[Java] Update auto-generated bindings to 0.0.105.0
[ldk-java] / src / main / java / org / ldk / structs / Score.java
index 63da5612f36822bc72baaac32464514119a6a24c..a1d8498dfe152f90f51fefda98b6050a701c96a7 100644 (file)
@@ -31,17 +31,13 @@ public class Score extends CommonBase {
                 * Returns the fee in msats willing to be paid to avoid routing `send_amt_msat` through the
                 * given channel in the direction from `source` to `target`.
                 * 
-                * The channel's capacity (less any other MPP parts which are also being considered for use in
-                * the same payment) is given by `channel_capacity_msat`. It may be guessed from various
-                * sources or assumed from no data at all.
-                * 
-                * For hints provided in the invoice, we assume the channel has sufficient capacity to accept
-                * the invoice's full amount, and provide a `channel_capacity_msat` of `None`. In all other
-                * cases it is set to `Some`, even if we're guessing at the channel value.
-                * 
-                * Your code should be overflow-safe through a `channel_capacity_msat` of 21 million BTC.
+                * The channel's capacity (less any other MPP parts that are also being considered for use in
+                * the same payment) is given by `capacity_msat`. It may be determined from various sources
+                * such as a chain data, network gossip, or invoice hints. For invoice hints, a capacity near
+                * [`u64::max_value`] is given to indicate sufficient capacity for the invoice's full amount.
+                * Thus, implementations should be overflow-safe.
                 */
-               long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, long send_amt_msat, Option_u64Z channel_capacity_msat, NodeId source, NodeId target);
+               long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, long send_amt_msat, long capacity_msat, NodeId source, NodeId target);
                /**
                 * Handles updating channel penalties after failing to route through a channel.
                 */
@@ -59,12 +55,11 @@ public class Score extends CommonBase {
        public static Score new_impl(ScoreInterface arg) {
                final LDKScoreHolder impl_holder = new LDKScoreHolder();
                impl_holder.held = new Score(new bindings.LDKScore() {
-                       @Override public long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, long send_amt_msat, long channel_capacity_msat, long source, long target) {
-                               Option_u64Z channel_capacity_msat_hu_conv = Option_u64Z.constr_from_ptr(channel_capacity_msat);
-                               channel_capacity_msat_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+                       @Override public long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, long send_amt_msat, long capacity_msat, long source, long target) {
                                NodeId source_hu_conv = null; if (source < 0 || source > 4096) { source_hu_conv = new NodeId(null, source); }
                                NodeId target_hu_conv = null; if (target < 0 || target > 4096) { target_hu_conv = new NodeId(null, target); }
-                               long ret = arg.channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, send_amt_msat, channel_capacity_msat_hu_conv, source_hu_conv, target_hu_conv);
+                               long ret = arg.channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, send_amt_msat, capacity_msat, source_hu_conv, target_hu_conv);
+                               Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
                                return ret;
                        }
                        @Override public void payment_path_failed(long[] path, long short_channel_id) {
@@ -77,6 +72,7 @@ public class Score extends CommonBase {
                                        path_conv_10_arr[k] = path_conv_10_hu_conv;
                                }
                                arg.payment_path_failed(path_conv_10_arr, short_channel_id);
+                               Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
                        }
                        @Override public void payment_path_successful(long[] path) {
                                int path_conv_10_len = path.length;
@@ -88,9 +84,11 @@ public class Score extends CommonBase {
                                        path_conv_10_arr[k] = path_conv_10_hu_conv;
                                }
                                arg.payment_path_successful(path_conv_10_arr);
+                               Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
                        }
                        @Override public byte[] write() {
                                byte[] ret = arg.write();
+                               Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
                                return ret;
                        }
                });
@@ -100,22 +98,18 @@ public class Score extends CommonBase {
         * Returns the fee in msats willing to be paid to avoid routing `send_amt_msat` through the
         * given channel in the direction from `source` to `target`.
         * 
-        * The channel's capacity (less any other MPP parts which are also being considered for use in
-        * the same payment) is given by `channel_capacity_msat`. It may be guessed from various
-        * sources or assumed from no data at all.
-        * 
-        * For hints provided in the invoice, we assume the channel has sufficient capacity to accept
-        * the invoice's full amount, and provide a `channel_capacity_msat` of `None`. In all other
-        * cases it is set to `Some`, even if we're guessing at the channel value.
-        * 
-        * Your code should be overflow-safe through a `channel_capacity_msat` of 21 million BTC.
+        * The channel's capacity (less any other MPP parts that are also being considered for use in
+        * the same payment) is given by `capacity_msat`. It may be determined from various sources
+        * such as a chain data, network gossip, or invoice hints. For invoice hints, a capacity near
+        * [`u64::max_value`] is given to indicate sufficient capacity for the invoice's full amount.
+        * Thus, implementations should be overflow-safe.
         */
-       public long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, long send_amt_msat, Option_u64Z channel_capacity_msat, NodeId source, NodeId target) {
-               long ret = bindings.Score_channel_penalty_msat(this.ptr, short_channel_id, send_amt_msat, channel_capacity_msat.ptr, source == null ? 0 : source.ptr & ~1, target == null ? 0 : target.ptr & ~1);
+       public long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, long send_amt_msat, long capacity_msat, NodeId source, NodeId target) {
+               long ret = bindings.Score_channel_penalty_msat(this.ptr, short_channel_id, send_amt_msat, capacity_msat, source == null ? 0 : source.ptr & ~1, target == null ? 0 : target.ptr & ~1);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(short_channel_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(send_amt_msat);
-               Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_capacity_msat);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(capacity_msat);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(source);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(target);
                this.ptrs_to.add(source);