* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
*
- * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+ * The preimages of outbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
* A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
* preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
*
* Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
* irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
- Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx, byte[][] preimages);
+ Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages);
+ /**
+ * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
+ *
+ * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
+ * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
+ */
+ Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret);
/**
* Returns an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
* some [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`] types. This should be sufficient to identify this
byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 32);
return result;
}
- @Override public long validate_holder_commitment(long holder_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
+ @Override public long validate_holder_commitment(long holder_tx, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages) {
org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx_hu_conv = null; if (holder_tx < 0 || holder_tx > 4096) { holder_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, holder_tx); }
- Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_holder_commitment(holder_tx_hu_conv, preimages);
+ Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_holder_commitment(holder_tx_hu_conv, outbound_htlc_preimages);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
+ long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+ return result;
+ }
+ @Override public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
+ Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(idx, secret);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
*
- * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+ * The preimages of outbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
* A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
* preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
*
* Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
* irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
- public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelSigner_validate_holder_commitment(this.ptr, holder_tx == null ? 0 : holder_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(preimages).map(preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
+ public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelSigner_validate_holder_commitment(this.ptr, holder_tx == null ? 0 : holder_tx.ptr, outbound_htlc_preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(outbound_htlc_preimages).map(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(holder_tx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(preimages);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(outbound_htlc_preimages);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(holder_tx); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
+ *
+ * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
+ * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
+ */
+ public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelSigner_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(secret);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
/**
* Returns an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
* some [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`] types. This should be sufficient to identify this