Package org.ldk.structs
Class Event.PaymentForwarded
- java.lang.Object
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- org.ldk.structs.Event
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- org.ldk.structs.Event.PaymentForwarded
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Nested Class Summary
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Nested classes/interfaces inherited from class org.ldk.structs.Event
Event.FundingGenerationReady, Event.PaymentFailed, Event.PaymentForwarded, Event.PaymentReceived, Event.PaymentSent, Event.PendingHTLCsForwardable, Event.SpendableOutputs
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Field Summary
Fields Modifier and Type Field Description boolean
claim_from_onchain_tx
If this is `true`, the forwarded HTLC was claimed by our counterparty via an on-chain transaction.Option_u64Z
fee_earned_msat
The fee, in milli-satoshis, which was earned as a result of the payment.
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Method Summary
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Methods inherited from class org.ldk.structs.Event
clone, finalize, funding_generation_ready, payment_failed, payment_forwarded, payment_received, payment_sent, pending_htlcs_forwardable, spendable_outputs, write
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Field Detail
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fee_earned_msat
public final Option_u64Z fee_earned_msat
The fee, in milli-satoshis, which was earned as a result of the payment. Note that if we force-closed the channel over which we forwarded an HTLC while the HTLC was pending, the amount the next hop claimed will have been rounded down to the nearest whole satoshi. Thus, the fee calculated here may be higher than expected as we still claimed the full value in millisatoshis from the source. In this case, `claim_from_onchain_tx` will be set. If the channel which sent us the payment has been force-closed, we will claim the funds via an on-chain transaction. In that case we do not yet know the on-chain transaction fees which we will spend and will instead set this to `None`. It is possible duplicate `PaymentForwarded` events are generated for the same payment iff `fee_earned_msat` is `None`.
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claim_from_onchain_tx
public final boolean claim_from_onchain_tx
If this is `true`, the forwarded HTLC was claimed by our counterparty via an on-chain transaction.
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