1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
9 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
11 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
12 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
14 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
16 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
17 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
18 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
29 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
30 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
33 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
39 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
40 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
41 if witness_script_len == 133 {
42 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
43 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
44 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
51 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
52 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
54 pub(super) fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
55 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
58 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
59 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
60 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
66 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
67 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
69 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
72 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
73 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
76 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
77 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
78 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
79 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
87 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
88 pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
89 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
93 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
95 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
102 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
103 //TODO This can be optimized?
104 let mut min = 1 << 48;
105 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
114 pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
115 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
117 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
118 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
119 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
120 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
126 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
127 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
129 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
130 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
134 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
137 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
141 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
142 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
143 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
144 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
145 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
148 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
153 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
154 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
155 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
156 writer.write_all(secret)?;
157 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
162 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
163 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
164 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
165 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
166 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
167 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
170 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
174 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or payment key) from the base
175 /// private key for that type of key and the per_commitment_point (available in TxCreationKeys)
176 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
177 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
178 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
179 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
180 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
182 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
183 key.add_assign(&res)?;
187 pub(super) fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
188 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
189 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
190 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
191 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
193 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
194 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
197 /// Derives a revocation key from its constituent parts.
198 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
199 /// generated (ie our own).
200 pub(super) fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
201 let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
202 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
204 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
205 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
206 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
207 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
209 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
211 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
212 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
213 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
214 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
216 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
219 let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
220 part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
221 let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
222 part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
223 part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
227 pub(super) fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
228 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
229 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
230 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
231 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
233 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
235 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
236 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
237 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
238 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
240 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
243 let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
244 part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
245 let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
246 part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
247 part_a.combine(&part_b)
250 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
251 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
252 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
253 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
254 /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
255 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
256 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
257 /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
258 pub(crate) revocation_key: PublicKey,
260 pub(crate) a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
262 pub(crate) b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
263 /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
264 pub(crate) a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
266 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
267 { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
269 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
270 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
271 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
272 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
273 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
274 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
275 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
276 /// revocation keys. The per-commitment revocation private key is then revealed by the owner of
277 /// a commitment transaction so that their counterparty can claim all available funds if they
278 /// broadcast an old state.
279 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
280 /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
281 /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
283 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
284 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
285 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
286 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
287 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
288 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
289 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
290 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
293 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
295 revocation_basepoint,
297 delayed_payment_basepoint,
302 impl TxCreationKeys {
303 pub(crate) fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
305 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
306 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
307 a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
308 b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
309 a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
314 /// Gets the "to_local" output redeemscript, ie the script which is time-locked or spendable by
315 /// the revocation key
316 pub(super) fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
317 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
318 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
319 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
320 .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
321 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
322 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
323 .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
324 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
325 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
329 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
330 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
331 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
332 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
333 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
334 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
335 /// the remote party or our own.
337 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
338 /// this divided by 1000.
339 pub amount_msat: u64,
340 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
341 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
342 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
343 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
344 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
345 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
346 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
347 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
350 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
355 transaction_output_index
359 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
360 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
362 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
363 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
364 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
365 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
366 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
367 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
368 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
369 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
370 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
371 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
373 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
374 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
375 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
377 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
378 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
380 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
381 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
382 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
383 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
384 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
385 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
386 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
387 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
390 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
391 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
392 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
393 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
394 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
395 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
396 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
397 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
398 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
399 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
401 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
402 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
403 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
404 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
405 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
407 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
408 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
410 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
411 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
412 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
413 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
414 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
415 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
416 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
417 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
418 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
423 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
424 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
426 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
427 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
430 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
431 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
432 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
433 let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
434 let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
436 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
437 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
438 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
439 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
441 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
442 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
443 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
446 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
447 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u64, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
448 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
450 previous_output: OutPoint {
451 txid: prev_hash.clone(),
452 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
454 script_sig: Script::new(),
459 let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
460 feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
462 feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
465 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
467 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
468 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
473 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
480 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
481 /// to broadcast. Eventually this will require a signer which is possibly external, but for now we
482 /// just pass in the SecretKeys required.
483 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
484 // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
485 // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
486 // so we're probably most of the way there.
487 /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
488 pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
489 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
490 pub their_sig: Signature,
491 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
492 // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
494 /// The key derivation parameters for this commitment transaction
495 pub local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
496 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
497 /// controlled by the channel initiator.
498 pub feerate_per_kw: u64,
499 /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
501 /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
502 /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
503 /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
505 /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
506 /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
507 pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
509 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
511 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
512 let dummy_input = TxIn {
513 previous_output: OutPoint {
514 txid: Default::default(),
517 script_sig: Default::default(),
521 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
522 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
524 unsigned_tx: Transaction {
526 input: vec![dummy_input],
530 their_sig: dummy_sig,
531 our_sig_first: false,
532 local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
533 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
534 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
535 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
536 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
537 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
544 /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
545 /// remote signature and both parties keys
546 pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
547 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
548 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
553 our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
560 /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
561 /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
562 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
563 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
566 /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
568 /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
569 /// by your ChannelKeys.
570 /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
571 /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
572 /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
573 /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
574 pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
575 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
576 .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
577 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
580 pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
581 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
582 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
583 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
585 if self.our_sig_first {
586 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
587 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
589 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
590 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
592 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
593 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
595 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
599 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
600 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
602 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
603 /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
605 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
606 let txid = self.txid();
607 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
608 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
610 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
611 if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
612 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
614 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
616 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
617 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
625 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
626 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
627 let txid = self.txid();
628 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
629 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
630 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
631 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
632 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
633 if this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
635 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
636 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
637 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
638 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
640 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
642 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
643 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
645 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
646 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
647 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
648 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
650 if this_htlc.0.offered {
651 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
652 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
654 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
657 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
661 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
662 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
663 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
664 self.txid() == o.txid()
667 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
668 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
669 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
671 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
672 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
675 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
676 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
677 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
678 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
679 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
680 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
687 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
688 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
689 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
692 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
693 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
696 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
697 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
698 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
699 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
700 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
701 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
702 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
703 let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
704 let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
705 per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
708 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
709 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
710 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
725 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
729 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
730 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
731 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
734 macro_rules! test_secrets {
736 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
737 for secret in secrets.iter() {
738 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
741 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
742 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
747 // insert_secret correct sequence
748 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
751 secrets.push([0; 32]);
752 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
753 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
756 secrets.push([0; 32]);
757 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
758 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
761 secrets.push([0; 32]);
762 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
763 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
766 secrets.push([0; 32]);
767 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
768 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
771 secrets.push([0; 32]);
772 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
773 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
776 secrets.push([0; 32]);
777 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
778 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
781 secrets.push([0; 32]);
782 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
783 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
786 secrets.push([0; 32]);
787 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
788 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
793 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
794 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
797 secrets.push([0; 32]);
798 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
799 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
802 secrets.push([0; 32]);
803 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
804 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
808 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
809 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
812 secrets.push([0; 32]);
813 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
814 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
817 secrets.push([0; 32]);
818 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
819 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
822 secrets.push([0; 32]);
823 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
824 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
827 secrets.push([0; 32]);
828 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
829 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
833 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
834 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
837 secrets.push([0; 32]);
838 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
839 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
842 secrets.push([0; 32]);
843 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
844 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
847 secrets.push([0; 32]);
848 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
849 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
852 secrets.push([0; 32]);
853 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
854 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
858 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
859 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
862 secrets.push([0; 32]);
863 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
864 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
867 secrets.push([0; 32]);
868 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
869 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
872 secrets.push([0; 32]);
873 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
874 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
877 secrets.push([0; 32]);
878 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
879 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
882 secrets.push([0; 32]);
883 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
884 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
887 secrets.push([0; 32]);
888 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
889 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
892 secrets.push([0; 32]);
893 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
894 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
897 secrets.push([0; 32]);
898 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
899 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
903 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
904 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
907 secrets.push([0; 32]);
908 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
909 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
912 secrets.push([0; 32]);
913 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
914 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
917 secrets.push([0; 32]);
918 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
919 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
922 secrets.push([0; 32]);
923 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
924 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
927 secrets.push([0; 32]);
928 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
929 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
932 secrets.push([0; 32]);
933 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
934 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
938 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
939 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
942 secrets.push([0; 32]);
943 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
944 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
947 secrets.push([0; 32]);
948 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
949 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
952 secrets.push([0; 32]);
953 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
954 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
957 secrets.push([0; 32]);
958 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
959 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
962 secrets.push([0; 32]);
963 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
964 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
967 secrets.push([0; 32]);
968 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
969 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
972 secrets.push([0; 32]);
973 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
974 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
977 secrets.push([0; 32]);
978 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
979 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
983 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
984 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
987 secrets.push([0; 32]);
988 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
989 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
992 secrets.push([0; 32]);
993 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
994 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
997 secrets.push([0; 32]);
998 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
999 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1002 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1003 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1004 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1007 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1008 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1009 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1012 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1013 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1014 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1017 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1018 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1019 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1022 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1023 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1024 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1028 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1029 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1032 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1033 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1034 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1037 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1038 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1039 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1042 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1043 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1044 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1047 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1048 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1049 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1052 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1053 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1054 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1057 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1058 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1059 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1062 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1063 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1064 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1067 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1068 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1069 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());