using org.ldk.impl; using org.ldk.enums; using org.ldk.util; using System; namespace org { namespace ldk { namespace structs { /** * Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate * channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. * * Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through * to individual Channels. * * Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for * all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being * serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e., * called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed. * * Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with * [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each * [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from * [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With * `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other * `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the * deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to * [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds * will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees). * * Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which * tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager. * See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details. * * Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating * [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid * spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been * offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call * [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect. * * To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and * inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do * not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have * many peers with unfunded channels. * * Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are * exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are * never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself. * * Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] * a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but * essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a * [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when * you're using lightning-net-tokio. * * [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected * [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated * [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated * [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash * [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate * [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred * [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read */ public class ChannelManager : CommonBase { internal ChannelManager(object _dummy, long ptr) : base(ptr) { } ~ChannelManager() { if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelManager_free(ptr); } } /** * Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them. * * The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`. * * This is the main \"logic hub\" for all channel-related actions, and implements * [`ChannelMessageHandler`]. * * Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator. * * Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or * disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting * from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for * more details. * * [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected * [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected * [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash */ public static ChannelManager of(org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_est, org.ldk.structs.Watch chain_monitor, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.Router router, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.structs.EntropySource entropy_source, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.SignerProvider signer_provider, org.ldk.structs.UserConfig config, org.ldk.structs.ChainParameters _params, int current_timestamp) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster.ptr, router.ptr, logger.ptr, entropy_source.ptr, node_signer.ptr, signer_provider.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr, _params == null ? 0 : _params.ptr, current_timestamp); GC.KeepAlive(fee_est); GC.KeepAlive(chain_monitor); GC.KeepAlive(tx_broadcaster); GC.KeepAlive(router); GC.KeepAlive(logger); GC.KeepAlive(entropy_source); GC.KeepAlive(node_signer); GC.KeepAlive(signer_provider); GC.KeepAlive(config); GC.KeepAlive(_params); GC.KeepAlive(current_timestamp); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager(null, ret); } if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(ret_hu_conv); }; if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(fee_est); }; if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(chain_monitor); }; if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(tx_broadcaster); }; if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(router); }; if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(logger); }; if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(entropy_source); }; if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(node_signer); }; if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(signer_provider); }; if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(config); }; if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(_params); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels. */ public UserConfig get_current_default_configuration() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_current_default_configuration(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.UserConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UserConfig(null, ret); } if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value. * * `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events * correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a * randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it * is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored. * * Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is * greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`. * * Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to * generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`]. * * Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no * connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in * the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload). * * If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the * channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you. * * Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in * [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after * [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for * one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel * immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]. * * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id * [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id * * Note that override_config (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None */ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, org.ldk.util.UInt128 user_channel_id, org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ temporary_channel_id, org.ldk.structs.UserConfig override_config) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(their_network_key, 33)), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(user_channel_id.getLEBytes()), temporary_channel_id.ptr, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(their_network_key); GC.KeepAlive(channel_value_satoshis); GC.KeepAlive(push_msat); GC.KeepAlive(user_channel_id); GC.KeepAlive(temporary_channel_id); GC.KeepAlive(override_config); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(temporary_channel_id); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(override_config); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for * more information. */ public ChannelDetails[] list_channels() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } int ret_conv_16_len = InternalUtils.getArrayLength(ret); ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len]; for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) { long ret_conv_16 = InternalUtils.getU64ArrayElem(ret, q); org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); } if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv; } bindings.free_buffer(ret); return ret_conv_16_arr; } /** * Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to * [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used. * * These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the * documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria * are. */ public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } int ret_conv_16_len = InternalUtils.getArrayLength(ret); ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len]; for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) { long ret_conv_16 = InternalUtils.getU64ArrayElem(ret, q); org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); } if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv; } bindings.free_buffer(ret); return ret_conv_16_arr; } /** * Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order. */ public ChannelDetails[] list_channels_with_counterparty(byte[] counterparty_node_id) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels_with_counterparty(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(counterparty_node_id); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } int ret_conv_16_len = InternalUtils.getArrayLength(ret); ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len]; for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) { long ret_conv_16 = InternalUtils.getU64ArrayElem(ret, q); org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); } if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv; } bindings.free_buffer(ret); return ret_conv_16_arr; } /** * Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a * successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs. * * This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a * result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an * [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment. * * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent */ public RecentPaymentDetails[] list_recent_payments() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_recent_payments(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } int ret_conv_22_len = InternalUtils.getArrayLength(ret); RecentPaymentDetails[] ret_conv_22_arr = new RecentPaymentDetails[ret_conv_22_len]; for (int w = 0; w < ret_conv_22_len; w++) { long ret_conv_22 = InternalUtils.getU64ArrayElem(ret, w); org.ldk.structs.RecentPaymentDetails ret_conv_22_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.RecentPaymentDetails.constr_from_ptr(ret_conv_22); if (ret_conv_22_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_22_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; ret_conv_22_arr[w] = ret_conv_22_hu_conv; } bindings.free_buffer(ret); return ret_conv_22_arr; } /** * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain. * * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] * fee estimate. * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing * transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which * would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our * counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however. * * May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed. * * Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to * generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the * channel. * * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee * [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(channel_id); GC.KeepAlive(counterparty_node_id); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain. * * `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated * the channel being closed or not: * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing * transaction. The upper-bound is set by * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] * fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater). * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure * transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which * will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower). * * The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction. * Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by * ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must * also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features. * * May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed. * * Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to * generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the * channel. * * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee * [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown * * Note that shutdown_script (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, org.ldk.structs.Option_u32Z target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, org.ldk.structs.ShutdownScript shutdown_script) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33)), target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight.ptr, shutdown_script == null ? 0 : shutdown_script.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(channel_id); GC.KeepAlive(counterparty_node_id); GC.KeepAlive(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight); GC.KeepAlive(shutdown_script); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(shutdown_script); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and * rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to * the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding * channel. */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(channel_id); GC.KeepAlive(counterparty_node_id); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting * the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the * `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel. * * You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from * [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`]. */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(channel_id); GC.KeepAlive(counterparty_node_id); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction * for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each. */ public void force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn() { bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); } /** * Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest * local transaction(s). */ public void force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn() { bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); } /** * Sends a payment along a given route. * * Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`] * fields for more info. * * May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via * [`PeerManager::process_events`]). * * # Avoiding Duplicate Payments * * If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this * method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment * is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an * [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a * second payment with the same [`PaymentId`]. * * Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own * tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you * should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should * consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the * [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes. * * Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash * before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're * using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See * [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information. * * # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`] * * Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with * each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see * [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info. * * In general, a path may raise: * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee, * node public key) is specified. * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been * closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected. * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the * relevant updates. * * Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been * irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a * different route unless you intend to pay twice! * * [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent * [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed * [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs * [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events * [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress */ public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ send_payment_with_route(org.ldk.structs.Route route, byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment_with_route(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32)), recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(route); GC.KeepAlive(payment_hash); GC.KeepAlive(recipient_onion); GC.KeepAlive(payment_id); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(route); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(recipient_onion); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on * `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`. */ public Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ send_payment(byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id, org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Retry retry_strategy) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32)), recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32)), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, retry_strategy.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(payment_hash); GC.KeepAlive(recipient_onion); GC.KeepAlive(payment_id); GC.KeepAlive(route_params); GC.KeepAlive(retry_strategy); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(recipient_onion); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(route_params); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(retry_strategy); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a * pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before * retries are exhausted. * * # Event Generation * * If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon * as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment. * * Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still * wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to * determine the ultimate status of a payment. * * # Requested Invoices * * In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning * the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] * and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated * once the invoice has been received. * * # Restart Behavior * * If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the * [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for * [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]. * * [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice */ public void abandon_payment(byte[] payment_id) { bindings.ChannelManager_abandon_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(payment_id); } /** * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify * the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node * would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will * never reach the recipient. * * See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function * and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key. * * Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See * [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage. * * [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment */ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(org.ldk.structs.Route route, org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_preimage, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, payment_preimage.ptr, recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(route); GC.KeepAlive(payment_preimage); GC.KeepAlive(recipient_onion); GC.KeepAlive(payment_id); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(route); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(payment_preimage); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(recipient_onion); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route * based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`. * * See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous * payments. * * [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend */ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_preimage, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id, org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Retry retry_strategy) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(this.ptr, payment_preimage.ptr, recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32)), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, retry_strategy.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(payment_preimage); GC.KeepAlive(recipient_onion); GC.KeepAlive(payment_id); GC.KeepAlive(route_params); GC.KeepAlive(retry_strategy); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(payment_preimage); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(recipient_onion); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(route_params); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(retry_strategy); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the * [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows * us to easily discern them from real payments. */ public Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ send_probe(org.ldk.structs.Path path) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_probe(this.ptr, path == null ? 0 : path.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(path); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(path); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given * amount to the given `node_id`. * * See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information. */ public Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(byte[] node_id, long amount_msat, int final_cltv_expiry_delta, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z liquidity_limit_multiplier) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(node_id, 33)), amount_msat, final_cltv_expiry_delta, liquidity_limit_multiplier.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(node_id); GC.KeepAlive(amount_msat); GC.KeepAlive(final_cltv_expiry_delta); GC.KeepAlive(liquidity_limit_multiplier); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(liquidity_limit_multiplier); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found * according to the given [`RouteParameters`]. * * This may be used to send \"pre-flight\" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting * the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the * probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user * confirmation in a wallet UI. * * Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the * actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if * liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the * payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required * amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight * probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`. */ public Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ send_preflight_probes(org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z liquidity_limit_multiplier) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_preflight_probes(this.ptr, route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, liquidity_limit_multiplier.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(route_params); GC.KeepAlive(liquidity_limit_multiplier); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(route_params); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(liquidity_limit_multiplier); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel. * * Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs * or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]. * * Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation * across the p2p network. * * Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided * for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`]. * * May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other * channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction * keys per-channel). * * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our * counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the * [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed. * * Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does * not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead, * create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction. * * Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend * the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as * implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See * for more details. * * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady * [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[] funding_transaction) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(funding_transaction)); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(temporary_channel_id); GC.KeepAlive(counterparty_node_id); GC.KeepAlive(funding_transaction); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels. * * Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to * each individual channel and transaction output. * * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction * will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's * signature for each channel. * * If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed. */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ batch_funding_transaction_generated(TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesPublicKeyZ[] temporary_channels, byte[] funding_transaction) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_batch_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint64Array(InternalUtils.mapArray(temporary_channels, temporary_channels_conv_35 => temporary_channels_conv_35 != null ? temporary_channels_conv_35.ptr : 0)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(funding_transaction)); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(temporary_channels); GC.KeepAlive(funding_transaction); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels. * * Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel * ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`], * or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated * containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network. * * Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect * `counterparty_node_id` is provided. * * Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value * below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]. * * If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied. * * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths * [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat * [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta * [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate * [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable * [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ update_partial_channel_config(byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[][] channel_ids, org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfigUpdate config_update) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_update_partial_channel_config(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33)), InternalUtils.encodeUint64Array(InternalUtils.mapArray(channel_ids, channel_ids_conv_8 => InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_ids_conv_8, 32)))), config_update == null ? 0 : config_update.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(counterparty_node_id); GC.KeepAlive(channel_ids); GC.KeepAlive(config_update); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(config_update); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels. * * Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel * ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`], * or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated * containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network. * * Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect * `counterparty_node_id` is provided. * * Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value * below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]. * * If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied. * * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths * [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat * [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta * [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate * [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable * [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ update_channel_config(byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[][] channel_ids, org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig config) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_update_channel_config(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33)), InternalUtils.encodeUint64Array(InternalUtils.mapArray(channel_ids, channel_ids_conv_8 => InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_ids_conv_8, 32)))), config == null ? 0 : config.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(counterparty_node_id); GC.KeepAlive(channel_ids); GC.KeepAlive(config); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(config); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided * amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. * * Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time * channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity. * * To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use * [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the * receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an * [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or * [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event. * * Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop * you from forwarding more than you received. See * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount * than expected. * * Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed * backwards. * * [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ forward_intercepted_htlc(byte[] intercept_id, byte[] next_hop_channel_id, byte[] next_node_id, long amt_to_forward_msat) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_forward_intercepted_htlc(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(intercept_id, 32)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(next_hop_channel_id, 32)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(next_node_id, 33)), amt_to_forward_msat); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(intercept_id); GC.KeepAlive(next_hop_channel_id); GC.KeepAlive(next_node_id); GC.KeepAlive(amt_to_forward_msat); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to * an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`]. * * Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed * backwards. * * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ fail_intercepted_htlc(byte[] intercept_id) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_intercepted_htlc(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(intercept_id, 32))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(intercept_id); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay. * * Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event. * Will likely generate further events. */ public void process_pending_htlc_forwards() { bindings.ChannelManager_process_pending_htlc_forwards(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); } /** * Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter. * * This currently includes: * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels, * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more * than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over * the channel. * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs * with the current [`ChannelConfig`]. * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels. * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner. * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled * or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time. * The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time * minus two hours in `no-std`. * * Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate * estimate fetches. * * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate * [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig */ public void timer_tick_occurred() { bindings.ChannelManager_timer_tick_occurred(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); } /** * Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect * after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources * along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it). * * Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have * already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a * second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment * may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time. * * While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling * [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for * [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on * startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed. */ public void fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash) { bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(payment_hash); } /** * This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the * reason for the failure. * * See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes. */ public void fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.FailureCode failure_code) { bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32)), failure_code.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(payment_hash); GC.KeepAlive(failure_code); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(failure_code); }; } /** * Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any * [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment. * * This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current * height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race * conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment * successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call. * * Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable` * event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide * the sender \"proof-of-payment\" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment. * * This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we * will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use * [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]. * * [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable * [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline * [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed * [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash * [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs */ public void claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage) { bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(payment_preimage); } /** * This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with * even type numbers. * * # Note * * You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to * claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand. * * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds */ public void claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(byte[] payment_preimage) { bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(payment_preimage); } /** * Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager */ public byte[] get_our_node_id() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_our_node_id(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } byte[] ret_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(ret); return ret_conv; } /** * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]. * * The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted, * and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open * the channel. * * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call. * * Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support * for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be * used to accept such channels. * * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, org.ldk.util.UInt128 user_channel_id) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(user_channel_id.getLEBytes())); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(temporary_channel_id); GC.KeepAlive(counterparty_node_id); GC.KeepAlive(user_channel_id); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating * it as confirmed immediately. * * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call. * * Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel * and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately. * * This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding * transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm. * * If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction * does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*. * * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id */ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, org.ldk.util.UInt128 user_channel_id) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(user_channel_id.getLEBytes())); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(temporary_channel_id); GC.KeepAlive(counterparty_node_id); GC.KeepAlive(user_channel_id); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and * enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual * [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received. * * Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by * the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request. * The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`: * - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if * [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`. * - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and * - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]. * * If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from * [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied. * * # Payment * * The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request * when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has * been sent. * * To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the * invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the * payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]. * * # Privacy * * Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] * as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the * node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node * in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`]. * * # Limitations * * Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to * [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding * [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]. * * # Errors * * Errors if: * - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link, * - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer, * - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice * request. * * [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest * [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity * [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note * [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder * [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice * [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths * [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments */ public Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ pay_for_offer(org.ldk.structs.Offer offer, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z quantity, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z amount_msats, org.ldk.structs.Option_StrZ payer_note, byte[] payment_id, org.ldk.structs.Retry retry_strategy, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z max_total_routing_fee_msat) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_pay_for_offer(this.ptr, offer == null ? 0 : offer.ptr, quantity.ptr, amount_msats.ptr, payer_note.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32)), retry_strategy.ptr, max_total_routing_fee_msat.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(offer); GC.KeepAlive(quantity); GC.KeepAlive(amount_msats); GC.KeepAlive(payer_note); GC.KeepAlive(payment_id); GC.KeepAlive(retry_strategy); GC.KeepAlive(max_total_routing_fee_msat); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(offer); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(quantity); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(amount_msats); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(payer_note); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(retry_strategy); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(max_total_routing_fee_msat); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion * message. * * The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a * [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding * [`PaymentPreimage`]. * * # Limitations * * Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to * [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each * node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be * received and no retries will be made. * * # Errors * * Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply * path for the invoice. * * [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice */ public Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ request_refund_payment(org.ldk.structs.Refund refund) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_request_refund_payment(this.ptr, refund == null ? 0 : refund.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(refund); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(refund); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing * to pay us. * * This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you. * * The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which * will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with * its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be * passed directly to [`claim_funds`]. * * See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements. * * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. * * # Note * * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received. * * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. * * If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable * on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114. * * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds * [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable * [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose * [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment * [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash */ public Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ create_inbound_payment(org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(min_value_msat); GC.KeepAlive(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); GC.KeepAlive(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(min_value_msat); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is * stored external to LDK. * * A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a * payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least * the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided. * * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though * note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound * payments. * * `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment * received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat` * before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the * sender \"proof-of-payment\" unless they have paid the required amount. * * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for * in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice. * After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to * pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for * invoices when no timeout is set. * * Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin * to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will * accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry. * If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of * [`PaymentClaimable`]. * * Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` * set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]. * * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. * * # Note * * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received. * * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. * * If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable * on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114. * * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment * [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable */ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32)), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, min_final_cltv_expiry.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(payment_hash); GC.KeepAlive(min_value_msat); GC.KeepAlive(invoice_expiry_delta_secs); GC.KeepAlive(min_final_cltv_expiry); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(min_value_msat); }; if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(min_final_cltv_expiry); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were * previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. * * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment */ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ get_payment_preimage(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_payment_preimage(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32)), InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(payment_hash); GC.KeepAlive(payment_secret); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids * are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints. * * [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager */ public long get_phantom_scid() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_scid(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); return ret; } /** * Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. * * [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager */ public PhantomRouteHints get_phantom_route_hints() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_route_hints(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints(null, ret); } if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are * used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See * [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`]. * * Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few * times to get a unique scid. */ public long get_intercept_scid() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_intercept_scid(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); return ret; } /** * Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in * our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity. */ public InFlightHtlcs compute_inflight_htlcs() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_compute_inflight_htlcs(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.InFlightHtlcs ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.InFlightHtlcs(null, ret); } if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Constructs a new MessageSendEventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned MessageSendEventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is */ public MessageSendEventsProvider as_MessageSendEventsProvider() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_MessageSendEventsProvider(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } MessageSendEventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new MessageSendEventsProvider(null, ret); if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Constructs a new EventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned EventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is */ public EventsProvider as_EventsProvider() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_EventsProvider(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } EventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new EventsProvider(null, ret); if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Constructs a new Listen which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Listen must be freed before this_arg is */ public Listen as_Listen() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Listen(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Listen ret_hu_conv = new Listen(null, ret); if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Constructs a new Confirm which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Confirm must be freed before this_arg is */ public Confirm as_Confirm() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Confirm(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Confirm ret_hu_conv = new Confirm(null, ret); if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or * may have events that need processing. * * In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call * [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]. * * Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this * [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later. */ public Future get_event_or_persistence_needed_future() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.Future ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.Future(null, ret); } if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted. */ public bool get_and_clear_needs_persistence() { bool ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_and_clear_needs_persistence(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); return ret; } /** * Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or * [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces. */ public BestBlock current_best_block() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_current_best_block(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.BestBlock ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.BestBlock(null, ret); } if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by * [`ChannelManager`]. */ public NodeFeatures node_features() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_node_features(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.NodeFeatures ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.NodeFeatures(null, ret); } if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by * [`ChannelManager`]. */ public ChannelFeatures channel_features() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_channel_features(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.ChannelFeatures ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelFeatures(null, ret); } if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by * [`ChannelManager`]. */ public ChannelTypeFeatures channel_type_features() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_channel_type_features(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.ChannelTypeFeatures ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelTypeFeatures(null, ret); } if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by * [`ChannelManager`]. */ public InitFeatures init_features() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_init_features(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.InitFeatures ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.InitFeatures(null, ret); } if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Constructs a new ChannelMessageHandler which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned ChannelMessageHandler must be freed before this_arg is */ public ChannelMessageHandler as_ChannelMessageHandler() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_ChannelMessageHandler(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } ChannelMessageHandler ret_hu_conv = new ChannelMessageHandler(null, ret); if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Constructs a new OffersMessageHandler which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned OffersMessageHandler must be freed before this_arg is */ public OffersMessageHandler as_OffersMessageHandler() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_OffersMessageHandler(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } OffersMessageHandler ret_hu_conv = new OffersMessageHandler(null, ret); if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } /** * Serialize the ChannelManager object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelManager_read */ public byte[] write() { long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_write(this.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } byte[] ret_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(ret); return ret_conv; } } } } }