extern const uint16_t BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
+extern const uint16_t MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA;
+
extern const uintptr_t REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH;
void Transaction_free(struct LDKTransaction _res);
void ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_minimum_depth(struct LDKChannelHandshakeConfig *NONNULL_PTR this_ptr, uint32_t val);
/**
- * Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money.
+ * Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
+ * the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
+ * transaction).
*
- * It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
- * be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds
- * at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks.
+ * This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
+ * be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
+ * blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
+ * possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
*
* Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
* case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
* our channel.
*
- * Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`] (currently 144), we enforce it as a minimum at channel
- * opening so you can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+ * Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
+ * can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
*/
uint16_t ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_to_self_delay(const struct LDKChannelHandshakeConfig *NONNULL_PTR this_ptr);
/**
- * Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money.
+ * Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
+ * the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
+ * transaction).
*
- * It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
- * be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds
- * at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks.
+ * This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
+ * be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
+ * blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
+ * possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
*
* Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
* case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
* our channel.
*
- * Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`] (currently 144), we enforce it as a minimum at channel
- * opening so you can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+ * Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
+ * can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
*/
void ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_to_self_delay(struct LDKChannelHandshakeConfig *NONNULL_PTR this_ptr, uint16_t val);
*/
void ChannelConfig_set_fee_proportional_millionths(struct LDKChannelConfig *NONNULL_PTR this_ptr, uint32_t val);
+/**
+ * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
+ * the channel this config applies to.
+ *
+ * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
+ * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
+ * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
+ *
+ * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
+ * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
+ * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
+ * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
+ * the spending transaction).
+ *
+ * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
+ * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
+ * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
+ *
+ * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+ */
+uint16_t ChannelConfig_get_cltv_expiry_delta(const struct LDKChannelConfig *NONNULL_PTR this_ptr);
+
+/**
+ * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
+ * the channel this config applies to.
+ *
+ * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
+ * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
+ * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
+ *
+ * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
+ * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
+ * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
+ * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
+ * the spending transaction).
+ *
+ * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
+ * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
+ * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
+ *
+ * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+ */
+void ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(struct LDKChannelConfig *NONNULL_PTR this_ptr, uint16_t val);
+
/**
* Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
* channel.
/**
* Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
*/
-MUST_USE_RES struct LDKChannelConfig ChannelConfig_new(uint32_t fee_proportional_millionths_arg, bool announced_channel_arg, bool commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg);
+MUST_USE_RES struct LDKChannelConfig ChannelConfig_new(uint32_t fee_proportional_millionths_arg, uint16_t cltv_expiry_delta_arg, bool announced_channel_arg, bool commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg);
/**
* Creates a copy of the ChannelConfig
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_minimum_depth(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u32) {
unsafe { &mut *this_ptr.inner }.minimum_depth = val;
}
-/// Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money.
+/// Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
+/// the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
+/// transaction).
///
-/// It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
-/// be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds
-/// at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks.
+/// This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
+/// be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
+/// blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
+/// possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
///
/// Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
/// case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
/// our channel.
///
-/// Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`] (currently 144), we enforce it as a minimum at channel
-/// opening so you can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+/// Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
+/// can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_to_self_delay(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u16 {
let mut inner_val = &mut unsafe { &mut *this_ptr.inner }.our_to_self_delay;
(*inner_val)
}
-/// Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money.
+/// Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
+/// the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
+/// transaction).
///
-/// It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
-/// be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds
-/// at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks.
+/// This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
+/// be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
+/// blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
+/// possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
///
/// Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
/// case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
/// our channel.
///
-/// Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`] (currently 144), we enforce it as a minimum at channel
-/// opening so you can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+/// Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
+/// can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_to_self_delay(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u16) {
unsafe { &mut *this_ptr.inner }.our_to_self_delay = val;
pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_fee_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: u32) {
unsafe { &mut *this_ptr.inner }.fee_proportional_millionths = val;
}
+/// The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
+/// the channel this config applies to.
+///
+/// This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
+/// HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
+/// (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
+///
+/// Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
+/// we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
+/// commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
+/// enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
+/// the spending transaction).
+///
+/// Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
+/// Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
+/// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
+///
+/// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> u16 {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut unsafe { &mut *this_ptr.inner }.cltv_expiry_delta;
+ (*inner_val)
+}
+/// The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
+/// the channel this config applies to.
+///
+/// This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
+/// HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
+/// (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
+///
+/// Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
+/// we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
+/// commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
+/// enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
+/// the spending transaction).
+///
+/// Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
+/// Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
+/// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
+///
+/// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: u16) {
+ unsafe { &mut *this_ptr.inner }.cltv_expiry_delta = val;
+}
/// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
/// channel.
///
/// Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_new(mut fee_proportional_millionths_arg: u32, mut announced_channel_arg: bool, mut commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg: bool) -> ChannelConfig {
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_new(mut fee_proportional_millionths_arg: u32, mut cltv_expiry_delta_arg: u16, mut announced_channel_arg: bool, mut commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg: bool) -> ChannelConfig {
ChannelConfig { inner: Box::into_raw(Box::new(nativeChannelConfig {
fee_proportional_millionths: fee_proportional_millionths_arg,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: cltv_expiry_delta_arg,
announced_channel: announced_channel_arg,
commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg,
})), is_owned: true }
projects / ldk-c-bindings / commitdiff