* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
*
- * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
- * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
- * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+ * The preimages of outbound and inbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment
+ * are provided. A validating signer should ensure that an outbound HTLC output is removed
+ * only when the matching preimage is provided and after the corresponding inbound HTLC has
+ * been removed for forwarded payments.
*
* Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
* irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
- Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages);
- /**Validate the counterparty's revocation.
- *
- * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
- * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
- */
- Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret);
+ Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages);
/**Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
*
* This will be called
* [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
* broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
*
- * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
+ * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
* [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor);
* Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
* our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
* protocol.
+ *
+ * [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
}
internal LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder) { this.arg = arg; this.impl_holder = impl_holder; }
private EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg;
private LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder;
- public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long _commitment_tx, long _preimages) {
+ public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long _commitment_tx, long _inbound_htlc_preimages, long _outbound_htlc_preimages) {
org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_commitment_tx < 0 || _commitment_tx > 4096) { _commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, _commitment_tx); }
- int _preimages_conv_8_len = InternalUtils.getArrayLength(_preimages);
- byte[][] _preimages_conv_8_arr = new byte[_preimages_conv_8_len][];
- for (int i = 0; i < _preimages_conv_8_len; i++) {
- long _preimages_conv_8 = InternalUtils.getU64ArrayElem(_preimages, i);
- byte[] _preimages_conv_8_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_preimages_conv_8);
- _preimages_conv_8_arr[i] = _preimages_conv_8_conv;
+ int _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len = InternalUtils.getArrayLength(_inbound_htlc_preimages);
+ byte[][] _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr = new byte[_inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len][];
+ for (int i = 0; i < _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len; i++) {
+ long _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 = InternalUtils.getU64ArrayElem(_inbound_htlc_preimages, i);
+ byte[] _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8);
+ _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr[i] = _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_conv;
}
- bindings.free_buffer(_preimages);
- Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv, _preimages_conv_8_arr);
- GC.KeepAlive(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long _idx, long _secret) {
- byte[] _secret_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_secret);
- Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(_idx, _secret_conv);
+ bindings.free_buffer(_inbound_htlc_preimages);
+ int _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len = InternalUtils.getArrayLength(_outbound_htlc_preimages);
+ byte[][] _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr = new byte[_outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len][];
+ for (int i = 0; i < _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len; i++) {
+ long _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 = InternalUtils.getU64ArrayElem(_outbound_htlc_preimages, i);
+ byte[] _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8);
+ _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr[i] = _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_conv;
+ }
+ bindings.free_buffer(_outbound_htlc_preimages);
+ Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv, _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr, _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr);
GC.KeepAlive(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
*
- * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
- * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
- * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+ * The preimages of outbound and inbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment
+ * are provided. A validating signer should ensure that an outbound HTLC output is removed
+ * only when the matching preimage is provided and after the corresponding inbound HTLC has
+ * been removed for forwarded payments.
*
* Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
* irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
- public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint64Array(InternalUtils.mapArray(preimages, preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)))));
+ public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages) {
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint64Array(InternalUtils.mapArray(inbound_htlc_preimages, inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)))), InternalUtils.encodeUint64Array(InternalUtils.mapArray(outbound_htlc_preimages, outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)))));
GC.KeepAlive(this);
GC.KeepAlive(commitment_tx);
- GC.KeepAlive(preimages);
+ GC.KeepAlive(inbound_htlc_preimages);
+ GC.KeepAlive(outbound_htlc_preimages);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(commitment_tx); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
- /**
- * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
- *
- * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
- * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
- */
- public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32)));
- GC.KeepAlive(this);
- GC.KeepAlive(idx);
- GC.KeepAlive(secret);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
/**
* Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
*
* [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
* broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
*
- * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
+ * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
* [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
* Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
* our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
* protocol.
+ *
+ * [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff