1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, EntropySource, BaseSign, SignerProvider};
39 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
41 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
42 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
43 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
44 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use crate::prelude::*;
48 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
50 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use crate::sync::Mutex;
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 pub struct AvailableBalances {
67 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
68 pub balance_msat: u64,
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
77 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
79 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
81 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
82 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
83 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
84 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
85 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
86 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
88 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
92 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
93 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
94 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
95 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
98 enum InboundHTLCState {
99 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
100 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
101 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
102 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
103 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
104 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
105 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
106 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
107 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
108 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
109 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
110 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
111 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
112 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
113 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
115 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
116 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
119 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
120 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
123 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
124 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
125 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
126 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
127 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
128 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
130 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
131 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
132 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
133 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
134 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
135 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
137 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
139 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
140 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
142 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
143 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
144 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
145 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
146 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
147 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
148 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
149 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
152 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
156 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157 state: InboundHTLCState,
160 enum OutboundHTLCState {
161 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
162 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
163 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
164 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
165 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
166 /// money back (though we won't), and,
167 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
168 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
169 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
170 /// we'll never get out of sync).
171 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
172 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
173 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
175 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
176 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
177 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
178 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
179 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
180 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
181 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
182 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
183 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
188 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
189 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
193 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
194 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
195 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
198 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
201 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
202 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
207 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
216 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
220 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
221 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
226 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
227 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
233 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
236 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
241 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
245 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
246 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
247 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
248 /// move on to ChannelReady.
249 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
250 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
251 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
253 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
254 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
255 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
256 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
257 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
258 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
259 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
261 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
262 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
263 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
265 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
266 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
267 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
268 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
269 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
270 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
272 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
273 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
275 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
277 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
278 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
279 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
280 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
281 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
282 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
283 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
285 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
286 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
287 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
288 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
289 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
290 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
292 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
293 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
294 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
295 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
296 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
298 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
299 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
301 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
303 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
304 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
305 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
306 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
307 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
308 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
310 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
312 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
314 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
316 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
320 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
322 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
323 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
324 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
326 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
327 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
329 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
330 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
331 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
332 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
333 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
335 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
336 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
340 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
346 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
349 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
350 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 holding_cell_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
356 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
357 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
358 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
359 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
360 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
361 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
362 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
363 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
368 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
369 struct HTLCCandidate {
371 origin: HTLCInitiator,
375 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
383 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
385 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
387 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
388 htlc_value_msat: u64,
389 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
394 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
395 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
396 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
397 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
398 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
400 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
401 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
402 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
403 htlc_value_msat: u64,
404 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
405 /// in the holding cell).
406 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
408 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
409 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
413 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
415 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
416 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
421 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
424 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
425 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
426 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
427 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
428 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
429 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
430 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
431 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
432 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
433 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
434 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
437 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
438 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
439 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
440 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
441 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
442 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
443 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
444 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
447 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
448 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
449 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
450 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
451 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
452 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
453 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
454 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
455 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
456 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
457 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
458 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
459 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
460 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
461 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
463 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
464 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
465 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
466 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
468 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
469 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
470 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
471 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
473 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
474 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
475 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
476 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
477 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
479 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
480 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
481 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
482 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
484 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
485 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
486 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
488 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
489 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
490 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
491 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
492 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
494 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
495 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
496 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
499 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
500 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
501 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
502 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
504 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
505 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
506 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
507 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
509 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
513 channel_id: [u8; 32],
516 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
517 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
519 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
520 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
521 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
523 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
524 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
525 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
526 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
528 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
529 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
531 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
533 holder_signer: Signer,
534 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
535 destination_script: Script,
537 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
538 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
539 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
541 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
544 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
545 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
546 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
548 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
549 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
550 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
551 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
552 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
553 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
555 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
557 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
558 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
559 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
560 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
561 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
562 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
564 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
566 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
567 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
568 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
569 // HTLCs with similar state.
570 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
571 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
572 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
573 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
574 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
575 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
576 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
577 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
578 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
581 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
582 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
583 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
585 update_time_counter: u32,
587 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
588 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
589 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
591 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
592 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
594 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
595 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
597 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
598 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
599 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
600 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
602 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
603 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
605 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
607 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
609 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
610 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
611 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
612 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
613 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
614 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
616 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
617 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
618 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
619 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
620 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
622 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
623 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
624 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
625 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
626 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
627 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
628 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
629 channel_creation_height: u32,
631 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
634 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
636 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
639 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
644 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
646 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
648 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
649 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
652 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
659 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
665 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
667 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
668 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
670 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
674 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
676 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
678 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
679 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
680 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
681 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
683 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
684 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
685 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
687 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
688 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
689 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
691 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
692 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
693 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
694 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
696 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
698 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
700 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
701 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
702 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
703 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
704 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
706 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
707 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
710 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
711 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
712 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
713 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
714 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
715 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
716 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
718 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
719 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
721 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
722 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
723 // the channel's funding UTXO.
725 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
726 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
727 // associated channel mapping.
729 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
730 // to store all of them.
731 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
733 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
734 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
735 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
736 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
737 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
739 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
740 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
743 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
744 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
748 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
750 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
751 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
752 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
756 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
758 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
761 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
765 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
767 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
769 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
771 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
772 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
773 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
774 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
775 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
777 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
778 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
780 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
782 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
783 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
785 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
786 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
787 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
788 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
789 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
790 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
792 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
793 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
795 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
796 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
797 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
798 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
799 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
801 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
802 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
804 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
805 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
807 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
808 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
809 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
810 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
816 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
817 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
819 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
821 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
826 macro_rules! secp_check {
827 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
830 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
835 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
836 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
837 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
838 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
840 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
842 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
843 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
844 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
846 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
849 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
851 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
854 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
855 /// required by us according to the configured or default
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
858 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
860 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
861 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
862 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
863 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
864 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
867 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
868 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
869 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
870 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
871 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
872 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
873 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
876 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
877 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
880 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
881 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
882 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
883 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
884 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
885 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
886 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
887 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
892 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
893 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
894 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
895 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
896 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
897 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
898 // We've exhausted our options
901 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
902 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
906 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
907 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
908 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
909 outbound_scid_alias: u64
910 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
911 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
912 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
913 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
915 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
917 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
918 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
919 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
920 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
922 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
923 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
925 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
926 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
928 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
929 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
930 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
932 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
933 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
935 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
936 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
937 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
938 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
939 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
942 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
944 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
945 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
946 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
947 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
950 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
951 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
953 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
954 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
957 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
958 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
959 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
966 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
967 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
968 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
969 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
974 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
976 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
977 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
978 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
980 channel_value_satoshis,
982 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
985 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
986 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
988 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
989 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
992 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
993 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
994 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
995 pending_update_fee: None,
996 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
997 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
998 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
999 update_time_counter: 1,
1001 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1003 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1004 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1005 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1006 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1007 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1008 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1010 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1011 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1012 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1013 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1015 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1016 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1017 closing_fee_limits: None,
1018 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1020 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1022 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1023 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1024 short_channel_id: None,
1025 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1027 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1028 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1029 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1030 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1031 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1032 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1033 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1034 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1035 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1036 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1037 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1039 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1041 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1042 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1043 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1044 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1045 counterparty_parameters: None,
1046 funding_outpoint: None,
1047 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1048 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1050 funding_transaction: None,
1052 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1053 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1054 counterparty_node_id,
1056 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1058 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1060 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1061 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1063 announcement_sigs: None,
1065 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1066 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1067 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1068 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1070 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1072 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1073 outbound_scid_alias,
1075 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1077 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1078 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1080 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1085 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1086 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1087 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1089 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1090 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1091 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1092 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1093 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1094 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1095 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1096 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1098 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1099 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1100 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1101 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1102 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1103 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1104 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1105 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1107 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1108 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1117 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1118 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1119 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1120 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1121 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1122 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1123 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1124 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1125 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1126 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1129 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1130 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1132 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1133 // support this channel type.
1134 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1135 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1139 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1143 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1144 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1145 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1146 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1147 // publicly announced.
1148 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1149 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1150 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1153 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1157 channel_type.clone()
1159 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1161 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1165 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1166 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1167 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1168 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1169 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1170 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1171 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1172 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1173 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1176 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1180 // Check sanity of message fields:
1181 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1184 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1187 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1190 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1191 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1194 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1197 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1200 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1202 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1203 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1204 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1206 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1209 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1213 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1214 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1217 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1220 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1223 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1226 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1229 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1232 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1236 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1238 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1239 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1244 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1245 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1246 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1247 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1250 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1253 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1254 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1255 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1257 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1258 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1261 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1262 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1263 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1264 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1265 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1269 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1270 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1271 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1272 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1276 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1277 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1278 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1279 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1280 if script.len() == 0 {
1283 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1286 Some(script.clone())
1289 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1290 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1291 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1296 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1297 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1300 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1301 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1306 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1307 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1309 let chan = Channel {
1312 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1313 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1315 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1320 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1322 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1323 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1324 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1327 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1330 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1331 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1333 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1334 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1335 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1337 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1338 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1339 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1340 pending_update_fee: None,
1341 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1342 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1343 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1344 update_time_counter: 1,
1346 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1348 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1349 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1350 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1351 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1352 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1353 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1355 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1356 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1357 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1358 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1360 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1361 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1362 closing_fee_limits: None,
1363 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1365 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1367 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1368 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1369 short_channel_id: None,
1370 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1372 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1373 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1374 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1375 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1376 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1377 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1378 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1379 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1380 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1381 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1382 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1383 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1385 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1387 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1388 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1389 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1390 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1391 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1392 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1393 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1395 funding_outpoint: None,
1396 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1397 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1399 funding_transaction: None,
1401 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1402 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1403 counterparty_node_id,
1405 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1407 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1409 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1410 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1412 announcement_sigs: None,
1414 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1415 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1416 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1417 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1419 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1421 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1422 outbound_scid_alias,
1424 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1426 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1427 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1436 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1437 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1438 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1439 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1440 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1442 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1443 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1444 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1445 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1446 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1447 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1448 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1450 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1451 where L::Target: Logger
1453 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1454 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1455 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1457 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1458 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1459 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1460 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1462 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1463 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1464 if match update_state {
1465 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1466 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1467 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1468 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1469 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1471 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1475 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1476 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1477 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1478 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1480 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1481 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1482 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1484 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1485 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1486 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1487 transaction_output_index: None
1492 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1493 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1494 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1495 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1496 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1499 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1501 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1502 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1503 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1505 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1506 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1509 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1510 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1513 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1515 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1516 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1517 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1519 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1520 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1526 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1527 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1528 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1529 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1530 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1531 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1532 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1536 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1537 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1539 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1541 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1542 if generated_by_local {
1543 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1544 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1553 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1555 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1556 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1557 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1558 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1559 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1560 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1561 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1564 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1565 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1566 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1567 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1571 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1572 preimages.push(preimage);
1576 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1577 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1579 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1581 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1582 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1584 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1585 if !generated_by_local {
1586 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1594 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1595 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1596 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1597 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1598 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1599 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1600 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1601 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1603 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1605 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1606 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1607 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1608 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1610 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1612 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1613 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1614 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1615 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1618 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1619 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1620 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1621 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1623 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1626 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1627 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1628 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1629 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1631 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1634 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1635 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1640 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1641 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1646 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1648 let channel_parameters =
1649 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1650 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1651 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1654 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1659 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1662 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1663 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1664 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1665 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1667 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1668 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1669 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1677 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1678 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1684 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1685 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1686 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1687 // outside of those situations will fail.
1688 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1692 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1697 1 + // script length (0)
1701 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1702 2 + // witness marker and flag
1703 1 + // witness element count
1704 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1705 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1706 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1707 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1708 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1709 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1711 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1712 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1713 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1719 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1720 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1721 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1722 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1724 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1725 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1726 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1728 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1729 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1730 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1731 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1732 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1733 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1736 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1737 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1740 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1741 value_to_holder = 0;
1744 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1745 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1746 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1747 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1749 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1750 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1753 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1754 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1758 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1759 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1760 /// our counterparty!)
1761 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1762 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1763 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1764 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1765 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1766 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1767 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1769 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1773 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1774 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1775 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1776 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1777 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1778 //may see payments to it!
1779 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1780 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1781 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1783 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1786 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1787 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1788 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1789 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1790 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1793 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1796 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1797 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1799 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1801 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1802 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1803 where L::Target: Logger {
1804 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1805 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1806 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1807 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1808 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1809 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1810 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1811 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1815 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1816 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1817 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1818 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1820 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1821 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1823 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1825 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1827 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1828 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1829 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1831 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1832 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1833 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1834 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1835 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1837 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1838 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1839 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1841 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1842 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1844 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1847 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1848 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1852 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1856 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1858 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1859 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1860 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1861 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1864 // Now update local state:
1866 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1867 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1868 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1869 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1870 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1871 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1872 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1876 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1877 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1878 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1879 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1880 // do not not get into this branch.
1881 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1882 match pending_update {
1883 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1884 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1885 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1886 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1887 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1888 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1889 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1892 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1893 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1894 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1895 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1896 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1897 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1898 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1904 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1905 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1906 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1908 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1909 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1910 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1912 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1913 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1916 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1917 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1919 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1920 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1922 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1923 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1926 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1929 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1930 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1931 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1932 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1937 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1938 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1939 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1940 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1941 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1944 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1945 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1946 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1947 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1948 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1950 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1951 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1952 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1956 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1957 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1958 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1959 /// before we fail backwards.
1961 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1962 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1963 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1964 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
1965 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1966 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
1967 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
1970 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1971 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1972 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1973 /// before we fail backwards.
1975 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1976 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1977 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1978 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
1979 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1980 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1981 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1983 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1985 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1986 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1987 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1989 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1990 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1991 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1993 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1994 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1995 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1997 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2002 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2003 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2009 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2010 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2011 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2012 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2013 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2017 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2018 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2019 force_holding_cell = true;
2022 // Now update local state:
2023 if force_holding_cell {
2024 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2025 match pending_update {
2026 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2027 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2028 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2029 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2033 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2034 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2035 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2036 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2042 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2043 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2044 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2050 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2052 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2053 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2056 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2057 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2058 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2063 // Message handlers:
2065 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2066 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2068 // Check sanity of message fields:
2069 if !self.is_outbound() {
2070 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2072 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2073 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2075 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2078 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2079 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2081 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2082 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2084 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2086 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2088 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2089 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2090 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2092 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2093 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2096 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2099 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2103 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2104 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2107 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2108 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2110 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2113 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2114 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2116 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2117 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2119 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2120 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2122 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2126 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2127 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2130 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2131 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2133 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2136 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2137 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2138 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2139 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2140 if script.len() == 0 {
2143 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2146 Some(script.clone())
2149 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2150 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2156 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2157 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2158 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2159 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2160 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2162 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2163 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2165 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2168 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2169 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2170 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2171 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2172 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2173 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2176 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2177 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2178 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2181 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2182 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2184 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2185 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2190 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2191 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2193 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2194 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2196 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2197 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2198 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2199 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2200 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2201 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2202 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2203 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2204 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2207 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2208 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2210 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2211 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2212 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2213 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2215 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2216 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2218 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2219 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2222 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2223 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2226 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2227 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2228 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2230 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2233 if self.is_outbound() {
2234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2236 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2237 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2238 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2242 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2245 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2246 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2247 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2248 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2251 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2252 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2253 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2254 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2255 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2257 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2259 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2260 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2264 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2265 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2266 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2270 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2271 initial_commitment_tx,
2274 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2275 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2278 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2279 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2281 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2283 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2284 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2285 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2286 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2287 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2288 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2289 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2290 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2291 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2292 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2293 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2295 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2297 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2299 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2300 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2301 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2302 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2304 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2306 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2307 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2309 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2312 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2313 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2314 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2315 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2316 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2318 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2321 if !self.is_outbound() {
2322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2324 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2327 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2328 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2329 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2330 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2333 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2335 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2336 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2337 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2338 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2340 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2341 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2343 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2344 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2346 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2347 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2348 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2349 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2350 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2355 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2356 initial_commitment_tx,
2359 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2360 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2363 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2364 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2367 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2368 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2369 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2370 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2371 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2372 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2373 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2374 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2375 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2376 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2377 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2378 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2380 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2382 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2384 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2385 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2386 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2387 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2389 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2391 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2394 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2395 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2397 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2398 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2399 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2400 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2403 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2404 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2405 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2406 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2407 // when routing outbound payments.
2408 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2412 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2414 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2415 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2416 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2417 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2418 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2419 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2420 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2421 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2422 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2424 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2425 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2426 let expected_point =
2427 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2428 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2430 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2432 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2433 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2434 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2435 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2436 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2438 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2446 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2447 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2449 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2451 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2454 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2455 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2456 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2457 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2463 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2464 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2465 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2466 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2467 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2468 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2469 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2470 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2471 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2474 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2477 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2478 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2479 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2481 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2482 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2483 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2484 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2485 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2486 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2488 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2489 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2495 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2496 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2497 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2498 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2499 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2500 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2501 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2502 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2503 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2506 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2509 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2510 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2511 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2513 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2514 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2515 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2516 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2517 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2518 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2520 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2521 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2525 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2526 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2527 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2528 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2529 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2530 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2531 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2533 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2534 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2536 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2543 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2544 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2545 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2546 /// corner case properly.
2547 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2548 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2549 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2551 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2552 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2553 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2554 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2557 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2559 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2560 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2561 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2564 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2565 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2566 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2567 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2569 outbound_capacity_msat,
2570 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2571 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2572 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2578 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2579 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2582 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2583 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2584 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2585 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2586 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2587 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2590 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2591 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2593 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2594 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2597 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2598 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2599 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2601 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2602 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2604 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2607 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2608 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2610 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2611 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2613 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2614 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2616 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2617 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2621 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2622 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2628 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2629 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2630 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2633 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2634 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2635 included_htlcs += 1;
2638 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2639 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2643 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2644 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2645 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2646 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2647 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2648 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2653 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2655 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2656 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2661 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2662 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2666 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2667 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2668 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2671 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2672 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2674 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2675 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2676 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2678 total_pending_htlcs,
2679 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2680 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2681 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2683 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2684 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2685 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2687 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2689 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2694 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2695 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2696 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2698 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2699 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2701 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2704 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2705 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2707 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2708 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2710 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2711 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2713 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2714 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2718 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2719 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2725 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2726 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2727 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2728 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2729 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2730 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2733 included_htlcs += 1;
2736 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2737 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2740 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2741 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2743 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2744 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2745 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2750 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2751 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2752 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2755 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2756 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2758 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2759 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2761 total_pending_htlcs,
2762 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2763 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2764 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2766 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2767 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2768 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2770 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2772 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2777 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2778 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2779 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2780 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2781 if local_sent_shutdown {
2782 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2784 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2785 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2786 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2787 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2789 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2790 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2792 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2793 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2795 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2796 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2798 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2799 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2802 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2803 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2804 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2805 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2807 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2808 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2810 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2811 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2812 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2813 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2814 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2815 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2816 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2817 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2818 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2819 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2820 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2822 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2823 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2824 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2825 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2826 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2827 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2831 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2834 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2835 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2836 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2838 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2839 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2840 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2841 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2842 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2843 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2844 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2848 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2849 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2850 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2851 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2852 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2853 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2854 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2858 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2859 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2860 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2861 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2862 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2866 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2867 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2868 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2869 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2870 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2872 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2876 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2880 if !self.is_outbound() {
2881 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2882 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2883 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2884 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2885 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2886 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2887 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2888 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2889 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2890 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2891 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2892 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2893 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2894 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2895 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2898 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2899 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2900 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2901 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2902 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2905 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2906 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2908 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2912 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2913 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2914 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2918 // Now update local state:
2919 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2920 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2921 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2922 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2923 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2924 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2925 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2930 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2932 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2933 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2934 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2935 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2936 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2937 None => fail_reason.into(),
2938 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2939 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2940 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2941 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2943 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2947 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2949 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2950 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2952 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2953 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2958 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2961 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2962 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2963 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2965 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2969 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2972 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2973 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2974 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2976 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2980 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2984 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2985 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2986 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2988 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2989 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2992 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2996 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2997 where L::Target: Logger
2999 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3000 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
3002 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3003 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
3005 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3006 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
3009 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3011 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3013 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3014 let commitment_txid = {
3015 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3016 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3017 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3019 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3020 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3021 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3022 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3023 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3024 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3028 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3030 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3031 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3032 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3033 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3036 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3037 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3038 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3039 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3042 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3044 if self.is_outbound() {
3045 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3046 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3047 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3048 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3049 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3050 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3051 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3052 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3053 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3054 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3060 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3061 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3064 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3065 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3066 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3067 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3068 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3069 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3070 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3072 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3073 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3074 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3075 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3076 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3077 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3078 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3079 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3081 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3083 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3087 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3088 commitment_stats.tx,
3090 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3091 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3092 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3095 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3096 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3097 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3098 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3100 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3101 let mut need_commitment = false;
3102 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3103 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3104 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3105 need_commitment = true;
3109 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3110 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3111 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3112 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3113 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3114 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3118 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3119 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3120 Some(forward_info.clone())
3122 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3123 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3124 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3125 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3126 need_commitment = true;
3129 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3130 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3131 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3132 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3133 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3134 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3135 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3136 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3137 need_commitment = true;
3141 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3142 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3143 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3144 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3146 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3147 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3148 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3149 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3150 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3151 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3152 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3153 // includes the right HTLCs.
3154 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3155 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3156 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3157 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3158 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3159 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3161 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3162 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3163 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3166 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3167 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3168 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3169 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3170 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3171 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3172 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3173 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3174 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3178 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3179 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3181 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3182 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3183 per_commitment_secret,
3184 next_per_commitment_point,
3185 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3188 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3189 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3190 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3191 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3192 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3193 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3194 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3195 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3198 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3199 /// for our counterparty.
3200 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3201 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3202 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3203 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3204 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3206 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3207 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3208 updates: Vec::new(),
3211 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3212 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3213 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3214 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3215 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3216 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3217 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3218 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3219 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3220 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3221 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3222 // to rebalance channels.
3223 match &htlc_update {
3224 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3225 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3226 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3229 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3230 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3231 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3232 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3233 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3234 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3235 // into the holding cell without ever being
3236 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3237 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3238 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3241 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3247 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3248 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3249 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3250 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3251 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3252 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3253 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3254 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3255 (msg, monitor_update)
3256 } else { unreachable!() };
3257 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3258 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3260 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3261 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3262 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3263 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3264 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3265 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3266 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3267 // for a full revocation before failing.
3268 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3271 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3273 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3280 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3281 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3283 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3284 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3289 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3290 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3291 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3292 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3293 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3295 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3296 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3297 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3299 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3301 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3303 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3306 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3308 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3312 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3313 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3314 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3315 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3316 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3317 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3318 where L::Target: Logger,
3320 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3323 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3324 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3326 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3330 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3332 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3333 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3338 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3339 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3340 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3341 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3342 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3343 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3344 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3345 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3349 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3351 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3352 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3355 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3356 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3358 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3360 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3361 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3362 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3363 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3364 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3365 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3366 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3367 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3371 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3372 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3373 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3374 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3375 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3376 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3377 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3378 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3380 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3381 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3384 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3385 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3386 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3387 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3388 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3389 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3390 let mut require_commitment = false;
3391 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3394 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3395 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3396 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3398 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3399 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3400 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3401 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3402 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3403 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3408 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3409 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3410 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3411 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3412 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3414 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3415 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3416 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3421 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3422 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3424 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3428 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3429 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3431 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3432 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3433 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3434 require_commitment = true;
3435 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3436 match forward_info {
3437 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3438 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3439 require_commitment = true;
3441 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3442 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3443 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3445 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3446 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3447 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3451 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3452 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3453 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3454 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3460 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3461 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3462 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3463 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3465 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3466 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3467 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3468 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3469 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3470 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3471 require_commitment = true;
3475 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3477 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3478 match update_state {
3479 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3480 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3481 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3482 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3483 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3485 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3486 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3487 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3488 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3489 require_commitment = true;
3490 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3491 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3496 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3497 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3498 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3499 if require_commitment {
3500 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3501 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3502 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3503 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3504 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3505 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3506 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3507 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3508 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3510 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3511 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3512 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3513 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3514 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3515 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3516 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3518 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3522 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3523 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3524 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3525 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3526 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3528 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3529 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3530 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3533 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3534 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3535 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3536 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3539 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3540 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3541 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3542 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3544 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3547 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3548 if require_commitment {
3549 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3551 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3552 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3553 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3554 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3556 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3557 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3559 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3560 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3561 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3563 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3567 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3568 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3569 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3572 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3574 commitment_update: None,
3575 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3576 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3577 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3584 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3585 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3586 /// commitment update.
3587 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3588 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3589 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3592 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3593 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3594 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3595 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3597 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3598 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3599 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3600 if !self.is_outbound() {
3601 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3603 if !self.is_usable() {
3604 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3606 if !self.is_live() {
3607 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3610 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3611 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3612 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3613 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3614 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3615 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3616 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3617 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3618 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3619 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3623 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3624 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3625 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3626 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3627 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3630 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3631 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3635 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3636 force_holding_cell = true;
3639 if force_holding_cell {
3640 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3644 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3645 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3647 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3648 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3653 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3654 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3656 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3658 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3659 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3660 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3661 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3665 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3666 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3667 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3671 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3672 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3675 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3676 // will be retransmitted.
3677 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3678 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3679 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3681 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3682 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3684 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3685 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3686 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3687 // this HTLC accordingly
3688 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3691 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3692 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3693 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3694 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3697 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3698 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3699 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3700 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3701 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3702 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3707 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3709 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3710 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3711 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3712 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3716 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3717 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3718 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3719 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3720 // the update upon reconnection.
3721 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3725 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3726 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3729 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3730 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3731 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3732 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3733 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3734 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3736 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3737 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3738 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3739 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3740 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3741 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3743 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3744 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3745 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3746 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3747 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3748 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3749 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3752 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3753 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3754 /// to the remote side.
3755 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3756 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3757 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3759 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3760 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3761 // first received the funding_signed.
3762 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3763 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3764 self.funding_transaction.take()
3766 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3767 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3768 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3769 funding_broadcastable = None;
3772 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3773 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3774 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3775 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3776 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3777 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3778 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3779 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3780 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3781 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3782 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3783 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3784 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3785 next_per_commitment_point,
3786 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3790 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3792 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3793 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3794 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3795 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3796 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3797 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3799 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3800 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3801 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3802 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3803 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3804 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3808 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3809 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3811 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3812 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3815 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3816 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3817 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3818 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3819 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3820 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3821 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3822 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3823 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3827 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3828 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3830 if self.is_outbound() {
3831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3833 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3836 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3837 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3839 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3840 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3841 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3842 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3843 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3844 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3845 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3846 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3847 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3848 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3849 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3850 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3851 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3853 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3854 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3855 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3861 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3862 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3863 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3864 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3865 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3866 per_commitment_secret,
3867 next_per_commitment_point,
3871 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3872 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3873 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3874 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3875 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3877 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3878 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3879 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3880 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3881 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3882 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3883 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3884 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3885 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3890 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3891 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3893 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3894 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3895 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3896 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3897 reason: err_packet.clone()
3900 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3901 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3902 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3903 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3904 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3905 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3908 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3909 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3910 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3911 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3912 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3919 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3920 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3921 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3922 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3926 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3927 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3928 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3929 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3930 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3931 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3935 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3936 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3938 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3939 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3940 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3941 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3942 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3943 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock)
3944 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3945 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3946 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3947 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3948 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3952 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3953 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3954 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3957 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3958 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3959 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3960 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3961 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3962 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3963 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3966 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3967 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3968 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3969 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3970 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3973 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3974 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3975 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3976 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3977 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3978 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3979 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3980 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3983 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3987 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3988 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3989 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3990 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3992 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3996 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3997 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3998 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4000 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4001 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4002 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4003 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4004 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4008 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4010 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4011 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4012 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4013 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4014 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4015 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4017 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4018 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4019 channel_ready: None,
4020 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4021 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4022 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4026 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4027 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4028 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4029 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4030 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4031 next_per_commitment_point,
4032 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4034 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4035 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4036 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4040 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4041 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4042 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4044 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4045 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4046 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4049 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4052 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4055 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4056 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4057 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4058 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4059 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4061 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4062 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4063 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4064 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4065 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4066 next_per_commitment_point,
4067 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4071 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4072 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4073 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4075 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4078 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4079 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4080 raa: required_revoke,
4081 commitment_update: None,
4082 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4084 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4085 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4086 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4088 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4091 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4092 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4093 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4094 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4095 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4096 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4099 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4100 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4101 raa: required_revoke,
4102 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4103 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4107 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4111 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4112 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4113 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4114 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4116 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4118 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4120 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4121 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4122 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4123 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4124 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4125 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4127 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4128 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4129 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4130 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4131 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4133 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4134 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4135 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4136 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4139 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4140 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4141 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4142 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4143 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4144 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4145 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4146 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4147 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4148 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4149 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4150 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4151 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4152 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4153 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4155 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4158 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4159 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4162 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4163 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4164 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4165 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4166 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4167 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4168 self.channel_state &
4169 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4170 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4171 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4172 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4175 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4176 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4177 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4178 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4179 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4180 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4181 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4183 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4189 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4190 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4191 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4192 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4194 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4195 return Ok((None, None));
4198 if !self.is_outbound() {
4199 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4200 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4202 return Ok((None, None));
4205 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4207 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4208 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4209 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4210 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4212 let sig = self.holder_signer
4213 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4214 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4216 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4217 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4218 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4219 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4221 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4222 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4223 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4228 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4229 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4230 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4231 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4233 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4236 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4237 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4238 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4239 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4242 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4243 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4247 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4249 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4250 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4253 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4254 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4255 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4258 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4261 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4262 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4263 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4264 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4266 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4269 assert!(send_shutdown);
4270 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4271 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4274 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4279 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4281 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4282 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4284 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4285 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4286 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4287 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4288 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4289 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4293 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4294 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4295 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4296 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4300 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4301 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4302 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4303 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4304 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4305 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4307 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4308 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4315 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4316 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4318 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4321 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4322 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4324 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4326 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4327 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4328 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4329 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4330 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4331 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4332 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4333 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4334 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4336 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4337 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4340 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4344 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4345 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4346 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4347 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4349 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4350 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4352 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4355 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4358 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4362 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4363 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4366 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4367 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4368 return Ok((None, None));
4371 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4372 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4373 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4376 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4378 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4381 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4382 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4383 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4384 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4385 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4389 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4390 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4391 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4395 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4396 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4397 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4398 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4399 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4400 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4401 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4405 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4407 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4408 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4409 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4410 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4412 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4415 let sig = self.holder_signer
4416 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4417 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4419 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4420 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4421 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4422 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4426 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4427 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4428 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4429 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4431 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4432 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4433 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4439 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4440 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4441 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4443 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4444 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4446 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4447 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4450 if !self.is_outbound() {
4451 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4452 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4453 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4454 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4456 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4457 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4458 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4460 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4461 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4464 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4465 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4466 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4467 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4468 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4469 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4470 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4471 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4473 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4476 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4477 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4478 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4479 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4481 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4485 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4486 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4487 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4488 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4490 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4496 // Public utilities:
4498 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4502 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4506 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4507 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4508 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4512 /// Gets the channel's type
4513 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4517 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4518 /// is_usable() returns true).
4519 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4520 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4521 self.short_channel_id
4524 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4525 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4526 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4529 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4530 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4531 self.outbound_scid_alias
4533 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4534 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4535 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4536 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4537 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4540 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4541 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4542 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4543 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4546 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4547 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4548 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4551 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4552 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4553 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4554 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4558 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4561 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4562 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4565 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4566 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4569 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4570 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4571 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4574 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4575 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4578 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4579 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4580 self.counterparty_node_id
4583 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4584 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4585 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4588 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4589 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4590 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4593 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4594 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4596 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4597 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4598 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4599 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4601 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4605 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4606 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4607 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4610 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4611 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4612 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4615 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4616 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4617 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4619 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4620 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4625 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4626 self.channel_value_satoshis
4629 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4630 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4633 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4634 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4637 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4638 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4641 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4642 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4643 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4646 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4647 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4648 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4651 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4652 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4653 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4656 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4657 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4658 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4659 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4660 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4663 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4665 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4666 self.prev_config = None;
4670 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4671 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4675 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4676 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4677 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4678 let did_channel_update =
4679 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4680 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4681 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4682 if did_channel_update {
4683 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4684 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4685 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4686 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4688 self.config.options = *config;
4692 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4693 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4694 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4695 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4696 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4697 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4698 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4700 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4701 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4704 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4706 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4707 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4713 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4714 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4715 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4716 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4717 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4718 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4719 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4721 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4722 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4729 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4733 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4734 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4735 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4736 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4737 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4738 // which are near the dust limit.
4739 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4740 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4741 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4742 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4743 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4745 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4746 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4748 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4751 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4752 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4755 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4756 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4759 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4760 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4764 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4769 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4771 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4772 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4773 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4774 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4775 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4776 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4778 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4780 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4788 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4789 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4793 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4794 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4795 self.update_time_counter
4798 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4799 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4802 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4803 self.config.announced_channel
4806 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4807 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4810 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4811 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4812 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4813 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4816 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4817 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4818 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4821 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4822 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4823 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4824 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4825 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4828 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4829 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4830 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4831 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4832 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4835 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4836 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4837 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4838 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4841 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4842 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4843 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4846 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4847 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4848 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4850 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4851 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4852 if self.channel_state &
4853 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4854 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4855 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4856 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4857 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4860 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4861 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4862 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4863 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4864 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4865 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4867 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4868 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4869 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4871 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4872 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4873 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4874 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4875 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4876 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4882 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4883 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4884 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4887 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4888 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4889 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4892 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4893 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4894 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4897 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4898 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4899 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4900 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4901 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4902 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4907 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4908 self.channel_update_status
4911 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4912 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4913 self.channel_update_status = status;
4916 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4918 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4919 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4920 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4924 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4925 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4926 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4929 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4933 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4934 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4935 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4937 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4938 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4939 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4941 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4942 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4945 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4946 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4947 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4948 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4949 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4950 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4951 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4952 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4953 self.channel_state);
4955 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4959 if need_commitment_update {
4960 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4961 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4962 let next_per_commitment_point =
4963 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4964 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4965 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4966 next_per_commitment_point,
4967 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4971 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4977 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4978 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4979 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4980 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4981 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L)
4982 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4983 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4984 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4985 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4986 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4987 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4988 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4989 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4990 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4991 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4992 if self.is_outbound() {
4993 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4994 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4995 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4996 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4997 // channel and move on.
4998 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4999 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5001 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5002 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5003 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5005 if self.is_outbound() {
5006 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5007 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5008 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5009 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5010 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5011 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5015 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5016 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5017 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5018 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5019 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5023 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5024 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5025 // may have already happened for this block).
5026 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5027 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5028 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5029 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5032 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5033 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5034 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5035 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5043 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5044 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5045 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5046 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5048 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5049 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5052 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5054 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, user_config: UserConfig, logger: &L)
5055 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5056 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk, user_config)), logger)
5059 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey, UserConfig)>, logger: &L)
5060 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5061 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5062 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5063 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5065 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5066 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5068 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5069 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5070 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5078 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5080 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5081 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk, user_config)) = genesis_node_pk {
5082 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, &user_config, height, logger)
5084 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5085 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5088 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5089 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5090 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5091 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5092 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5093 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5094 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5095 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5096 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5099 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5100 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5101 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5102 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5104 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5105 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5106 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5108 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5109 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5110 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5111 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5113 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5114 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5115 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5116 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5117 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5118 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5119 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5122 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk, user_config)) = genesis_node_pk {
5123 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, &user_config, height, logger)
5125 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5128 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5129 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5130 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5131 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5132 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5133 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5134 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5135 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5136 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5137 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5138 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5139 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5140 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5141 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5142 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5143 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5144 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5150 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5155 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5156 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5158 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5159 if !self.is_outbound() {
5160 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5162 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5163 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5166 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5167 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5170 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5171 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5175 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5176 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5177 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5178 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5179 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5180 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5181 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5182 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5183 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5184 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5185 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5186 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5187 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5188 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5189 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5190 first_per_commitment_point,
5191 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5192 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5193 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5194 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5196 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5200 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5201 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5204 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5205 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5206 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5207 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5210 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5211 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5213 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5214 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5215 if self.is_outbound() {
5216 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5218 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5219 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5221 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5222 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5224 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5225 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5228 self.user_id = user_id;
5229 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5231 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5234 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5235 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5236 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5238 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5239 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5240 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5241 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5243 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5244 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5245 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5246 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5247 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5248 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5249 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5250 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5251 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5252 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5253 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5254 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5255 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5256 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5257 first_per_commitment_point,
5258 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5259 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5260 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5262 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5266 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5267 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5269 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5271 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5272 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5275 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5276 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5277 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5278 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5279 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5280 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5283 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5284 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5285 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5286 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5287 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5288 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5289 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5290 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5291 if !self.is_outbound() {
5292 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5294 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5295 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5297 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5298 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5299 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5300 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5303 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5304 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5306 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5309 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5310 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5315 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5317 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5319 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5320 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5321 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5323 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5324 temporary_channel_id,
5325 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5326 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5331 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5332 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5333 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5334 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5336 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5339 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5340 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5341 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5342 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5344 if !self.is_usable() {
5345 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5348 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5350 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5351 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5353 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5354 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5355 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5356 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5357 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5358 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5364 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5365 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5366 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5370 if !self.is_usable() {
5374 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5375 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5379 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5383 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5384 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5387 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5391 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5393 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5398 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5400 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5401 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5402 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5403 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5404 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5408 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5410 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5411 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5412 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5414 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5415 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5416 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5417 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5418 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5419 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5420 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5421 contents: announcement,
5424 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5428 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5429 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5430 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5431 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5432 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash, user_config)?;
5434 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5436 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5437 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5438 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5439 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5441 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5442 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5443 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5444 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5447 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5448 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5449 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5450 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5453 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5456 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5457 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5458 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5459 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5462 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash, user_config) {
5464 Err(_) => return None,
5466 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5467 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5472 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5473 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5474 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5475 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5476 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5477 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5478 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5479 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5480 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5481 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5482 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5483 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5484 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5485 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5486 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5487 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5488 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5489 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5490 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5493 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5494 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5495 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5496 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5499 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5500 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5501 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5502 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5503 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5504 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5505 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5506 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5508 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5509 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5510 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5511 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5512 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5513 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5514 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5515 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5516 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5518 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5524 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5526 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5527 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5528 /// commitment update.
5530 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5531 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5532 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5533 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5535 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5536 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5538 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5539 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5544 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5545 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5547 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5549 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5550 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5552 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5553 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5554 /// regenerate them.
5556 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5557 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5559 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5560 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5561 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5562 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5563 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5564 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5566 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5567 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5568 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5571 if amount_msat == 0 {
5572 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5575 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5576 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5579 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5580 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5581 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5582 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5583 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5584 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5585 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5586 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5589 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5590 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5591 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5592 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5594 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5595 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5596 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5599 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5600 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5601 if !self.is_outbound() {
5602 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5603 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5604 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5605 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5606 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5607 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5611 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5614 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5615 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5616 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5618 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5619 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5620 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5621 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5622 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5623 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5627 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5628 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5629 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5630 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5631 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5632 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5636 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5637 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5638 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5641 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5642 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5643 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5644 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5646 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5647 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5650 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5651 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5652 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5653 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5654 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5657 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5658 force_holding_cell = true;
5661 // Now update local state:
5662 if force_holding_cell {
5663 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5668 onion_routing_packet,
5673 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5674 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5676 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5678 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5682 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5683 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5684 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5688 onion_routing_packet,
5690 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5695 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5696 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5697 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5698 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5699 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5701 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5702 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5703 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5705 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5706 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5710 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5711 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5712 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5713 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5714 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5715 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5716 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5719 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5720 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5721 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5722 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5723 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5724 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5727 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5729 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5730 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5731 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5732 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5733 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5734 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5736 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5739 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5740 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5743 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5744 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5745 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5746 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5747 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5748 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5749 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5750 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5753 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5754 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5757 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5758 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5759 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5760 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5761 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5762 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5763 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5767 if !self.is_outbound() {
5768 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5769 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5770 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5771 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5772 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5773 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5774 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5775 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5776 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5777 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5784 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5785 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5789 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5790 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5792 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5794 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5795 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5796 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5797 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5799 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5800 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5801 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5802 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5803 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5804 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5808 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5809 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5812 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5815 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5816 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5818 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5819 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5820 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5821 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
5822 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5823 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5824 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5830 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5831 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5832 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5835 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5836 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5839 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5840 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5841 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5842 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5848 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5849 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5850 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5851 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5852 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5853 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5854 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5855 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5858 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5859 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5860 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5862 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5863 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5866 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5867 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5868 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5871 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5874 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5875 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5876 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5878 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5883 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5884 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5885 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5886 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5888 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5890 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5892 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5893 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5894 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5895 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5896 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5897 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5901 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5902 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5903 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5906 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5907 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5908 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5909 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5910 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5912 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5913 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5920 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5923 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5924 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5925 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5926 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5927 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5928 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5929 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5930 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5931 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5932 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5933 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5935 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5936 // return them to fail the payment.
5937 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5938 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5939 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5941 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5942 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5947 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5948 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5949 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5950 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5951 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5952 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5953 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5954 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5955 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5956 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5957 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5958 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5959 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5964 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5965 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5966 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5969 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5970 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5971 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5973 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5974 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5978 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5982 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
5983 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5985 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5991 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5992 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5993 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5994 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5995 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5997 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5998 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5999 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6000 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6006 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6007 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6008 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6009 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6010 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6011 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6016 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6017 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6018 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6019 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6021 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6022 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6023 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6024 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6029 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6030 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6031 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6032 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6033 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6034 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6039 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6040 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6041 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6044 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6046 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6047 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6048 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6049 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6050 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6052 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6053 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6054 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6055 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6057 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6058 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6059 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6061 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6063 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6064 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6065 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6066 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6067 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6068 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6070 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6071 // deserialized from that format.
6072 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6073 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6074 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6076 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6078 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6079 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6080 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6082 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6083 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6084 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6085 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6088 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6089 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6090 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6093 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6094 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6095 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6096 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6098 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6099 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6101 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6103 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6105 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6107 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6110 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6112 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6117 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6119 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6120 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6121 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6122 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6123 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6124 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6125 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6127 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6129 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6131 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6134 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6135 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6136 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6139 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6141 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6142 preimages.push(preimage);
6144 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6145 reason.write(writer)?;
6147 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6149 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6150 preimages.push(preimage);
6152 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6153 reason.write(writer)?;
6158 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6159 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6161 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6163 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6164 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6165 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6166 source.write(writer)?;
6167 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6169 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6171 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6172 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6174 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6176 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6177 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6182 match self.resend_order {
6183 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6184 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6187 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6188 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6189 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6191 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6192 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6193 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6194 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6197 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6198 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6199 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6200 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6201 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6204 if self.is_outbound() {
6205 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6206 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6207 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6209 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6210 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6211 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6213 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6215 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6216 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6217 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6218 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6220 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6221 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6222 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6223 // consider the stale state on reload.
6226 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6227 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6228 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6230 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6231 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6232 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6234 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6235 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6237 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6238 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6239 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6241 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6242 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6244 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6247 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6248 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6249 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6251 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6254 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6255 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6257 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6258 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6259 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6261 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6263 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6265 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6267 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6268 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6269 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6270 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6271 htlc.write(writer)?;
6274 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6275 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6276 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6278 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6279 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6281 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6282 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6283 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6284 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6285 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6286 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6287 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6289 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6290 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6291 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6292 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6293 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6295 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6297 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6298 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6299 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6300 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6302 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6303 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6304 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6305 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6306 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6307 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6308 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6310 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6311 (2, chan_type, option),
6312 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6313 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6314 (5, self.config, required),
6315 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6316 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6317 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6318 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6319 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6320 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6321 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6322 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6323 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6324 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6325 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6326 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6333 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6334 impl<'a, 'b, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6336 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6337 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6339 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6340 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height) = args;
6341 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6343 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6344 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6345 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6346 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6348 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6350 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6351 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6352 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6353 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6354 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6356 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6357 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6360 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6361 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6362 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6364 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6366 let mut keys_data = None;
6368 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6369 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6370 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6371 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6372 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6373 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6374 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6375 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6376 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6377 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6381 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6382 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6383 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6386 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6389 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6390 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6392 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6393 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6394 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6395 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6396 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6397 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6398 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6399 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6400 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6401 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6402 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6403 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6404 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6405 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6410 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6411 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6412 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6413 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6414 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6415 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6416 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6417 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6418 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6419 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6420 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6421 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6423 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6424 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6427 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6428 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6431 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6432 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6434 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6439 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6440 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6441 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6442 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6443 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6444 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6445 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6446 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6447 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6448 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6450 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6451 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6452 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6454 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6455 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6456 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6458 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6462 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6463 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6464 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6465 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6468 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6469 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6470 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6472 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6474 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6475 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6478 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6479 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6480 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6481 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6484 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6491 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6493 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6494 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6495 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6496 // consider the stale state on reload.
6497 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6500 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6501 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6504 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6507 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6508 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6509 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6511 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6512 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6513 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6514 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6516 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6517 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6519 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6520 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6522 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6523 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6524 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6526 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6528 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6529 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6531 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6532 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6535 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6537 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6538 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6539 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6540 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6542 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6545 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6546 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6548 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6550 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6551 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6553 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6554 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6556 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6558 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6559 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6560 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6562 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6563 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6564 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6568 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6569 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6570 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6572 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6578 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6579 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6580 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6581 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6582 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6583 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6584 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6585 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6586 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6587 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6589 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6590 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6591 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6592 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6593 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6594 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6596 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6597 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6599 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6600 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6601 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6602 (2, channel_type, option),
6603 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6604 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6605 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6606 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6607 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6608 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6609 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6610 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6611 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6612 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6613 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6614 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6615 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6616 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6617 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6620 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6621 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6622 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6623 // required channel parameters.
6624 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6625 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6626 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6628 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6630 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6631 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6632 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6633 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6636 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6637 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6638 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6640 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6641 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6643 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6644 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6649 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6650 if iter.next().is_some() {
6651 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6655 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6656 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6657 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6658 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6659 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6662 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6663 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6664 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6667 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6668 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6670 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6671 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6672 // separate u64 values.
6673 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6678 config: config.unwrap(),
6682 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6683 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6684 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6688 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6690 channel_value_satoshis,
6692 latest_monitor_update_id,
6695 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6698 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6699 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6702 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6703 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6704 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6708 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6709 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6710 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6711 monitor_pending_forwards,
6712 monitor_pending_failures,
6713 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6716 holding_cell_update_fee,
6717 next_holder_htlc_id,
6718 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6719 update_time_counter,
6722 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6723 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6724 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6725 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6727 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6728 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6729 closing_fee_limits: None,
6730 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6732 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6734 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6735 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6737 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6739 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6740 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6741 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6742 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6743 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6744 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6745 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6746 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6747 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6750 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6752 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6753 funding_transaction,
6755 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6756 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6757 counterparty_node_id,
6759 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6763 channel_update_status,
6764 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6768 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6769 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6770 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6771 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6773 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6775 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6776 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6777 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6779 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6781 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6782 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6784 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6793 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6794 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6795 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6796 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6797 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6799 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6800 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6801 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6802 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6803 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6804 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6805 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6806 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6807 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6808 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6809 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6810 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
6811 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6812 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6813 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6814 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6815 use crate::util::test_utils;
6816 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6817 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6818 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6819 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6820 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6821 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6822 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6823 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6824 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6825 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6826 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6827 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6828 use crate::prelude::*;
6830 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6833 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6834 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6840 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6841 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6842 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6843 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6847 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6848 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6849 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6850 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6851 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6852 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6853 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6857 signer: InMemorySigner,
6860 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6861 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6864 impl NodeSigner for Keys {
6865 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6867 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
6868 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6869 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &self.get_node_secret(recipient)?))
6872 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6874 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6876 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6879 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6880 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6882 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6883 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6886 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6890 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6892 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6893 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6894 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6895 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6896 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6899 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6900 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6901 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6902 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6906 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6907 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6908 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6912 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6913 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6914 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6915 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6917 let seed = [42; 32];
6918 let network = Network::Testnet;
6919 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6920 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6921 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6924 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6925 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6926 let config = UserConfig::default();
6927 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6928 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6929 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6931 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6932 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6936 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6937 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6939 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6940 let original_fee = 253;
6941 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6942 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6943 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6944 let seed = [42; 32];
6945 let network = Network::Testnet;
6946 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6948 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6949 let config = UserConfig::default();
6950 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6952 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6953 // same as the old fee.
6954 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6955 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6956 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6960 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6961 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6962 // dust limits are used.
6963 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6964 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6965 let seed = [42; 32];
6966 let network = Network::Testnet;
6967 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6968 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6970 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6971 // they have different dust limits.
6973 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6974 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6975 let config = UserConfig::default();
6976 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6978 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6979 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6980 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6981 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6982 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6984 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6985 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6986 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6987 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
6988 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6990 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6991 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6992 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6994 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6995 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6996 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6997 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7000 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7002 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7003 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7004 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7005 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7006 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7008 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7009 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7010 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7011 payment_secret: None,
7012 payment_params: None,
7016 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7017 // the dust limit check.
7018 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7019 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7020 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7021 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7023 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7024 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7025 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7026 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7027 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7028 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7029 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7033 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7034 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7035 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7036 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7037 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7038 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7039 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7040 let seed = [42; 32];
7041 let network = Network::Testnet;
7042 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7044 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7045 let config = UserConfig::default();
7046 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7048 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7049 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7051 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7052 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7053 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7054 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7055 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7056 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7058 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7059 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7060 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7061 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7062 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7064 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7066 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7067 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7068 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7069 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7070 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7072 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7073 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7074 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7075 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7076 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7080 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7081 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7082 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7083 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7084 let seed = [42; 32];
7085 let network = Network::Testnet;
7086 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7087 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7088 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7090 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7092 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7093 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7094 let config = UserConfig::default();
7095 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7097 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7098 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7099 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7100 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7102 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7103 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7104 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7106 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7107 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7108 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7109 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7111 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7112 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7113 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7115 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7116 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7118 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7119 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7120 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7121 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7122 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7123 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7124 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7125 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7126 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7131 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7133 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7134 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7135 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7136 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7137 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7138 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7139 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7146 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7147 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7148 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7149 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7150 let seed = [42; 32];
7151 let network = Network::Testnet;
7152 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7153 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7154 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7156 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7157 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7158 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7159 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7160 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7161 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7162 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7163 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7165 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7166 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7167 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7168 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7169 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7170 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7172 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7173 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7174 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7175 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7177 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7179 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7180 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7181 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7182 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7183 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7184 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7186 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7187 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7188 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7189 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7191 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7192 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7193 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7194 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7195 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7197 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7198 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7200 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7201 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7202 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7204 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7205 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7206 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7207 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7208 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7210 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7211 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7213 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7214 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7215 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7219 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7221 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7222 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7223 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7225 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7226 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7227 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7228 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7230 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7231 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7232 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7234 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7236 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7237 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7240 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7241 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7242 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7243 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7244 let seed = [42; 32];
7245 let network = Network::Testnet;
7246 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7247 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7248 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7251 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7252 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7253 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7255 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7256 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7258 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7259 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7260 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7262 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7263 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7265 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7267 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7268 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7270 // Channel Negotiations failed
7271 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7272 assert!(result.is_err());
7277 fn channel_update() {
7278 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7279 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7280 let seed = [42; 32];
7281 let network = Network::Testnet;
7282 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7283 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7285 // Create a channel.
7286 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7287 let config = UserConfig::default();
7288 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7289 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7290 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7291 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7293 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7294 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7295 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7297 short_channel_id: 0,
7300 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7301 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7302 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7304 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7305 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7307 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7309 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7311 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7312 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7313 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7314 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7316 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7317 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7318 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7320 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7324 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7326 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7327 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7328 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7329 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7330 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7331 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7332 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7333 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7334 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7335 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7336 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7337 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7338 use crate::sync::Arc;
7340 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7341 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7342 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7343 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7345 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7347 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7348 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7349 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7350 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7351 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7352 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7354 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7355 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7360 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7361 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7362 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7364 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7365 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7366 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7367 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7368 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7369 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7371 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7373 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7374 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7375 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7376 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7377 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7378 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7380 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7381 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7382 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7383 selected_contest_delay: 144
7385 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7386 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7388 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7389 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7391 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7392 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7394 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7395 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7397 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7398 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7399 // build_commitment_transaction.
7400 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7401 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7402 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7403 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7404 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7406 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7407 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7408 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7409 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7413 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7414 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7415 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7416 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7420 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7421 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7422 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7424 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7425 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7427 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7428 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7430 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7432 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7433 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7434 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7435 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7436 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7437 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7438 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7440 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7441 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7442 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7443 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7445 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7446 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7447 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7449 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7451 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7452 commitment_tx.clone(),
7453 counterparty_signature,
7454 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7455 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7456 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7458 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7459 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7461 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7462 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7463 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7465 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7466 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7469 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7470 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7472 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7473 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7474 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7475 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7476 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7477 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7478 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7479 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7481 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7484 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7485 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7486 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7490 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7493 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7494 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7495 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7497 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7498 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7499 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7500 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7501 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7502 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7503 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7504 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7506 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7510 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7511 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7513 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7514 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7515 "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", {});
7517 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7518 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7519 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7520 "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", {});
7522 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7523 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7525 amount_msat: 1000000,
7527 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7528 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7530 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7533 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7534 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7536 amount_msat: 2000000,
7538 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7539 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7541 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7544 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7545 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7547 amount_msat: 2000000,
7549 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7550 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7551 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7553 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7556 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7557 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7559 amount_msat: 3000000,
7561 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7562 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7563 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7565 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7568 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7569 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7571 amount_msat: 4000000,
7573 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7574 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7576 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7580 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7581 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7582 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7584 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7585 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7586 "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", {
7589 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7590 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7591 "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" },
7594 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7595 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7596 "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" },
7599 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7600 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7601 "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" },
7604 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7605 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7606 "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" },
7609 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7610 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7611 "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" }
7614 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7615 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7616 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7618 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7619 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7620 "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", {
7623 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7624 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7625 "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" },
7628 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7629 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7630 "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" },
7633 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7634 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7635 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7638 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7639 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7640 "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" },
7643 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7644 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7645 "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" }
7648 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7649 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7650 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7652 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7653 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7654 "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", {
7657 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7658 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7659 "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" },
7662 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7663 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7664 "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" },
7667 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7668 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7669 "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" },
7672 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7673 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7674 "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" }
7677 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7678 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7679 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7680 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7682 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7683 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7684 "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", {
7687 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7688 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7689 "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" },
7692 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7693 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7694 "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" },
7697 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7698 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7699 "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" },
7702 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7703 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7704 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7707 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7708 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7709 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7710 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7712 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7713 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7714 "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", {
7717 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7718 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7719 "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" },
7722 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7723 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7724 "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" },
7727 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7728 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7729 "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" },
7732 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7733 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7734 "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" }
7737 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7738 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7739 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7741 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7742 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7743 "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", {
7746 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7747 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7748 "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" },
7751 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7752 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7753 "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" },
7756 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7757 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7758 "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" }
7761 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7762 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7763 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7765 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7766 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7767 "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", {
7770 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7771 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7772 "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" },
7775 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7776 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7777 "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" },
7780 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7781 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7782 "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" }
7785 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7786 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7787 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7789 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7790 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7791 "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", {
7794 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7795 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7796 "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" },
7799 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7800 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7801 "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" }
7804 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7805 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7806 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7807 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7809 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7810 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7811 "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", {
7814 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7815 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7816 "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" },
7819 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7820 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7821 "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" }
7824 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7825 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7826 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7827 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7829 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7830 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7831 "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", {
7834 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7835 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7836 "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" },
7839 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7840 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7841 "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" }
7844 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7845 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7846 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7848 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7849 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7850 "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", {
7853 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7854 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7855 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7858 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7859 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7860 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7861 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7863 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7864 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7865 "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", {
7868 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7869 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7870 "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" }
7873 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7874 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7875 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7876 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7878 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7879 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7880 "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", {
7883 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7884 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7885 "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" }
7888 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7889 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7890 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7891 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7893 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7894 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7895 "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", {});
7897 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7898 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7899 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7900 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7902 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7903 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7904 "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", {});
7906 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7907 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7908 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7909 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7911 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7912 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7913 "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", {});
7915 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7916 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7917 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7919 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7920 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7921 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7923 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7924 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7925 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7926 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7928 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7929 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7930 "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", {});
7932 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7933 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7934 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7935 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7937 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7938 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7939 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7941 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7942 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7943 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7944 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7945 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7946 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7948 amount_msat: 2000000,
7950 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7951 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7953 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7956 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7957 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7958 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7960 amount_msat: 5000000,
7962 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7963 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7964 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7966 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7969 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7970 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7972 amount_msat: 5000000,
7974 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7975 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7976 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7978 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7982 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7983 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7984 "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", {
7987 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7988 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7989 "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" },
7991 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7992 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7993 "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" },
7995 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7996 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7997 "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3402000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f014730440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e51101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
8000 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8001 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8002 "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", {
8005 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8006 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8007 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe2902000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec8347304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8009 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8010 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8011 "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" },
8013 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8014 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8015 "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" }
8020 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8021 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8023 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8024 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8025 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8026 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8028 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8029 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8030 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8032 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8033 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8035 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8036 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8038 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8039 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8040 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8044 fn test_key_derivation() {
8045 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8046 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8048 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8049 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8051 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8052 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8054 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8055 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8057 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8058 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8060 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8061 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8063 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8064 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8066 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8067 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8071 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8072 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8073 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8074 let seed = [42; 32];
8075 let network = Network::Testnet;
8076 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8077 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8079 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8080 let config = UserConfig::default();
8081 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8082 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8084 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8085 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8087 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8088 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8089 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8090 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8091 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8092 assert!(res.is_ok());