/**
* Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
*/
- public TwoTuple_OutPointScriptZ get_funding_txo() {
+ public TwoTuple_OutPointCVec_u8ZZ get_funding_txo() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_get_funding_txo(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- TwoTuple_OutPointScriptZ ret_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_OutPointScriptZ(null, ret);
+ TwoTuple_OutPointCVec_u8ZZ ret_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_OutPointCVec_u8ZZ(null, ret);
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
* transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
*/
- public TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32ScriptZZZ[] get_outputs_to_watch() {
+ public TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32CVec_u8ZZZZ[] get_outputs_to_watch() {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_get_outputs_to_watch(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- int ret_conv_40_len = ret.length;
- TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32ScriptZZZ[] ret_conv_40_arr = new TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32ScriptZZZ[ret_conv_40_len];
- for (int o = 0; o < ret_conv_40_len; o++) {
- long ret_conv_40 = ret[o];
- TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32ScriptZZZ ret_conv_40_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32ScriptZZZ(null, ret_conv_40);
- if (ret_conv_40_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_40_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
- ret_conv_40_arr[o] = ret_conv_40_hu_conv;
+ int ret_conv_52_len = ret.length;
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32CVec_u8ZZZZ[] ret_conv_52_arr = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32CVec_u8ZZZZ[ret_conv_52_len];
+ for (int a = 0; a < ret_conv_52_len; a++) {
+ long ret_conv_52 = ret[a];
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32CVec_u8ZZZZ ret_conv_52_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32CVec_u8ZZZZ(null, ret_conv_52);
+ if (ret_conv_52_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_52_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_52_arr[a] = ret_conv_52_hu_conv;
}
- return ret_conv_40_arr;
+ return ret_conv_52_arr;
}
/**
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(handler); };
}
+ /**
+ * Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
+ * transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
+ * the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
+ * watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
+ *
+ * This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
+ * that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
+ *
+ * This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
+ * to LDK 0.0.117+.
+ *
+ * [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
+ *
+ * Note that the return value (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+ */
+ @Nullable
+ public CommitmentTransaction initial_counterparty_commitment_tx() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
+ * may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
+ * commitment transactions are unsigned.
+ *
+ * This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
+ * justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
+ * used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
+ * with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
+ * [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
+ *
+ * It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
+ * commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
+ * the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
+ * monitor can sign the justice transaction.
+ *
+ * This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
+ * upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
+ * may have been created prior to upgrading.
+ *
+ * [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
+ */
+ public CommitmentTransaction[] counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(org.ldk.structs.ChannelMonitorUpdate update) {
+ long[] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(this.ptr, update == null ? 0 : update.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(update);
+ int ret_conv_23_len = ret.length;
+ CommitmentTransaction[] ret_conv_23_arr = new CommitmentTransaction[ret_conv_23_len];
+ for (int x = 0; x < ret_conv_23_len; x++) {
+ long ret_conv_23 = ret[x];
+ org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction ret_conv_23_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_23 < 0 || ret_conv_23 > 4096) { ret_conv_23_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, ret_conv_23); }
+ if (ret_conv_23_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_23_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_23_arr[x] = ret_conv_23_hu_conv;
+ }
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(update); };
+ return ret_conv_23_arr;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
+ * signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
+ * [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
+ * signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
+ * a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
+ * be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
+ *
+ * `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
+ * in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
+ * provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
+ * to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
+ * the signature will not be valid.
+ *
+ * [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
+ * [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
+ */
+ public Result_TransactionNoneZ sign_to_local_justice_tx(byte[] justice_tx, long input_idx, long value, long commitment_number) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_sign_to_local_justice_tx(this.ptr, justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(input_idx);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(value);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_number);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_TransactionNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_TransactionNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
/**
* Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
*
}
/**
- * Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
- * the Channel was out-of-date.
+ * Used by [`ChannelManager`] deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy
+ * of the channel state was out-of-date.
*
* You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
- * a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've
- * fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation
- * secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
+ * a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
+ * counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
*
* Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
* side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
* close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
* may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
- * to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you.
+ * to you.
*
- * [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
+ * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
*/
public byte[][] get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(org.ldk.structs.Logger logger) {
byte[][] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(this.ptr, logger.ptr);
*
* [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
*/
- public TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] block_connected(byte[] header, TwoTuple_usizeTransactionZ[] txdata, int height, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_estimator, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger) {
+ public TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] block_connected(byte[] header, TwoTuple_usizeTransactionZ[] txdata, int height, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_estimator, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger) {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_block_connected(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(header, 80), txdata != null ? Arrays.stream(txdata).mapToLong(txdata_conv_28 -> txdata_conv_28 != null ? txdata_conv_28.ptr : 0).toArray() : null, height, broadcaster.ptr, fee_estimator.ptr, logger.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(header);
Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster);
Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_estimator);
Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
- int ret_conv_39_len = ret.length;
- TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] ret_conv_39_arr = new TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[ret_conv_39_len];
- for (int n = 0; n < ret_conv_39_len; n++) {
- long ret_conv_39 = ret[n];
- TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ ret_conv_39_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ(null, ret_conv_39);
- if (ret_conv_39_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_39_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
- ret_conv_39_arr[n] = ret_conv_39_hu_conv;
+ int ret_conv_49_len = ret.length;
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] ret_conv_49_arr = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[ret_conv_49_len];
+ for (int x = 0; x < ret_conv_49_len; x++) {
+ long ret_conv_49 = ret[x];
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ ret_conv_49_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ(null, ret_conv_49);
+ if (ret_conv_49_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_49_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_49_arr[x] = ret_conv_49_hu_conv;
}
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(broadcaster); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(fee_estimator); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(logger); };
- return ret_conv_39_arr;
+ return ret_conv_49_arr;
}
/**
*
* [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
*/
- public TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] transactions_confirmed(byte[] header, TwoTuple_usizeTransactionZ[] txdata, int height, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_estimator, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger) {
+ public TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] transactions_confirmed(byte[] header, TwoTuple_usizeTransactionZ[] txdata, int height, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_estimator, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger) {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_transactions_confirmed(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(header, 80), txdata != null ? Arrays.stream(txdata).mapToLong(txdata_conv_28 -> txdata_conv_28 != null ? txdata_conv_28.ptr : 0).toArray() : null, height, broadcaster.ptr, fee_estimator.ptr, logger.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(header);
Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster);
Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_estimator);
Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
- int ret_conv_39_len = ret.length;
- TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] ret_conv_39_arr = new TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[ret_conv_39_len];
- for (int n = 0; n < ret_conv_39_len; n++) {
- long ret_conv_39 = ret[n];
- TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ ret_conv_39_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ(null, ret_conv_39);
- if (ret_conv_39_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_39_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
- ret_conv_39_arr[n] = ret_conv_39_hu_conv;
+ int ret_conv_49_len = ret.length;
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] ret_conv_49_arr = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[ret_conv_49_len];
+ for (int x = 0; x < ret_conv_49_len; x++) {
+ long ret_conv_49 = ret[x];
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ ret_conv_49_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ(null, ret_conv_49);
+ if (ret_conv_49_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_49_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_49_arr[x] = ret_conv_49_hu_conv;
}
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(broadcaster); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(fee_estimator); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(logger); };
- return ret_conv_39_arr;
+ return ret_conv_49_arr;
}
/**
*
* [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
*/
- public TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] best_block_updated(byte[] header, int height, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_estimator, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger) {
+ public TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] best_block_updated(byte[] header, int height, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_estimator, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger) {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_best_block_updated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(header, 80), height, broadcaster.ptr, fee_estimator.ptr, logger.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(header);
Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster);
Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_estimator);
Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
- int ret_conv_39_len = ret.length;
- TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] ret_conv_39_arr = new TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[ret_conv_39_len];
- for (int n = 0; n < ret_conv_39_len; n++) {
- long ret_conv_39 = ret[n];
- TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ ret_conv_39_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_TxidCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ(null, ret_conv_39);
- if (ret_conv_39_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_39_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
- ret_conv_39_arr[n] = ret_conv_39_hu_conv;
+ int ret_conv_49_len = ret.length;
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] ret_conv_49_arr = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[ret_conv_49_len];
+ for (int x = 0; x < ret_conv_49_len; x++) {
+ long ret_conv_49 = ret[x];
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ ret_conv_49_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ(null, ret_conv_49);
+ if (ret_conv_49_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_49_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_49_arr[x] = ret_conv_49_hu_conv;
}
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(broadcaster); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(fee_estimator); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(logger); };
- return ret_conv_39_arr;
+ return ret_conv_49_arr;
}
/**
* Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
*/
- public TwoTuple_TxidCOption_BlockHashZZ[] get_relevant_txids() {
+ public TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCOption_ThirtyTwoBytesZZ[] get_relevant_txids() {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_get_relevant_txids(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- int ret_conv_34_len = ret.length;
- TwoTuple_TxidCOption_BlockHashZZ[] ret_conv_34_arr = new TwoTuple_TxidCOption_BlockHashZZ[ret_conv_34_len];
- for (int i = 0; i < ret_conv_34_len; i++) {
- long ret_conv_34 = ret[i];
- TwoTuple_TxidCOption_BlockHashZZ ret_conv_34_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_TxidCOption_BlockHashZZ(null, ret_conv_34);
- if (ret_conv_34_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_34_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
- ret_conv_34_arr[i] = ret_conv_34_hu_conv;
+ int ret_conv_49_len = ret.length;
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCOption_ThirtyTwoBytesZZ[] ret_conv_49_arr = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCOption_ThirtyTwoBytesZZ[ret_conv_49_len];
+ for (int x = 0; x < ret_conv_49_len; x++) {
+ long ret_conv_49 = ret[x];
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCOption_ThirtyTwoBytesZZ ret_conv_49_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCOption_ThirtyTwoBytesZZ(null, ret_conv_49);
+ if (ret_conv_49_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_49_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_49_arr[x] = ret_conv_49_hu_conv;
}
- return ret_conv_34_arr;
+ return ret_conv_49_arr;
}
/**
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(logger); };
}
+ /**
+ * Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
+ * transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
+ * confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
+ * returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
+ * confirmations.
+ *
+ * Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
+ * once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
+ * descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
+ * missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
+ * channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
+ * an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
+ * transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
+ *
+ * `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
+ * outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
+ *
+ * `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
+ */
+ public SpendableOutputDescriptor[] get_spendable_outputs(byte[] tx, int confirmation_height) {
+ long[] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_get_spendable_outputs(this.ptr, tx, confirmation_height);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(tx);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(confirmation_height);
+ int ret_conv_27_len = ret.length;
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor[] ret_conv_27_arr = new SpendableOutputDescriptor[ret_conv_27_len];
+ for (int b = 0; b < ret_conv_27_len; b++) {
+ long ret_conv_27 = ret[b];
+ org.ldk.structs.SpendableOutputDescriptor ret_conv_27_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.SpendableOutputDescriptor.constr_from_ptr(ret_conv_27);
+ if (ret_conv_27_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_27_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_27_arr[b] = ret_conv_27_hu_conv;
+ }
+ return ret_conv_27_arr;
+ }
+
/**
* Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
* force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
* confirmations on the claim transaction.
*
* Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
- * LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
- * a revoked state.
+ * LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
*
* See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
* may be returned here and their meanings.
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff