X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?p=ldk-java;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ts%2Fstructs%2FChannelManager.mts;h=5c4da066aa09f6554f448255aa30c50c08442bcb;hp=cd4207bac654ccf74ecbe9becf9e997d44fb229d;hb=c629a01650402c8e2f9b9db8ced9ed63ce687727;hpb=d1d0121c000b713c10fd0bedd249eb8dda2e4db7 diff --git a/ts/structs/ChannelManager.mts b/ts/structs/ChannelManager.mts index cd4207ba..5c4da066 100644 --- a/ts/structs/ChannelManager.mts +++ b/ts/structs/ChannelManager.mts @@ -281,12 +281,64 @@ import CommonBase from './CommonBase.mjs'; import * as bindings from '../bindings.mjs' +/** + * Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate + * channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. + * + * Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through + * to individual Channels. + * + * Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for + * all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being + * serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie + * called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels). + * + * Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with + * ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before + * returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates + * happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during + * the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the + * ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the + * ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees). + * + * Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which + * tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along + * the \"reorg path\" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call + * block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the + * object! + * + * Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating + * ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid + * spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been + * offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call + * timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect. + * + * Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager + * a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but + * essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a + * SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when + * you're using lightning-net-tokio. + */ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { /* @internal */ public constructor(_dummy: object, ptr: number) { super(ptr, bindings.ChannelManager_free); } + /** + * Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. + * + * This is the main \"logic hub\" for all channel-related actions, and implements + * ChannelMessageHandler. + * + * Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator. + * + * panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`! + * + * Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or + * disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting + * from after `params.latest_hash`. + */ public static constructor_new(fee_est: FeeEstimator, chain_monitor: Watch, tx_broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface, logger: Logger, keys_manager: KeysInterface, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters): ChannelManager { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(fee_est), chain_monitor == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(chain_monitor), tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(tx_broadcaster), logger == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(logger), keys_manager == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(keys_manager), config == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(config) & ~1, params == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(params) & ~1); const ret_hu_conv: ChannelManager = new ChannelManager(null, ret); @@ -299,6 +351,9 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as + */ public get_current_default_configuration(): UserConfig { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_get_current_default_configuration(this.ptr); const ret_hu_conv: UserConfig = new UserConfig(null, ret); @@ -306,12 +361,46 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value. + * + * `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events + * correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0 + * for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here. + * `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise + * ignored. + * + * Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is + * greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`. + * + * Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no + * connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in + * the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload). + * + * Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in + * [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after + * [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for + * one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel + * immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]. + * + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id + * [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id + * + * Note that override_config (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None + */ public create_channel(their_network_key: Uint8Array, channel_value_satoshis: bigint, push_msat: bigint, user_channel_id: bigint, override_config: UserConfig): Result__u832APIErrorZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(their_network_key, 33)), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, override_config == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(override_config) & ~1); const ret_hu_conv: Result__u832APIErrorZ = Result__u832APIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for + * more information. + */ public list_channels(): ChannelDetails[] { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels(this.ptr); const ret_conv_16_len: number = bindings.getArrayLength(ret); @@ -322,9 +411,18 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { CommonBase.add_ref_from(ret_conv_16_hu_conv, this); ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv; } + bindings.freeWasmMemory(ret) return ret_conv_16_arr; } + /** + * Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to + * get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used. + * + * These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the + * documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria + * are. + */ public list_usable_channels(): ChannelDetails[] { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr); const ret_conv_16_len: number = bindings.getArrayLength(ret); @@ -335,31 +433,123 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { CommonBase.add_ref_from(ret_conv_16_hu_conv, this); ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv; } + bindings.freeWasmMemory(ret) return ret_conv_16_arr; } + /** + * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs + * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all + * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain. + * + * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and + * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee + * estimate. + * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing + * transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which + * would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our + * counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however. + * + * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. + * + * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis + * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background + * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal + */ public close_channel(channel_id: Uint8Array): Result_NoneAPIErrorZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32))); const ret_hu_conv: Result_NoneAPIErrorZ = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs + * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all + * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain. + * + * `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated + * the channel being closed or not: + * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing + * transaction. The upper-bound is set by + * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee + * estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater). + * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure + * transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which + * will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower). + * + * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. + * + * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis + * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background + * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal + */ public close_channel_with_target_feerate(channel_id: Uint8Array, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: number): Result_NoneAPIErrorZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_target_feerate(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32)), target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight); const ret_hu_conv: Result_NoneAPIErrorZ = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to + * the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager. + */ public force_close_channel(channel_id: Uint8Array): Result_NoneAPIErrorZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_channel(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32))); const ret_hu_conv: Result_NoneAPIErrorZ = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction + * for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each. + */ public force_close_all_channels(): void { bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels(this.ptr); } + /** + * Sends a payment along a given route. + * + * Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop + * fields for more info. + * + * Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative + * payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided + * next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as + * specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own + * payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent \"proof of + * payment\") and prevent double-sends yourself. + * + * May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed. + * + * Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with + * each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see + * PaymentSendFailure for more info. + * + * In general, a path may raise: + * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee, + * node public key) is specified. + * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates + * (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update + * failure). + * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the + * relevant updates. + * + * Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been + * irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a + * different route unless you intend to pay twice! + * + * payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate + * the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For + * newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route + * must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided + * payment_secret. + * If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature + * bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route, + * we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set. + * + * Note that payment_secret (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None + */ public send_payment(route: Route, payment_hash: Uint8Array, payment_secret: Uint8Array): Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(route) & ~1, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32)), bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32))); const ret_hu_conv: Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ = Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); @@ -367,6 +557,18 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Retries a payment along the given [`Route`]. + * + * Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see + * [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the + * retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment + * for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if + * further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`]. + * + * [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] + * [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] + */ public retry_payment(route: Route, payment_id: Uint8Array): Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_retry_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(route) & ~1, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32))); const ret_hu_conv: Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ = Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); @@ -374,10 +576,44 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur. + * + * After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id` + * will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated, + * an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining + * pending HTLCs for this payment. + * + * Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still + * wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to + * determine the ultimate status of a payment. + * + * [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment + * [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed + * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent + */ public abandon_payment(payment_id: Uint8Array): void { bindings.ChannelManager_abandon_payment(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32))); } + /** + * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have + * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify + * the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node + * would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will + * never reach the recipient. + * + * See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function. + * + * Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See + * [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage. + * + * Note that `route` must have exactly one path. + * + * [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment + * + * Note that payment_preimage (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None + */ public send_spontaneous_payment(route: Route, payment_preimage: Uint8Array): Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : CommonBase.get_ptr_of(route) & ~1, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32))); const ret_hu_conv: Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); @@ -385,70 +621,262 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel. + * + * Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs + * or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]. + * + * Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided + * for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`]. + * + * May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other + * channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction + * keys per-channel). + * + * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our + * counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the + * [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed. + * + * Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does + * not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead, + * create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction. + * + * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady + * [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed + */ public funding_transaction_generated(temporary_channel_id: Uint8Array, funding_transaction: Uint8Array): Result_NoneAPIErrorZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32)), bindings.encodeUint8Array(funding_transaction)); const ret_hu_conv: Result_NoneAPIErrorZ = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given + * arguments, providing them in corresponding events via + * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed + * on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node + * announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and + * our network addresses. + * + * `rgb` is a node \"color\" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this + * node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning. + * + * `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node + * accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly + * tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy, + * addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses. + * + * Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500). + * + * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events + */ public broadcast_node_announcement(rgb: Uint8Array, alias: Uint8Array, addresses: NetAddress[]): void { bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(rgb, 3)), bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(alias, 32)), bindings.encodeUint32Array(addresses != null ? addresses.map(addresses_conv_12 => CommonBase.get_ptr_of(addresses_conv_12)) : null)); } + /** + * Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay. + * + * Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event. + * Will likely generate further events. + */ public process_pending_htlc_forwards(): void { bindings.ChannelManager_process_pending_htlc_forwards(this.ptr); } + /** + * Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter. + * + * This currently includes: + * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels, + * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more + * than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over + * the channel. + * + * Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate + * estimate fetches. + */ public timer_tick_occurred(): void { bindings.ChannelManager_timer_tick_occurred(this.ptr); } + /** + * Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect + * after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources + * along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it). + * Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the + * HTLC backwards has been started. + */ public fail_htlc_backwards(payment_hash: Uint8Array): boolean { const ret: boolean = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32))); return ret; } + /** + * Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any + * [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment. + * + * Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or + * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived` + * event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide + * the sender \"proof-of-payment\" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment. + * + * Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now + * pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]. + * + * [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived + * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events + */ public claim_funds(payment_preimage: Uint8Array): boolean { const ret: boolean = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32))); return ret; } + /** + * Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager + */ public get_our_node_id(): Uint8Array { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_get_our_node_id(this.ptr); const ret_conv: Uint8Array = bindings.decodeUint8Array(ret); return ret_conv; } + /** + * Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing + * to pay us. + * + * This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the + * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you. + * + * The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which + * will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be + * passed directly to [`claim_funds`]. + * + * See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements. + * + * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by + * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. + * + * # Note + * + * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then + * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received. + * + * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. + * + * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds + * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived + * [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage + * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + */ public create_inbound_payment(min_value_msat: Option_u64Z, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: number): Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, CommonBase.get_ptr_of(min_value_msat), invoice_expiry_delta_secs); const ret_hu_conv: Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share + * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier. + * + * # Note + * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon. + * + * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + */ public create_inbound_payment_legacy(min_value_msat: Option_u64Z, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: number): Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_legacy(this.ptr, CommonBase.get_ptr_of(min_value_msat), invoice_expiry_delta_secs); const ret_hu_conv: Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is + * stored external to LDK. + * + * A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a + * payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least + * the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided. + * + * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though + * note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound + * payments. + * + * `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment + * received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat` + * before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the + * sender \"proof-of-payment\" unless they have paid the required amount. + * + * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for + * in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice. + * After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to + * pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for + * invoices when no timeout is set. + * + * Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin + * to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will + * accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry. + * If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of + * [`PaymentReceived`]. + * + * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year. + * + * Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry` + * set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`]. + * + * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by + * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. + * + * # Note + * + * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then + * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received. + * + * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. + * + * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived + */ public create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash: Uint8Array, min_value_msat: Option_u64Z, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: number): Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32)), CommonBase.get_ptr_of(min_value_msat), invoice_expiry_delta_secs); const ret_hu_conv: Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ = Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share + * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier. + * + * # Note + * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon. + * + * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + */ public create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash: Uint8Array, min_value_msat: Option_u64Z, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: number): Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32)), CommonBase.get_ptr_of(min_value_msat), invoice_expiry_delta_secs); const ret_hu_conv: Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ = Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were + * previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. + * + * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + */ public get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: Uint8Array, payment_secret: Uint8Array): Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_get_payment_preimage(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32)), bindings.encodeUint8Array(bindings.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32))); const ret_hu_conv: Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ = Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Constructs a new MessageSendEventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. + * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned MessageSendEventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is + */ public as_MessageSendEventsProvider(): MessageSendEventsProvider { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_as_MessageSendEventsProvider(this.ptr); const ret_hu_conv: MessageSendEventsProvider = new MessageSendEventsProvider(null, ret); @@ -456,6 +884,10 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Constructs a new EventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. + * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned EventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is + */ public as_EventsProvider(): EventsProvider { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_as_EventsProvider(this.ptr); const ret_hu_conv: EventsProvider = new EventsProvider(null, ret); @@ -463,6 +895,10 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Constructs a new Listen which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. + * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Listen must be freed before this_arg is + */ public as_Listen(): Listen { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Listen(this.ptr); const ret_hu_conv: Listen = new Listen(null, ret); @@ -470,6 +906,10 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Constructs a new Confirm which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. + * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Confirm must be freed before this_arg is + */ public as_Confirm(): Confirm { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Confirm(this.ptr); const ret_hu_conv: Confirm = new Confirm(null, ret); @@ -477,10 +917,19 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on + * `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken + * up. + */ public await_persistable_update(): void { bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update(this.ptr); } + /** + * Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or + * [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces. + */ public current_best_block(): BestBlock { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_current_best_block(this.ptr); const ret_hu_conv: BestBlock = new BestBlock(null, ret); @@ -488,6 +937,10 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Constructs a new ChannelMessageHandler which calls the relevant methods on this_arg. + * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned ChannelMessageHandler must be freed before this_arg is + */ public as_ChannelMessageHandler(): ChannelMessageHandler { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_as_ChannelMessageHandler(this.ptr); const ret_hu_conv: ChannelMessageHandler = new ChannelMessageHandler(null, ret); @@ -495,6 +948,9 @@ export class ChannelManager extends CommonBase { return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Serialize the ChannelManager object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelManager_read + */ public write(): Uint8Array { const ret: number = bindings.ChannelManager_write(this.ptr); const ret_conv: Uint8Array = bindings.decodeUint8Array(ret);