+
using org.ldk.impl;
using org.ldk.enums;
using org.ldk.util;
namespace org { namespace ldk { namespace structs {
+
+
+/** An implementation of EcdsaChannelSigner */
+public interface EcdsaChannelSignerInterface {
+ /**Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
+ *
+ * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
+ *
+ * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
+ * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+ *
+ * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+ * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
+ * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+ *
+ * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
+ * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
+ */
+ Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages);
+ /**Validate the counterparty's revocation.
+ *
+ * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
+ * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
+ */
+ Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret);
+ /**Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
+ *
+ * This will be called
+ * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
+ * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
+ *
+ * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
+ *
+ * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
+ */
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
+ /**Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
+ * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ *
+ * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+ * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+ * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+ * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
+ * so).
+ */
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
+ /**Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
+ * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ *
+ * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+ * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
+ * signature.
+ *
+ * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+ * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+ * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
+ * so).
+ *
+ * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
+ * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
+ */
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
+ /**Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
+ * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
+ * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
+ *
+ * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
+ * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
+ * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
+ *
+ * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
+ * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
+ */
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor);
+ /**Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
+ * transaction, either offered or received.
+ *
+ * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
+ * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
+ * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
+ * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
+ * outputs.
+ *
+ * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
+ * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
+ * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
+ * BIP 143 signature.
+ */
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
+ /**Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
+ *
+ * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
+ * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
+ */
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
+ /**Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
+ * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
+ */
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
+ /**Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
+ * channel participants.
+ *
+ * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
+ * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
+ *
+ * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
+ * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
+ * protocol.
+ */
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
+}
+
/**
* A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
* [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
* for an example of such policies.
*/
public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase {
- internal readonly bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance;
+ internal bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance;
+ internal long instance_idx;
+
internal EcdsaChannelSigner(object _dummy, long ptr) : base(ptr) { bindings_instance = null; }
- private EcdsaChannelSigner(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner arg, bindings.LDKChannelSigner ChannelSigner, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) : base(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(arg, ChannelSigner, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr())) {
- this.ptrs_to.AddLast(arg);
- this.ptrs_to.AddLast(ChannelSigner);
- this.bindings_instance = arg;
- }
~EcdsaChannelSigner() {
if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); }
}
- public interface EcdsaChannelSignerInterface {
- /**
- * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
- *
- * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
- *
- * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
- * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
- *
- * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
- * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
- * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
- *
- * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
- * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
- */
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx, byte[][] _preimages);
- /**
- * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
- *
- * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
- * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
- */
- Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long _idx, byte[] _secret);
- /**
- * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
- *
- * This will be called
- * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
- * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
- * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
- * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
- * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
- * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
- *
- * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
- *
- * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
- *
- * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
- */
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx);
- /**
- * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
- * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
- *
- * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
- * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
- * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
- * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- *
- * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
- * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
- * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
- * so).
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key);
- /**
- * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
- * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
- *
- * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
- * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
- * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
- * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
- * signature.
- *
- * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
- * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
- * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
- * so).
- *
- * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
- * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc);
- /**
- * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
- * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
- * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to
- * sign HTLC transactions from channels supporting anchor outputs after all additional
- * inputs/outputs have been added to the transaction.
- *
- * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, HTLCDescriptor _htlc_descriptor);
- /**
- * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
- * transaction, either offered or received.
- *
- * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
- * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
- * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
- * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
- * outputs.
- *
- * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- *
- * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
- * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
- * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
- * BIP 143 signature.
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc);
- /**
- * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
- *
- * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
- * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction _closing_tx);
- /**
- * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
- * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] _anchor_tx, long _input);
- /**
- * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
- * channel participants.
- *
- * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
- * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
- *
- * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
- * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
- * protocol.
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement _msg);
- }
private class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder { internal EcdsaChannelSigner held; }
private class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl : bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner {
internal LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder) { this.arg = arg; this.impl_holder = impl_holder; }
private EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg;
private LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder;
- public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long _commitment_tx, byte[][] _preimages) {
+ public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long _commitment_tx, long _preimages) {
org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_commitment_tx < 0 || _commitment_tx > 4096) { _commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, _commitment_tx); }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv, _preimages);
+ int _preimages_conv_8_len = InternalUtils.getArrayLength(_preimages);
+ byte[][] _preimages_conv_8_arr = new byte[_preimages_conv_8_len][];
+ for (int i = 0; i < _preimages_conv_8_len; i++) {
+ long _preimages_conv_8 = InternalUtils.getU64ArrayElem(_preimages, i);
+ byte[] _preimages_conv_8_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_preimages_conv_8);
+ _preimages_conv_8_arr[i] = _preimages_conv_8_conv;
+ }
+ bindings.free_buffer(_preimages);
+ Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv, _preimages_conv_8_arr);
GC.KeepAlive(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
- public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long _idx, byte[] _secret) {
- Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(_idx, _secret);
+ public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long _idx, long _secret) {
+ byte[] _secret_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_secret);
+ Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(_idx, _secret_conv);
GC.KeepAlive(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
- public long sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(long _commitment_tx) {
+ public long sign_holder_commitment(long _commitment_tx) {
org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_commitment_tx < 0 || _commitment_tx > 4096) { _commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, _commitment_tx); }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(_commitment_tx_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv);
GC.KeepAlive(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
- public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key) {
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(_justice_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key);
+ public long sign_justice_revoked_output(long _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, long _per_commitment_key) {
+ byte[] _justice_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_justice_tx);
+ byte[] _per_commitment_key_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_per_commitment_key);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(_justice_tx_conv, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key_conv);
GC.KeepAlive(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
- public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key, long _htlc) {
+ public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(long _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, long _per_commitment_key, long _htlc) {
+ byte[] _justice_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_justice_tx);
+ byte[] _per_commitment_key_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_per_commitment_key);
org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc < 0 || _htlc > 4096) { _htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, _htlc); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(_justice_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key, _htlc_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(_justice_tx_conv, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key_conv, _htlc_hu_conv);
GC.KeepAlive(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
- public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, long _htlc_descriptor) {
+ public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(long _htlc_tx, long _input, long _htlc_descriptor) {
+ byte[] _htlc_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_htlc_tx);
org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor _htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc_descriptor < 0 || _htlc_descriptor > 4096) { _htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor(null, _htlc_descriptor); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx, _input, _htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx_conv, _input, _htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
GC.KeepAlive(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
- public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_point, long _htlc) {
+ public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(long _htlc_tx, long _input, long _amount, long _per_commitment_point, long _htlc) {
+ byte[] _htlc_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_htlc_tx);
+ byte[] _per_commitment_point_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_per_commitment_point);
org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc < 0 || _htlc > 4096) { _htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, _htlc); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_point, _htlc_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx_conv, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_point_conv, _htlc_hu_conv);
GC.KeepAlive(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
public long sign_closing_transaction(long _closing_tx) {
org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction _closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_closing_tx < 0 || _closing_tx > 4096) { _closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, _closing_tx); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(_closing_tx_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(_closing_tx_hu_conv);
GC.KeepAlive(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
- public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] _anchor_tx, long _input) {
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(_anchor_tx, _input);
+ public long sign_holder_anchor_input(long _anchor_tx, long _input) {
+ byte[] _anchor_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_anchor_tx);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(_anchor_tx_conv, _input);
GC.KeepAlive(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
public long sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(long _msg) {
org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement _msg_hu_conv = null; if (_msg < 0 || _msg > 4096) { _msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, _msg); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(_msg_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(_msg_hu_conv);
GC.KeepAlive(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
}
- public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSigner.ChannelSignerInterface ChannelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
+
+ /** Creates a new instance of EcdsaChannelSigner from a given implementation */
+ public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSignerInterface channelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder();
- impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl(arg, impl_holder), ChannelSigner.new_impl(ChannelSigner_impl, pubkeys).bindings_instance, pubkeys);
- return impl_holder.held;
- }
+ LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl impl = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl(arg, impl_holder);
+ ChannelSigner channelSigner = ChannelSigner.new_impl(channelSigner_impl, pubkeys);
+ long[] ptr_idx = bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(impl, channelSigner.instance_idx, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr());
- /**
- * Gets the underlying ChannelSigner.
- */
- public ChannelSigner get_channel_signer() {
- ChannelSigner res = new ChannelSigner(null, bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_get_ChannelSigner(this.ptr));
- this.ptrs_to.AddLast(res);
- return res;
+ impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(null, ptr_idx[0]);
+ impl_holder.held.instance_idx = ptr_idx[1];
+ impl_holder.held.bindings_instance = impl;
+ impl_holder.held.ptrs_to.AddLast(channelSigner);
+ return impl_holder.held;
}
/**
* Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
* irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
- public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? InternalUtils.mapArray(preimages, preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)) : null);
+ public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint64Array(InternalUtils.mapArray(preimages, preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)))));
GC.KeepAlive(this);
GC.KeepAlive(commitment_tx);
GC.KeepAlive(preimages);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(commitment_tx); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
*/
public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32));
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32)));
GC.KeepAlive(this);
GC.KeepAlive(idx);
GC.KeepAlive(secret);
}
/**
- * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
+ * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
*
* This will be called
* - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
* - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
- * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
- * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
- * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
- * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
*
* This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
*
* An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
- *
- * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
*/
- public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
GC.KeepAlive(this);
GC.KeepAlive(commitment_tx);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(commitment_tx); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
* so).
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(justice_tx), input, amount, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32)));
GC.KeepAlive(this);
GC.KeepAlive(justice_tx);
GC.KeepAlive(input);
GC.KeepAlive(amount);
GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_key);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
* (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(justice_tx), input, amount, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32)), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
GC.KeepAlive(this);
GC.KeepAlive(justice_tx);
GC.KeepAlive(input);
GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_key);
GC.KeepAlive(htlc);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
* `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
- * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to
- * sign HTLC transactions from channels supporting anchor outputs after all additional
- * inputs/outputs have been added to the transaction.
+ * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
+ *
+ * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
+ * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
+ * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
*
* [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
+ * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor == null ? 0 : htlc_descriptor.ptr);
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(htlc_tx), input, htlc_descriptor == null ? 0 : htlc_descriptor.ptr);
GC.KeepAlive(this);
GC.KeepAlive(htlc_tx);
GC.KeepAlive(input);
GC.KeepAlive(htlc_descriptor);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc_descriptor); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
* BIP 143 signature.
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(htlc_tx), input, amount, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33)), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
GC.KeepAlive(this);
GC.KeepAlive(htlc_tx);
GC.KeepAlive(input);
GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_point);
GC.KeepAlive(htlc);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
* chosen to forgo their output as dust.
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
GC.KeepAlive(this);
GC.KeepAlive(closing_tx);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(closing_tx); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
* input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(anchor_tx), input);
GC.KeepAlive(this);
GC.KeepAlive(anchor_tx);
GC.KeepAlive(input);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
* protocol.
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
GC.KeepAlive(this);
GC.KeepAlive(msg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(msg); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff