* secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+ *
+ * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+ * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
+ * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+ *
+ * NOTE: all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
+ * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
- Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx);
+ Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx, byte[][] preimages);
/**
* Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
* some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this
*
* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+ *
+ * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+ * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
+ * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+ *
+ * NOTE: all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
+ * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
+ Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages);
/**
* Validate the counterparty's revocation.
*
*/
Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
/**
- * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
- * of the channel participants.
+ * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key and our node secret key (aka
+ * node_id or network_key), proving it comes from one of the channel participants.
+ *
+ * The first returned signature should be from our node secret key, the second from our
+ * funding key.
*
* Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
* our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
* protocol.
*/
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
+ Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
/**
* Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
* counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
impl_holder.held = new BaseSign(new bindings.LDKBaseSign() {
@Override public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx) {
byte[] ret = arg.get_per_commitment_point(idx);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 33);
return result;
}
@Override public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx) {
byte[] ret = arg.release_commitment_secret(idx);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 32);
return result;
}
- @Override public long validate_holder_commitment(long holder_tx) {
+ @Override public long validate_holder_commitment(long holder_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx_hu_conv = null; if (holder_tx < 0 || holder_tx > 4096) { holder_tx_hu_conv = new HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, holder_tx); }
- Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_holder_commitment(holder_tx_hu_conv);
+ Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_holder_commitment(holder_tx_hu_conv, preimages);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
byte[] ret = arg.channel_keys_id();
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 32);
return result;
}
- @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx) {
+ @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
+ Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, preimages);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(idx, secret);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(long commitment_tx) {
HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_closing_transaction(long closing_tx) {
ClosingTransaction closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (closing_tx < 0 || closing_tx > 4096) { closing_tx_hu_conv = new ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx); }
Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_channel_announcement(long msg) {
UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = null; if (msg < 0 || msg > 4096) { msg_hu_conv = new UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement(msg_hu_conv);
+ Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement(msg_hu_conv);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public void ready_channel(long channel_parameters) {
ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters_hu_conv = null; if (channel_parameters < 0 || channel_parameters > 4096) { channel_parameters_hu_conv = new ChannelTransactionParameters(null, channel_parameters); }
arg.ready_channel(channel_parameters_hu_conv);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
}
}, pubkeys);
return impl_holder.held;
* secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+ *
+ * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+ * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
+ * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+ *
+ * NOTE: all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
+ * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
- public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_validate_holder_commitment(this.ptr, holder_tx == null ? 0 : holder_tx.ptr & ~1);
+ public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
+ long ret = bindings.BaseSign_validate_holder_commitment(this.ptr, holder_tx == null ? 0 : holder_tx.ptr & ~1, preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(preimages).map(preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(holder_tx);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(preimages);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
this.ptrs_to.add(holder_tx);
*
* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+ *
+ * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+ * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
+ * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+ *
+ * NOTE: all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
+ * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
- public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr & ~1);
+ public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
+ long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr & ~1, preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(preimages).map(preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(preimages);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx);
}
/**
- * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
- * of the channel participants.
+ * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key and our node secret key (aka
+ * node_id or network_key), proving it comes from one of the channel participants.
+ *
+ * The first returned signature should be from our node secret key, the second from our
+ * funding key.
*
* Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
* our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
* protocol.
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
+ public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_channel_announcement(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr & ~1);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
this.ptrs_to.add(msg);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff