import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
+/**
+ * A trait to sign lightning channel transactions as described in BOLT 3.
+ *
+ * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet. In this case,
+ * the current Sign would be a front-end on top of a communication
+ * channel connected to your secure device and lightning key material wouldn't
+ * reside on a hot server. Nevertheless, a this deployment would still need
+ * to trust the ChannelManager to avoid loss of funds as this latest component
+ * could ask to sign commitment transaction with HTLCs paying to attacker pubkeys.
+ *
+ * A more secure iteration would be to use hashlock (or payment points) to pair
+ * invoice/incoming HTLCs with outgoing HTLCs to implement a no-trust-ChannelManager
+ * at the price of more state and computation on the hardware wallet side. In the future,
+ * we are looking forward to design such interface.
+ *
+ * In any case, ChannelMonitor or fallback watchtowers are always going to be trusted
+ * to act, as liveness and breach reply correctness are always going to be hard requirements
+ * of LN security model, orthogonal of key management issues.
+ */
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
public class Sign extends CommonBase {
final bindings.LDKSign bindings_instance;
}
public static interface SignInterface {
+ /**
+ * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
+ *
+ * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ */
byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx);
+ /**
+ * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
+ *
+ * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
+ * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
+ *
+ * May be called more than once for the same index.
+ *
+ * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ */
byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx);
+ /**
+ * Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
+ * some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this
+ * Sign object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
+ */
byte[] channel_keys_id();
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
+ *
+ * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
+ */
Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
+ /**
+ * Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
+ * This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
+ * latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
+ * This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
+ * reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
+ * the latest.
+ * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
+ *
+ * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
+ *
+ * May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
+ */
Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
+ * transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ *
+ * A justice transaction may claim multiples outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+ * It may be called multiples time for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+ * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+ * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
+ * so).
+ *
+ * htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock) if the output being spent is a HTLC output, thus
+ * changing the format of the witness script (which is committed to in the BIP 143
+ * signatures).
+ */
Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_transaction(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
+ * transaction, either offered or received.
+ *
+ * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
+ * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
+ * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
+ * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
+ * outputs.
+ *
+ * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
+ * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
+ * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
+ * BIP 143 signature.
+ */
Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
+ *
+ * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
+ * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
+ */
Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(byte[] closing_tx);
+ /**
+ * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
+ * of the channel participants.
+ *
+ * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
+ * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
+ * protocol.
+ */
Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
+ /**
+ * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
+ * counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
+ * This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data,
+ * they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set.
+ *
+ * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
+ *
+ * We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience.
+ *
+ * Will be called before any signatures are applied.
+ */
void ready_channel(ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters);
+ /**
+ * Serialize the object into a byte array
+ */
byte[] write();
}
private static class LDKSignHolder { Sign held; }
}, pubkeys);
return impl_holder.held;
}
+ /**
+ * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
+ *
+ * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ */
public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx) {
byte[] ret = bindings.Sign_get_per_commitment_point(this.ptr, idx);
return ret;
}
+ /**
+ * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
+ *
+ * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
+ * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
+ *
+ * May be called more than once for the same index.
+ *
+ * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ */
public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx) {
byte[] ret = bindings.Sign_release_commitment_secret(this.ptr, idx);
return ret;
}
+ /**
+ * Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
+ * some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this
+ * Sign object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
+ */
public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
byte[] ret = bindings.Sign_channel_keys_id(this.ptr);
return ret;
}
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
+ *
+ * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
+ */
public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr & ~1);
Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
+ * This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
+ * latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
+ * This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
+ * reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
+ * the latest.
+ * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
+ *
+ * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
+ *
+ * May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
+ */
public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr & ~1);
Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
+ * transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ *
+ * A justice transaction may claim multiples outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+ * It may be called multiples time for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+ * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+ * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
+ * so).
+ *
+ * htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock) if the output being spent is a HTLC output, thus
+ * changing the format of the witness script (which is committed to in the BIP 143
+ * signatures).
+ */
public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_transaction(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_justice_transaction(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1);
Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
+ * transaction, either offered or received.
+ *
+ * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
+ * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
+ * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
+ * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
+ * outputs.
+ *
+ * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
+ * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
+ * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
+ * BIP 143 signature.
+ */
public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1);
Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
+ *
+ * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
+ * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
+ */
public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(byte[] closing_tx) {
long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx);
Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
+ * of the channel participants.
+ *
+ * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
+ * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
+ * protocol.
+ */
public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_channel_announcement(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr & ~1);
Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
+ * counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
+ * This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data,
+ * they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set.
+ *
+ * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
+ *
+ * We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience.
+ *
+ * Will be called before any signatures are applied.
+ */
public void ready_channel(ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters) {
bindings.Sign_ready_channel(this.ptr, channel_parameters == null ? 0 : channel_parameters.ptr & ~1);
this.ptrs_to.add(channel_parameters);
}
+ /**
+ * Serialize the object into a byte array
+ */
public byte[] write() {
byte[] ret = bindings.Sign_write(this.ptr);
return ret;
}
+ /**
+ * Frees any resources associated with this object given its this_arg pointer.
+ * Does not need to free the outer struct containing function pointers and may be NULL is no resources need to be freed.
+ */
public ChannelPublicKeys get_pubkeys() {
long ret = bindings.Sign_get_pubkeys(this.ptr);
ChannelPublicKeys ret_hu_conv = new ChannelPublicKeys(null, ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Creates a copy of a Sign
+ */
public Sign clone() {
long ret = bindings.Sign_clone(this.ptr);
Sign ret_hu_conv = new Sign(null, ret);
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff