import org.ldk.enums.*;
import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.lang.ref.Reference;
import javax.annotation.Nullable;
*/
public int get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths() {
int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
*/
public void set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
*/
public int get_forwarding_fee_base_msat() {
int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
*/
public void set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(int val) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
*/
public short get_cltv_expiry_delta() {
short ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
*/
public void set_cltv_expiry_delta(short val) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
- * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
- * channel.
+ * Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
+ * small to claim on-chain.
*
- * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+ * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
+ * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
+ * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
+ * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
+ * channel is force-closed.
*
- * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
- * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+ * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
+ * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
+ * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
+ * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
+ * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
+ * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
+ * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
*
- * This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
+ * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
+ * exposure across all three types per-channel.
*
- * Default value: false.
+ * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000.
+ */
+ public MaxDustHTLCExposure get_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure ret_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
+ * small to claim on-chain.
+ *
+ * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
+ * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
+ * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
+ * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
+ * channel is force-closed.
+ *
+ * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
+ * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
+ * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
+ * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
+ * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
+ * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
+ * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
+ *
+ * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
+ * exposure across all three types per-channel.
+ *
+ * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000.
*/
- public boolean get_announced_channel() {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_announced_channel(this.ptr);
+ public void set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure val) {
+ bindings.ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr, val.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(val); };
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
+ * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
+ *
+ * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
+ * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
+ * funder/initiator.
+ *
+ * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
+ * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
+ * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
+ * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
+ * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
+ * funds.
+ *
+ * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
+ * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
+ * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
+ *
+ * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
+ *
+ * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
+ * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
+ */
+ public long get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
- * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
- * channel.
+ * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
+ * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
*
- * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+ * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
+ * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
+ * funder/initiator.
*
- * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
- * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+ * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
+ * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
+ * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
+ * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
+ * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
+ * funds.
*
- * This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
+ * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
+ * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
+ * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
*
- * Default value: false.
+ * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
+ *
+ * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
+ * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
*/
- public void set_announced_channel(boolean val) {
- bindings.ChannelConfig_set_announced_channel(this.ptr, val);
+ public void set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(long val) {
+ bindings.ChannelConfig_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
- * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
- * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
- * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+ * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
+ * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
+ * generated by this channel's counterparty.
+ * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
+ * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
+ * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
+ * actual forward amounts is their fee. See
+ * <https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/tree/main/LSPS2#flow-lsp-trusts-client-model>
+ * for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case.
*
- * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
- * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
- * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+ * # Note
+ * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
+ * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
+ * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
+ * counterparty.
*
- * This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
+ * # Note
+ * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
+ * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
*
- * Default value: true.
+ * Default value: false.
+ *
+ * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
+ * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
+ * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+ * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
+ * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
+ * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
*/
- public boolean get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey() {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr);
+ public boolean get_accept_underpaying_htlcs() {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
- * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
- * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
- * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+ * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
+ * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
+ * generated by this channel's counterparty.
+ * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
+ * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
+ * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
+ * actual forward amounts is their fee. See
+ * <https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/tree/main/LSPS2#flow-lsp-trusts-client-model>
+ * for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case.
*
- * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
- * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
- * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+ * # Note
+ * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
+ * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
+ * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
+ * counterparty.
*
- * This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
+ * # Note
+ * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
+ * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
*
- * Default value: true.
+ * Default value: false.
+ *
+ * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
+ * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
+ * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+ * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
+ * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
+ * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
*/
- public void set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(boolean val) {
- bindings.ChannelConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr, val);
+ public void set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(boolean val) {
+ bindings.ChannelConfig_set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
*/
- public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg);
- if (ret < 1024) { return null; }
- ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+ public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, boolean accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg.ptr, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(cltv_expiry_delta_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ long clone_ptr() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
/**
* Creates a copy of the ChannelConfig
*/
public ChannelConfig clone() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone(this.ptr);
- if (ret < 1024) { return null; }
- ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Checks if two ChannelConfigs contain equal inner contents.
+ * This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
+ * Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
+ */
+ public boolean eq(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig b) {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_eq(this.ptr, b == null ? 0 : b.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(b);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(b); };
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ @Override public boolean equals(Object o) {
+ if (!(o instanceof ChannelConfig)) return false;
+ return this.eq((ChannelConfig)o);
+ }
+ /**
+ * Applies the given [`ChannelConfigUpdate`] as a partial update to the [`ChannelConfig`].
+ */
+ public void apply(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfigUpdate update) {
+ bindings.ChannelConfig_apply(this.ptr, update == null ? 0 : update.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(update);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(update); };
+ }
+
/**
* Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
*/
public static ChannelConfig with_default() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_default();
- if (ret < 1024) { return null; }
- ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
*/
public byte[] write() {
byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_write(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
*/
public static Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ read(byte[] ser) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_read(ser);
- if (ret < 1024) { return null; }
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff