1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
38 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
40 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
41 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
43 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
47 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
48 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
50 use util::logger::Logger;
51 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
53 use util::events::Event;
57 use io::{self, Error};
58 use core::convert::TryInto;
62 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
63 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
65 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
66 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
67 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
68 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
69 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
72 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
73 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
74 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
75 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
76 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
78 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
79 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
80 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
82 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
83 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
84 /// its docs for more details.
89 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
90 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
91 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
92 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
93 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
95 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
97 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
98 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
99 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
100 self.update_id.write(w)?;
101 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
102 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
103 update_step.write(w)?;
105 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
109 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
110 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
111 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
112 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
113 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
114 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
116 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
120 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
121 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
125 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
126 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
127 pub enum MonitorEvent {
128 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
129 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
131 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
132 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
134 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
135 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
137 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure
139 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
140 funding_txo: OutPoint,
141 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
142 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
144 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
145 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
146 monitor_update_id: u64,
149 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
150 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
152 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure
153 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
155 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
156 // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
157 // generated only in ChainMonitor
158 (0, UpdateCompleted) => {
159 (0, funding_txo, required),
160 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
164 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
168 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
169 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
170 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
171 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
172 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
173 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
174 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
175 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
176 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
178 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
179 (0, payment_hash, required),
180 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
181 (2, source, required),
182 (4, payment_preimage, option),
185 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
186 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
187 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
188 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
189 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
190 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
191 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
192 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
193 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
194 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
195 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
196 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
197 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
198 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
199 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
200 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
201 /// accurate block height.
202 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
203 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
204 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
205 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
206 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
207 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
210 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
211 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
212 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
213 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
214 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
215 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
216 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
217 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
218 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
219 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
221 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
222 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
223 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
225 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
226 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
228 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
229 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
231 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
232 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
233 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
234 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
236 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
238 struct HolderSignedTx {
239 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
241 revocation_key: PublicKey,
242 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
243 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
244 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
245 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
246 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
247 to_self_value_sat: u64,
250 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
252 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
253 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
254 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
255 (2, revocation_key, required),
256 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
257 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
258 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
259 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
260 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
261 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
264 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
265 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
267 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
268 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
269 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
270 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
273 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
275 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
276 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
277 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
278 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
279 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
284 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
285 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
286 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
287 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
288 // used. Read it for compatibility.
289 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
290 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
291 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
292 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
293 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
294 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
298 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
299 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
300 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
301 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
302 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
303 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
304 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
306 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
307 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
308 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
309 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
312 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
316 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
317 /// transaction causing it.
319 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
321 struct OnchainEventEntry {
325 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
328 impl OnchainEventEntry {
329 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
330 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
332 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
333 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
335 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
336 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
337 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
339 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
340 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
341 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
342 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
343 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
350 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
351 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
355 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
357 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
358 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
360 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
361 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
364 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
365 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
366 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
367 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
368 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
369 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
372 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
373 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
374 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
375 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
376 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
378 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
379 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
381 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
383 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
385 FundingSpendConfirmation {
386 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
387 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
388 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
389 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
390 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
392 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
393 /// counterparty output.
394 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
396 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
397 /// is constructed. This is used when
398 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
399 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
400 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
401 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
402 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
404 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
405 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
407 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
408 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
409 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
410 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
411 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
412 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
413 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
414 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
418 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
419 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
420 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
421 (0, self.txid, required),
422 (1, self.transaction, option),
423 (2, self.height, required),
424 (4, self.event, required),
430 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
431 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
432 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
433 let mut transaction = None;
435 let mut event = None;
436 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
438 (1, transaction, option),
439 (2, height, required),
440 (4, event, ignorable),
442 if let Some(ev) = event {
443 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
450 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
452 (0, source, required),
453 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
454 (2, payment_hash, required),
455 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
457 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
458 (0, descriptor, required),
460 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
461 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
462 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
464 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
465 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
466 (2, preimage, option),
467 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
472 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
474 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
475 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
476 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
477 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
479 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
480 commitment_txid: Txid,
481 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
482 commitment_number: u64,
483 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
486 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
492 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
493 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
495 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
496 /// think we've fallen behind!
497 should_broadcast: bool,
500 scriptpubkey: Script,
504 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
505 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
507 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
508 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
509 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
510 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
511 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
512 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
517 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
518 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
519 (0, commitment_tx, required),
520 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
522 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
523 (0, commitment_txid, required),
524 (2, commitment_number, required),
525 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
526 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
528 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
529 (0, payment_preimage, required),
531 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
533 (2, secret, required),
535 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
536 (0, should_broadcast, required),
538 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
539 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
543 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
545 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
547 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
548 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
550 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
551 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
552 /// force-closed now.
553 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
554 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
555 /// required to do so.
556 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
558 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
559 /// we consider it spendable.
560 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
561 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
562 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
563 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
564 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
566 confirmation_height: u32,
568 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
569 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
570 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
572 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
573 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
574 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
575 ContentiousClaimable {
576 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
577 /// required to do so.
578 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
579 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
583 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
584 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
585 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
586 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
587 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
588 /// which will be required to do so.
589 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
590 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
592 claimable_height: u32,
594 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
595 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
596 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
597 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
598 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
599 /// which will be required to do so.
600 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
601 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
602 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
605 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
608 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
609 /// following amount.
610 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
611 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
613 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
614 /// were already spent.
615 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
619 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
621 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
622 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
623 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
624 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
626 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
627 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
628 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
631 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
632 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
633 (1, resolving_txid, option),
634 (2, payment_preimage, option),
637 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
638 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
640 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
641 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
643 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
644 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
645 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
646 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
648 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
649 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
650 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
651 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
652 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
653 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
655 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
657 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
660 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
661 latest_update_id: u64,
662 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
664 destination_script: Script,
665 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
666 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
667 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
669 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
670 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
671 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
672 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
673 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
675 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
676 funding_redeemscript: Script,
677 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
678 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
679 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
681 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
683 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
684 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
685 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
686 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
687 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
688 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
689 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
690 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
691 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
692 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
693 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
694 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
695 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
696 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
697 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
698 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
700 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
701 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
702 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
703 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
704 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
705 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
707 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
709 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
710 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
712 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
714 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
715 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
716 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
718 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
720 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
721 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
722 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
723 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
724 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
725 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
726 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
727 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
728 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
729 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
731 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
733 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
734 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
735 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
736 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
738 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
739 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
740 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
741 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
742 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
745 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
747 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
749 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
750 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
751 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
752 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
754 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
755 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
756 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
758 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
759 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
760 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
761 holder_tx_signed: bool,
763 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
764 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
765 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
766 funding_spend_seen: bool,
768 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
769 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
770 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
771 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
772 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
773 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
775 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
776 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
777 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
778 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
779 // the full block_connected).
780 best_block: BestBlock,
782 /// The node_id of our counterparty
783 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
785 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
788 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
789 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
791 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
792 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
794 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
795 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
796 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
797 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
803 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
805 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
806 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
807 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
808 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
809 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
810 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
811 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
812 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
813 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
814 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
815 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
816 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
817 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
818 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
819 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
820 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
821 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
822 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
823 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
824 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
825 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
826 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
827 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
828 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
829 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
830 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
831 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
832 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
833 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
834 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
835 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
836 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
837 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
838 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
839 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
840 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
849 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
850 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
851 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
855 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
856 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
857 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
859 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
860 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
861 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
863 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
865 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
866 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
868 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
869 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
870 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
871 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
872 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
873 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
875 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
878 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
879 match &self.shutdown_script {
880 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
881 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
884 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
885 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
886 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
887 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
888 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
889 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
890 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
892 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
893 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
894 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
896 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
897 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
898 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
899 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
900 match second_option {
901 Some(second_pubkey) => {
902 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
905 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
910 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
914 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
916 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
918 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
919 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
920 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
921 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
922 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
923 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
924 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
928 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
929 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
930 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
931 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
932 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
933 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
934 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
935 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
936 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
937 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
941 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
942 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
943 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
944 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
947 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
948 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
949 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
950 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
953 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
954 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
955 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
957 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
960 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
962 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
963 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
965 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
966 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
967 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
970 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
971 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
972 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
974 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
975 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
977 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
981 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
982 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
986 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
987 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
988 event.write(writer)?;
991 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
992 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
994 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
995 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
996 entry.write(writer)?;
999 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1000 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1001 txid.write(writer)?;
1002 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1003 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1005 script.write(writer)?;
1008 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1010 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1011 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1013 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1014 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1015 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
1016 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
1017 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1018 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1019 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1026 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1027 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1028 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1029 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1030 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1031 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1034 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1035 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1036 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1037 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1038 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1039 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1040 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1042 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1043 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1044 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1046 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1047 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1048 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1049 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1051 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1052 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1054 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1055 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1056 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1057 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1059 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1060 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1062 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1063 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1064 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1065 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1066 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1067 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1068 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1069 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1071 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1074 let onchain_tx_handler =
1075 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1076 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1078 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1079 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1081 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1082 latest_update_id: 0,
1083 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1085 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1086 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1087 counterparty_payment_script,
1091 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1093 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1094 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1096 counterparty_commitment_params,
1097 funding_redeemscript,
1098 channel_value_satoshis,
1099 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1101 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1103 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1104 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1105 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1106 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1108 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1109 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1110 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1111 current_holder_commitment_number,
1113 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1114 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1115 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1117 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1122 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1123 holder_tx_signed: false,
1124 funding_spend_seen: false,
1125 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1126 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1127 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1130 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1137 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1138 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1141 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1142 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1143 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1144 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1145 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1148 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1149 commitment_number: u64,
1150 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1152 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1153 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1154 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1158 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1159 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1160 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1161 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1162 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1165 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1166 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1167 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1169 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1170 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1172 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1175 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1176 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1179 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1180 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1183 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1188 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1191 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1194 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1197 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1198 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1200 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1206 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1207 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1210 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1213 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1215 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1216 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1219 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1220 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1221 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1224 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1225 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1226 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1227 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1228 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1231 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1232 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1233 /// have been registered.
1234 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1235 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1236 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1237 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1238 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1239 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1240 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1242 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1243 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1249 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1250 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1251 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1252 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1255 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1258 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1259 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1260 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1261 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1262 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1265 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1266 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1269 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1270 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1273 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1274 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1277 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1279 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1281 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1282 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1285 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1286 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1287 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1288 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1289 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1290 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1291 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1292 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1293 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1294 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1295 where L::Target: Logger {
1296 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1299 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1300 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1301 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1302 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1303 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1304 where L::Target: Logger {
1305 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1308 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1309 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1310 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1311 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1312 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1313 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1315 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1316 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1318 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1319 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1321 header: &BlockHeader,
1322 txdata: &TransactionData,
1327 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1329 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1330 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1333 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1334 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1337 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1339 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1341 header: &BlockHeader,
1347 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1348 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1351 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1352 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1355 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1356 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1358 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1359 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1361 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1362 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1364 header: &BlockHeader,
1365 txdata: &TransactionData,
1370 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1372 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1373 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1376 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1377 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1378 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1381 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1383 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1384 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1386 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1387 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1394 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1395 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1398 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1399 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1400 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1403 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1404 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1406 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1407 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1409 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1410 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1412 header: &BlockHeader,
1417 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1419 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1420 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1423 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1424 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1425 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1428 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1429 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1430 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1431 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1433 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1434 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1436 txids.sort_unstable();
1441 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1442 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1443 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1444 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1448 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1449 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1450 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1451 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1452 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1453 -> Option<Balance> {
1454 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1455 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1457 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1458 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1459 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1460 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1461 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1463 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1464 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1465 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1466 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1467 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1468 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1469 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1471 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1472 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1473 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1474 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1475 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1476 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1478 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1479 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1480 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1481 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1482 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1487 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1488 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
1489 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1490 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
1493 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1495 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1496 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1498 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
1499 "This code needs updating for anchors");
1500 BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
1502 BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
1504 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1506 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1507 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1508 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1509 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1510 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1512 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1513 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1514 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1515 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1516 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1517 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1518 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1519 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1520 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1521 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1522 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1524 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1525 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1526 Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
1527 inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
1529 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1530 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1532 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1537 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1538 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1539 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1540 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1541 // need to do so again here.
1543 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1544 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1545 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1546 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1547 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1548 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1551 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1552 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1553 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1554 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1555 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1556 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1557 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1558 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1561 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1562 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1563 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1566 } else if self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1567 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1568 // we know the preimage.
1569 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1570 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1571 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1572 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1573 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1574 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1575 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1576 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1579 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1580 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1581 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1584 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1585 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1586 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1587 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1594 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1595 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1596 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1599 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1600 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1601 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1602 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1604 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1605 /// LDK prior to 0.0.108, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
1606 /// a revoked state.
1608 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1609 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1610 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1611 let mut res = Vec::new();
1612 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1614 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1615 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1616 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1617 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1618 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1621 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1622 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1625 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1626 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1627 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1628 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1629 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1632 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1633 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1634 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1635 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1637 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
1645 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1646 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1647 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1648 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
1649 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1650 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1651 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1652 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1654 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1657 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1658 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1659 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1662 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1663 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1664 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1667 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1668 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1670 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1671 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
1672 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
1673 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
1674 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
1675 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
1676 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1677 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1678 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
1680 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1681 claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
1682 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
1684 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
1685 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
1686 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
1687 ).unwrap_or(false) {
1688 spent_counterparty_output = true;
1694 if spent_counterparty_output {
1695 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
1696 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
1697 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
1698 if output_spendable {
1699 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1700 claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
1704 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
1705 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
1708 found_commitment_tx = true;
1709 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1710 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1711 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1712 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1713 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1714 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1717 found_commitment_tx = true;
1718 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1719 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1720 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1721 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1722 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1723 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1724 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1727 found_commitment_tx = true;
1730 if !found_commitment_tx {
1731 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1732 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1733 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1734 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1735 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1736 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1737 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1742 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1743 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1744 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1746 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1747 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1748 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1750 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1751 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1753 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
1754 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
1755 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1756 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1757 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1761 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1762 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1769 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1770 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1771 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1772 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1773 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1775 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1776 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1777 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1778 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1779 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1780 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1782 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1783 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1784 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1785 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1786 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1787 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1788 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1789 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1790 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1791 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1792 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1793 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1794 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1795 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1796 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1797 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1799 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1802 if !htlc_update_confd {
1803 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1810 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1811 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1812 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1813 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1814 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1815 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1820 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1821 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1822 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1823 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1824 Some((a, &**source))
1827 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1828 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1829 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1831 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1832 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1833 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1834 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1839 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1840 // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
1841 // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1842 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1844 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1845 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1846 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1847 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1853 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1854 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1856 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1857 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1864 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1865 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1869 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1870 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1871 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1873 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1874 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1875 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1876 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1877 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1878 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1880 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1881 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1882 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1883 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1884 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1885 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
1886 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1887 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
1889 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1890 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1891 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1892 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1893 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1894 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1895 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1896 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1897 // payment_preimage.
1898 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1899 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1900 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1901 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1903 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1905 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1906 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1907 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1908 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1909 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1910 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1911 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1912 matched_htlc = true;
1916 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1917 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1918 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1920 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1921 *update_source != **source
1926 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1927 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
1928 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
1929 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1930 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1931 source: (**source).clone(),
1932 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1933 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1934 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
1937 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1938 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
1939 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1940 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1946 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1947 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1949 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1950 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1955 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
1956 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
1957 // in-line tests later.
1960 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
1961 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
1962 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1963 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1964 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1965 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1966 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
1971 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
1972 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
1975 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1976 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1977 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1978 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1979 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1980 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1981 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
1984 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1985 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1986 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1987 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1992 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1993 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1994 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1995 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1996 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1998 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1999 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2000 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2004 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2005 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2006 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2011 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2018 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2027 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2028 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2029 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2030 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2032 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2033 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2036 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2037 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2038 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2039 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2040 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2041 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2042 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2043 Some(old_points) => {
2044 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2045 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2046 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2047 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2048 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2050 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2053 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2057 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2060 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2061 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2062 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2068 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2069 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2070 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2071 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2072 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2073 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2074 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
2075 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
2076 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2077 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2078 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2079 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2082 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2083 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2084 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2085 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2086 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2088 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2089 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2092 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2093 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2094 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2095 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2096 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2101 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2102 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2103 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2104 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2105 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
2106 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2107 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2110 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2112 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2113 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2114 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2115 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2116 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2117 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2120 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2121 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2122 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2126 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2127 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2128 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2133 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2134 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2135 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2136 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2137 // holder commitment transactions.
2138 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2139 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2140 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2142 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2143 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2144 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2145 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
2146 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2151 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
2152 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2155 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
2156 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2157 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2159 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2162 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
2163 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2164 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2167 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
2168 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2169 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
2170 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
2171 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
2172 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
2173 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2174 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2175 match updates.updates[0] {
2176 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
2178 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2179 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2182 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2183 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2185 let mut ret = Ok(());
2186 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2188 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
2189 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2190 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2191 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
2192 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2193 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2197 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2198 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2199 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2201 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2202 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2203 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2204 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2206 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2207 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2208 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2209 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2210 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2214 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2215 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2216 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2217 if *should_broadcast {
2218 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2219 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2220 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
2222 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2223 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2224 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2225 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2228 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2229 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2230 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2231 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2236 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2238 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2239 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2244 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2245 self.latest_update_id
2248 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2252 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2253 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2254 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2255 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2256 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2257 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2259 &self.outputs_to_watch
2262 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2263 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2264 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2268 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2269 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2270 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2274 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2275 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2276 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2279 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2280 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2283 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2284 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2287 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2288 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2291 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2292 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2293 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2294 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2296 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2297 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2299 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L)
2300 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2301 where L::Target: Logger {
2302 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2303 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2304 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2305 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2306 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2308 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2309 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2311 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2312 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2315 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2320 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2321 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2322 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2323 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2324 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2325 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2326 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2328 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2329 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2331 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2332 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2333 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2334 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2335 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2336 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2337 to_counterparty_output_info =
2338 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2342 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2343 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2344 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2345 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2346 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2347 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2348 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2349 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2350 to_counterparty_output_info);
2352 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2353 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2354 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2359 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2360 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2361 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2362 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2363 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2364 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2366 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2368 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2369 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2370 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2371 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2374 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2375 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2376 [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2379 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2380 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2381 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2382 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2383 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2384 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2385 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2387 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2388 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2390 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2392 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2393 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2394 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2395 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2398 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2399 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2400 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2401 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2402 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2406 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2409 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2410 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2411 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2412 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2413 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2415 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2416 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2417 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2419 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2420 Some(points) => points,
2421 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2424 let per_commitment_point =
2425 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2426 // per-commitment point
2427 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2428 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2429 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2430 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2431 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2432 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2434 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2435 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2437 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2438 let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
2439 if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2440 &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
2442 if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
2443 &per_commitment_point,
2444 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
2446 Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2447 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2448 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
2450 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
2454 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
2457 if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
2458 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2459 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2460 to_counterparty_output_info =
2461 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2467 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2468 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2469 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2470 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2471 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2472 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2473 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2476 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2477 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2478 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2479 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2480 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2481 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2482 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2483 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
2485 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2486 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2487 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2488 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2491 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2492 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2493 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2498 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2501 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2502 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2503 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2504 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2505 return (Vec::new(), None)
2508 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2509 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2512 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2517 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2518 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2519 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2521 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2522 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2523 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2524 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2525 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2526 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2529 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2530 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2531 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2532 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2533 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2535 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2536 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2538 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2539 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2540 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2541 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2543 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2546 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2549 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2551 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2552 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2556 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2559 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2560 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2561 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2562 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2563 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2564 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2570 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2571 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2572 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2573 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2574 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2575 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2576 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2577 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2579 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2580 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2581 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2582 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2583 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2587 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2588 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2590 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2591 is_holder_tx = true;
2592 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2593 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2594 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2595 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2596 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2597 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2598 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2599 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2600 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2601 is_holder_tx = true;
2602 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2603 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2604 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2605 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2606 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2607 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2613 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2619 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2620 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2621 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2622 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2623 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2624 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2625 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2626 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2627 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2628 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2629 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2632 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2633 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2634 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2635 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2636 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2637 // confirmed in the next block.
2640 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2641 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2642 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2646 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2647 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2651 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2652 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2653 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2654 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2655 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2656 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2657 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2658 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2659 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2660 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2661 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2662 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2666 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2667 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2668 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2675 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2676 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2677 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2680 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2681 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2683 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2684 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2687 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2689 header: &BlockHeader,
2692 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2694 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2696 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2697 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2700 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2702 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2703 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2704 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2705 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2706 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2707 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2708 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2710 } else { Vec::new() }
2713 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2715 header: &BlockHeader,
2716 txdata: &TransactionData,
2719 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2721 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2723 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2724 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2727 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2728 for tx in &txn_matched {
2729 let mut output_val = 0;
2730 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2731 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2732 output_val += out.value;
2733 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2737 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2739 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2740 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2741 for tx in &txn_matched {
2742 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2743 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2744 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2745 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2747 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2748 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2749 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2750 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2751 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2752 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2753 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
2754 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2755 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
2756 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2757 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
2758 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2759 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2761 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2762 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2763 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2764 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
2765 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
2766 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2767 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2769 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2770 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2774 let txid = tx.txid();
2775 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2777 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
2779 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2780 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2781 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
2785 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2786 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2787 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2788 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2789 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2794 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2795 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2796 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2797 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2799 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2802 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2803 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2806 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2809 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2810 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2811 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2812 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2814 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2815 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2816 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2819 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2820 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2821 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2823 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2825 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2827 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2828 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2831 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2832 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2834 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2835 if should_broadcast {
2836 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2837 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2838 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2839 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2840 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2841 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2842 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2843 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2844 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2845 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2846 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2847 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2848 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2850 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2853 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2854 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2855 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2856 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2857 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2858 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2859 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2861 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2865 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2866 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2867 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2869 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2870 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2874 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2875 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2877 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2878 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2880 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
2881 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2882 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2885 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2886 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2887 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2888 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2890 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2891 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2892 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2893 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2894 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2897 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
2898 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
2899 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2901 payment_preimage: None,
2902 source: source.clone(),
2903 htlc_value_satoshis,
2905 if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
2906 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
2907 commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
2908 payment_preimage: None,
2912 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2913 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2914 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2915 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2918 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2919 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
2920 commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
2921 payment_preimage: preimage,
2924 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
2925 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2926 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2931 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2933 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2934 // updating the latter in the process.
2935 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2936 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2937 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2941 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2942 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2943 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2944 for tx in &txn_matched {
2945 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2946 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2947 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2948 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2956 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2957 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2958 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2961 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2964 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2965 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2966 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2968 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2969 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2971 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2974 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2978 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2981 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2982 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2985 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
2986 log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
2989 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2992 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2993 /// transactions thereof.
2994 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2995 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2996 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2997 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2998 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2999 if matches { break; }
3000 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3005 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3008 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3011 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3012 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3013 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3014 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3015 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3016 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3019 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3020 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3021 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3022 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3023 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3024 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3025 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3026 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3030 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3031 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3032 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3033 } else { panic!(); }
3044 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3045 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3046 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3047 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3048 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3049 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3050 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3051 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3052 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3053 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3054 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3055 let height = self.best_block.height();
3056 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3057 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3058 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3059 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3060 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3061 // time out the HTLC first.
3062 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3063 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3064 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3065 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3066 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3067 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3068 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3069 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3070 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3071 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3072 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3073 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3074 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3075 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3076 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3077 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3078 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3079 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3080 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3081 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3082 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3083 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3084 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3085 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3092 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3094 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3095 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3096 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3099 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3100 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3101 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3108 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3109 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3110 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3111 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3112 let mut payment_data = None;
3113 let witness_items = input.witness.len();
3114 let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
3115 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
3116 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
3117 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
3118 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
3119 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
3120 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3121 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
3122 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
3123 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
3125 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3126 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
3128 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3129 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3130 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3131 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3132 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3135 macro_rules! log_claim {
3136 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
3137 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
3138 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
3140 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3141 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3142 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3143 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3144 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
3145 // matched by any HTLC spend:
3146 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3147 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
3148 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
3149 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
3150 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
3151 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
3152 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
3153 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3154 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3155 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
3157 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
3158 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3159 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3160 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
3165 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
3166 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
3167 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
3168 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
3169 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
3170 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3171 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3172 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3181 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3182 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3183 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3184 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3185 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3186 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3187 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3188 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3189 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3190 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3191 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3192 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3193 } else if !$holder_tx {
3194 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3195 if payment_data.is_none() {
3196 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3199 if payment_data.is_none() {
3200 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3201 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3202 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3203 txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3204 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3205 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3206 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3207 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3208 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3209 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3210 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3211 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3212 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3213 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3216 continue 'outer_loop;
3223 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3224 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3225 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3227 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3228 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3229 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3230 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3233 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3234 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3235 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3238 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3239 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3240 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3241 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3242 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3243 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3244 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3247 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3248 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3249 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3250 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3251 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3254 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3256 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3258 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3261 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3262 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3263 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3264 upd.source == source
3266 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3268 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3270 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3271 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3272 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3273 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3276 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3278 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3280 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3284 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3285 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3287 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3288 *htlc_source != source
3293 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3295 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3297 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3298 source, payment_hash,
3299 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3300 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3303 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3304 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3310 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3311 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3312 let mut spendable_output = None;
3313 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3314 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3315 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3316 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3317 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3318 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3319 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3320 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3321 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3322 // non-standard due to their size.
3323 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3324 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3325 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3328 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3329 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3330 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3331 output: outp.clone(),
3335 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3336 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3337 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3338 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3339 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3340 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3341 output: outp.clone(),
3342 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3343 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3344 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3349 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3350 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3351 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3352 output: outp.clone(),
3353 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3354 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3358 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3359 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3360 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3361 output: outp.clone(),
3366 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3367 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3369 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3371 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3373 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3374 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3379 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3381 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3382 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3385 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3386 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3389 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3390 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3394 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3396 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3397 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3400 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3401 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3404 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3405 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3408 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3409 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3412 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3413 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3417 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3419 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3420 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3421 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3422 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3426 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3431 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3433 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3434 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3436 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3437 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3439 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3440 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3441 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3442 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3445 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3447 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3448 let shutdown_script = {
3449 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3450 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3453 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3454 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3455 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3456 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3457 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3458 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3459 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3461 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3462 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3463 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3465 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3466 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3467 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3469 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3470 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3474 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3475 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3476 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3477 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3479 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3484 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3486 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3488 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3491 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3492 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3493 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3494 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3495 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3497 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3498 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3504 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3505 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3506 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3507 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3508 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3509 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3510 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3511 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3513 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3514 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3518 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3519 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3520 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3521 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3522 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3523 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3524 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3528 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3529 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3530 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3531 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3532 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3533 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3534 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3538 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3539 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3542 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3544 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3546 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3548 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3549 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3551 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3552 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3553 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3554 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3555 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3556 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3557 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3561 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3562 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3563 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3564 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3565 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3566 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3567 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3568 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3570 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3573 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3574 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3575 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3576 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3577 pending_events.push(event);
3581 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3583 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3584 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3585 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3586 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3587 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3591 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3592 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3593 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3594 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3595 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3596 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3597 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3598 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3600 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3601 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3604 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3606 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3607 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3609 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3610 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3611 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3612 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3613 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3614 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3615 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3619 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3620 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3621 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3622 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3623 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3626 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3627 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3628 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3629 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3630 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
3631 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3632 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3633 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3634 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3635 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3636 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3637 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
3640 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3641 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3643 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3645 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3648 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3649 counterparty_payment_script,
3653 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3655 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3656 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3658 counterparty_commitment_params,
3659 funding_redeemscript,
3660 channel_value_satoshis,
3661 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3666 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3667 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3668 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3670 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3671 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3672 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3673 current_holder_commitment_number,
3676 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3679 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3684 lockdown_from_offchain,
3686 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3687 funding_spend_confirmed,
3688 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
3689 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3692 counterparty_node_id,
3701 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3702 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3703 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3704 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3705 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3706 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3707 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3708 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3709 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3710 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3711 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3712 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3713 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3717 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3719 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3720 use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3721 use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3722 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3723 use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3724 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3725 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3726 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3728 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3729 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
3730 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
3731 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3732 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3733 use util::errors::APIError;
3734 use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3735 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3736 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3737 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3739 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
3742 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3743 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3744 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3745 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3746 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3747 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3748 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3749 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3750 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3752 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3753 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3757 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3758 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3759 &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3760 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3761 &nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3763 // Rebalance somewhat
3764 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3766 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3767 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3768 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3770 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3771 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3772 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3773 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3774 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3775 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3776 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3778 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3779 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3780 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3781 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3782 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3783 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
3784 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3785 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3786 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3788 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3789 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3790 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3792 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3793 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3794 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3795 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
3796 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3797 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3799 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3800 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3802 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3803 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3804 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3805 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3806 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3807 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3808 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3809 } else { panic!(); }
3810 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3811 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3813 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3815 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3817 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3819 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3820 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3821 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3822 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3823 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3824 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3825 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3826 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3827 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3830 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3831 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3832 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
3836 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3837 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3838 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3839 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3840 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
3842 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3843 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3845 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3848 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3849 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3850 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3854 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3855 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3857 let mut res = Vec::new();
3858 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3859 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3863 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3864 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3871 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3872 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3874 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3875 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3881 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3882 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3883 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3884 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3889 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3891 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3892 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3893 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3894 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3895 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3896 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3902 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3903 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3904 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3905 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3906 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3907 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3909 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
3910 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3911 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3912 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3913 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3914 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3915 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3916 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3918 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3921 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3923 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3924 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3925 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3926 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3927 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3928 &channel_parameters,
3929 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3930 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
3932 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3933 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3934 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3935 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3936 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3937 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3938 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3939 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
3940 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
3943 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3944 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3945 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3946 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3947 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3948 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3949 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3951 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3952 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3953 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3954 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3955 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3956 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3958 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3959 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3960 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3961 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3962 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3963 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3964 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3965 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3967 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3968 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3969 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3970 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3971 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3972 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3976 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3977 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3978 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3980 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3981 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3982 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3984 macro_rules! sign_input {
3985 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
3986 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3987 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
3989 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3990 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3991 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3993 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3994 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
3995 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
3996 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
3997 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
3998 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
3999 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4000 witness.push(ser_sig);
4001 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4002 witness.push(vec!(1));
4003 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4004 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4005 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4006 witness.push(vec![0]);
4008 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4010 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4011 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4012 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4013 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4014 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4018 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4019 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4021 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4022 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4023 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4024 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4026 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4027 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4031 script_sig: Script::new(),
4032 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4033 witness: Witness::new(),
4036 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4037 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4040 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4041 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4042 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4044 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4045 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4046 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4047 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4050 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4053 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4054 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4055 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4056 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4058 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4059 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4063 script_sig: Script::new(),
4064 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4065 witness: Witness::new(),
4068 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4069 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4072 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4073 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4074 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4076 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4077 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4078 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4079 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4082 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4085 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4086 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4087 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4088 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4089 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4090 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4094 script_sig: Script::new(),
4095 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4096 witness: Witness::new(),
4098 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4099 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4102 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4103 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4104 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4106 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4107 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4108 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4109 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4112 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4116 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.