From 00906418aabc482c0067b085e6f57db61df68bb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Corallo Date: Wed, 4 Aug 2021 16:10:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Expose the amount of funds available for claim in ChannelMonitor In general, we should always allow users to query for how much is currently in-flight being claimed on-chain at any time. This does so by examining the confirmed claims on-chain and breaking down what is left to be claimed into a new `ClaimableBalance` enum. Fixes #995. --- lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs | 222 ++++++++++++- lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs | 457 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 676 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index b2ed3d99..30e2793d 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -535,6 +535,59 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, }, ); +/// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain. +/// +/// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not +/// be provided. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))] +pub enum Balance { + /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet + /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is + /// force-closed now. + ClaimableOnChannelClose { + /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be + /// required to do so. + claimable_amount_satoshis: u64, + }, + /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until + /// we consider it spendable. + ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which + /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction. + claimable_amount_satoshis: u64, + /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this + /// amount. + confirmation_height: u32, + }, + /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending + /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is + /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain. + /// + /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be + /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via + /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`]. + ContentiousClaimable { + /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be + /// required to do so. + claimable_amount_satoshis: u64, + /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not + /// done so. + timeout_height: u32, + }, + /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain + /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat + /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do. + MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be + /// required to do so. + claimable_amount_satoshis: u64, + /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not + /// done so. + claimable_height: u32, + }, +} + /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY. #[derive(PartialEq)] struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { @@ -1302,6 +1355,173 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock { self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone() } + + /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to + /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting + /// confirmation). + /// + /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are + /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the + /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several + /// confirmations on the claim transaction. + /// + /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked + /// state(s) may not be fully captured here. + // TODO, fix that ^ + /// + /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which + /// may be returned here and their meanings. + pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec { + let mut res = Vec::new(); + let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap(); + + let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed; + let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None; + let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| { + if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event { + Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold())) + } else { None } + }); + if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending { + debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(), + "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!"); + confirmed_txid = Some(txid); + pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh); + } + + macro_rules! walk_htlcs { + ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => { + for htlc in $htlc_iter { + if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index { + if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) { + assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some()); + } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment { + // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate + // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back + // and awaiting confirmations on it. + let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| { + if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event { + if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None } + } else { None } + }); + if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending { + res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + confirmation_height: conf_thresh, + }); + } else { + res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry, + }); + } + } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() { + // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if + // we know the preimage. + // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the + // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue + // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY. + let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| { + if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event { + if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { + Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some())) + } else { None } + } else { None } + }); + if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending { + res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + confirmation_height: conf_thresh, + }); + } else { + res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry, + }); + } + } + } + } + } + } + + if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid { + let mut found_commitment_tx = false; + if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid { + walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a)); + if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh { + if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| { + if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { + descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor) + } = &event.event { + Some(descriptor.output.value) + } else { None } + }) { + res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: value, + confirmation_height: conf_thresh, + }); + } else { + // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we + // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting + // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount. + } + } + found_commitment_tx = true; + } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid { + walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a)); + if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh { + res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat, + confirmation_height: conf_thresh, + }); + } + found_commitment_tx = true; + } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx { + if txid == prev_commitment.txid { + walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a)); + if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh { + res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat, + confirmation_height: conf_thresh, + }); + } + found_commitment_tx = true; + } + } + if !found_commitment_tx { + if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh { + // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that + // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated + // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty. + res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat, + confirmation_height: conf_thresh, + }); + } + } + // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked + // outputs. + } else { + let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0; + for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; } + if htlc.offered { + res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry, + }); + } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() { + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000; + } + } + res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat, + }); + } + + res + } } /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state, @@ -2488,7 +2708,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact - // as a ClaimableBalance, something which we do not yet do. + // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do. // TODO: Track the above as claimable! } continue 'outer_loop; diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index 8fdf28e5..1a332fbb 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations. -use chain::channelmonitor::ANTI_REORG_DELAY; -use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; +use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance}; +use chain::transaction::OutPoint; +use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; +use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT; use ln::features::InitFeatures; use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HTLCFailChannelUpdate, ErrorAction}; use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; @@ -19,6 +21,10 @@ use routing::router::get_route; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; +use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder; +use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; + use prelude::*; use ln::functional_test_utils::*; @@ -79,3 +85,450 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() { expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false); expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true); } + +#[test] +fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { + // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim. + // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in + // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a + // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000 + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap(); + let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown); + let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown); + + let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed); + let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed); + let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap()); + let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(node_1_none.is_none()); + + let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)); + assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]); + + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000, + confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000, + confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + + assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]); + } + + let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]); + } +} + +fn sorted_vec(mut v: Vec) -> Vec { + v.sort_unstable(); + v +} + +fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { + // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close. + // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the + // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain. + let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + if prev_commitment_tx { + // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation + // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation + // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a + // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked. + chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; + } + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + + // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage + let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0; + // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable + // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC. + let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000); + // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all: + let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000); + + let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety + + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + + let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id); + // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats + // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs. + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * + (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its + // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all. + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + if prev_commitment_tx { + // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages. + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); + expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); + nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa); + let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs); + let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + } + + // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its + // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance. + let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis + 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis + 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis + 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis + 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis + // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs: + chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + + if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * + channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]; + if !prev_commitment_tx { + a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }); + } + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's + // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage. + let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]); + + let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 }); + if prev_commitment_tx { + check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]); + } else { + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]); + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]); + } + // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats + check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); + check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]); + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); + check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx); + + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we + // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed + // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to + // other Balance variants, as close has already happened. + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * + (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the + // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY. + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, + }, + // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too + // long. + Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + + // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a + // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay. + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]); + } + + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC + // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it. + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]); + if !prev_commitment_tx { + expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); + } + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1); + let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3); + check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]); + assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, + a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout); + // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); + + // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC + // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations". + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable + // balance entry. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true); + + let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]); + } else { panic!(); } + + // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction + // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the + // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`. + let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable, + }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have + // only the HTLCs claimable on node B. + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1); + + let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]); + } + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable, + }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and + // have only one HTLC output left spendable. + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1); + + let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]); + } else { panic!(); } + + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able + // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC + // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend. + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); +} + +#[test] +fn test_claim_value_force_close() { + do_test_claim_value_force_close(true); + do_test_claim_value_force_close(false); +} -- 2.30.2