import java.util.Arrays;
/**
- * A trait to sign lightning channel transactions as described in BOLT 3.
+ * A cloneable signer.
*
- * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet. In this case,
- * the current Sign would be a front-end on top of a communication
- * channel connected to your secure device and lightning key material wouldn't
- * reside on a hot server. Nevertheless, a this deployment would still need
- * to trust the ChannelManager to avoid loss of funds as this latest component
- * could ask to sign commitment transaction with HTLCs paying to attacker pubkeys.
- *
- * A more secure iteration would be to use hashlock (or payment points) to pair
- * invoice/incoming HTLCs with outgoing HTLCs to implement a no-trust-ChannelManager
- * at the price of more state and computation on the hardware wallet side. In the future,
- * we are looking forward to design such interface.
- *
- * In any case, ChannelMonitor or fallback watchtowers are always going to be trusted
- * to act, as liveness and breach reply correctness are always going to be hard requirements
- * of LN security model, orthogonal of key management issues.
+ * Although we require signers to be cloneable, it may be useful for developers to be able to use
+ * signers in an un-sized way, for example as `dyn BaseSign`. Therefore we separate the Clone trait,
+ * which implies Sized, into this derived trait.
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
public class Sign extends CommonBase {
final bindings.LDKSign bindings_instance;
Sign(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); bindings_instance = null; }
- private Sign(bindings.LDKSign arg, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
- super(bindings.LDKSign_new(arg, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.ptr & ~1));
+ private Sign(bindings.LDKSign arg, bindings.LDKBaseSign BaseSign, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
+ super(bindings.LDKSign_new(arg, BaseSign, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.ptr & ~1));
this.ptrs_to.add(arg);
+ this.ptrs_to.add(BaseSign);
this.ptrs_to.add(pubkeys);
this.bindings_instance = arg;
}
}
public static interface SignInterface {
- /**
- * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
- *
- * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
- */
- byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx);
- /**
- * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
- *
- * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
- * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
- *
- * May be called more than once for the same index.
- *
- * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
- */
- byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx);
- /**
- * Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
- * some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this
- * Sign object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
- */
- byte[] channel_keys_id();
- /**
- * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
- *
- * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
- */
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
- /**
- * Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
- * This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
- * latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
- * This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
- * reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
- * the latest.
- * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
- *
- * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
- *
- * May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
- */
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
- /**
- * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
- * transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
- *
- * A justice transaction may claim multiples outputs at the same time if timelocks are
- * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
- * It may be called multiples time for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
- * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- *
- * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
- * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
- * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
- * so).
- *
- * htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock) if the output being spent is a HTLC output, thus
- * changing the format of the witness script (which is committed to in the BIP 143
- * signatures).
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_transaction(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
- /**
- * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
- * transaction, either offered or received.
- *
- * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
- * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
- * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
- * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
- * outputs.
- *
- * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- *
- * Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
- * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
- * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
- * BIP 143 signature.
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
- /**
- * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
- *
- * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
- * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(byte[] closing_tx);
- /**
- * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
- * of the channel participants.
- *
- * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
- * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
- * protocol.
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
- /**
- * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
- * counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
- * This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data,
- * they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set.
- *
- * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
- *
- * We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience.
- *
- * Will be called before any signatures are applied.
- */
- void ready_channel(ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters);
/**
* Serialize the object into a byte array
*/
byte[] write();
}
private static class LDKSignHolder { Sign held; }
- public static Sign new_impl(SignInterface arg, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
+ public static Sign new_impl(SignInterface arg, BaseSign.BaseSignInterface BaseSign_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
final LDKSignHolder impl_holder = new LDKSignHolder();
impl_holder.held = new Sign(new bindings.LDKSign() {
- @Override public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx) {
- byte[] ret = arg.get_per_commitment_point(idx);
- return ret;
- }
- @Override public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx) {
- byte[] ret = arg.release_commitment_secret(idx);
- return ret;
- }
- @Override public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
- byte[] ret = arg.channel_keys_id();
- return ret;
- }
- @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx) {
- CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = new CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx);
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
- long result = ret != null ? ret.ptr : 0;
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(long commitment_tx) {
- HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = new HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx);
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
- long result = ret != null ? ret.ptr : 0;
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_justice_transaction(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
- HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = new HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc);
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_transaction(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
- long result = ret != null ? ret.ptr : 0;
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
- HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = new HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc);
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
- long result = ret != null ? ret.ptr : 0;
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_closing_transaction(byte[] closing_tx) {
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx);
- long result = ret != null ? ret.ptr : 0;
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_channel_announcement(long msg) {
- UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = new UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg);
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement(msg_hu_conv);
- long result = ret != null ? ret.ptr : 0;
- return result;
- }
- @Override public void ready_channel(long channel_parameters) {
- ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters_hu_conv = new ChannelTransactionParameters(null, channel_parameters);
- arg.ready_channel(channel_parameters_hu_conv);
- }
@Override public byte[] write() {
byte[] ret = arg.write();
return ret;
}
- }, pubkeys);
+ }, BaseSign.new_impl(BaseSign_impl, pubkeys).bindings_instance, pubkeys);
return impl_holder.held;
}
- /**
- * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
- *
- * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
- */
- public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx) {
- byte[] ret = bindings.Sign_get_per_commitment_point(this.ptr, idx);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /**
- * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
- *
- * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
- * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
- *
- * May be called more than once for the same index.
- *
- * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
- */
- public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx) {
- byte[] ret = bindings.Sign_release_commitment_secret(this.ptr, idx);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /**
- * Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
- * some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this
- * Sign object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
- */
- public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
- byte[] ret = bindings.Sign_channel_keys_id(this.ptr);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /**
- * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
- *
- * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
- */
- public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
- long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr & ~1);
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
- * This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
- * latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
- * This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
- * reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
- * the latest.
- * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
- *
- * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
- *
- * May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
- */
- public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
- long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr & ~1);
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
- * transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
- *
- * A justice transaction may claim multiples outputs at the same time if timelocks are
- * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
- * It may be called multiples time for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
- * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- *
- * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
- * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
- * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
- * so).
- *
- * htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock) if the output being spent is a HTLC output, thus
- * changing the format of the witness script (which is committed to in the BIP 143
- * signatures).
- */
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_transaction(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
- long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_justice_transaction(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1);
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- this.ptrs_to.add(htlc);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
- * transaction, either offered or received.
- *
- * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
- * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
- * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
- * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
- * outputs.
- *
- * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- *
- * Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
- * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
- * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
- * BIP 143 signature.
- */
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
- long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1);
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- this.ptrs_to.add(htlc);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
- *
- * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
- * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
- */
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(byte[] closing_tx) {
- long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx);
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
- * of the channel participants.
- *
- * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
- * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
- * protocol.
- */
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
- long ret = bindings.Sign_sign_channel_announcement(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr & ~1);
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- this.ptrs_to.add(msg);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
- * counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
- * This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data,
- * they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set.
- *
- * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
- *
- * We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience.
- *
- * Will be called before any signatures are applied.
- */
- public void ready_channel(ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters) {
- bindings.Sign_ready_channel(this.ptr, channel_parameters == null ? 0 : channel_parameters.ptr & ~1);
- this.ptrs_to.add(channel_parameters);
- }
-
/**
* Serialize the object into a byte array
*/
return ret;
}
- /**
- * Frees any resources associated with this object given its this_arg pointer.
- * Does not need to free the outer struct containing function pointers and may be NULL is no resources need to be freed.
- */
- public ChannelPublicKeys get_pubkeys() {
- long ret = bindings.Sign_get_pubkeys(this.ptr);
- ChannelPublicKeys ret_hu_conv = new ChannelPublicKeys(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
/**
* Creates a copy of a Sign
*/
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff