1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use lightning::blinded_path::payment::ReceiveTlvs;
36 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
37 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
38 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
40 use lightning::sign::{KeyMaterial, InMemorySigner, Recipient, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
41 use lightning::events;
42 use lightning::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
43 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId};
45 use lightning::ln::outbound_payment::{RecipientOnionFields, PaymentSendFailure};
46 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
47 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
48 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
49 use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
50 use lightning::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
51 use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
52 use lightning::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessagePath};
53 use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
54 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
55 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
56 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
57 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
58 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Path, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
60 use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
61 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
63 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, self};
64 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
65 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
66 use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
69 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
70 use hashbrown::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
71 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
72 use std::sync::atomic;
74 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
76 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
77 struct FuzzEstimator {
78 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
80 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
81 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
82 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
83 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
84 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
85 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
87 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep => MAX_FEE,
88 ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum|ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee => 253,
89 ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
96 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
98 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
99 _inflight_htlcs: InFlightHtlcs
100 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
101 Err(msgs::LightningError {
102 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
103 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
107 fn create_blinded_payment_paths<
108 ES: EntropySource + ?Sized, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
110 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _first_hops: Vec<ChannelDetails>, _tlvs: ReceiveTlvs,
111 _amount_msats: u64, _entropy_source: &ES, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
112 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
117 impl MessageRouter for FuzzRouter {
119 &self, _sender: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _destination: Destination
120 ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
124 fn create_blinded_paths<
125 ES: EntropySource + ?Sized, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
127 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _entropy_source: &ES,
128 _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
129 ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
134 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
135 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
136 fn broadcast_transactions(&self, _txs: &[&Transaction]) { }
139 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
140 impl Writer for VecWriter {
141 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
142 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
147 struct TestChainMonitor {
148 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
149 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
150 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
151 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
152 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
153 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
154 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
155 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
156 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
157 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
159 impl TestChainMonitor {
160 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
162 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
166 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
170 impl chain::Watch<TestChannelSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
171 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>) -> Result<chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, ()> {
172 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
173 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
174 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
175 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
177 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
180 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
181 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
182 let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
183 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
184 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
186 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::
187 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
188 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
189 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
190 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
191 map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
192 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
195 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>, Option<PublicKey>)> {
196 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
201 node_secret: SecretKey,
202 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
203 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
206 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
207 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
208 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
209 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_secret[31]];
210 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
215 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
216 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
217 let node_secret = match recipient {
218 Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
219 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
221 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
224 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
225 let mut node_secret = match recipient {
226 Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
227 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
229 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
230 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
232 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
235 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
236 KeyMaterial([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_secret[31]])
239 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
243 fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
244 &self, _invoice_request: &UnsignedInvoiceRequest
245 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
249 fn sign_bolt12_invoice(
250 &self, _invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice,
251 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
255 fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
256 let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
257 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
258 Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
262 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
263 type EcdsaSigner = TestChannelSigner;
265 type TaprootSigner = TestChannelSigner;
267 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
268 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
272 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
273 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
274 let id = channel_keys_id[0];
275 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
277 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
278 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
279 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
280 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
281 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
282 [id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_secret[31]],
283 channel_value_satoshis,
287 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
288 TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
291 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> {
292 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
294 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
295 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
297 Ok(TestChannelSigner {
300 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
301 available: Arc::new(Mutex::new(true)),
305 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
306 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
307 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
308 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
309 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
312 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
313 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
314 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
315 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
316 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
321 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
322 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
323 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
324 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
326 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
332 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
334 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
335 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
336 APIError::InvalidRoute { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
337 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
338 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
339 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
340 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
342 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected" => {},
343 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - ") => {},
344 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - ") => {},
345 _ => panic!("{}", err),
347 assert!(sendable_bounds_violated);
349 APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
350 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
352 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
356 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
358 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated),
359 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
360 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
362 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
363 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); }
365 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
366 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
368 PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
372 type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager<Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
375 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
376 let mut payment_hash;
378 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).to_byte_array());
379 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600, None) {
380 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
382 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
388 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
389 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
390 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
391 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
392 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
394 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
395 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(dest_chan_id))
397 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
399 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
400 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
401 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
402 node_features: dest.node_features(),
403 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
404 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
406 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
407 maybe_announced_channel: true,
408 }], blinded_tail: None }],
410 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
411 check_payment_err(err, amt > max_value_sendable || amt < min_value_sendable);
414 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
415 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
416 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
417 assert!(amt <= max_value_sendable);
422 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
423 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
424 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
425 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
426 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
428 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
429 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(middle_chan_id))
431 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
433 let first_hop_fee = 50_000;
434 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
435 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
436 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
437 node_features: middle.node_features(),
438 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
439 channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
440 fee_msat: first_hop_fee,
441 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
442 maybe_announced_channel: true,
444 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
445 node_features: dest.node_features(),
446 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
447 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
449 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
450 maybe_announced_channel: true,
451 }], blinded_tail: None }],
453 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
454 let sent_amt = amt + first_hop_fee;
455 check_payment_err(err, sent_amt < min_value_sendable || sent_amt > max_value_sendable);
458 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
459 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
460 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
461 assert!(amt + first_hop_fee <= max_value_sendable);
467 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out, anchors: bool) {
468 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
469 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
470 let router = FuzzRouter {};
472 macro_rules! make_node {
473 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
474 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
475 let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, $node_id]).unwrap();
476 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
477 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
478 Arc::new(TestPersister {
479 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
480 }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
482 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
483 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
484 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
486 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
487 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
489 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
490 let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
491 let params = ChainParameters {
493 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
495 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp),
496 monitor, keys_manager)
500 macro_rules! reload_node {
501 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
502 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
503 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
504 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
505 Arc::new(TestPersister {
506 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
507 }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
509 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
510 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
511 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
513 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
514 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
517 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
518 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
519 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
520 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
521 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
523 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
524 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
525 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
528 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
529 entropy_source: keys_manager.clone(),
530 node_signer: keys_manager.clone(),
531 signer_provider: keys_manager.clone(),
532 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
533 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
534 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
537 default_config: config,
538 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
541 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
542 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
543 assert_eq!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon),
544 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
550 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
551 macro_rules! make_channel {
552 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $dest_keys_manager: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
553 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
554 features: $dest.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
556 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
557 features: $source.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
560 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None, None).unwrap();
562 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
563 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
564 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
566 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
569 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
570 let accept_channel = {
572 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
573 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
574 if let events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
575 ref temporary_channel_id, ref counterparty_node_id, ..
577 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
578 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&$dest_keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
579 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
580 $dest.accept_inbound_channel(
581 temporary_channel_id,
582 counterparty_node_id,
585 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
587 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
588 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
589 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
591 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
594 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
597 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
599 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
600 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
601 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
603 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
604 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
605 channel_txn.push(tx);
606 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
609 let funding_created = {
610 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
611 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
612 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
614 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
616 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
618 let funding_signed = {
619 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
621 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
623 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
625 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
626 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
627 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
628 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$source.get_our_node_id());
629 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
631 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
632 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
633 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
634 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
635 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id());
636 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
642 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
644 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
645 let mut header = create_dummy_header(chain_hash, 42);
646 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
647 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
649 header = create_dummy_header(header.block_hash(), 42);
651 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
655 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
656 ($nodes: expr) => { {
657 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
658 for node in $nodes.iter() {
659 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
661 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
662 for event in node_event {
663 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
664 for node in $nodes.iter() {
665 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
666 node.handle_channel_ready(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
669 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
673 for node in $nodes.iter() {
674 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
675 for event in events {
676 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
677 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
683 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
684 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
685 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
686 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
687 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
688 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
690 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
692 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
693 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
694 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
696 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
698 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], keys_manager_b, 0);
699 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], keys_manager_c, 1);
701 for node in nodes.iter() {
705 lock_fundings!(nodes);
707 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
708 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
710 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
711 let mut payment_idx: u64 = 0;
713 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
714 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
715 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
716 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
717 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
718 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
720 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
721 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
722 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
723 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
724 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
725 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
727 macro_rules! test_return {
729 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
730 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
731 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
736 let mut read_pos = 0;
737 macro_rules! get_slice {
740 let slice_len = $len as usize;
741 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
744 read_pos += slice_len;
745 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
751 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
752 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
753 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
754 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
755 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
756 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
757 for event in $excess_events {
758 let push_a = match event {
759 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
760 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
763 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
764 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
767 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
768 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
771 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => continue,
772 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
773 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
774 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
775 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
778 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
780 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
785 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
786 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
789 enum ProcessMessages {
790 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
791 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
793 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
794 /// message (which may already be queued).
796 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
797 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
798 /// provides potentially more coverage.
802 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
803 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
804 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
805 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
806 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
807 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
810 } else if $node == 0 {
811 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
812 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
815 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
816 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
819 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
820 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
821 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
823 let mut had_events = false;
824 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
825 let mut extra_ev = None;
826 for event in &mut events_iter {
829 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
830 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
831 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
832 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
833 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
834 if !$corrupt_forward {
835 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
837 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
838 // check will fail and we generate a
839 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
840 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
841 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
842 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
843 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
844 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
847 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
848 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
849 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
851 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
852 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
853 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
855 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
856 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
857 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
859 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
860 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
861 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
863 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
864 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
865 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
866 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
867 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
868 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
869 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
870 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
871 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
877 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
878 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
883 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
884 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
885 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
886 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
887 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
891 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
892 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
893 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
894 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
895 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
899 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {
900 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
902 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
903 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
905 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
906 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
907 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
908 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
909 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
910 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
911 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
912 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
914 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
917 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
920 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
925 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
926 } else if $node == 0 {
927 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
928 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
930 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
931 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
937 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
938 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
939 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
940 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
942 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
943 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
944 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
945 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
946 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
947 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
948 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
950 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
953 panic!("Unhandled message event")
957 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
961 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
963 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
964 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
965 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
966 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
967 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
968 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
969 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
971 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
974 panic!("Unhandled message event")
978 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
985 macro_rules! process_events {
986 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
987 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
988 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
989 // deduplicate the calls here.
990 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
991 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
992 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
993 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
994 // PaymentClaimable, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
995 // PaymentClaimable event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
996 // our claim_set deduplication).
997 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
998 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = a {
999 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
1001 } else { Ordering::Equal }
1002 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
1003 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = b {
1005 } else { Ordering::Equal }
1006 } else { Ordering::Equal }
1008 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
1009 for event in events.drain(..) {
1011 events::Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
1012 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
1014 nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
1016 nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0));
1020 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
1021 events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {},
1022 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
1023 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
1024 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
1025 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { .. } | events::Event::ProbeFailed { .. } => {
1026 // Even though we don't explicitly send probes, because probes are
1027 // detected based on hashing the payment hash+preimage, its rather
1028 // trivial for the fuzzer to build payments that accidentally end up
1029 // looking like probes.
1031 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
1032 events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {},
1033 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
1034 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
1036 events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {},
1037 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
1040 panic!("Unhandled event")
1048 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
1049 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
1051 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
1052 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
1053 // harm in doing so.
1055 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1056 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1057 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1058 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1059 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1060 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1063 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1064 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1065 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1069 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1070 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1071 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1075 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1076 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1077 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1081 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1082 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1083 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1088 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1089 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1090 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1091 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1092 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1096 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1097 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1098 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1099 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1100 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1104 if chan_a_disconnected {
1105 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1106 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1108 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1109 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1111 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1115 if chan_b_disconnected {
1116 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1117 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1119 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1120 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1122 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1126 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1127 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1128 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1129 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1130 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1131 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1133 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
1134 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
1136 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1137 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1138 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1139 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1140 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1141 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1143 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
1144 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
1146 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1147 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1148 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1149 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1150 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1151 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1153 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
1154 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
1157 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1158 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1159 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1160 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
1164 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
1165 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
1166 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
1169 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1170 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1171 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1172 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1176 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1177 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1178 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1179 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1183 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
1184 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
1185 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
1188 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1189 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1190 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1191 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
1195 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1196 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1197 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1200 // 1/10th the channel size:
1201 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1202 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1203 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1204 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1205 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1206 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1208 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1209 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1210 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1211 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1212 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1213 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1215 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1216 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1217 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1218 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1219 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1220 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1222 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1223 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1224 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1225 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1226 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1227 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1229 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1230 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1231 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1232 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1233 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1234 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1236 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1237 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1238 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1239 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1240 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1241 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1243 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1244 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1245 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1246 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1247 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1248 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1250 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1251 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1252 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1253 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1254 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1255 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1258 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a;
1260 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1262 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1263 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1265 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1267 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1270 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b;
1272 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1274 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1275 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1277 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1279 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1282 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c;
1284 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1286 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1287 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1289 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1291 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1294 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1295 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1296 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1298 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1301 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1302 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1303 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1305 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1308 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1309 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1310 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1312 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1316 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1317 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1318 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1320 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1323 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1324 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1325 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1327 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1330 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1331 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1332 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1334 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1338 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1339 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1340 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1342 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1345 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1346 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1347 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1349 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1352 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1353 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1354 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1356 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1360 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1361 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1362 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1364 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1367 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1368 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1369 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1371 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1374 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1375 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1376 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1378 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1382 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1383 // after we resolve all pending events.
1384 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1385 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1386 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1387 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1388 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1390 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1391 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1392 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1394 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1395 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1396 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1398 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1399 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1400 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1402 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1403 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1404 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1407 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1408 if chan_a_disconnected {
1409 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1410 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1412 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1413 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1415 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1417 if chan_b_disconnected {
1418 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1419 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1421 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1422 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1424 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1427 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1428 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1429 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1430 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1431 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1432 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1433 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1434 // payments claimed.
1435 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1436 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1437 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1441 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1443 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1444 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1446 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1447 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1449 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1450 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1451 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1453 _ => test_return!(),
1456 if nodes[0].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1457 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1458 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1460 if nodes[1].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1461 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1462 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1464 if nodes[2].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1465 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1466 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1471 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1472 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1474 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1476 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1478 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1479 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1480 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1481 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1482 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1484 self.output.locked_write(data)
1487 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1488 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1489 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1493 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1494 do_test(data, out.clone(), false);
1495 do_test(data, out, true);
1499 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1500 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, false);
1501 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, true);