digest::Context::new(alg); + write_name(&mut ctx, &dnskey.name); + ctx.update(&dnskey.flags.to_be_bytes()); + ctx.update(&dnskey.protocol.to_be_bytes()); + ctx.update(&dnskey.alg.to_be_bytes()); + ctx.update(&dnskey.pubkey); + let hash = ctx.finish(); + if hash.as_ref() == &ds.digest { + validated_dnskeys.push(*dnskey); + break; + } + } + } + } + verify_rrsig(sig, validated_dnskeys.iter().map(|k| *k), records) +} + +/// Verifies the given set of resource records. +/// +/// Given a set of arbitrary records, this attempts to validate DNSSEC data from the [`root_hints`] +/// through to any supported non-DNSSEC record types. +/// +/// All records which could be validated are returned. +pub fn verify_rr_stream<'a>(inp: &'a [RR]) -> Result, ValidationError> { + let mut zone = "."; + let mut res = Vec::new(); + let mut next_ds_set = None; + 'next_zone: while zone == "." || next_ds_set.is_some() { + let mut found_unsupported_alg = false; + for rrsig in inp.iter() + .filter_map(|rr| if let RR::RRSig(sig) = rr { Some(sig) } else { None }) + .filter(|rrsig| rrsig.name.0 == zone && rrsig.ty == DnsKey::TYPE) + { + let dnskeys = inp.iter() + .filter_map(|rr| if let RR::DnsKey(dnskey) = rr { Some(dnskey) } else { None }) + .filter(move |dnskey| dnskey.name.0 == zone); + let dnskeys_verified = if zone == "." { + verify_dnskey_rrsig(rrsig, &root_hints(), dnskeys.clone().collect()) + } else { + debug_assert!(next_ds_set.is_some()); + if next_ds_set.is_none() { break 'next_zone; } + verify_dnskey_rrsig(rrsig, next_ds_set.clone().unwrap(), dnskeys.clone().collect()) + }; + if dnskeys_verified.is_ok() { + let mut last_validated_type = None; + next_ds_set = None; + for rrsig in inp.iter() + .filter_map(|rr| if let RR::RRSig(sig) = rr { Some(sig) } else { None }) + .filter(move |rrsig| rrsig.key_name.0 == zone && rrsig.name.0 != zone) + { + if !rrsig.name.ends_with(zone) { return Err(ValidationError::Invalid); } + if last_validated_type == Some(rrsig.ty) { + // If we just validated all the RRs for this type, go ahead and skip it. We + // may end up double-validating some RR Sets if there's multiple RRSigs for + // the same sets interwoven with other RRSets, but that's okay. + continue; + } + let signed_records = inp.iter() + .filter(|rr| rr.name() == &rrsig.name && rr.ty() == rrsig.ty); + verify_rrsig(rrsig, dnskeys.clone(), signed_records.clone().collect())?; + match rrsig.ty { + // RRSigs shouldn't cover child `DnsKey`s or other `RRSig`s + RRSig::TYPE|DnsKey::TYPE => return Err(ValidationError::Invalid), + DS::TYPE => { + next_ds_set = Some(signed_records.filter_map(|rr| + if let RR::DS(ds) = rr { Some(ds) } + else { debug_assert!(false, "We already filtered by type"); None })); + zone = &rrsig.name; + }, + _ => { + for record in signed_records { res.push(record); } + last_validated_type = Some(rrsig.ty); + }, + } + } + if next_ds_set.is_none() { break 'next_zone; } + else { continue 'next_zone; } + } else if dnskeys_verified == Err(ValidationError::UnsupportedAlgorithm) { + // There may be redundant signatures by different keys, where one we don't supprt + // and another we do. Ignore ones we don't support, but if there are no more, + // return UnsupportedAlgorithm + found_unsupported_alg = true; + } else { + // We don't explicitly handle invalid signatures here, instead we move on to the + // next RRSig (if there is one) and return `Invalid` if no `RRSig`s match. + } + } + // No RRSigs were able to verify our DnsKey set + if found_unsupported_alg { + return Err(ValidationError::UnsupportedAlgorithm); + } else { + return Err(ValidationError::Invalid); + } + } + if res.is_empty() { Err(ValidationError::Invalid) } + else { Ok(res) } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + use hex_conservative::FromHex; + + fn root_dnskey() -> (Vec, Vec) { + let dnskeys = vec![DnsKey { + name: ".".try_into().unwrap(), flags: 256, protocol: 3, alg: 8, + pubkey: base64::decode("AwEAAentCcIEndLh2QSK+pHFq/PkKCwioxt75d7qNOUuTPMo0Fcte/NbwDPbocvbZ/eNb5RV/xQdapaJASQ/oDLsqzD0H1+JkHNuuKc2JLtpMxg4glSE4CnRXT2CnFTW5IwOREL+zeqZHy68OXy5ngW5KALbevRYRg/q2qFezRtCSQ0knmyPwgFsghVYLKwi116oxwEU5yZ6W7npWMxt5Z+Qs8diPNWrS5aXLgJtrWUGIIuFfuZwXYziGRP/z3o1EfMo9zZU19KLopkoLXX7Ls/diCXdSEdJXTtFA8w0/OKQviuJebfKscoElCTswukVZ1VX5gbaFEo2xWhHJ9Uo63wYaTk=").unwrap(), + }, DnsKey { + name: ".".try_into().unwrap(), flags: 257, protocol: 3, alg: 8, + pubkey: base64::decode("AwEAAaz/tAm8yTn4Mfeh5eyI96WSVexTBAvkMgJzkKTOiW1vkIbzxeF3+/4RgWOq7HrxRixHlFlExOLAJr5emLvN7SWXgnLh4+B5xQlNVz8Og8kvArMtNROxVQuCaSnIDdD5LKyWbRd2n9WGe2R8PzgCmr3EgVLrjyBxWezF0jLHwVN8efS3rCj/EWgvIWgb9tarpVUDK/b58Da+sqqls3eNbuv7pr+eoZG+SrDK6nWeL3c6H5Apxz7LjVc1uTIdsIXxuOLYA4/ilBmSVIzuDWfdRUfhHdY6+cn8HFRm+2hM8AnXGXws9555KrUB5qihylGa8subX2Nn6UwNR1AkUTV74bU=").unwrap(), + }]; + let dnskey_rrsig = RRSig { + name: ".".try_into().unwrap(), ty: DnsKey::TYPE, alg: 8, labels: 0, orig_ttl: 172800, + expiration: 1708473600, inception: 1706659200, key_tag: 20326, key_name: ".".try_into().unwrap(), + signature: base64::decode("ZO8LbjtwAiVkkBzOnGbiI/3ilGUPmmJpagsLSBVbIZRG6o/8a+hUZpIPTvk5ERZ1rAW4x0YxKAU8qtaHQpKIp3qYA6u97DYytVD7RdtXKHmGYAvR6QbD5eVTkCw1Sz705rJxbwt6+YM5OBweSUAy5Glo6JSQPDQwRDwj/bV2fLRhJbvfsBgxqaXJA0SaE/ceyvK8gB2NIaguTJNrztr2TENrHxi86OKOuHYDHthOW0TFoPfr19qj/P2eEC6dYniTVovUwHT7e+Hqrb05dJF4mI4ZjaIb5mFf8i5RehT1aRlnb3CLiwJ01bEjrRBo3xUn5I3PkCnglHhx3EvkO73OzA==").unwrap(), + }; + let root_hints = root_hints(); + verify_dnskey_rrsig(&dnskey_rrsig, &root_hints, dnskeys.iter().collect()).unwrap(); + let rrs = vec![dnskeys[0].clone().into(), dnskeys[1].clone().into(), dnskey_rrsig.into()]; + (dnskeys, rrs) + } + + fn com_dnskey() -> (Vec, Vec) { + let root_dnskeys = root_dnskey().0; + let mut com_ds = vec![DS { + name: "com.".try_into().unwrap(), key_tag: 19718, alg: 13, digest_type: 2, + digest: Vec::from_hex("8ACBB0CD28F41250A80A491389424D341522D946B0DA0C0291F2D3D771D7805A").unwrap(), + }]; + let ds_rrsig = RRSig { + name: "com.".try_into().unwrap(), ty: DS::TYPE, alg: 8, labels: 1, orig_ttl: 86400, + expiration: 1708189200, inception: 1707062400, key_tag: 30903, key_name: ".".try_into().unwrap(), + signature: base64::decode("vwMOBBwqRBdlmGZB+0FKfyMSignEtpYW9sD4TzPW2E+wdbF7O7epR5cmKmvcv0RUJdM0dGC/QmhCfgf/yqw1Xp7TpmPaYzaruW70hjGXZJO2nY3G6stUVe4S7lM2CzHL7nbbpaB5B+iSu6Ua9dZ+nyKrxfB7855HBLCLrHrkMGxWQiEPTallXXS8tEM1Y2XrsuzAQu2vZ2D2ClhFspFbPwwOdw+G6+NsZ8PnIfTkCj6DuKcgbdxjmGaYmw/6hVt9OU3kGCOBaJaEy4LrD8Kwzfu4S7axMwTKP4y4c5Y/E4k/mVAW0cuUtv549HaDfD2V0CvW1bDl6PqRkOiVsqM/lA==").unwrap(), + }; + verify_rrsig(&ds_rrsig, &root_dnskeys, com_ds.iter().collect()).unwrap(); + let dnskeys = vec![DnsKey { + name: "com.".try_into().unwrap(), flags: 256, protocol: 3, alg: 13, + pubkey: base64::decode("5i9qjJgyH+9MBz7VO269/srLQB/xRRllyUoVq8oLBZshPe4CGzDSFGnXAM3L/QPzB9ULpJuuy7jcxmBZ5Ebo7A==").unwrap(), + }, DnsKey { + name: "com.".try_into().unwrap(), flags: 257, protocol: 3, alg: 13, + pubkey: base64::decode("tx8EZRAd2+K/DJRV0S+hbBzaRPS/G6JVNBitHzqpsGlz8huE61Ms9ANe6NSDLKJtiTBqfTJWDAywEp1FCsEINQ==").unwrap(), + }]; + let dnskey_rrsig = RRSig { + name: "com.".try_into().unwrap(), ty: DnsKey::TYPE, alg: 13, labels: 1, orig_ttl: 86400, + expiration: 1707750155, inception: 1706453855, key_tag: 19718, key_name: "com.".try_into().unwrap(), + signature: base64::decode("ZFGChM7QfJt0QSqVWerWnG5pMjpL1pXyJAmuHe8dHI/olmaNCxm+mqNHv9i3AploFY6JoNtiHmeBiC6zuFj/ZQ==").unwrap(), + }; + verify_dnskey_rrsig(&dnskey_rrsig, &com_ds, dnskeys.iter().collect()).unwrap(); + let rrs = vec![com_ds.pop().unwrap().into(), ds_rrsig.into(), + dnskeys[0].clone().into(), dnskeys[1].clone().into(), dnskey_rrsig.into()]; + (dnskeys, rrs) + } + + fn mattcorallo_dnskey() -> (Vec, Vec) { + let com_dnskeys = com_dnskey().0; + let mut mattcorallo_ds = vec![DS { + name: "mattcorallo.com.".try_into().unwrap(), key_tag: 25630, alg: 13, digest_type: 2, + digest: Vec::from_hex("DC608CA62BE89B3B9DB1593F9A59930D24FBA79D486E19C88A7792711EC00735").unwrap(), + }]; + let ds_rrsig = RRSig { + name: "mattcorallo.com.".try_into().unwrap(), ty: DS::TYPE, alg: 13, labels: 2, orig_ttl: 86400, + expiration: 1707631252, inception: 1707022252, key_tag: 4534, key_name: "com.".try_into().unwrap(), + signature: base64::decode("M7Fk+CjfLz6hRsY5iSuw5bwc2OqlS3XtKH8FDs7lcbhEiR63n+DzOF0I8L+3k06SXFnE89uuofQECzWmAyef6Q==").unwrap(), + }; + verify_rrsig(&ds_rrsig, &com_dnskeys, mattcorallo_ds.iter().collect()).unwrap(); + let dnskeys = vec![DnsKey { + name: "mattcorallo.com.".try_into().unwrap(), flags: 257, protocol: 3, alg: 13, + pubkey: base64::decode("8BP51Etiu4V6cHvGCYqwNqCip4pvHChjEgkgG4zpdDvO9YRcTGuV/p71hAUut2/qEdxqXfUOT/082BJ/Z089DA==").unwrap(), + }, DnsKey { + name: "mattcorallo.com.".try_into().unwrap(), flags: 256, protocol: 3, alg: 13, + pubkey: base64::decode("AhUlQ8qk7413R0m4zKfTDHb/FQRlKag+ncGXxNxT+qTzSZTb9E5IGjo9VCEp6+IMqqpkd4GrXpN9AzDvlcU9Ig==").unwrap(), + }]; + let dnskey_rrsig = RRSig { + name: "mattcorallo.com.".try_into().unwrap(), ty: DnsKey::TYPE, alg: 13, labels: 2, orig_ttl: 604800, + expiration: 1708278650, inception: 1707063650, key_tag: 25630, key_name: "mattcorallo.com.".try_into().unwrap(), + signature: base64::decode("nyVDwG+la8d5dyWgB7m+H3BQwCvTWLQ/kAqNruMzdLmn9B3VC9u/rvM/ortEu0WPbA1FZWJbRKpF1Ohkj3ltNw==").unwrap(), + }; + verify_dnskey_rrsig(&dnskey_rrsig, &mattcorallo_ds, dnskeys.iter().collect()).unwrap(); + let rrs = vec![mattcorallo_ds.pop().unwrap().into(), ds_rrsig.into(), + dnskeys[0].clone().into(), dnskeys[1].clone().into(), dnskey_rrsig.into()]; + (dnskeys, rrs) + } + + fn mattcorallo_txt_record() -> (Txt, RRSig) { + let txt_resp = Txt { + name: "matt.user._bitcoin-payment.mattcorallo.com.".try_into().unwrap(), + data: "bitcoin:?b12=lno1qsgqmqvgm96frzdg8m0gc6nzeqffvzsqzrxqy32afmr3jn9ggkwg3egfwch2hy0l6jut6vfd8vpsc3h89l6u3dm4q2d6nuamav3w27xvdmv3lpgklhg7l5teypqz9l53hj7zvuaenh34xqsz2sa967yzqkylfu9xtcd5ymcmfp32h083e805y7jfd236w9afhavqqvl8uyma7x77yun4ehe9pnhu2gekjguexmxpqjcr2j822xr7q34p078gzslf9wpwz5y57alxu99s0z2ql0kfqvwhzycqq45ehh58xnfpuek80hw6spvwrvttjrrq9pphh0dpydh06qqspp5uq4gpyt6n9mwexde44qv7lstzzq60nr40ff38u27un6y53aypmx0p4qruk2tf9mjwqlhxak4znvna5y".to_owned().into_bytes(), + }; + let txt_rrsig = RRSig { + name: "matt.user._bitcoin-payment.mattcorallo.com.".try_into().unwrap(), + ty: Txt::TYPE, alg: 13, labels: 5, orig_ttl: 3600, expiration: 1708123318, + inception: 1706908318, key_tag: 47959, key_name: "mattcorallo.com.".try_into().unwrap(), + signature: base64::decode("mgU6iwyMWO0w9nj2Gmt1+RmaIJIU3KO7DWVZiCD1bmU9e9zNefXCtnWOC2HtwjUsn/QYkWluvuSfYpBrt1IjpQ==").unwrap(), + }; + (txt_resp, txt_rrsig) + } + + #[test] + fn check_txt_record() { + let dnskeys = mattcorallo_dnskey().0; + let (txt, txt_rrsig) = mattcorallo_txt_record(); + let txt_resp = [txt]; + verify_rrsig(&txt_rrsig, &dnskeys, txt_resp.iter().collect()).unwrap(); + } + + #[test] + fn check_txt_proof() { + let mut rr_stream = Vec::new(); + for rr in root_dnskey().1 { write_rr(&rr, 1, &mut rr_stream); } + for rr in com_dnskey().1 { write_rr(&rr, 1, &mut rr_stream); } + for rr in mattcorallo_dnskey().1 { write_rr(&rr, 1, &mut rr_stream); } + let (txt, txt_rrsig) = mattcorallo_txt_record(); + for rr in [RR::Txt(txt), RR::RRSig(txt_rrsig)] { write_rr(&rr, 1, &mut rr_stream); } + + let rrs = parse_rr_stream(&rr_stream).unwrap(); + let verified_rrs = verify_rr_stream(&rrs).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(verified_rrs.len(), 1); + if let RR::Txt(txt) = &verified_rrs[0] { + assert_eq!(txt.name.0, "matt.user._bitcoin-payment.mattcorallo.com."); + assert_eq!(txt.data, b"bitcoin:?b12=lno1qsgqmqvgm96frzdg8m0gc6nzeqffvzsqzrxqy32afmr3jn9ggkwg3egfwch2hy0l6jut6vfd8vpsc3h89l6u3dm4q2d6nuamav3w27xvdmv3lpgklhg7l5teypqz9l53hj7zvuaenh34xqsz2sa967yzqkylfu9xtcd5ymcmfp32h083e805y7jfd236w9afhavqqvl8uyma7x77yun4ehe9pnhu2gekjguexmxpqjcr2j822xr7q34p078gzslf9wpwz5y57alxu99s0z2ql0kfqvwhzycqq45ehh58xnfpuek80hw6spvwrvttjrrq9pphh0dpydh06qqspp5uq4gpyt6n9mwexde44qv7lstzzq60nr40ff38u27un6y53aypmx0p4qruk2tf9mjwqlhxak4znvna5y"); + } else { panic!(); } + } + + #[test] + fn rfc9102_parse_test() { + // Note that this is the `AuthenticationChain` field only, and ignores the + // `ExtSupportLifetime` field (stripping the top two 0 bytes from the front). +let rfc9102_test_vector = Vec::from_hex("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").unwrap(); + + let rrs = parse_rr_stream(&rfc9102_test_vector).unwrap(); + let verified_rrs = verify_rr_stream(&rrs).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(verified_rrs.len(), 1); + if let RR::TLSA(tlsa) = &verified_rrs[0] { + assert_eq!(tlsa.cert_usage, 3); + assert_eq!(tlsa.selector, 1); + assert_eq!(tlsa.data_ty, 1); + assert_eq!(tlsa.data, Vec::from_hex("8bd1da95272f7fa4ffb24137fc0ed03aae67e5c4d8b3c50734e1050a7920b922").unwrap()); + } else { panic!(); } + } +} -- 2.39.5