* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
*
- * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
- * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
- * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+ * The preimages of outbound and inbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment
+ * are provided. A validating signer should ensure that an outbound HTLC output is removed
+ * only when the matching preimage is provided and after the corresponding inbound HTLC has
+ * been removed for forwarded payments.
*
* Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
* irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages);
+ Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages);
/**
- * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
- *
- * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
- * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
- */
- Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret);
- /**
- * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
+ * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
*
* This will be called
* - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
* - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
- * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
- * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
- * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
- * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
*
* This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
*
* An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
- *
- * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
*/
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
/**
* Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
* or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
* not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
* so).
*/
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
/**
* Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
* HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
* `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
* (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
*/
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
* `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
- * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to
- * sign HTLC transactions from channels supporting anchor outputs after all additional
- * inputs/outputs have been added to the transaction.
+ * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
+ *
+ * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
+ * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
+ * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
*
- * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
+ * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
+ * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
*/
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor);
/**
* Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
* transaction, either offered or received.
* channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
* BIP 143 signature.
*/
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
/**
* Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
*
* Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
* chosen to forgo their output as dust.
*/
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
* input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
*/
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
/**
* Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
* channel participants.
* Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
* our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
* protocol.
+ *
+ * [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
*/
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
}
private static class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder { EcdsaChannelSigner held; }
public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSigner.ChannelSignerInterface ChannelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
final LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder();
impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(new bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner() {
- @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
+ @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages) {
org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, preimages);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
- Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(idx, secret);
+ Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, inbound_htlc_preimages, outbound_htlc_preimages);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
- @Override public long sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(long commitment_tx) {
+ @Override public long sign_holder_commitment(long commitment_tx) {
org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long htlc_descriptor) {
org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = null; if (htlc_descriptor < 0 || htlc_descriptor > 4096) { htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor(null, htlc_descriptor); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_closing_transaction(long closing_tx) {
org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (closing_tx < 0 || closing_tx > 4096) { closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(long msg) {
org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = null; if (msg < 0 || msg > 4096) { msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg_hu_conv);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
*
- * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
- * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
- * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+ * The preimages of outbound and inbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment
+ * are provided. A validating signer should ensure that an outbound HTLC output is removed
+ * only when the matching preimage is provided and after the corresponding inbound HTLC has
+ * been removed for forwarded payments.
*
* Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
* irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
- public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(preimages).map(preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
+ public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages) {
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, inbound_htlc_preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(inbound_htlc_preimages).map(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, outbound_htlc_preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(outbound_htlc_preimages).map(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(preimages);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(inbound_htlc_preimages);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(outbound_htlc_preimages);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
- *
- * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
- * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
- */
- public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32));
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(secret);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
+ * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
*
* This will be called
* - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
* - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
- * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
- * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
- * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
- * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
*
* This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
*
* An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
- *
- * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
*/
- public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
* so).
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
* (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
* `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
- * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to
- * sign HTLC transactions from channels supporting anchor outputs after all additional
- * inputs/outputs have been added to the transaction.
+ * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
*
- * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
+ * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
+ * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
+ * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
+ *
+ * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
+ * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor == null ? 0 : htlc_descriptor.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_descriptor);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc_descriptor); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
* BIP 143 signature.
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
* chosen to forgo their output as dust.
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(closing_tx);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(closing_tx); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
* input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(anchor_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
* our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
* protocol.
+ *
+ * [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
*/
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
+ public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(msg); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff