From: Antoine Riard Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 16:57:52 +0000 (-0500) Subject: Introduce OnchainTxHandler, move bumping and tracking logic X-Git-Tag: v0.0.12~110^2~4 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?p=rust-lightning;a=commitdiff_plain;h=3d640da5c343111f538f006996c13c9a98e0d9e6 Introduce OnchainTxHandler, move bumping and tracking logic Encapsulates tracking and bumping of in-flight transactions in its own component. This component may be latter abstracted to reuse tracking and RBF for new features (e.g dual-funding, splicing) Build all transactions generation in one place. Also as fees and signatures are closely tied, what keys do you have determine what bumping mode you can use. --- diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index b1e8428b..a8fdb32a 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -12,13 +12,12 @@ //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices. use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::consensus::encode; use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash; -use bitcoin::util::bip143; use bitcoin_hashes::Hash; use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; @@ -33,14 +32,15 @@ use ln::msgs::DecodeError; use ln::chan_utils; use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType}; use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; -use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT}; +use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler; +use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys}; use util::logger::Logger; use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; -use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet}; +use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map}; use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex}; use std::{hash,cmp, mem}; use std::ops::Deref; @@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ impl, Option)>, } -#[derive(PartialEq)] -enum InputDescriptors { - RevokedOfferedHTLC, - RevokedReceivedHTLC, - OfferedHTLC, - ReceivedHTLC, - RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output -} - /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -enum InputMaterial { +pub(crate) enum InputMaterial { Revoked { script: Script, pubkey: Option, @@ -567,69 +558,12 @@ impl Readable for InputMaterial { /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY) #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] enum OnchainEvent { - /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from - /// bump-txn candidate buffer. - Claim { - claim_request: Sha256dHash, - }, /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash), }, - /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx. - /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking - /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen. - ContentiousOutpoint { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint, - input_material: InputMaterial, - } -} - -/// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial { - // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too - // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it. - height_timer: u32, - // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material - feerate_previous: u64, - // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute - // a priority of not feerate - soonest_timelock: u32, - // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey. - per_input_material: HashMap, -} - -impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial { - fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?; - for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() { - outp.write(writer)?; - tx_material.write(writer)?; - } - Ok(()) - } -} - -impl Readable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?; - let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?; - let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?; - let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); - for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len { - let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; - let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?; - per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material); - } - Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }) - } } const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; @@ -819,39 +753,11 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { pending_htlcs_updated: Vec, pending_events: Vec, - destination_script: Script, // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to // scan every commitment transaction for that to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>, - // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump - // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within - // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the - // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at - // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set - // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one - // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and - // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints. - // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by - // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved. - // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial) - #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization - pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap, - #[cfg(not(test))] - pending_claim_requests: HashMap, - - // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request. - // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim - // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier - // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is - // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if - // block with output gets disconnected. - #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization - pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap, - #[cfg(not(test))] - claimable_outpoints: HashMap, - // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type. @@ -863,6 +769,11 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly. outputs_to_watch: HashMap>, + #[cfg(test)] + pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler, + #[cfg(not(test))] + onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler, + // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way. // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep @@ -872,40 +783,6 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit... logger: Arc, } -macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee { - ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => { - { - $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority); - let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; - if $value <= fee { - $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; - if $value <= fee { - $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background); - fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; - if $value <= fee { - log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", - fee, $value); - false - } else { - log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", - $value); - $value -= fee; - true - } - } else { - log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", - $value); - $value -= fee; - true - } - } else { - $value -= fee; - true - } - } - } -} #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the @@ -932,10 +809,7 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages || self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated || self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly - self.destination_script != other.destination_script || self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue || - self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests || - self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints || self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf || self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch { @@ -1113,7 +987,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?; - self.destination_script.write(writer)?; if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue { writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; to_remote_script.write(writer)?; @@ -1122,39 +995,17 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; } - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?; - for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() { - ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?; - claim_tx_data.write(writer)?; - } - - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?; - for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() { - outp.write(writer)?; - claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?; - claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?; - } - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?; for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() { writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?; for ev in events.iter() { match *ev { - OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - claim_request.write(writer)?; - }, OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; htlc_update.0.write(writer)?; htlc_update.1.write(writer)?; }, - OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => { - writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?; - outpoint.write(writer)?; - input_material.write(writer)?; - } } } } @@ -1167,6 +1018,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { script.write(writer)?; } } + self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?; Ok(()) } @@ -1246,61 +1098,19 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(), pending_events: Vec::new(), - destination_script: destination_script.clone(), to_remote_rescue: None, - pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(), - - claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), - onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(), outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(), + onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), logger.clone()), + last_block_hash: Default::default(), secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), logger, } } - fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize { - let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags - for inp in inputs { - // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary - tx_weight += match inp { - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77 - }, - }; - } - tx_weight - } - - fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 { - if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 { - return current_height + 1 - } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 { - return current_height + 3 - } - current_height + 15 - } - /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key). @@ -1575,12 +1385,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions. /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of /// revoked remote commitment tx - fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: F) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec) - where F::Target: FeeEstimator - { + fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<(u32, bool, BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial)>, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec) { // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast - let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new(); + let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new(); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); @@ -1591,7 +1399,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ( $thing : expr ) => { match $thing { Ok(a) => a, - Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs) + Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs) } }; } @@ -1600,23 +1408,21 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() { let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap(); let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret)); - let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref keys, ref payment_base_key, .. } => { + let (revocation_pubkey, revocation_key, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref keys, ref revocation_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => { let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)), ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)), Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key)))) }, - Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); - (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)), - None) + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + unimplemented!() }, }; let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap())); let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { - None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs), + None => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs), Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)), }; @@ -1630,25 +1436,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()) } else { None }; - let mut total_value = 0; - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_info = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new(); - + // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote) for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { - inputs.push(TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: idx as u32, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput); - inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32)); - total_value += outp.value; + claimable_outpoints.push((height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, true, BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: revokeable_redeemscript.clone(), pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: outp.value })); } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() { spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, @@ -1658,99 +1449,25 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - macro_rules! sign_input { - ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => { - { - let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0; - chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey) - }; - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]); - let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); - (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - if $htlc_idx.is_none() { - $input.witness.push(vec!(1)); - } else { - $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); - } - $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes()); - (redeemscript, revocation_key) - } - } - } - + // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { - inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len()); - - for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user - } - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: transaction_output_index, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { - inputs.push(input); - inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }); - inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry)); - total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value; - } else { - let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: vec![input], - output: vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, - }), - }; - let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); - let mut used_feerate; - if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); - let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000); - assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight()); - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer); - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); - per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); } - } - txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); - } + return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user } + claimable_outpoints.push((htlc.cltv_expiry, true, BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: expected_script, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value })); } } } - if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours + // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken + if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction! - log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len()); + log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len()); watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); @@ -1768,7 +1485,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != **source }, - _ => return true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}); @@ -1792,58 +1508,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx } - if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx - - let outputs = vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: total_value, - }); - let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: inputs, - output: outputs, - }; - - let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]); - - let mut used_feerate; - if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); - } - - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); - - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len()); - let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX; - for info in inputs_info.iter() { - if info.2 <= soonest_timelock { - soonest_timelock = info.2; - } - } - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock); - let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid(); - for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) { - let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1); - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer); - per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); } - } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); } - } - - assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); - - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(), - }); - txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is @@ -1885,7 +1549,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != **source }, - _ => return true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}); @@ -1915,21 +1578,20 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None } } else { None }; if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option { - let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => { + let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, htlc_privkey) = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref keys, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint))) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key))) + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key))) }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!() } }; let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { - None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs), + None => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs), Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)), }; + // First, mark as spendable our to_remote output for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() { match self.key_storage { @@ -1948,192 +1610,22 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - let mut total_value = 0; - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_info = Vec::new(); - - macro_rules! sign_input { - ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr, $idx: expr) => { - { - let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$idx as usize].0; - let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]); - let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)); - (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - $input.witness.push($preimage); - $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes()); - (redeemscript, htlc_key) - } - } - } - - for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + // Then, try to find htlc outputs + for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user + return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user } - if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { - if htlc.offered { - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: transaction_output_index, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { - inputs.push(input); - inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }); - inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry, idx)); - total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value; - } else { - let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: vec![input], - output: vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, - }), - }; - let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); - let mut used_feerate; - if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); - let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec(), idx); - assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight()); - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(), - }); - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer); - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); - per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 }); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); } - } - txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); - } - } - } + let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None }; + let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true }; + if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered { + claimable_outpoints.push((htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: expected_script, key: htlc_privkey, preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry })); } - if !htlc.offered { - // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the - // rest of the claim transaction, as above. - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: transaction_output_index, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - let mut timeout_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry, - input: vec![input], - output: vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, - }), - }; - let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); - let mut used_feerate; - if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx); - let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0], idx); - assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight()); - //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer); - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); - per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry }); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); } - } - } - txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx); - } - } - } - - if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx - - let outputs = vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: total_value - }); - let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: inputs, - output: outputs, - }; - - let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]); - - let mut used_feerate; - if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); - } - - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); - - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len()); - let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX; - for info in inputs_info.iter() { - if info.2 <= soonest_timelock { - soonest_timelock = info.2; } } - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock); - let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid(); - for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) { - let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec(), info.3); - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer); - per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0}); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); } - } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); } - } - assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(), - }); - txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); } } } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue { @@ -2147,122 +1639,51 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } } - - (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs) + (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs) } /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key - fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: F) -> (Option, Option) - where F::Target: FeeEstimator - { + fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32) -> Vec<(u32, bool, BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial)> { //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency - if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 { - return (None, None) + if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 { + return Vec::new() } macro_rules! ignore_error { ( $thing : expr ) => { match $thing { Ok(a) => a, - Err(_) => return (None, None) + Err(_) => return Vec::new() } }; } - let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); }; + let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return Vec::new(); }; let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret)); let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); - let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => { - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)) + let (revocation_pubkey, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref keys, ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, revocation_base_key))) }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!() } }; let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key { - None => return (None, None), + None => return Vec::new(), Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)), }; let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); - let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers! - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - let mut amount = 0; - - if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout - inputs.push(TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: htlc_txid, - vout: 0, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - amount = tx.output[0].value; - } - - if !inputs.is_empty() { - let outputs = vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: amount - }); - - let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: inputs, - output: outputs, - }; - let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]); - let mut used_feerate; - if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - return (None, None); - } - - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); - - let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]); - let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); - (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key) - } - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1)); - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes()); - - assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); - let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }; - let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone(); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32); - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer); - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); - per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); } - } - (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output })) - } else { (None, None) } + log_trace!(self, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0); + let claimable_outpoints = vec!((height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, true, BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value })); + claimable_outpoints } - fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec, Vec, Vec, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) { + fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey) -> (Vec, Vec, Vec) { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); - let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); macro_rules! add_dynamic_output { ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => { @@ -2301,12 +1722,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}); //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer); - pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material })); + log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid); res.push(htlc_timeout_tx); } else { if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { @@ -2319,12 +1738,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}); //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer); - pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material })); + log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid); res.push(htlc_success_tx); } } @@ -2334,7 +1751,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims) + (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) } /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet) @@ -2357,7 +1774,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != $source }, - _ => return true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}); @@ -2374,12 +1790,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0); spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1); watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2); - for claim in $updates.3 { - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); } - } - } } } @@ -2403,7 +1813,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig()); match self.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => { - let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height); + let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key); append_onchain_update!(res); }, Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { } @@ -2427,7 +1837,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig()); match self.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => { - let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height); + let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key); append_onchain_update!(res); }, Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { } @@ -2507,7 +1917,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()]; match self.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => { - res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0); + res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key).0); // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do. // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation. }, @@ -2540,7 +1950,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len()); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); - let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new(); + let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new(); for tx in txn_matched { if tx.input.len() == 1 { // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what), @@ -2548,7 +1958,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy // filters. let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output; - let mut txn: Vec = Vec::new(); let funding_txo = match self.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { funding_info.clone() @@ -2559,120 +1968,40 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) { if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 { - let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, &*fee_estimator); - txn = remote_txn; + let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height); spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } - if txn.is_empty() { + if new_outpoints.is_empty() { let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height); spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); - txn = local_txn; + for tx in local_txn.iter() { + log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx)); + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); + } if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } } + claimable_outpoints.push(new_outpoints); } - if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() { + if !funding_txo.is_none() && claimable_outpoints.is_empty() { if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) { spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output); } } } else { if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { - let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &*fee_estimator); - if let Some(tx) = tx { - txn.push(tx); - } - if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output { - spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output); - } + let mut new_outpoints = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height); + claimable_outpoints.push(new_outpoints); } } - for tx in txn.iter() { - log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx)); - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); - } } // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus, // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check. self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height); - - // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us - let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new(); - for inp in &tx.input { - if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) { - // If outpoint has claim request pending on it... - if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) { - //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request - // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued - // by us. - let mut set_equality = true; - if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() { - set_equality = false; - } else { - for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) { - if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output { - set_equality = false; - } - } - } - - macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay { - () => { - let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() }; - match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) { - entry.get_mut().push(new_event); - } - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec![new_event]); - } - } - } - } - - // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs - // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for - // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map. - if set_equality { - clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!(); - } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set - for input in tx.input.iter() { - if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) { - claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material)); - } - // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY. - if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() { - clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!(); - } - } - //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees - bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone()); - } - break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their - } else { - panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map"); - } - } - } - for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) { - let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material }; - match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) { - entry.get_mut().push(new_event); - } - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec![new_event]); - } - } - } } let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) @@ -2693,7 +2022,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness()); match self.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => { - let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height); + let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key); spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); if !new_outputs.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); @@ -2710,15 +2039,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) { for ev in events { match ev { - OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => { - // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have - // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically - if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) { - for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() { - self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint); - } - } - }, OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => { log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0)); self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate { @@ -2727,32 +2047,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { source: htlc_update.0, }); }, - OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => { - self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint); - } } } } - for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() { - if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height { - bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone()); - } - } - for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() { - if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = { - if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) { - if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) { - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx); - Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) - } else { None } - } else { unreachable!(); } - } { - if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) { - claim_material.height_timer = new_timer; - claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate; - } else { unreachable!(); } - } - } + let mut spendable_output = self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, broadcaster, &*fee_estimator); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() { self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect()); @@ -2772,49 +2072,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { F::Target: FeeEstimator { log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height); - let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new(); - if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) { + if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) { //We may discard: //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected - //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output - //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx - for ev in events { - match ev { - OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => { - if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) { - if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) { - claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material); - // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting - // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast - bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone()); - } - } - }, - _ => {}, - } - } - } - for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() { - if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) { - claim_material.height_timer = new_timer; - claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate; - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx); - } - } - for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() { - self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material); - } - //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but - // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request. - let mut remove_request = Vec::new(); - self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v| - if v.1 == height { - remove_request.push(v.0.clone()); - false - } else { true }); - for req in remove_request { - self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req); } + + self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator); + self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); } @@ -3009,7 +2273,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != source }, - _ => return true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}); @@ -3022,152 +2285,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } } - - /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration - /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent. - fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: F) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> - where F::Target: FeeEstimator - { - if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() { - inputs.push(TxIn { - previous_output: *outp, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - } - let mut bumped_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: inputs, - output: vec![TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: 0 - }], - }; - - macro_rules! RBF_bump { - ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => { - { - let mut used_feerate; - // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee... - let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) { - let mut value = $amount; - if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee - $amount - value - } else { - log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount); - return None; - } - // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number) - } else { - let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750; - if $amount <= fee { - log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount); - return None; - } - fee - }; - - let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000; - let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000; - // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling - // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions. - // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting. - let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee { - new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee - } else { - new_fee - }; - Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight)) - } - } - } - - let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock); - let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0; - let mut amt = 0; - for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() { - match per_outp_material { - &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => { - inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() }); - amt += *amount; - }, - &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => { - inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] }); - amt += *amount; - }, - &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; } - } - } - - let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight; - let new_feerate; - if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) { - // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees - if new_fee > amt { - bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0; - } else { - bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee; - } - new_feerate = feerate; - } else { - return None; - } - assert!(new_feerate != 0); - - for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() { - match per_outp_material { - &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => { - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]); - let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - if *is_htlc { - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec()); - } else { - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1)); - } - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes()); - log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate); - }, - &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => { - if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime }; - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]); - let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - if let &Some(preimage) = preimage { - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec()); - } else { - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]); - } - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes()); - log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate); - }, - &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { - //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't - // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification : - // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html - return None; - } - } - } - assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight()); - Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx)) - } } const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024; impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) { fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc) -> Result { - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); macro_rules! unwrap_obj { ($key: expr) => { match $key { @@ -3375,7 +2498,6 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH } let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; - let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?; let to_remote_rescue = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => None, 1 => { @@ -3386,21 +2508,6 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; - let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); - for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len { - pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?); - } - - let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); - for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len { - let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; - let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?; - let height = Readable::read(reader)?; - claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height)); - } - let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len { @@ -3410,26 +2517,12 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH for _ in 0..events_len { let ev = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => { - let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?; - OnchainEvent::Claim { - claim_request - } - }, - 1 => { let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?; let hash = Readable::read(reader)?; OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash) } }, - 2 => { - let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; - let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?; - OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { - outpoint, - input_material - } - } _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; events.push(ev); @@ -3450,6 +2543,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } + let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?; Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor { latest_update_id, @@ -3478,22 +2572,18 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH pending_htlcs_updated, pending_events, - destination_script, to_remote_rescue, - pending_claim_requests, - - claimable_outpoints, - onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf, outputs_to_watch, + onchain_tx_handler, + last_block_hash, - secp_ctx, + secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), logger, })) } - } #[cfg(test)] @@ -3510,7 +2600,8 @@ mod tests { use hex; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; - use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors}; + use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor; + use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors}; use ln::chan_utils; use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction}; use util::test_utils::TestLogger; @@ -3718,7 +2809,7 @@ mod tests { for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() { sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs); } - assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); + assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs claim_tx.input.clear(); @@ -3740,7 +2831,7 @@ mod tests { for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() { sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs); } - assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); + assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output claim_tx.input.clear(); @@ -3760,7 +2851,7 @@ mod tests { for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() { sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs); } - assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); + assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); } // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests. diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 089ac9ca..7ba3675f 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -2325,33 +2325,41 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { } let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 26); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 21); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3) // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2) - // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx * 7 (7), after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore - // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (14) - - - assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[7]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[9]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[14]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[17]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[20]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[23]); - - assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[8]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[10]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[15]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[18]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[21]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[24]); - + // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx (4), after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore + // ChannelMonito r: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (14) + + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[9]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[13]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[15]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[17]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[19]); + + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[10]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[14]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[16]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[18]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[20]); + + + // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration and present 8 times (rebroadcast at every block from 200 to 206) assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1); + let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output + check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone()); + // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4 + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1); fn get_txout(out_point: &BitcoinOutPoint, tx: &Transaction) -> Option { if out_point.txid == tx.txid() { tx.output.get(out_point.vout as usize).cloned() @@ -2359,28 +2367,18 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { None } } - node_txn[0].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap(); - node_txn[1].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap(); node_txn[2].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap(); + node_txn[3].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap(); + node_txn[4].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap(); let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new(); - witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); - witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); + witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); + witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3); assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC - - assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1); - check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone()); - - assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1); - let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output - assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid()); - assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid); - assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid); } get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); @@ -2623,21 +2621,20 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() { { let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout) * 2 (block-rescan), timeout tx - assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[5]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[6]); - check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone()); - check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone()); - assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); - assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone()); - check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); - assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); - assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone(); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]); + + check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + + check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + + timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone(); node_txn.clear(); } @@ -4075,10 +4072,9 @@ fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() { let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); - assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); - assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone()); } @@ -4123,8 +4119,7 @@ eprintln!("{:?}", node_txn[1]); check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1); - assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2); - assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]); + assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone()); } @@ -4155,8 +4150,7 @@ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() { check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); - assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2); - assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]); + assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone()); } @@ -4201,10 +4195,9 @@ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() { // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); - assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); - assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]); + assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone()); - check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[2].clone()); + check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); } #[test] @@ -4247,12 +4240,11 @@ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() { // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1); - assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5); + assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); - assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output - check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx + check_spends!(spend_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx } #[test] @@ -6903,8 +6895,6 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() { nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false); - let mut received = ::std::usize::MAX; - let mut offered = ::std::usize::MAX; let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 6); if revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { @@ -6913,106 +6903,81 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() { assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); - received = 0; - offered = 1; } else if revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); - received = 1; - offered = 0; } // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A - let header_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 128, 0, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + let header_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 128, 0, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] }, 129); let first; - let second; let feerate_1; - let feerate_2; + let penalty_txn; { let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 2 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn - assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2); assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1); - check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()); + if node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() { + assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[1].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid()); + } else if node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() { + assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[1].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid()); + } else { + panic!(); + } first = node_txn[4].txid(); - assert_eq!(node_txn[5].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(node_txn[5].output.len(), 1); - check_spends!(node_txn[5], revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()); - second = node_txn[5].txid(); // Store both feerates for later comparison - let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value; + let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value; feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64; - let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[5].output[0].value; - feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[5].get_weight() as u64; + penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]; node_txn.clear(); } // Connect three more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn - let header_132 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 3, 129, true, header_129.bitcoin_hash()); - let penalty_local_tx; + let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn }, 130); { let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 bumped penalty txn on offered/received HTLC outputs of revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tx on to_local of revoked commitment tx + 2 bumped penalty tx on revoked HTLC txn + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); - check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); - - penalty_local_tx = node_txn[2].clone(); node_txn.clear(); }; - // Few more blocks to broadcast and confirm penalty_local_tx - let header_133 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_132, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_133, txdata: vec![penalty_local_tx] }, 133); - let header_135 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 2, 133, true, header_133.bitcoin_hash()); + + // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn + let header_135 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 5, 130, true, header_130.bitcoin_hash()); { let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); - check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0); node_txn.clear(); } let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 9, 135, true, header_135); let node_txn = { let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); - - let mut penalty_offered = ::std::usize::MAX; - let mut penalty_received = ::std::usize::MAX; + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); - { - for (i, tx) in node_txn.iter().enumerate() { - if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[offered].txid() { - penalty_offered = i; - } else if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[received].txid() { - penalty_received = i; - } - } + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); + if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() { + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid()); + } else if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() { + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid()); + } else { + panic!(); } - - assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].output.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_offered].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_offered].output.len(), 1); - // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic - check_spends!(node_txn[penalty_offered], revoked_htlc_txn[offered].clone()); - assert_ne!(first, node_txn[penalty_offered].txid()); - let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[offered].output[0].value - node_txn[penalty_offered].output[0].value; - let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[penalty_offered].get_weight() as u64; - assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_1 * 125); - - check_spends!(node_txn[penalty_received], revoked_htlc_txn[received].clone()); - assert_ne!(second, node_txn[penalty_received].txid()); - let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[received].output[0].value - node_txn[penalty_received].output[0].value; - let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[penalty_received].get_weight() as u64; - assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_2 * 125); - let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]; + //// Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic + assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid()); + let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64; + assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125); + let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()]; node_txn.clear(); txn }; @@ -7022,7 +6987,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() { connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 20, 145, true, header_145.bitcoin_hash()); { let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //TODO: fix check_spend_remote_htlc lack of watch output + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); //TODO: fix check_spend_remote_htlc lack of watch output node_txn.clear(); } check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false); @@ -7305,8 +7270,8 @@ fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() { { let monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap(); if let Some(monitor) = monitors.get(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0)) { - assert!(monitor.pending_claim_requests.is_empty()); - assert!(monitor.claimable_outpoints.is_empty()); + assert!(monitor.onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty()); + assert!(monitor.onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty()); } } } diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/mod.rs b/lightning/src/ln/mod.rs index 4cb1b89c..38396dd7 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/mod.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/mod.rs @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ pub mod router; pub mod peer_handler; pub mod chan_utils; pub mod features; +pub(crate) mod onchaintx; #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")] pub mod peer_channel_encryptor; diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/onchaintx.rs b/lightning/src/ln/onchaintx.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7bacc91a --- /dev/null +++ b/lightning/src/ln/onchaintx.rs @@ -0,0 +1,698 @@ +//! The logic to build claims and bump in-flight transactions until confirmations. +//! +//! OnchainTxHandler objetcs are fully-part of ChannelMonitor and encapsulates all +//! building, tracking, bumping and notifications functions. + +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; +use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script; +use bitcoin::util::bip143; + +use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; + +use secp256k1::Secp256k1; +use secp256k1; + +use ln::msgs::DecodeError; +use ln::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER, InputMaterial}; +use ln::chan_utils::HTLCType; +use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT}; +use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor; +use util::logger::Logger; +use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable}; +use util::byte_utils; + +use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet}; +use std::sync::Arc; +use std::cmp; +use std::ops::Deref; + +const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024; + +/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it +/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY) +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +enum OnchainEvent { + /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from + /// bump-txn candidate buffer. + Claim { + claim_request: Sha256dHash, + }, + /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx. + /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking + /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen. + ContentiousOutpoint { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint, + input_material: InputMaterial, + } +} + +/// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial { + // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too + // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it. + height_timer: u32, + // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material + feerate_previous: u64, + // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute + // a priority of not feerate + soonest_timelock: u32, + // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey. + per_input_material: HashMap, +} + +impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial { + fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?; + for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() { + outp.write(writer)?; + tx_material.write(writer)?; + } + Ok(()) + } +} + +impl Readable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial { + fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { + let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?; + let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?; + let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?; + let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); + for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len { + let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; + let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?; + per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material); + } + Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }) + } +} + +#[derive(PartialEq)] +pub(super) enum InputDescriptors { + RevokedOfferedHTLC, + RevokedReceivedHTLC, + OfferedHTLC, + ReceivedHTLC, + RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output +} + +macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee { + ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => { + { + $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority); + let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; + if $value <= fee { + $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); + fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; + if $value <= fee { + $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background); + fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; + if $value <= fee { + log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", + fee, $value); + false + } else { + log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", + $value); + $value -= fee; + true + } + } else { + log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", + $value); + $value -= fee; + true + } + } else { + $value -= fee; + true + } + } + } +} + + +/// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and +/// do RBF bumping if possible. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct OnchainTxHandler { + destination_script: Script, + + // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump + // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within + // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the + // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at + // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set + // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one + // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and + // we need to regenerate new claim request with reduced set of still-claimable outpoints. + // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by + // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved. + // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial) + #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization + pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap, + #[cfg(not(test))] + pending_claim_requests: HashMap, + + // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request. + // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim + // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier + // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is + // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if + // block with output gets disconnected. + #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization + pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap, + #[cfg(not(test))] + claimable_outpoints: HashMap, + + onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap>, + + secp_ctx: Secp256k1, + logger: Arc +} + +impl Writeable for OnchainTxHandler { + fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + self.destination_script.write(writer)?; + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?; + for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() { + ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?; + claim_tx_data.write(writer)?; + } + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?; + for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() { + outp.write(writer)?; + claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?; + claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?; + } + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?; + for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?; + for ev in events.iter() { + match *ev { + OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + claim_request.write(writer)?; + }, + OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + outpoint.write(writer)?; + input_material.write(writer)?; + } + } + } + } + Ok(()) + } +} + +impl ReadableArgs> for OnchainTxHandler { + fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc) -> Result { + let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?; + + let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); + for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len { + pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?); + } + + let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); + for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len { + let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; + let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?; + let height = Readable::read(reader)?; + claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height)); + } + let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); + for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len { + let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?; + let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); + for _ in 0..events_len { + let ev = match ::read(reader)? { + 0 => { + let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?; + OnchainEvent::Claim { + claim_request + } + }, + 1 => { + let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; + let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?; + OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { + outpoint, + input_material + } + } + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + events.push(ev); + } + onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events); + } + + Ok(OnchainTxHandler { + destination_script, + claimable_outpoints, + pending_claim_requests, + onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf, + secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), + logger, + }) + } +} + +impl OnchainTxHandler { + pub(super) fn new(destination_script: Script, logger: Arc) -> Self { + OnchainTxHandler { + destination_script, + pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(), + claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), + onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(), + + secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), + logger, + } + } + + pub(super) fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize { + let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags + for inp in inputs { + // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary + tx_weight += match inp { + // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script + &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => { + 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133 + }, + // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script + &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => { + 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139 + }, + // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script + &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => { + 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133 + }, + // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script + &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => { + 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139 + }, + // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script + &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => { + 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77 + }, + }; + } + tx_weight + } + + fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 { + if timelock_expiration <= current_height + 3 { + return current_height + 1 + } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 { + return current_height + 3 + } + current_height + 15 + } + + /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration + /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent. + fn generate_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: F) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> + where F::Target: FeeEstimator + { + if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs + let mut inputs = Vec::new(); + for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() { + log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{}", outp.txid, outp.vout); + inputs.push(TxIn { + previous_output: *outp, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: 0xfffffffd, + witness: Vec::new(), + }); + } + let mut bumped_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: 0, + input: inputs, + output: vec![TxOut { + script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), + value: 0 + }], + }; + + macro_rules! RBF_bump { + ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => { + { + let mut used_feerate; + // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee... + let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) { + let mut value = $amount; + if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) { + // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee + $amount - value + } else { + log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount); + return None; + } + // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number) + } else { + let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750; + if $amount <= fee { + log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount); + return None; + } + fee + }; + + let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000; + let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000; + // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling + // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions. + // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting. + let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee { + new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee + } else { + new_fee + }; + Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight)) + } + } + } + + let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock); + let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0; + let mut amt = 0; + for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() { + match per_outp_material { + &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => { + inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() }); + amt += *amount; + }, + &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => { + inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] }); + amt += *amount; + }, + &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; } + } + } + + let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight; + let mut new_feerate; + // If old feerate is 0, first iteration of this claim, use normal fee calculation + if cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous != 0 { + if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) { + // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees + if new_fee > amt { + bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0; + } else { + bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee; + } + new_feerate = feerate; + } else { return None; } + } else { + if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, amt, predicted_weight, new_feerate) { + bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt; + } else { return None; } + } + assert!(new_feerate != 0); + + for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() { + match per_outp_material { + &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => { + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx); + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]); + let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + if *is_htlc { + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec()); + } else { + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1)); + } + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes()); + log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate); + }, + &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => { + if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime }; // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx); + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]); + let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + if let &Some(preimage) = preimage { + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec()); + } else { + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]); + } + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes()); + log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate); + }, + &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { + //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't + // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification : + // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html + return None; + } + } + } + log_trace!(self, "...with timer {}", new_timer); + assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight()); + Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx)) + } + + pub(super) fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], claimable_outpoints: Vec>, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F) -> Vec + where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator + { + let mut new_claims = Vec::new(); + let mut aggregated_claim = HashMap::new(); + let mut aggregated_soonest = ::std::u32::MAX; + let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); + + // Try to aggregate outputs if they're 1) belong to same parent tx, 2) their + // timelock expiration isn't imminent (<= CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER). + for siblings_outpoints in claimable_outpoints { + for outp in siblings_outpoints { + // Don't claim a outpoint twice that would be bad for privacy and may uselessly lock a CPFP input for a while + if let Some(_) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outp.2) { log_trace!(self, "Bouncing off outpoint {}:{}, already registered its claiming request", outp.2.txid, outp.2.vout); } else { + log_trace!(self, "Test if outpoint can be aggregated with expiration {} against {}", outp.0, height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER); + if outp.0 <= height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER || !outp.1 { // Don't aggregate if outpoint absolute timelock is soon or marked as non-aggregable + let mut single_input = HashMap::new(); + single_input.insert(outp.2, outp.3); + new_claims.push((outp.0, single_input)); + } else { + aggregated_claim.insert(outp.2, outp.3); + if outp.0 < aggregated_soonest { + aggregated_soonest = outp.0; + } + } + } + } + } + new_claims.push((aggregated_soonest, aggregated_claim)); + + // Generate claim transactions and track them to bump if necessary at + // height timer expiration (i.e in how many blocks we're going to take action). + for claim in new_claims { + let mut claim_material = ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer: 0, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: claim.0, per_input_material: claim.1.clone() }; + if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) { + claim_material.height_timer = new_timer; + claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate; + let txid = tx.txid(); + self.pending_claim_requests.insert(txid, claim_material); + for k in claim.1.keys() { + log_trace!(self, "Registering claiming request for {}:{}", k.txid, k.vout); + self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (txid, height)); + } + log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx)); + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, + output: tx.output[0].clone(), + }); + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); + } + } + + let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new(); + for tx in txn_matched { + // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us + let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new(); + for inp in &tx.input { + if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) { + // If outpoint has claim request pending on it... + if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) { + //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request + // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued + // by us. + let mut set_equality = true; + if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() { + set_equality = false; + } else { + for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) { + if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output { + set_equality = false; + } + } + } + + macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay { + () => { + let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() }; + match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) { + entry.get_mut().push(new_event); + } + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + entry.insert(vec![new_event]); + } + } + } + } + + // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs + // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for + // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map. + if set_equality { + clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!(); + } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set + for input in tx.input.iter() { + if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) { + claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material)); + } + // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY. + if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() { + clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!(); + } + } + //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees + bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone()); + } + break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their + } else { + panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map"); + } + } + } + for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) { + let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material }; + match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) { + entry.get_mut().push(new_event); + } + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + entry.insert(vec![new_event]); + } + } + } + } + + // After security delay, either our claim tx got enough confs or outpoint is definetely out of reach + if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) { + for ev in events { + match ev { + OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => { + // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have + // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically + if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) { + for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() { + self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint); + } + } + }, + OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => { + self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint); + } + } + } + } + + // Check if any pending claim request must be rescheduled + for (first_claim_txid, ref claim_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() { + if claim_data.height_timer == height { + bump_candidates.insert(*first_claim_txid); + } + } + + // Build, bump and rebroadcast tx accordingly + for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() { + if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = { + if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) { + if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) { + log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx)); + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx); + Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) + } else { None } + } else { unreachable!(); } + } { + if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) { + claim_material.height_timer = new_timer; + claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate; + } else { unreachable!(); } + } + } + + spendable_outputs + } + + pub(super) fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F) + where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator + { + let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new(); + if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) { + //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output + //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx + for ev in events { + match ev { + OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => { + if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) { + if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) { + claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material); + // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting + // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast + bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone()); + } + } + }, + _ => {}, + } + } + } + for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() { + if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) { + claim_material.height_timer = new_timer; + claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate; + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx); + } + } + for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() { + self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material); + } + //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but + // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request. + let mut remove_request = Vec::new(); + self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v| + if v.1 == height { + remove_request.push(v.0.clone()); + false + } else { true }); + for req in remove_request { + self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req); + } + } +}