import org.ldk.enums.*;
import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.lang.ref.Reference;
+import javax.annotation.Nullable;
/**
* disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
* from after `params.latest_hash`.
*/
- public static ChannelManager constructor_new(FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, LDKNetwork params_network_arg, BestBlock params_best_block_arg) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, bindings.ChainParameters_new(params_network_arg, params_best_block_arg == null ? 0 : params_best_block_arg.ptr & ~1));
- ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = new ChannelManager(null, ret);
+ public static ChannelManager of(FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, ChainParameters params) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, params == null ? 0 : params.ptr & ~1);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_est);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_monitor);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(tx_broadcaster);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(config);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(params);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelManager(null, ret); }
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est);
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor);
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster);
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger);
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(params_best_block_arg);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
*/
public UserConfig get_current_default_configuration() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_current_default_configuration(this.ptr);
- UserConfig ret_hu_conv = new UserConfig(null, ret);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ UserConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new UserConfig(null, ret); }
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
*
- * user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
- * tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
- * user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
- * user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
- * otherwise ignored.
+ * `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
+ * correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
+ * for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
+ * `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
+ * ignored.
*
- * If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
- * PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
+ * Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
+ * greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
*
- * Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
- * greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
+ * Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
+ * connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
+ * the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
+ *
+ * Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
+ * [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
+ * [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
+ * one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
+ * immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
+ *
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
+ *
+ * Note that override_config (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
*/
- public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, long user_id, UserConfig override_config) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr & ~1);
- Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- this.ptrs_to.add(override_config);
+ public Result__u832APIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, long user_channel_id, @Nullable UserConfig override_config) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(their_network_key, 33), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr & ~1);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(their_network_key);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_value_satoshis);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(push_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(override_config);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result__u832APIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result__u832APIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
*/
public ChannelDetails[] list_channels() {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels(this.ptr);
- ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length];
- for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) {
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+ ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+ for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
- ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16);
+ ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
}
* Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
* get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
*
- * These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
- * ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
+ * These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
+ * documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
+ * are.
*/
public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr);
- ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length];
- for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) {
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+ ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+ for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
- ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16);
+ ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
}
* will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
* pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
*
+ * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+ * estimate.
+ * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
+ * transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
+ * would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
+ * counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
+ *
* May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+ * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+ * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
*/
public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id);
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+ * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+ * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+ *
+ * `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
+ * the channel being closed or not:
+ * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
+ * transaction. The upper-bound is set by
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+ * estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
+ * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
+ * transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
+ * will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
+ *
+ * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+ * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+ * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_target_feerate(byte[] channel_id, int target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_target_feerate(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
*/
public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_channel(byte[] channel_id) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id);
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
*/
public void force_close_all_channels() {
bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
}
/**
* If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
* bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
* we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
+ *
+ * Note that payment_secret (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
*/
- public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, payment_hash, payment_secret);
+ public Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_hash, @Nullable byte[] payment_secret) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ this.ptrs_to.add(route);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
+ *
+ * Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
+ * [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
+ * retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
+ * for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
+ * further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
+ *
+ * [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
+ * [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
+ */
+ public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ retry_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_retry_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
this.ptrs_to.add(route);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
+ *
+ * After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
+ * will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
+ * an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
+ * pending HTLCs for this payment.
+ *
+ * Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
+ * wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
+ * determine the ultimate status of a payment.
+ *
+ * [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
+ * [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
+ * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+ */
+ public void abandon_payment(byte[] payment_id) {
+ bindings.ChannelManager_abandon_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
+ * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
+ * the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
+ * would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
+ * never reach the recipient.
+ *
+ * See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
+ *
+ * Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
+ * [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
+ *
+ * Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
+ *
+ * [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
+ *
+ * Note that payment_preimage (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+ */
+ public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(Route route, @Nullable byte[] payment_preimage) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ this.ptrs_to.add(route);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
/**
* Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
*
* Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
* or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
*
- * Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
+ * Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
+ * for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
*
* May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
* channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
* Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
* not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
* create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
+ *
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
*/
public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] funding_transaction) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction);
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), funding_transaction);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_transaction);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
- * BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
- * seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
+ * Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
+ * arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
+ * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
+ * on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
+ * announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
+ * our network addresses.
*
- * RGB is a node \"color\" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
- * to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
+ * `rgb` is a node \"color\" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
+ * node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
*
- * addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
- * incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
- * addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
- * only Tor Onion addresses.
+ * `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
+ * accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
+ * tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
+ * addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
*
- * Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
+ * Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
+ *
+ * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
*/
public void broadcast_node_announcement(byte[] rgb, byte[] alias, NetAddress[] addresses) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, rgb, alias, Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(addresses_conv_12 -> addresses_conv_12.ptr).toArray());
- /* TODO 2 NetAddress */;
+ bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(rgb, 3), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(alias, 32), addresses != null ? Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(addresses_conv_12 -> addresses_conv_12.ptr).toArray() : null);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(rgb);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(alias);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(addresses);
}
/**
*/
public void process_pending_htlc_forwards() {
bindings.ChannelManager_process_pending_htlc_forwards(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
}
/**
- * If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
- * After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
- * to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
+ * Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
*
- * This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
+ * This currently includes:
+ * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
+ * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
+ * than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
+ * the channel.
*
- * Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
+ * Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
+ * estimate fetches.
*/
public void timer_tick_occurred() {
bindings.ChannelManager_timer_tick_occurred(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
}
/**
* Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
* HTLC backwards has been started.
*/
- public boolean fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, payment_hash, payment_secret);
+ public boolean fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash) {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
return ret;
}
/**
- * Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
- * generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
- * should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
+ * Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
+ * [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
*
- * You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
- * available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
- * reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
- * payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
- * privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
- * motivated attackers.
+ * Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
+ * event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
+ * the sender \"proof-of-payment\" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
*
- * Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
- * set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
+ * Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
+ * pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
*
- * May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
+ * [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
*/
- public boolean claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage, byte[] payment_secret, long expected_amount) {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, payment_preimage, payment_secret, expected_amount);
+ public boolean claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage) {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
return ret;
}
*/
public byte[] get_our_node_id() {
byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_our_node_id(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
- * Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
- * ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
- * operation.
+ * Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
+ * triggered.
*
- * All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
- * fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
+ * The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
*
- * Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
- * current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
- * ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
- * exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
+ * For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+ * with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
*
- * Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
- * 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
- * 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
- * said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
- * any time it cannot do so instantly,
- * 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
- * 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
- * completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
+ * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
*/
- public void channel_monitor_updated(OutPoint funding_txo, long highest_applied_update_id) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_channel_monitor_updated(this.ptr, funding_txo == null ? 0 : funding_txo.ptr & ~1, highest_applied_update_id);
- this.ptrs_to.add(funding_txo);
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel(byte[] temporary_channel_id, long user_channel_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), user_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Constructs a new MessageSendEventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
- * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned MessageSendEventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is
+ * Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
+ * to pay us.
+ *
+ * This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
+ * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
+ *
+ * The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
+ * will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
+ * passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
+ *
+ * See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
+ *
+ * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ *
+ * # Note
+ *
+ * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ *
+ * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ *
+ * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+ * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
+ * [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
*/
- public MessageSendEventsProvider as_MessageSendEventsProvider() {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_MessageSendEventsProvider(this.ptr);
- MessageSendEventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new MessageSendEventsProvider(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ create_inbound_payment(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Constructs a new EventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
- * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned EventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is
+ * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+ * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
+ *
+ * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
+ *
+ * # Note
+ * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
+ *
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
*/
- public EventsProvider as_EventsProvider() {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_EventsProvider(this.ptr);
- EventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new EventsProvider(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_legacy(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_legacy(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Constructs a new Listen which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
- * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Listen must be freed before this_arg is
+ * Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
+ * stored external to LDK.
+ *
+ * A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
+ * payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
+ * the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
+ *
+ * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
+ * note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
+ * payments.
+ *
+ * `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
+ * received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
+ * before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
+ * sender \"proof-of-payment\" unless they have paid the required amount.
+ *
+ * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
+ * in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
+ * After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
+ * pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
+ * invoices when no timeout is set.
+ *
+ * Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
+ * to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
+ * accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
+ * If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
+ * [`PaymentReceived`].
+ *
+ * Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
+ * set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
+ *
+ * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ *
+ * # Note
+ *
+ * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ *
+ * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ *
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
*/
- public Listen as_Listen() {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Listen(this.ptr);
- Listen ret_hu_conv = new Listen(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ public Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Updates channel state to take note of transactions which were confirmed in the given block
- * at the given height.
- *
- * Note that you must still call (or have called) [`update_best_block`] with the block
- * information which is included here.
+ * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+ * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
*
- * This method may be called before or after [`update_best_block`] for a given block's
- * transaction data and may be called multiple times with additional transaction data for a
- * given block.
+ * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
*
- * This method may be called for a previous block after an [`update_best_block`] call has
- * been made for a later block, however it must *not* be called with transaction data from a
- * block which is no longer in the best chain (ie where [`update_best_block`] has already
- * been informed about a blockchain reorganization which no longer includes the block which
- * corresponds to `header`).
+ * # Note
+ * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
*
- * [`update_best_block`]: `Self::update_best_block`
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
*/
- public void transactions_confirmed(byte[] header, int height, TwoTuple<Long, byte[]>[] txdata) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_transactions_confirmed(this.ptr, header, height, Arrays.stream(txdata).mapToLong(txdata_conv_24 -> bindings.C2Tuple_usizeTransactionZ_new(txdata_conv_24.a, txdata_conv_24.b)).toArray());
- /* TODO 2 TwoTuple<Long, byte[]> */;
+ public Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Updates channel state with the current best blockchain tip. You should attempt to call this
- * quickly after a new block becomes available, however if multiple new blocks become
- * available at the same time, only a single `update_best_block()` call needs to be made.
- *
- * This method should also be called immediately after any block disconnections, once at the
- * reorganization fork point, and once with the new chain tip. Calling this method at the
- * blockchain reorganization fork point ensures we learn when a funding transaction which was
- * previously confirmed is reorganized out of the blockchain, ensuring we do not continue to
- * accept payments which cannot be enforced on-chain.
+ * Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
+ * previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
*
- * In both the block-connection and block-disconnection case, this method may be called either
- * once per block connected or disconnected, or simply at the fork point and new tip(s),
- * skipping any intermediary blocks.
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
*/
- public void update_best_block(byte[] header, int height) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_update_best_block(this.ptr, header, height);
+ public Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ get_payment_preimage(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_payment_preimage(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Gets the set of txids which should be monitored for their confirmation state.
- *
- * If you're providing information about reorganizations via [`transaction_unconfirmed`], this
- * is the set of transactions which you may need to call [`transaction_unconfirmed`] for.
- *
- * This may be useful to poll to determine the set of transactions which must be registered
- * with an Electrum server or for which an Electrum server needs to be polled to determine
- * transaction confirmation state.
- *
- * This may update after any [`transactions_confirmed`] or [`block_connected`] call.
- *
- * Note that this is NOT the set of transactions which must be included in calls to
- * [`transactions_confirmed`] if they are confirmed, but a small subset of it.
+ * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
+ * are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
*
- * [`transactions_confirmed`]: Self::transactions_confirmed
- * [`transaction_unconfirmed`]: Self::transaction_unconfirmed
- * [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
+ * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
*/
- public byte[][] get_relevant_txids() {
- byte[][] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_relevant_txids(this.ptr);
+ public long get_phantom_scid() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_scid(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
- * Marks a transaction as having been reorganized out of the blockchain.
+ * Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
*
- * If a transaction is included in [`get_relevant_txids`], and is no longer in the main branch
- * of the blockchain, this function should be called to indicate that the transaction should
- * be considered reorganized out.
- *
- * Once this is called, the given transaction will no longer appear on [`get_relevant_txids`],
- * though this may be called repeatedly for a given transaction without issue.
- *
- * Note that if the transaction is confirmed on the main chain in a different block (indicated
- * via a call to [`transactions_confirmed`]), it may re-appear in [`get_relevant_txids`], thus
- * be very wary of race-conditions wherein the final state of a transaction indicated via
- * these APIs is not the same as its state on the blockchain.
- *
- * [`transactions_confirmed`]: Self::transactions_confirmed
- * [`get_relevant_txids`]: Self::get_relevant_txids
+ * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
*/
- public void transaction_unconfirmed(byte[] txid) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_transaction_unconfirmed(this.ptr, txid);
+ public PhantomRouteHints get_phantom_route_hints() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_route_hints(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ PhantomRouteHints ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new PhantomRouteHints(null, ret); }
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new MessageSendEventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+ * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned MessageSendEventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is
+ */
+ public MessageSendEventsProvider as_MessageSendEventsProvider() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_MessageSendEventsProvider(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ MessageSendEventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new MessageSendEventsProvider(null, ret);
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new EventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+ * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned EventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is
+ */
+ public EventsProvider as_EventsProvider() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_EventsProvider(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ EventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new EventsProvider(null, ret);
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new Listen which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+ * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Listen must be freed before this_arg is
+ */
+ public Listen as_Listen() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Listen(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Listen ret_hu_conv = new Listen(null, ret);
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new Confirm which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+ * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Confirm must be freed before this_arg is
+ */
+ public Confirm as_Confirm() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Confirm(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Confirm ret_hu_conv = new Confirm(null, ret);
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
* `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
* up.
- * Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
+ *
+ * Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
*/
public boolean await_persistable_update_timeout(long max_wait) {
boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update_timeout(this.ptr, max_wait);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(max_wait);
return ret;
}
*/
public void await_persistable_update() {
bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
+ * [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
+ */
+ public BestBlock current_best_block() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_current_best_block(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ BestBlock ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new BestBlock(null, ret); }
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
*/
public ChannelMessageHandler as_ChannelMessageHandler() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_ChannelMessageHandler(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
ChannelMessageHandler ret_hu_conv = new ChannelMessageHandler(null, ret);
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
return ret_hu_conv;
*/
public byte[] write() {
byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_write(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new Payer which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+ * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Payer must be freed before this_arg is
+ */
+ public Payer as_Payer() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Payer(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Payer ret_hu_conv = new Payer(null, ret);
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
}
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff