+/** An implementation of BaseSign */
export interface BaseSignInterface {
+ /**Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
+ *
+ * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ */
get_per_commitment_point(idx: bigint): Uint8Array;
+ /**Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
+ *
+ * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
+ * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
+ *
+ * May be called more than once for the same index.
+ *
+ * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ */
release_commitment_secret(idx: bigint): Uint8Array;
+ /**Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs.
+ *
+ * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment
+ * secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
+ * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
+ * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+ */
validate_holder_commitment(holder_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction): Result_NoneNoneZ;
+ /**Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
+ * some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this
+ * Sign object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
+ */
channel_keys_id(): Uint8Array;
+ /**Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
+ *
+ * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
+ *
+ * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
+ * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+ */
sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx: CommitmentTransaction): Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ;
+ /**Validate the counterparty's revocation.
+ *
+ * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
+ * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
+ */
validate_counterparty_revocation(idx: bigint, secret: Uint8Array): Result_NoneNoneZ;
+ /**Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
+ * This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
+ * latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
+ * This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
+ * reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
+ * the latest.
+ * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
+ *
+ * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
+ *
+ * May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
+ */
sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction): Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ;
+ /**Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
+ * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ *
+ * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+ * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+ * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+ * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
+ * so).
+ */
sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx: Uint8Array, input: number, amount: bigint, per_commitment_key: Uint8Array): Result_SignatureNoneZ;
+ /**Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
+ * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ *
+ * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+ * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+ * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+ * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
+ * so).
+ *
+ * htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
+ * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
+ */
sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx: Uint8Array, input: number, amount: bigint, per_commitment_key: Uint8Array, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment): Result_SignatureNoneZ;
+ /**Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
+ * transaction, either offered or received.
+ *
+ * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
+ * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
+ * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
+ * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
+ * outputs.
+ *
+ * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
+ * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
+ * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
+ * BIP 143 signature.
+ */
sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx: Uint8Array, input: number, amount: bigint, per_commitment_point: Uint8Array, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment): Result_SignatureNoneZ;
+ /**Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
+ *
+ * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
+ * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
+ */
sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx: ClosingTransaction): Result_SignatureNoneZ;
+ /**Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
+ * of the channel participants.
+ *
+ * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
+ * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
+ * protocol.
+ */
sign_channel_announcement(msg: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement): Result_SignatureNoneZ;
+ /**Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
+ * counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
+ * This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data,
+ * they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set.
+ *
+ * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
+ *
+ * We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience.
+ *
+ * Will be called before any signatures are applied.
+ */
ready_channel(channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters): void;
}
held: BaseSign;
}
+/**
+ * A trait to sign lightning channel transactions as described in BOLT 3.
+ *
+ * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet. In this case,
+ * the current Sign would be a front-end on top of a communication
+ * channel connected to your secure device and lightning key material wouldn't
+ * reside on a hot server. Nevertheless, a this deployment would still need
+ * to trust the ChannelManager to avoid loss of funds as this latest component
+ * could ask to sign commitment transaction with HTLCs paying to attacker pubkeys.
+ *
+ * A more secure iteration would be to use hashlock (or payment points) to pair
+ * invoice/incoming HTLCs with outgoing HTLCs to implement a no-trust-ChannelManager
+ * at the price of more state and computation on the hardware wallet side. In the future,
+ * we are looking forward to design such interface.
+ *
+ * In any case, ChannelMonitor or fallback watchtowers are always going to be trusted
+ * to act, as liveness and breach reply correctness are always going to be hard requirements
+ * of LN security model, orthogonal of key management issues.
+ */
export class BaseSign extends CommonBase {
/* @internal */
public bindings_instance?: bindings.LDKBaseSign;
this.bindings_instance = null;
}
- static new_impl(arg: BaseSignInterface, pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys): BaseSign {
+ /** Creates a new instance of BaseSign from a given implementation */
+ public static new_impl(arg: BaseSignInterface, pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys): BaseSign {
const impl_holder: LDKBaseSignHolder = new LDKBaseSignHolder();
let structImplementation = {
get_per_commitment_point (idx: bigint): number {
impl_holder.held.bindings_instance = structImplementation;
return impl_holder.held;
}
+
+ /**
+ * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
+ *
+ * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ */
public get_per_commitment_point(idx: bigint): Uint8Array {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_get_per_commitment_point(this.ptr, idx);
const ret_conv: Uint8Array = bindings.decodeUint8Array(ret);
return ret_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
+ *
+ * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
+ * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
+ *
+ * May be called more than once for the same index.
+ *
+ * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ */
public release_commitment_secret(idx: bigint): Uint8Array {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_release_commitment_secret(this.ptr, idx);
const ret_conv: Uint8Array = bindings.decodeUint8Array(ret);
return ret_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs.
+ *
+ * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment
+ * secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
+ * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
+ * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+ */
public validate_holder_commitment(holder_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction): Result_NoneNoneZ {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_validate_holder_commitment(this.ptr, holder_tx == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(holder_tx) & ~1);
const ret_hu_conv: Result_NoneNoneZ = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
+ * some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this
+ * Sign object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
+ */
public channel_keys_id(): Uint8Array {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_channel_keys_id(this.ptr);
const ret_conv: Uint8Array = bindings.decodeUint8Array(ret);
return ret_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
+ *
+ * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
+ *
+ * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
+ * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+ */
public sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx: CommitmentTransaction): Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(commitment_tx) & ~1);
const ret_hu_conv: Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
+ *
+ * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
+ * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
+ */
public validate_counterparty_revocation(idx: bigint, secret: Uint8Array): Result_NoneNoneZ {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(secret, 32)));
const ret_hu_conv: Result_NoneNoneZ = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
+ * This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
+ * latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
+ * This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
+ * reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
+ * the latest.
+ * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
+ *
+ * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
+ *
+ * May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
+ */
public sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction): Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(commitment_tx) & ~1);
const ret_hu_conv: Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
+ * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ *
+ * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+ * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+ * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+ * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
+ * so).
+ */
public sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx: Uint8Array, input: number, amount: bigint, per_commitment_key: Uint8Array): Result_SignatureNoneZ {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(justice_tx), input, amount, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32)));
const ret_hu_conv: Result_SignatureNoneZ = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
+ * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ *
+ * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+ * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+ * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+ * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
+ * so).
+ *
+ * htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
+ * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
+ */
public sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx: Uint8Array, input: number, amount: bigint, per_commitment_key: Uint8Array, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment): Result_SignatureNoneZ {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(justice_tx), input, amount, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32)), htlc == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(htlc) & ~1);
const ret_hu_conv: Result_SignatureNoneZ = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
+ * transaction, either offered or received.
+ *
+ * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
+ * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
+ * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
+ * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ *
+ * Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
+ * outputs.
+ *
+ * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
+ * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
+ * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
+ * BIP 143 signature.
+ */
public sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx: Uint8Array, input: number, amount: bigint, per_commitment_point: Uint8Array, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment): Result_SignatureNoneZ {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(htlc_tx), input, amount, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33)), htlc == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(htlc) & ~1);
const ret_hu_conv: Result_SignatureNoneZ = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
+ *
+ * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
+ * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
+ */
public sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx: ClosingTransaction): Result_SignatureNoneZ {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(closing_tx) & ~1);
const ret_hu_conv: Result_SignatureNoneZ = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
+ * of the channel participants.
+ *
+ * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
+ * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
+ * protocol.
+ */
public sign_channel_announcement(msg: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement): Result_SignatureNoneZ {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_sign_channel_announcement(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(msg) & ~1);
const ret_hu_conv: Result_SignatureNoneZ = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
+ * counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
+ * This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data,
+ * they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set.
+ *
+ * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
+ *
+ * We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience.
+ *
+ * Will be called before any signatures are applied.
+ */
public ready_channel(channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters): void {
bindings.BaseSign_ready_channel(this.ptr, channel_parameters == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(channel_parameters) & ~1);
CommonBase.add_ref_from(this, channel_parameters);
}
+ /**
+ * Frees any resources associated with this object given its this_arg pointer.
+ * Does not need to free the outer struct containing function pointers and may be NULL is no resources need to be freed.
+ */
public get_pubkeys(): ChannelPublicKeys {
const ret: number = bindings.BaseSign_get_pubkeys(this.ptr);
const ret_hu_conv: ChannelPublicKeys = new ChannelPublicKeys(null, ret);
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff