1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
15 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
16 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
32 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
33 use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
34 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
35 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
36 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
37 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
38 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
43 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
44 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
46 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
47 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
48 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
49 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
50 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
53 use crate::prelude::*;
54 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
56 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
57 use crate::sync::Mutex;
58 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
60 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
63 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
64 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
66 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
70 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
71 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
74 pub struct AvailableBalances {
75 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
76 pub balance_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
78 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
80 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
81 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
83 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
84 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
87 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
89 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
91 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
92 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
93 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
94 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
95 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
96 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
98 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
102 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
103 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
104 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
105 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
108 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
110 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
111 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
112 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
114 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
115 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
117 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
119 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
120 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
121 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
123 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
127 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
129 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
132 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
136 enum InboundHTLCState {
137 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
138 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
139 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
140 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
141 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
142 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
143 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
144 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
145 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
146 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
147 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
148 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
149 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
150 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
151 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
153 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
154 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
155 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
156 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
157 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
158 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
159 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
160 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
161 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
162 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
163 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
164 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
165 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
166 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
168 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
169 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
170 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
171 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
172 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
173 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
174 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
175 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
177 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
178 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
180 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
181 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
182 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
183 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
184 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
185 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
186 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
187 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
190 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
191 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
193 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
194 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
195 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
196 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
197 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
198 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
199 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
200 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
201 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
202 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
203 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
204 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
210 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
214 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
215 state: InboundHTLCState,
218 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
219 enum OutboundHTLCState {
220 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
221 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
222 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
223 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
224 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
225 /// money back (though we won't), and,
226 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
227 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
228 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
229 /// we'll never get out of sync).
230 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
231 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
232 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
234 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
235 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
236 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
237 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
238 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
239 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
240 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
241 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
242 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
243 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
244 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
245 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
246 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
247 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
248 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
251 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
252 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
254 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
255 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
256 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
257 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
258 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
260 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
261 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
263 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
264 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
265 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
266 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
267 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
269 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
275 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
276 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
277 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
278 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
279 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
282 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
283 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
285 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
286 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
291 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
292 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
294 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
295 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
300 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
301 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
305 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
306 state: OutboundHTLCState,
308 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
309 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
312 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
313 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
314 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
315 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
319 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
321 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
322 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
323 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
324 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
327 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
332 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
337 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
341 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
342 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
343 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
344 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
345 struct $flag_type(u32);
350 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
353 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
355 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
358 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
361 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
362 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
365 Ok($flag_type(flags))
370 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
372 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
374 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
376 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
380 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
383 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
385 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
387 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
388 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
390 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
392 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
394 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
395 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
398 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
399 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
401 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
404 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
406 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
408 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
411 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
412 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
414 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
415 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
416 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
417 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
418 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
419 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
420 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
421 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
423 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
425 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
427 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
428 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
430 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
432 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
434 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
435 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
437 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
438 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
440 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
441 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
446 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
449 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
450 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
451 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
452 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
453 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
454 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
455 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
456 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
457 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
458 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
459 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
460 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
461 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
462 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
466 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
468 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
469 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
470 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
471 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
472 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
473 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
474 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
475 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
476 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
477 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
478 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
479 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
480 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
481 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
486 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
487 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
488 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
489 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
490 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
491 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
496 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
497 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
498 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
499 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
500 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
501 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
502 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
503 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
504 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
505 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
506 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
507 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
508 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
509 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
514 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
515 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
516 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
517 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
518 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
519 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
520 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
521 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
525 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
526 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
527 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
529 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
530 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
531 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
532 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
533 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
535 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
536 /// funding transaction to confirm.
537 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
538 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
540 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
541 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
542 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
546 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
547 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
549 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
552 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
561 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
563 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
567 fn $clear(&mut self) {
570 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
572 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
576 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
577 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
579 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
580 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
585 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
587 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
588 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
590 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
591 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
592 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
593 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
594 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
595 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
596 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
597 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
605 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
607 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
608 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
609 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
610 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
611 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
615 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
616 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
619 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
620 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
623 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
625 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
626 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
627 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
631 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
633 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
634 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
635 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
636 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
638 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
644 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
645 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
646 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
647 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
648 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
649 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
650 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
651 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
654 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
656 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
658 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
659 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
660 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
661 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
665 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
667 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
669 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
671 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
672 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
673 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
674 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
675 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
677 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
678 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
680 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
682 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
683 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
685 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
686 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
687 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
688 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
689 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
690 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
692 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
693 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
695 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
696 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
697 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
698 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
699 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
701 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
702 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
704 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
705 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
707 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
708 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
709 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
710 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
716 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
717 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
719 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
720 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
721 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
726 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
727 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
729 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
730 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
731 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
736 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
738 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
739 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
740 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
743 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
744 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
745 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
746 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
747 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
748 self.logger.log(record)
752 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
753 where L::Target: Logger {
754 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
755 where S::Target: SignerProvider
759 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
760 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
766 macro_rules! secp_check {
767 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
770 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
775 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
776 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
777 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
778 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
779 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
780 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
781 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
782 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
784 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
786 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
788 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
792 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
794 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
795 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
796 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
798 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
799 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
801 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
802 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
803 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
804 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
805 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
807 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
808 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
812 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
818 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
820 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
821 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
822 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
823 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
824 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
825 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
826 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
827 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
830 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
831 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
832 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
833 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
834 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
835 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
836 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
837 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
838 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
839 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
840 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
843 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
844 struct HTLCCandidate {
846 origin: HTLCInitiator,
850 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
858 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
860 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
862 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
863 htlc_value_msat: u64,
864 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
869 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
870 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
871 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
872 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
873 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
875 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
876 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
877 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
878 htlc_value_msat: u64,
880 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
881 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
885 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
886 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
887 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
888 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
889 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
890 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
891 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
892 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
893 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
894 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
895 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
896 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
899 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
901 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
902 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
903 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
904 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
907 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
908 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
909 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
910 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
911 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
912 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
913 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
914 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
917 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
919 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
920 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
921 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
922 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
923 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
924 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
925 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
926 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
927 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
928 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
929 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
930 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
931 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
932 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
933 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
936 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
937 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
938 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
939 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
940 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
941 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
942 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
943 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
944 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
945 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
946 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
947 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
948 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
949 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
950 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
952 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
953 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
954 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
955 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
957 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
958 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
959 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
960 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
962 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
963 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
964 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
965 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
966 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
968 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
969 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
970 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
971 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
973 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
974 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
975 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
977 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
978 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
979 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
980 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
981 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
983 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
984 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
987 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
988 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
990 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
991 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
992 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
993 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
995 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
996 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
998 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
999 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1002 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1003 (0, update, required),
1006 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1007 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1008 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1009 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1010 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1011 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1012 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1013 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1014 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1015 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1018 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1019 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1020 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1022 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1024 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1025 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1026 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1027 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1028 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1029 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1030 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1034 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1036 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1037 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1038 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1039 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1040 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1041 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1042 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1047 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1048 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1049 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1050 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1051 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1053 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1054 /// in a timely manner.
1055 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1058 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1059 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1060 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1062 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1063 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1064 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1065 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1069 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1070 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1071 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1073 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1074 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1075 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1076 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1078 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1082 /// The current channel ID.
1083 channel_id: ChannelId,
1084 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1085 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1086 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1087 channel_state: ChannelState,
1089 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1090 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1092 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1093 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1094 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1096 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1097 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1098 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1099 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1101 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1102 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1104 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1106 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1107 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1108 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1110 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1111 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1112 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1114 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1115 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1116 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1117 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1118 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1119 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1121 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1122 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1123 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1124 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1125 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1126 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1128 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1130 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1131 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1132 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1134 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1135 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1136 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1137 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1138 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1139 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1140 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1141 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1143 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1144 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1145 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1147 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1148 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1149 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1150 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1151 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1152 /// outbound or inbound.
1153 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1155 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1157 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1158 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1159 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1160 // HTLCs with similar state.
1161 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1162 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1163 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1164 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1165 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1166 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1167 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1168 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1169 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1170 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1172 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1173 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1174 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1176 update_time_counter: u32,
1178 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1179 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1180 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1181 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1182 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1183 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1185 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1186 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1188 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1189 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1190 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1191 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1193 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1194 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1196 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1198 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1200 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1201 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1202 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1203 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1204 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1206 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1207 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1209 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1210 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1211 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1213 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1214 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1215 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1216 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1217 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1218 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1219 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1220 pub(super) channel_creation_height: u32,
1222 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1225 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1227 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1230 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1232 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1235 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1237 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1239 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1240 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1243 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1245 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1247 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1248 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1250 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1252 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1253 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1254 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1256 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1258 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1259 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1260 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1262 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1263 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1264 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1266 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1268 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1270 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1271 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1272 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1273 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1275 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1276 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1277 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1279 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1280 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1281 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1283 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1284 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1285 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1286 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1287 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1288 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1289 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1290 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1292 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1293 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1294 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1295 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1296 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1298 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1299 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1301 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1302 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1303 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1304 /// unblock the state machine.
1306 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1307 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1308 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1310 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1311 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1312 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1314 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1315 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1316 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1317 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1318 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1319 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1320 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1321 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1323 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1324 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1326 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1327 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1328 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1330 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1331 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1332 // associated channel mapping.
1334 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1335 // to store all of them.
1336 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1338 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1339 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1340 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1341 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1342 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1344 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1345 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1347 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1348 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1350 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1351 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1353 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1354 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1356 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1358 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1360 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1361 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1362 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1365 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1366 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1367 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1368 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1369 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1370 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1371 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1373 config: &'a UserConfig,
1374 current_chain_height: u32,
1377 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1378 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1379 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1380 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1381 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1383 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1384 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1386 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1387 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1389 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1391 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1392 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1394 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1396 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1397 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1398 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1400 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1401 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1404 // Check sanity of message fields:
1405 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1406 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1407 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1408 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1409 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1411 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1412 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1414 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1415 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1417 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1418 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1419 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1421 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1422 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1424 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1425 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1427 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1429 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1430 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1431 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1433 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1436 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1437 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1440 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1441 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1442 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1444 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1445 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1447 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1448 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1450 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1451 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1453 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1454 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1456 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1457 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1459 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1460 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1463 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1465 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1466 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1467 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1471 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1472 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1473 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1474 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1476 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1477 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1479 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1480 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1481 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1483 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1484 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1487 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1488 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1489 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1490 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1494 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1495 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1496 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1497 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1500 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1501 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1502 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1503 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1504 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1507 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1508 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1509 &Some(ref script) => {
1510 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1511 if script.len() == 0 {
1514 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1515 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1517 Some(script.clone())
1520 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1522 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1527 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1528 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1529 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1530 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1534 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1535 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1536 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1540 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1541 Ok(script) => script,
1542 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1545 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1546 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1548 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1551 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1554 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1556 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1558 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1561 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1562 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1564 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1569 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1571 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1572 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1573 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1574 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1576 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1579 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1581 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1582 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1585 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1586 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1589 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1590 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1591 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1592 pending_update_fee: None,
1593 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1594 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1595 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1596 update_time_counter: 1,
1598 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1600 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1601 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1602 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1603 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1604 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1605 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1606 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1608 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1609 signer_pending_funding: false,
1612 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1613 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1614 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1615 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1617 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1618 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1619 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1620 closing_fee_limits: None,
1621 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1623 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1624 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1625 short_channel_id: None,
1626 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1628 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1629 channel_value_satoshis,
1630 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1631 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1632 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1633 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1634 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1635 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1636 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1637 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1638 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1639 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1642 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1644 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1645 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1646 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1647 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1648 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1649 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1650 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1652 funding_outpoint: None,
1653 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1655 funding_transaction: None,
1656 is_batch_funding: None,
1658 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1659 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1660 counterparty_node_id,
1662 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1664 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1666 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1667 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1669 announcement_sigs: None,
1671 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1672 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1673 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1674 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1676 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1677 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1679 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1680 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1682 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1683 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1685 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1686 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1691 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1693 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1699 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1700 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1701 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1702 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1703 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1704 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1705 funding_satoshis: u64,
1708 config: &'a UserConfig,
1709 current_chain_height: u32,
1710 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1711 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1712 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1713 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1714 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1715 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1716 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1718 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1719 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1720 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1722 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1723 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1725 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1727 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1728 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1730 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1731 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1733 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1734 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1735 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1737 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1738 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1741 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1742 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1744 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1745 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1747 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1749 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1751 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1752 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1753 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1754 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1757 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1758 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1760 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1761 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1762 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1763 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1767 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1768 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1769 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1773 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1774 Ok(script) => script,
1775 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1778 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1783 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1784 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1785 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1786 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1791 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1793 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1794 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1795 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1796 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1798 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1799 channel_value_satoshis,
1801 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1803 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1804 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1807 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1808 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1811 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1812 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1813 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1814 pending_update_fee: None,
1815 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1816 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1817 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1818 update_time_counter: 1,
1820 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1822 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1823 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1824 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1825 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1826 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1827 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1828 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1830 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1831 signer_pending_funding: false,
1833 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
1834 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1835 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1836 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1837 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1838 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1840 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1841 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1842 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1843 closing_fee_limits: None,
1844 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1846 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1847 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1848 short_channel_id: None,
1849 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1851 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
1852 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1853 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1854 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1855 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
1856 // receive `accept_channel2`.
1857 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1858 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1859 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1860 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1861 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1862 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1863 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1864 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1866 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1868 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1869 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1870 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1871 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1872 counterparty_parameters: None,
1873 funding_outpoint: None,
1874 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1876 funding_transaction: None,
1877 is_batch_funding: None,
1879 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1880 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1881 counterparty_node_id,
1883 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1885 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1887 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1888 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1890 announcement_sigs: None,
1892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1893 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1895 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1897 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1898 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1900 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1901 outbound_scid_alias,
1903 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1904 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1906 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1907 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1912 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1913 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1917 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1918 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1919 self.update_time_counter
1922 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1923 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1926 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1927 self.config.announced_channel
1930 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1931 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1934 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1935 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1936 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1937 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1940 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1941 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1942 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1945 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1946 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1947 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1948 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1949 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1950 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1951 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1954 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1955 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1956 match self.channel_state {
1957 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1958 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1959 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1960 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1961 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1962 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1963 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1965 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1967 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1968 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1972 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1973 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1974 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1975 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1976 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1977 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1980 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1981 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1982 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1986 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1987 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1988 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1989 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1990 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1993 // Public utilities:
1995 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1999 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2001 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2002 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2003 self.temporary_channel_id
2006 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2010 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2011 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2012 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2016 /// Gets the channel's type
2017 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2021 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2023 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2024 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2025 self.short_channel_id
2028 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2029 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2030 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2033 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2034 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2035 self.outbound_scid_alias
2038 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2040 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2041 return &self.holder_signer
2044 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2045 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2046 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2047 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2048 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2049 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2052 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2053 /// get_funding_created.
2054 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2055 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2058 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2059 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2060 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2061 if conf_height > 0 {
2068 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2069 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2070 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2073 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2074 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2075 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2076 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2080 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2083 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2084 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2087 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2088 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2091 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2092 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2093 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2096 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2097 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2100 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2101 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2102 self.counterparty_node_id
2105 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2106 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2107 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2110 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2111 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2112 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2115 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2116 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2118 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2119 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2120 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2121 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2123 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2127 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2128 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2129 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2132 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2133 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2134 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2137 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2138 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2139 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2141 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2142 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2147 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2148 self.channel_value_satoshis
2151 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2152 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2155 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2156 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2159 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2160 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2161 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2162 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2165 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2166 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2167 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2168 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2170 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2174 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2175 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2176 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2179 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2180 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2181 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2184 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2185 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2186 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2189 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2190 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2191 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2194 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2195 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2196 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2199 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2200 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2201 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2204 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2205 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2206 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2207 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2208 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2211 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2213 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2214 self.prev_config = None;
2218 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2219 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2223 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2224 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2225 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2226 let did_channel_update =
2227 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2228 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2229 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2230 if did_channel_update {
2231 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2232 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2233 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2234 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2236 self.config.options = *config;
2240 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2241 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2242 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2243 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2244 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2247 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2248 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2249 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2250 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2251 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2253 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2254 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2255 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2256 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2257 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2258 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2259 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2261 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2262 where L::Target: Logger
2264 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2265 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2266 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2268 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2269 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2270 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2271 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2273 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2274 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2275 if match update_state {
2276 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2277 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2278 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2279 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2280 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2282 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2286 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2287 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2288 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2290 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2292 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2293 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2294 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2296 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2297 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2298 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2299 transaction_output_index: None
2304 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2305 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2306 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2307 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2308 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2311 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2313 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2314 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2315 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2317 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2318 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2321 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2322 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2325 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2327 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2328 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2329 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2331 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2332 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2338 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2340 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2341 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2342 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2343 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2344 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2345 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2346 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2350 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2351 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2353 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2355 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2356 if generated_by_local {
2357 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2358 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2359 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2369 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2371 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2372 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2373 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2374 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2375 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2376 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2377 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2380 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2381 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2382 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2387 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2388 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2392 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2393 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2395 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2397 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2398 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2400 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2401 if !generated_by_local {
2402 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2410 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2411 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2412 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2413 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2414 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2415 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2416 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2417 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2419 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2421 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2422 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2423 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2424 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2426 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2428 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2429 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2430 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2431 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2434 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2435 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2436 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2437 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2439 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2442 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2443 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2444 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2445 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2447 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2450 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2451 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2456 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2457 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2462 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2464 let channel_parameters =
2465 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2466 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2467 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2474 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2477 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2478 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2479 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2480 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2488 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2489 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2490 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2491 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2496 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2497 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2498 /// our counterparty!)
2499 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2500 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2501 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2502 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2503 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2504 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2505 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2507 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2511 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2512 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2513 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2514 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2515 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2516 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2517 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2519 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2522 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2523 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2524 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2525 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2526 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2529 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2530 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2533 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2537 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2538 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2539 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2540 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2541 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2542 // which are near the dust limit.
2543 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2544 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2545 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2546 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2547 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2549 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2550 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2552 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2553 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2556 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2557 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2558 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2561 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2562 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2564 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2566 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2567 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2570 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2571 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2574 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2575 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2577 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2578 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2580 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2583 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2584 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2585 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2586 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2587 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2588 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2590 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2592 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2593 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2598 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2599 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2600 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2601 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2603 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2604 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2605 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2606 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2607 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2608 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2610 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2612 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2613 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2617 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2618 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2619 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2620 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2621 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2622 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2623 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2625 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2627 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2628 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2630 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2636 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2637 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2638 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2639 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2640 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2641 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2642 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2643 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2644 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2645 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2646 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2647 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2648 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2649 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2650 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2651 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2652 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2657 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2658 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2659 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2660 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2661 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2662 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2663 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2664 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2668 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2669 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2670 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2671 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2672 match holding_cell_update {
2673 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2674 holding_cell_states.insert(
2676 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2679 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2680 holding_cell_states.insert(
2682 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2685 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2686 holding_cell_states.insert(
2688 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2692 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2695 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2696 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2699 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2700 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2702 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2703 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2704 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2705 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2706 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2707 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2708 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2709 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2710 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2711 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2718 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2719 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2720 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2721 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2724 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2725 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2727 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2728 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2729 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2730 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2731 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2732 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2733 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2734 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2735 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2736 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2739 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2740 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2746 } = *holding_cell_update {
2747 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2749 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2750 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2751 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2752 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2753 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2754 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2761 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2762 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2763 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2764 /// corner case properly.
2765 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2766 -> AvailableBalances
2767 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2769 let context = &self;
2770 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
2773 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
2774 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2776 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2777 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2778 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2779 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2782 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
2784 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2785 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
2787 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2789 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2791 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2792 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2796 if context.is_outbound() {
2797 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2798 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2800 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2801 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2803 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2804 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2805 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2806 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2809 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2810 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2811 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2812 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2813 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2814 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2815 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2818 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2819 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2820 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2821 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2822 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2823 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2824 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2825 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2826 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2827 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2828 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2830 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2833 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2834 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2835 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2836 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2837 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2840 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2841 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2843 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2844 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2845 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2847 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2848 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2849 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2850 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2854 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2856 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2857 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2858 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2859 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2860 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2861 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2862 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2864 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2865 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2867 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2868 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2869 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2872 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2873 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2874 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
2875 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
2876 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
2877 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
2878 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2879 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
2880 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
2881 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2885 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
2886 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
2887 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
2888 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2889 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
2890 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2893 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2894 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2895 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2896 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
2897 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2900 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2901 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2902 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2904 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2908 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2909 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2911 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
2912 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2916 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2917 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2918 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2919 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2921 outbound_capacity_msat,
2922 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2923 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2928 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2929 let context = &self;
2930 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2933 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2934 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2936 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2937 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2939 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2940 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2942 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2943 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2944 let context = &self;
2945 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2947 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2950 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2951 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2953 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2954 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2956 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2957 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2959 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2960 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2964 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2965 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2971 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2972 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2973 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2976 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2977 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2978 included_htlcs += 1;
2981 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2982 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2986 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2987 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2988 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2989 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2990 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2991 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2996 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2998 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2999 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3004 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3005 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3009 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3010 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3011 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3014 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3015 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3017 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3018 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3019 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3021 total_pending_htlcs,
3022 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3023 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3024 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3026 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3027 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3028 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3030 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3032 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3037 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3038 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3040 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3041 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3043 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3044 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3046 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3047 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3048 let context = &self;
3049 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3051 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3054 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3055 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3057 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3058 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3060 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3061 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3063 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3064 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3068 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3069 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3075 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3076 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3077 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3078 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3079 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3080 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3083 included_htlcs += 1;
3086 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3087 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3090 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3091 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3093 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3094 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3095 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3100 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3101 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3102 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3105 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3106 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3108 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3109 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3111 total_pending_htlcs,
3112 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3113 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3114 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3116 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3117 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3118 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3120 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3122 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3127 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3128 match self.channel_state {
3129 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3130 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3131 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3132 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3142 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3144 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3145 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3148 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3150 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3151 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3152 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3156 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3157 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3158 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3161 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3163 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3164 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3167 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3168 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3169 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3170 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3171 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3172 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3173 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3174 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3175 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3176 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3177 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3179 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3180 // return them to fail the payment.
3181 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3182 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3183 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3185 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3186 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3191 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3192 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3193 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3194 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3195 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3196 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3197 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3198 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3199 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3200 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3201 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3202 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3203 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3204 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3205 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3209 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3210 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3212 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3213 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3217 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3218 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3219 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3220 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3221 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3222 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3223 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3224 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3228 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3229 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3230 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3231 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3233 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3234 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3235 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3236 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3238 match &self.holder_signer {
3239 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3240 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3241 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3242 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3243 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3246 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3250 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3251 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3252 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3254 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3255 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3256 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3258 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3259 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3260 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3263 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3264 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3266 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3272 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3273 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3274 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3275 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3276 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3279 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3281 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3283 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3284 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3289 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3290 // We've exhausted our options
3293 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3294 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3297 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3298 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3299 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3300 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3302 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3303 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3304 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3305 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3306 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3307 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3309 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3311 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3316 // Internal utility functions for channels
3318 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3319 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3320 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3322 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3324 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3325 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3326 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3328 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3331 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3333 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3336 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3337 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3338 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3340 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3342 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3343 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3344 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3345 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3346 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3349 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3350 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3351 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3352 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3353 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3354 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3355 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3358 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3359 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3361 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3363 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3364 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3365 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3366 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3367 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3368 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3369 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3372 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3373 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3375 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3376 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3379 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3380 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3381 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3382 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3383 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3384 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3387 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3388 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3389 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3390 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3391 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3392 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3398 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3399 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3400 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3401 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3402 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3403 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3404 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3405 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3406 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3407 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3408 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3409 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3412 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3413 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3414 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3415 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3416 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3417 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3420 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3421 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3423 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3424 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3425 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3429 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3430 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3431 trait FailHTLCContents {
3432 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3433 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3434 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3435 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3437 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3438 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3439 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3440 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3442 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3443 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3445 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3446 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3449 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3450 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3451 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3452 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3455 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3456 failure_code: self.1
3459 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3460 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3462 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3463 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3465 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3466 failure_code: self.1
3471 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3472 fn name() -> &'static str;
3474 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3475 fn name() -> &'static str {
3479 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3480 fn name() -> &'static str {
3481 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3485 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3486 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3487 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3489 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3490 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3491 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3492 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3494 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3495 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3497 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3499 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3500 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3501 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3502 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3504 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3505 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3515 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3516 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3517 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3518 // outside of those situations will fail.
3519 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3523 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3528 1 + // script length (0)
3532 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3533 2 + // witness marker and flag
3534 1 + // witness element count
3535 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3536 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3537 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3538 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3539 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3540 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3542 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3543 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3544 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3550 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3551 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3552 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3553 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3555 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3556 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3557 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3559 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3560 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3561 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3562 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3563 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3564 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3567 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3568 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3571 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3572 value_to_holder = 0;
3575 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3576 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3577 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3578 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3580 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3581 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3584 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3585 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3588 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3591 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3592 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3594 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3596 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3597 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3598 where L::Target: Logger {
3599 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3600 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3601 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3602 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3603 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3604 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3605 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3606 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3610 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3611 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3612 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3613 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3615 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3616 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3619 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3620 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3621 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3623 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3624 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3625 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3626 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3627 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3628 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3629 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3631 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3632 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3633 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3635 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3636 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3638 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3641 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3642 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3646 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3650 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3651 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3652 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3653 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3654 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3655 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3658 // Now update local state:
3660 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3661 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3662 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3663 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3664 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3665 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3666 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3667 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3669 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3672 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3673 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3674 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3675 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3676 // do not not get into this branch.
3677 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3678 match pending_update {
3679 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3680 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3681 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3682 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3683 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3684 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3685 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3688 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3689 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3691 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3692 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3693 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3694 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3695 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3696 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3702 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3703 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3704 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3707 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3708 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3711 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3714 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3715 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3717 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3718 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3720 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3721 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3724 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3727 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3728 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3729 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3730 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3735 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3736 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3737 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3738 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3739 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3740 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3741 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3742 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3743 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3744 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3745 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3746 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3747 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3748 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3749 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3751 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3752 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3753 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3754 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3755 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3758 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3759 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3760 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3766 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3767 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3769 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3773 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3774 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3775 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3776 /// before we fail backwards.
3778 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3779 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3780 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3781 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3782 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3783 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3784 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3787 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3788 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3790 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3791 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3792 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3793 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3794 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3795 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3798 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3799 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3800 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3801 /// before we fail backwards.
3803 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3804 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3805 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3806 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3807 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3809 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3810 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3811 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3814 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3815 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3816 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3818 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3819 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3820 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3822 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3823 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3824 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3826 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3831 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3832 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3838 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3839 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3840 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3841 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3842 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3846 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3847 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3848 force_holding_cell = true;
3851 // Now update local state:
3852 if force_holding_cell {
3853 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3854 match pending_update {
3855 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3856 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3858 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3862 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3863 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3865 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3866 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3867 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3873 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3874 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3878 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3879 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3881 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3882 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3885 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3888 // Message handlers:
3889 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3890 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3891 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3892 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3893 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3894 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3895 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3898 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3900 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3902 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3903 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3904 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3905 debug_assert!(matches!(
3906 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3908 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3909 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3912 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3913 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3915 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3916 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3917 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3918 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3920 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3923 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3924 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3925 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3928 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3929 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3930 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3931 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3932 // when routing outbound payments.
3933 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3937 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3938 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3939 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3940 match &self.context.channel_state {
3941 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3942 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
3943 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3944 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3945 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3946 check_reconnection = true;
3947 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3948 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3949 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3950 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3951 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3953 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3954 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3957 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3958 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3959 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3961 if check_reconnection {
3962 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3963 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3964 let expected_point =
3965 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3966 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3968 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3969 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3970 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3971 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3972 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3973 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3975 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3976 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3977 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3978 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3979 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3981 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3987 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3988 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3990 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3992 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
3995 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
3996 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3997 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3998 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
3999 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4000 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4002 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4003 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4004 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4006 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4009 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4010 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4012 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4013 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4015 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4016 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4019 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4020 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4021 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4022 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4024 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4028 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4029 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4030 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4031 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4032 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4033 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4034 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4035 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4036 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4037 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4038 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4040 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4041 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4042 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4043 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4044 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4045 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4049 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4050 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4051 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4052 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4053 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4054 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4057 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4058 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4060 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4061 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4062 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4064 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4065 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4069 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4070 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4072 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4073 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4077 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4078 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4082 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4083 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4084 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4085 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4086 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4087 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4090 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4093 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4094 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4097 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4098 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4099 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4103 // Now update local state:
4104 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4105 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4106 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4107 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4108 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4109 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4110 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4111 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4117 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4119 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4120 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4121 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4122 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4123 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4124 None => fail_reason.into(),
4125 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4126 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4127 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4130 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4134 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4136 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4137 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4139 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4145 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4148 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4149 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4150 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4152 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4156 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4159 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4160 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4163 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4167 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4171 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4172 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4173 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4175 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4179 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4183 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4184 where L::Target: Logger
4186 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4187 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4189 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4190 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4192 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4196 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4198 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4200 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4201 let commitment_txid = {
4202 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4203 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4204 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4206 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4207 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4208 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4209 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4210 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4215 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4217 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4218 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4219 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4220 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4223 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4224 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4225 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4226 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4229 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4231 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4232 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4233 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4234 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4235 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4236 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4237 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4238 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4239 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4240 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4241 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4247 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4251 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4252 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4253 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4254 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4255 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4256 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4257 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4258 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4259 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4260 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4261 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4262 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4263 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4266 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4267 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4268 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4269 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4270 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4271 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4272 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4274 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4275 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4276 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4277 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4278 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4279 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4280 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4281 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4283 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4284 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4287 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4289 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4290 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4291 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4294 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4297 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4298 commitment_stats.tx,
4300 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4301 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4302 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4305 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4306 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4308 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4309 let mut need_commitment = false;
4310 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4311 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4312 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4313 need_commitment = true;
4317 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4318 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4319 Some(resolution.clone())
4321 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4322 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4323 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4324 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4325 need_commitment = true;
4328 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4329 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4330 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4331 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4332 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4333 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4334 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4335 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4336 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4337 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4338 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4339 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4340 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4341 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4343 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4345 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4346 need_commitment = true;
4350 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4351 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4352 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4353 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4354 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4355 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4356 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4358 nondust_htlc_sources,
4360 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4363 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4364 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4365 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4366 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4367 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4369 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4370 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4371 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4372 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4373 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4374 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4375 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4376 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4377 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4378 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4379 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4380 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4381 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4382 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4384 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4385 &self.context.channel_id);
4386 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4389 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4390 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4391 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4392 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4393 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4394 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4395 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4396 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4397 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4401 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4402 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4403 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4404 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4407 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4408 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4409 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4410 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4411 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4412 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4413 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4415 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4416 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4417 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4420 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4421 /// for our counterparty.
4422 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4423 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4424 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4425 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4427 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4428 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4429 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4430 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4432 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4433 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4434 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4435 updates: Vec::new(),
4436 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4439 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4440 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4441 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4442 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4443 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4444 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4445 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4446 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4447 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4448 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4449 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4450 // to rebalance channels.
4451 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4452 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4453 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4454 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4456 match self.send_htlc(
4457 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4458 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4460 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4463 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4464 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4465 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4466 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4467 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4468 // into the holding cell without ever being
4469 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4470 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4471 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4474 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4481 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4482 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4483 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4484 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4485 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4486 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4487 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4488 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4489 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4490 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4491 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4492 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4495 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4496 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4497 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4499 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4500 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4501 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4504 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4506 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4507 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4508 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4509 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4510 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4511 // for a full revocation before failing.
4512 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4513 update_fail_count += 1;
4515 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4517 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4522 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4523 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4525 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4526 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4531 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4532 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4533 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4534 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4535 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4537 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4538 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4539 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4541 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4542 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4548 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4549 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4550 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4551 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4552 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4553 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4554 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4555 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4556 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4558 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4561 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4562 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4564 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4565 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4568 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4570 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4571 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4576 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4577 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4578 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4579 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4580 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4581 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4582 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4583 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4584 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4587 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4589 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4590 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4593 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4594 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4595 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4596 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4598 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4600 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4605 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4606 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4607 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4608 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4609 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4610 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4611 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4612 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4613 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4615 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4618 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4619 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4620 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4621 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4622 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4623 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4624 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4625 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4626 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4628 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4629 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4632 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4633 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4634 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4635 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4636 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4637 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4638 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4639 let mut require_commitment = false;
4640 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4643 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4644 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4645 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4646 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4648 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4649 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4650 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4651 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4652 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4653 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4655 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4659 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4660 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4661 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4662 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4663 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4665 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4666 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4667 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4672 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4673 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4675 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4679 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4680 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4682 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4683 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4684 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4685 require_commitment = true;
4686 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4688 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4689 match pending_htlc_status {
4690 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4691 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4692 require_commitment = true;
4694 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4695 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4696 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4698 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4699 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4700 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4704 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4705 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4706 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4707 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4710 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4711 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4712 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4713 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4719 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4720 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4721 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4722 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4723 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4725 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4726 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4727 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4728 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4729 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4730 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4731 require_commitment = true;
4735 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4737 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4738 match update_state {
4739 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4740 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4741 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4742 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4743 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4744 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4746 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4747 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4748 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4749 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4750 require_commitment = true;
4751 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4752 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4757 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4758 let release_state_str =
4759 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4760 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4761 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4762 if !release_monitor {
4763 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4764 update: monitor_update,
4766 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4768 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4773 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4775 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4776 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4777 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4778 if require_commitment {
4779 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4780 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4781 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4782 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4784 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4785 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4786 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4787 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4788 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4790 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4791 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4792 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4793 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4794 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4797 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4798 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4799 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4800 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4801 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4802 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4804 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4805 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4807 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4808 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4810 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4811 if require_commitment {
4812 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4814 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4815 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4816 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4817 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4819 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4820 &self.context.channel_id(),
4821 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4824 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4825 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4827 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4828 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4830 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4831 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4837 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4838 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4839 /// commitment update.
4840 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4841 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4842 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4844 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4845 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4848 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4849 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4850 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4851 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4853 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4854 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4855 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4856 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4857 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4858 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4859 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4861 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4862 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4864 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4865 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4867 if !self.context.is_live() {
4868 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4871 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4872 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4873 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4874 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4875 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4876 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4877 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
4878 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4879 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4880 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4884 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4885 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4886 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4887 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4890 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4891 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4895 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4896 force_holding_cell = true;
4899 if force_holding_cell {
4900 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4904 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4905 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4907 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4908 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4913 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4914 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4916 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4918 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4919 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4920 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4921 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4925 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4926 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4927 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4931 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4932 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4935 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4936 // will be retransmitted.
4937 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4938 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4939 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4941 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4942 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4944 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4945 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4946 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4947 // this HTLC accordingly
4948 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4951 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4952 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4953 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4954 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4957 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4958 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4959 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4960 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4961 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4962 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4967 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4969 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4970 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4971 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4972 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4976 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4977 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4978 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4979 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4980 // the update upon reconnection.
4981 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4985 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4987 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4988 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4992 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4993 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4994 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4995 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4996 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4997 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4998 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5000 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5001 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5002 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5003 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5004 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5005 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5006 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5008 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5009 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5010 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5011 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5012 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5013 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5014 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5017 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5018 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5019 /// to the remote side.
5020 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5021 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5022 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5023 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5026 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5028 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5029 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5031 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5032 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5033 // first received the funding_signed.
5034 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5035 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5036 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5037 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5039 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5041 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5042 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5043 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5044 funding_broadcastable = None;
5047 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5048 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5049 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5050 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5051 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5052 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5053 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5054 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5055 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5056 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5057 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5058 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5059 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5060 next_per_commitment_point,
5061 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5065 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5067 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5068 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5069 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5070 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5071 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5072 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5073 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5074 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5076 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5077 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5078 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5079 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5080 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5081 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5082 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5086 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5087 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5089 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5090 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5092 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5093 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5096 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5097 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5098 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5099 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5100 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5101 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5102 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5103 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5104 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5105 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5109 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5110 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5112 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5115 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5118 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5120 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5121 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5122 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5123 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5124 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5125 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5126 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5127 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5128 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5130 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5131 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5132 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5137 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5139 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5140 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5141 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5142 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5144 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5145 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5147 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5148 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5151 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5152 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5153 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5154 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5156 SignerResumeUpdates {
5163 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5164 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5165 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5166 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5167 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5168 per_commitment_secret,
5169 next_per_commitment_point,
5171 next_local_nonce: None,
5175 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5176 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5177 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5178 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5179 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5180 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5182 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5183 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5184 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5185 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5186 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5187 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5188 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5189 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5190 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5191 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5192 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5197 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5198 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5200 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5201 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5202 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5203 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5204 reason: err_packet.clone()
5207 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5208 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5209 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5210 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5211 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5212 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5215 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5216 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5217 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5218 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5219 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5226 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5227 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5228 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5229 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5233 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5234 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5235 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5236 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5237 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5238 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5239 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5243 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5244 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5246 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5247 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5248 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5249 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5254 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5255 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5260 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5261 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5262 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5263 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5264 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5265 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5266 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5271 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5272 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5274 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5275 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5276 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5277 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5278 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5279 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5280 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5281 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5284 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5286 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5287 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5288 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5289 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5293 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5294 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5298 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5299 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5300 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5301 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5302 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5303 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5306 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5307 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5308 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5309 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5310 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5313 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5314 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5315 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5316 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5317 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5318 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5319 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5320 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5324 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5325 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5326 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5327 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5328 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5329 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5330 our_commitment_transaction
5334 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5335 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5336 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5337 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5339 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5341 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5343 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5344 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5345 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5346 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5347 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5350 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5351 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5352 channel_ready: None,
5353 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5354 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5355 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5359 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5360 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5361 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5362 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5363 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5364 next_per_commitment_point,
5365 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5367 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5368 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5369 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5373 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5374 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5375 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5377 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5378 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5379 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5382 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5385 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5386 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5387 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5388 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5389 our_commitment_transaction
5393 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5394 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5395 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5396 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5397 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5398 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5399 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5401 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5403 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5404 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5405 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5406 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5407 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5408 next_per_commitment_point,
5409 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5413 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5414 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5415 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5417 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5420 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5421 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5422 raa: required_revoke,
5423 commitment_update: None,
5424 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5426 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5427 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5428 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5430 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5433 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5434 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5435 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5436 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5437 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5438 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5441 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5442 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5443 raa: required_revoke,
5444 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5445 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5448 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5449 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5450 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5451 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5452 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5455 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5456 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5457 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5458 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5463 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5464 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5465 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5466 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5468 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5470 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5472 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5473 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5474 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5475 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5476 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5477 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5478 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5479 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5481 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5482 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5483 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5484 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5485 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5487 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5488 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5489 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5490 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5493 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5494 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5495 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5496 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5497 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5498 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5499 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5500 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5501 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5502 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5503 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5504 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5505 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5506 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5507 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5509 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5512 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5513 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5516 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5517 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5518 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5519 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5520 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5521 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5524 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5525 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5526 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5527 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5528 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5529 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5530 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5532 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5538 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5539 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5540 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5541 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5543 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5544 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5545 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5546 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5547 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5548 return Ok((None, None, None));
5551 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5552 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5553 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5555 return Ok((None, None, None));
5558 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5559 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5560 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5561 return Ok((None, None, None));
5564 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5566 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5567 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5568 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5569 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5571 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5572 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5574 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5575 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5577 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5578 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5579 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5580 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5582 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5583 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5584 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5588 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5594 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5595 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5597 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5598 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5601 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5602 /// within our expected timeframe.
5604 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5605 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5606 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5609 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5612 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5613 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5617 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5618 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5620 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5623 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5624 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5625 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5626 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5627 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5629 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5630 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5631 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5634 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5636 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5637 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5640 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5641 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5642 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5645 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5648 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5649 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5650 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5651 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5653 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5656 assert!(send_shutdown);
5657 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5658 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5659 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5661 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5662 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5664 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5669 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5671 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5672 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5674 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5675 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5676 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5677 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5678 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5679 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5680 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5682 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5684 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5685 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5687 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5688 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5689 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5690 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5694 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5695 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5696 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5697 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5698 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5699 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5701 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5702 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5709 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5710 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5712 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5715 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5716 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5718 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5720 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5721 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5722 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5723 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5724 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5725 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5726 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5727 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5728 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5730 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5731 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5734 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5738 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5739 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5740 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5741 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5743 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5744 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5746 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5749 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5750 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5752 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5756 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5760 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5761 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5762 return Ok((None, None, None));
5765 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5766 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5767 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5768 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5770 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5772 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5775 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5776 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5777 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5778 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5779 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5783 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5784 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < Amount::from_sat(MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS) {
5785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5789 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5790 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5792 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5795 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5796 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5797 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5798 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5800 monitor_update: None,
5801 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5802 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5803 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5804 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5805 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5806 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5807 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5808 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5810 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5811 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5812 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5813 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5817 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5819 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5820 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5821 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5822 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5824 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5827 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5828 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5830 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5831 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5832 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5833 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5835 monitor_update: None,
5836 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5837 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5838 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5839 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5840 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5841 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5842 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5843 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5845 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5846 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5847 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5848 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5853 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5854 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5855 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5856 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5858 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5859 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5860 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5862 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5864 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5871 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5872 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5873 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5875 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5876 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5878 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5882 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5883 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5884 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5885 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5886 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5888 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5889 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5890 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5892 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5893 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5896 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5897 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5898 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5899 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5900 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5901 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5902 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5903 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5905 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5908 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5909 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5910 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5911 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5913 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5917 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5918 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5919 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5920 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5922 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5928 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5929 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5930 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5931 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5932 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5933 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5934 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5936 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5937 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5940 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5942 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5943 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5949 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5950 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5951 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5952 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5953 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5954 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5955 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5957 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5958 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5965 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5966 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
5967 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
5969 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5972 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5973 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
5976 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5977 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5978 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5979 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5982 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5983 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
5984 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
5986 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5987 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5988 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
5989 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5990 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5991 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
5992 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
5995 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
5996 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
5997 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
5998 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
5999 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6000 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6001 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6002 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6006 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6007 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6008 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6009 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6010 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6011 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6012 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6016 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6017 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6022 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6023 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6024 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6025 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6026 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6027 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6031 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6032 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6033 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6034 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6036 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6037 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6038 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6039 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6040 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6041 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6042 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6043 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6044 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6046 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6047 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6048 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6055 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6056 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
6059 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6060 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6063 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6064 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6068 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6069 &self.context.holder_signer
6073 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6075 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6076 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6077 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6078 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6079 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6080 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6082 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6084 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6092 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6093 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6097 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6098 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6099 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6100 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6103 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6104 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6105 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6106 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6109 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6110 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6111 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6112 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6113 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6114 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6117 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6118 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6119 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6120 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6121 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6122 if !release_monitor {
6123 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6132 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6133 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6134 /// here after logging them.
6135 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6136 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6137 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6138 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6141 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6142 update.update.update_id,
6152 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6153 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6156 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6157 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6158 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6160 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6161 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6163 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6164 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6166 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6167 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6168 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6171 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6172 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6173 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6174 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6175 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6176 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6178 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6179 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6180 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6182 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6183 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6184 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6185 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6186 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6187 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6193 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6194 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6195 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6196 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6199 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6200 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6201 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6204 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6205 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6206 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6209 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6210 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6211 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6214 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6215 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6216 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6217 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6218 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6221 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6222 self.context.channel_update_status
6225 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6226 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6227 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6230 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
6232 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6233 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6234 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6238 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6239 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6240 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6243 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6247 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6248 // channel_ready yet.
6249 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6253 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6254 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6255 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6256 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6258 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6259 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6260 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6262 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6263 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6266 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6267 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6269 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6270 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6271 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6272 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6273 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6274 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6275 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6276 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6278 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6282 if need_commitment_update {
6283 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6284 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6285 let next_per_commitment_point =
6286 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6287 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6288 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6289 next_per_commitment_point,
6290 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6294 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6300 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6301 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6302 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6303 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6304 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6305 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6306 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6308 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6311 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6312 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6313 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6314 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6315 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6316 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6317 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6318 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6319 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh() ||
6320 tx.output[txo_idx].value.to_sat() != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6321 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6322 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6323 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6324 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6325 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6326 // channel and move on.
6327 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6328 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6330 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6331 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6332 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6334 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6335 if !tx.is_coinbase() {
6336 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6337 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6338 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6339 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6340 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6341 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6346 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6347 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6348 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6349 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6350 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6353 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6354 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6355 if tx.is_coinbase() &&
6356 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6357 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6358 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6361 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6362 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6363 // may have already happened for this block).
6364 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6365 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6366 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6367 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6370 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6371 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6372 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6373 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6381 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6382 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6383 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6384 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6386 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6387 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6390 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6392 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6393 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6394 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6395 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6397 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6400 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6403 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6404 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6405 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6406 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6408 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6411 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6412 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6413 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6415 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6416 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6418 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6419 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6420 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6428 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6430 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6431 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6432 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6434 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6435 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6438 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6439 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6440 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6441 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6442 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6443 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6444 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6445 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6448 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6449 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6450 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6451 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6453 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6454 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6455 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6457 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6458 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6459 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6460 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6462 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6463 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6464 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6465 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6466 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6467 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6468 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6471 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6472 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6474 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6477 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6478 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6479 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6480 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6481 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6482 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6483 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6484 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6485 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6486 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6487 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6488 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6489 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6490 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6491 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6492 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6493 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6499 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6504 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6505 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6507 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6508 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6509 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6510 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6512 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6515 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6517 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6518 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6519 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6520 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6521 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6522 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6524 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6525 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6528 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6529 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6530 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6531 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6532 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6533 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6535 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6536 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6539 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6540 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6541 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6542 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6543 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6549 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6550 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6551 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6552 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6554 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6557 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6561 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6565 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6566 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6570 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6574 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6575 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6578 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6582 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6584 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6589 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6590 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6591 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6593 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6598 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6600 None => return None,
6603 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6605 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6606 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6608 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6609 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6612 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6618 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6620 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6621 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6622 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6623 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6624 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6625 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6626 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6628 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6629 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6630 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6631 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6632 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6633 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6634 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6635 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6636 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6637 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6638 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6639 contents: announcement,
6642 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6647 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6651 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6652 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6653 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6654 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6655 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6656 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6657 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6658 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6660 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6662 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6664 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6665 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6667 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6668 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6669 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6670 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6673 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6674 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6675 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6676 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6679 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6682 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6683 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6684 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6685 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6686 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6687 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6690 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6692 Err(_) => return None,
6694 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6695 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6700 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6701 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6702 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6703 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6704 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6705 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6706 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6707 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6708 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6709 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6710 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6711 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6712 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6713 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6714 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6715 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6718 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6721 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6722 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6723 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6724 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6725 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6726 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6727 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6728 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6729 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6731 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6732 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6733 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6734 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6735 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6736 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6737 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6738 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6739 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6741 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6742 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6743 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6744 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6745 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6746 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6747 next_funding_txid: None,
6752 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6754 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6755 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6756 /// commitment update.
6758 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6759 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6760 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6761 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6762 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6763 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6764 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6767 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6768 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6769 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6771 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6772 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6777 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6778 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6780 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6782 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6783 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6785 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6786 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6787 /// regenerate them.
6789 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6790 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6792 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6793 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6794 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6795 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6796 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6797 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6798 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6799 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6801 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6802 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6803 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6805 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6807 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6808 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6809 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6812 if amount_msat == 0 {
6813 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6816 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6817 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6818 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6819 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6822 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6823 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6824 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6827 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6828 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6829 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6830 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6831 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6832 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6833 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6834 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6837 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6838 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6839 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6840 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6841 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6842 else { "to peer" });
6844 if need_holding_cell {
6845 force_holding_cell = true;
6848 // Now update local state:
6849 if force_holding_cell {
6850 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6855 onion_routing_packet,
6862 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6863 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6865 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6867 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6873 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6874 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6875 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6879 onion_routing_packet,
6883 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6888 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6889 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6890 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6891 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6893 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6894 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6895 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6897 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6898 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6902 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6903 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6904 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6905 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6906 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6907 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6908 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6911 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6912 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6913 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6914 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6915 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6916 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6919 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6921 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
6922 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6923 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
6924 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6925 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6927 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6928 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6931 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6932 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6933 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6934 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6935 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6936 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6937 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6938 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6939 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6940 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
6941 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
6942 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
6944 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6946 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6950 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6951 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6952 where L::Target: Logger
6954 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6955 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6956 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6958 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6960 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6961 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6962 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6963 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6964 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6965 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6966 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6967 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6968 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6969 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6970 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6976 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6979 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6980 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6981 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6982 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6983 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6984 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6986 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6987 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6988 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6990 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6991 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6992 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6995 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6996 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7000 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7001 &commitment_stats.tx,
7002 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7003 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7004 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7005 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7007 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7009 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7010 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7011 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7012 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7014 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7015 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7016 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7017 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7018 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7019 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7023 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7024 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7028 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7029 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7031 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7037 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7038 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7040 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7041 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7042 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7043 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7044 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7045 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7046 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7047 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7049 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7050 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7051 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7054 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7055 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7056 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7062 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7064 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7065 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7066 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7067 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7068 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7070 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7072 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7078 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7079 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7080 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7081 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7082 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7084 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7085 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7086 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7089 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7090 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7092 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7093 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7095 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7096 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7098 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7099 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7100 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7103 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7106 // use override shutdown script if provided
7107 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7108 Some(script) => script,
7110 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7111 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7112 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7113 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7117 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7118 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7120 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7125 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7126 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7127 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7128 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7129 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7131 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7132 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7133 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7134 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7135 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7136 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7137 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7139 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7141 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7142 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7144 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7145 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7146 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7149 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7150 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7151 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7152 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7153 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7155 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7156 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7163 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7164 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7166 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7169 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7170 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7171 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7173 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7174 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7178 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7182 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7183 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7184 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7185 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7188 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7189 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7190 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7191 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7192 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7193 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7194 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7195 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7197 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7198 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7199 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7200 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7201 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7202 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7205 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7206 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7207 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7210 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7214 counterparty_node_id,
7216 channel_value_satoshis,
7220 current_chain_height,
7221 outbound_scid_alias,
7222 temporary_channel_id,
7223 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7228 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7233 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7234 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7235 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7236 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7237 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7238 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7239 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7240 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7241 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7243 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7248 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7249 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7250 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7253 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7254 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7255 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7256 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7259 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7261 next_local_nonce: None,
7265 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7266 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7267 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7268 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7269 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7270 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7271 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7272 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7273 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7274 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7275 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7278 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7279 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7281 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7283 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7284 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7285 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7286 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7289 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7290 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7292 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7294 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7295 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7297 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7298 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7299 if funding_transaction.is_coinbase() &&
7300 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7301 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7302 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7305 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7306 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7308 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7309 if funding_created.is_none() {
7310 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7311 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7313 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7314 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7315 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7316 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7324 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7325 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7326 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7327 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7328 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7329 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7331 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7333 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7334 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7337 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7338 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7339 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7340 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7343 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7344 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7345 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7347 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7348 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7351 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7352 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7355 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7356 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7359 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7361 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7362 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7363 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7364 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7365 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7366 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7367 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7368 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7369 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7370 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7371 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7372 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7373 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7374 first_per_commitment_point,
7375 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7376 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7377 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7378 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7380 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7382 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7383 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7388 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7389 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7391 // Check sanity of message fields:
7392 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7393 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7395 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7396 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7398 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7399 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7401 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7402 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7404 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7405 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7407 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7408 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7409 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7411 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7412 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7413 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7415 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7416 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7417 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7419 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7422 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7423 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7426 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7427 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7428 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7430 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7431 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7433 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7434 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7436 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7437 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7439 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7440 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7442 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7443 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7445 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7446 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7449 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7450 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7453 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7454 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7456 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7457 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7458 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7460 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7461 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7464 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7465 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7466 &Some(ref script) => {
7467 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7468 if script.len() == 0 {
7471 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7472 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7474 Some(script.clone())
7477 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7479 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7484 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7485 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7486 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7487 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7488 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7490 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7491 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7493 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7496 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7497 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7498 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7499 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7500 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7501 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7504 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7505 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7506 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7509 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7510 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7512 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7513 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7515 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7520 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7521 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7522 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7523 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7524 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7528 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7529 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7531 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7532 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7534 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7535 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7536 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7537 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7540 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7542 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7543 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7544 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7545 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7547 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7548 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7550 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7551 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7553 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7554 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7555 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7556 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7557 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7558 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7562 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7563 initial_commitment_tx,
7566 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7567 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7571 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7572 if validated.is_err() {
7573 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7576 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7577 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7578 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7579 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7580 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7581 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7582 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7583 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7584 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7585 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7586 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7587 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7589 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7590 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7591 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7592 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7593 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7594 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7595 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7596 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7598 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7599 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7600 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7602 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7604 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7605 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7607 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7609 let mut channel = Channel {
7610 context: self.context,
7611 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7612 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7615 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7616 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7617 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7620 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7622 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7623 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7624 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7625 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7626 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7631 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7632 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7633 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7634 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7637 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7638 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7639 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7640 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7641 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7642 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7643 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7644 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7645 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7648 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7649 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7650 // `static_remote_key`.
7651 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7652 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7654 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7655 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7656 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7658 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7659 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7660 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7662 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7664 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7665 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7666 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7672 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7673 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7674 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7675 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7676 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7677 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7678 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7679 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7680 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7681 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7682 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7685 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7687 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7688 // support this channel type.
7689 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7691 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7692 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7693 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7694 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7695 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7696 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7697 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7701 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7705 counterparty_node_id,
7709 current_chain_height,
7714 counterparty_pubkeys,
7716 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7717 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7719 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7721 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7726 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7727 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7729 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7730 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7731 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7732 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7735 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7736 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7738 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7740 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7741 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7744 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7747 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7748 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7749 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7751 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7752 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7753 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7754 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7756 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7757 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7758 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7759 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7760 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7761 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7762 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7763 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7764 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7765 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7766 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7767 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7768 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7769 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7770 first_per_commitment_point,
7771 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7772 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7773 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7775 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7777 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7779 next_local_nonce: None,
7783 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7784 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7786 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7788 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7789 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7792 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7793 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7795 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7796 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7797 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7798 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7799 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7800 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7801 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7802 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7803 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7804 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7805 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7807 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7810 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7811 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7812 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7816 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7817 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7820 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7821 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7823 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7824 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7826 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7828 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7829 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7830 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7831 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7834 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7835 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7836 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7837 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7838 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7840 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7842 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7843 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7844 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7847 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7848 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7849 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7853 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7854 initial_commitment_tx,
7857 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7858 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7861 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7862 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7865 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7867 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7868 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7869 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7870 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7872 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7874 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7875 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7876 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7877 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7878 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7879 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7880 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7881 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7882 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7883 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7884 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7886 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7887 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7888 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7889 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7890 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7891 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7892 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7894 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7895 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7897 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7898 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7899 let mut channel = Channel {
7900 context: self.context,
7901 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7902 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7904 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7905 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7907 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7911 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
7912 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7913 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7914 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7915 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7916 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7917 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
7920 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7921 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7922 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7923 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7924 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
7925 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
7926 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
7927 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
7928 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7929 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7931 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
7932 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7933 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7935 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
7937 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
7938 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7940 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
7941 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
7944 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7948 counterparty_node_id,
7954 current_chain_height,
7955 outbound_scid_alias,
7956 temporary_channel_id,
7957 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7962 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
7963 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
7964 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
7965 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
7966 funding_tx_locktime,
7967 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7973 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7974 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7975 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7976 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7977 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7978 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
7980 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7982 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7983 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
7986 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
7987 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7988 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
7991 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7992 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
7995 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
7996 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7997 &self.context.secp_ctx);
7998 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
7999 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
8000 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8001 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8003 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8004 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8006 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8007 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8008 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8009 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8010 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8011 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8012 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8013 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8014 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8015 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8016 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8017 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8018 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8019 first_per_commitment_point,
8020 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8021 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8022 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8023 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8025 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8027 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8028 second_per_commitment_point,
8029 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8030 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8035 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8036 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8037 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8038 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8039 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8040 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8043 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8044 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8045 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8046 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8047 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8048 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8049 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8050 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8051 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8052 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8053 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8054 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8057 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8058 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8059 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8060 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8061 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8063 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8064 // support this channel type.
8065 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8066 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8067 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8069 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8071 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8072 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8073 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8074 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8075 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8076 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8079 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8083 counterparty_node_id,
8087 current_chain_height,
8093 counterparty_pubkeys,
8095 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8096 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8097 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8098 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8100 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8101 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8102 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8103 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8107 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8108 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8109 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8110 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8111 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8112 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8119 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8120 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8122 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8123 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8124 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8125 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8128 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8129 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8131 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8133 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8134 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8137 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8140 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8141 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8142 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8144 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8145 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8146 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8147 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8148 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8149 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8150 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8152 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8153 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8154 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8155 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8156 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8157 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8158 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8159 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8160 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8161 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8162 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8163 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8164 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8165 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8166 first_per_commitment_point,
8167 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8168 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8169 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8171 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8173 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8174 second_per_commitment_point,
8175 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8179 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8180 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8182 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8184 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8185 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8189 // Unfunded channel utilities
8191 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8192 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8193 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8194 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8195 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8196 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8197 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8198 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8199 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8200 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8203 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8204 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8205 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8206 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8207 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8208 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8214 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8215 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8217 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8223 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8225 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8226 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8227 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8229 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8230 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8231 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8232 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8238 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8239 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8240 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8241 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8242 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8243 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8248 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8250 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8251 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8253 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8254 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8255 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8256 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8261 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8262 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8263 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8264 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8265 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8266 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8271 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8272 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8273 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8276 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8277 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8278 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8279 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8283 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8285 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8287 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8289 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8290 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8291 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8292 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8293 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8295 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8296 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8297 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8298 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8300 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8302 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8303 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8304 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8306 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8308 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8310 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8312 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8314 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8315 // deserialized from that format.
8316 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8317 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8318 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8320 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8322 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8323 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8324 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8326 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8327 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8328 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8329 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8332 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8333 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8334 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8337 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8338 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8339 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8340 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8342 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8343 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8345 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8346 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8347 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8352 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8355 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8357 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8358 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8359 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8364 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8367 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8370 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8372 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8377 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8378 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8379 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8381 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8382 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8383 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8384 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8385 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8386 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8387 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8389 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8391 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8393 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8396 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8397 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8398 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8401 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8403 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8404 preimages.push(preimage);
8406 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8407 reason.write(writer)?;
8409 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8411 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8412 preimages.push(preimage);
8414 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8415 reason.write(writer)?;
8418 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8419 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8422 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8423 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8424 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8425 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8426 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8427 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8429 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8430 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8431 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8434 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8435 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8436 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8437 source.write(writer)?;
8438 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8440 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8441 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8443 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8445 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8446 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8448 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8450 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8451 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8453 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8454 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8456 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8457 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8458 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8460 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8462 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8463 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8468 match self.context.resend_order {
8469 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8470 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8473 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8474 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8475 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8477 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8478 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8479 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8480 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8483 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8484 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8485 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8486 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8487 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8490 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8491 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8492 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8493 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8495 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8496 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8497 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8499 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8501 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8502 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8503 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8504 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8506 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8507 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8508 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8509 // consider the stale state on reload.
8512 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8513 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8514 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8516 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8517 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8518 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8520 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8521 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8523 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8524 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8525 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8527 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8528 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8530 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8533 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8534 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8535 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8537 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8540 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8541 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8543 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8544 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8545 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8547 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8549 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8551 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8553 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8554 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8555 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8556 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8557 htlc.write(writer)?;
8560 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8561 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8562 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8564 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8565 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8567 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8568 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8569 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8570 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8571 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8572 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8573 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8575 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8576 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8577 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8578 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8579 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8581 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8582 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8584 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8585 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8586 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8587 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8589 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8591 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8592 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8593 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8596 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8597 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8598 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8599 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8600 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8601 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8602 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8604 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8605 (2, chan_type, option),
8606 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8607 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8608 (5, self.context.config, required),
8609 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8610 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8611 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8612 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8613 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8614 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8615 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8616 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8617 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8618 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8619 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8620 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8621 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8622 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8623 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8624 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8625 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8626 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8627 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8628 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8629 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8630 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8631 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8632 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
8633 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8640 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8641 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8643 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8644 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8646 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8647 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8648 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8650 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8651 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8652 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8653 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8655 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8657 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8658 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8659 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8660 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8661 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8663 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8664 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8667 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8668 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8669 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8671 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8673 let mut keys_data = None;
8675 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8676 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8677 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8678 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8679 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8680 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8681 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8682 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8683 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8684 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8688 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8689 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8690 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8693 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8695 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8696 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8697 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8699 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8701 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8702 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8703 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8704 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8705 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8706 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8707 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8708 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8710 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8711 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8713 Readable::read(reader)?
8715 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8718 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8719 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8721 Readable::read(reader)?
8723 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8725 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8726 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8727 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8732 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8733 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8734 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8735 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8736 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8737 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8738 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8739 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8740 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8741 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8742 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8743 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8745 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8746 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8749 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8750 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8753 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8754 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8756 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8758 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8759 blinding_point: None,
8763 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8764 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8765 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8766 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8767 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8768 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8769 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8770 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8771 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8772 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8773 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8774 blinding_point: None,
8776 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8777 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8778 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8780 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8781 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8782 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8784 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8788 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8789 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8790 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8791 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8794 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8795 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8796 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8798 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8799 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8800 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8801 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8804 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8805 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8806 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8807 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8810 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8812 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8814 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8815 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8816 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8817 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8819 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8820 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8821 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8822 // consider the stale state on reload.
8823 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8826 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8827 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8828 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8830 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8833 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8834 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8835 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8837 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8838 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8839 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8840 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8842 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8843 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8845 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8846 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8848 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8849 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8850 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8852 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8854 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8855 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8857 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8858 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8861 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8863 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8864 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8865 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8866 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8868 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8871 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8872 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8874 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8876 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8877 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8879 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8880 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8882 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8884 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8885 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8886 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8888 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8889 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8890 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8894 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8895 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8896 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8898 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8904 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8905 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8906 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8907 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8908 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8909 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8910 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8911 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8912 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8913 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8915 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8916 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8917 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8918 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8919 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8920 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8921 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8923 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8924 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8925 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8926 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8928 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8930 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8931 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8933 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8935 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
8937 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8938 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8940 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8941 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
8943 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8944 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8945 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8946 (2, channel_type, option),
8947 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8948 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8949 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8950 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8951 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8952 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8953 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8954 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8955 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8956 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8957 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8958 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8959 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8960 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8961 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8962 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8963 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8964 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8965 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8966 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8967 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8968 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8969 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8970 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8971 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8972 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8973 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
8974 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
8977 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8978 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8979 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8980 // required channel parameters.
8981 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8982 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8984 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8986 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8987 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8988 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8989 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8992 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8993 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8994 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8996 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8997 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8999 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9000 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9005 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9006 if iter.next().is_some() {
9007 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9011 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9012 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9013 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9014 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9015 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9018 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9019 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9020 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9022 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9023 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9025 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9026 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9027 // separate u64 values.
9028 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9030 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9032 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9033 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9034 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9035 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9037 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9038 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9040 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9041 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9042 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9043 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9044 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9047 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9048 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9050 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9051 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9052 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9053 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9055 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9056 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9058 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9059 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9060 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9061 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9062 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9065 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9066 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9069 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9070 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9071 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9072 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9073 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9074 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9077 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9078 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9079 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9081 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9086 context: ChannelContext {
9089 config: config.unwrap(),
9093 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9094 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9095 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9098 temporary_channel_id,
9100 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9102 channel_value_satoshis,
9104 latest_monitor_update_id,
9106 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9107 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9110 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9111 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9114 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9115 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9116 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9117 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9121 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9122 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9123 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9124 monitor_pending_forwards,
9125 monitor_pending_failures,
9126 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9127 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9129 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9130 signer_pending_funding: false,
9133 holding_cell_update_fee,
9134 next_holder_htlc_id,
9135 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9136 update_time_counter,
9139 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9140 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9141 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9142 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9144 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9145 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9146 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9147 closing_fee_limits: None,
9148 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9150 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9151 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9153 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9155 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9156 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9157 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9158 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9159 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9160 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9161 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9162 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9163 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9166 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9168 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9169 funding_transaction,
9172 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9173 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9174 counterparty_node_id,
9176 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9180 channel_update_status,
9181 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9185 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9186 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9187 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9188 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9190 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9191 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9193 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9194 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9195 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9197 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9198 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9200 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9201 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9203 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9206 local_initiated_shutdown,
9208 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9210 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9211 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9219 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
9220 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9221 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9222 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, Version};
9223 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9224 use bitcoin::network::Network;
9225 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9226 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9227 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9228 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9229 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9230 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9231 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9232 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9233 use crate::ln::msgs;
9234 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9235 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9236 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9237 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9238 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9239 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9240 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9241 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9242 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9243 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9244 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9245 use crate::util::test_utils;
9246 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9247 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9248 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9249 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9250 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9251 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9252 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9253 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9254 use bitcoin::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion, WPubkeyHash};
9255 use crate::prelude::*;
9258 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9259 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9260 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9261 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9263 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9264 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9265 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9266 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9269 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9272 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9273 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9279 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9280 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9281 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9282 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9286 signer: InMemorySigner,
9289 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9290 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9293 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9294 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9296 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9298 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9299 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9302 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9306 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9308 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9309 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9310 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9311 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9312 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9315 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9316 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9317 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9318 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9322 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9323 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9324 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9328 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9329 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9330 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9331 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9334 let seed = [42; 32];
9335 let network = Network::Testnet;
9336 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9337 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9338 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9341 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9342 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9343 let config = UserConfig::default();
9344 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9345 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9346 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9348 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9349 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9353 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9354 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9356 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9357 let original_fee = 253;
9358 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9359 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9360 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9361 let seed = [42; 32];
9362 let network = Network::Testnet;
9363 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9365 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9366 let config = UserConfig::default();
9367 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9369 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9370 // same as the old fee.
9371 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9372 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9373 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9377 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9378 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9379 // dust limits are used.
9380 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9381 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9382 let seed = [42; 32];
9383 let network = Network::Testnet;
9384 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9385 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9386 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9388 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9389 // they have different dust limits.
9391 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9392 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9393 let config = UserConfig::default();
9394 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9396 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9397 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9398 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9399 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9400 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9402 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9403 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9404 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9405 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9406 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9408 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9409 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9410 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9411 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9413 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9414 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9415 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9417 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9418 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9419 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9421 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9422 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9423 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9425 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9426 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9427 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9428 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9431 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9433 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9434 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9435 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9436 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9437 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9438 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9439 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9440 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9441 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9443 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9444 blinding_point: None,
9447 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9448 // the dust limit check.
9449 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9450 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9451 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9452 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9454 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9455 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9456 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9457 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9458 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9459 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9460 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9464 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9465 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9466 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9467 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9468 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9469 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9470 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9471 let seed = [42; 32];
9472 let network = Network::Testnet;
9473 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9475 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9476 let config = UserConfig::default();
9477 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9479 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9480 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9482 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9483 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9484 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9485 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9486 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9487 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9489 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9490 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9491 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9492 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9493 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9495 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9497 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9498 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9499 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9500 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9501 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9503 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9504 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9505 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9506 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9507 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9511 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9512 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9513 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9514 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9515 let seed = [42; 32];
9516 let network = Network::Testnet;
9517 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9518 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9519 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9521 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9523 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9524 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9525 let config = UserConfig::default();
9526 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9528 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9529 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9530 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9531 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9533 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9534 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9535 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9537 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9538 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9539 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9540 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9542 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9543 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9544 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9546 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9547 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9548 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9550 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9551 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9552 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9553 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9554 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9555 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9556 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9558 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9560 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9561 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9562 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9563 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9564 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9568 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9569 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9570 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9571 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9572 let seed = [42; 32];
9573 let network = Network::Testnet;
9574 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9575 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9576 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9578 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9579 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9580 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9581 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9582 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9583 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9584 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9585 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9587 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9588 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9589 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9590 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9591 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9592 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9594 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9595 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9596 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9597 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9599 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9601 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9602 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9603 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9604 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9605 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9606 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9608 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9609 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9610 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9611 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9613 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9614 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9615 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9616 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9617 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9619 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9620 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9622 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9623 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9624 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9626 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9627 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9628 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9629 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9630 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9632 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9633 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9635 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9636 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9637 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9641 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9643 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9644 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9645 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9647 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9648 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9649 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9650 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9652 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9653 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9654 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9656 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9658 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9659 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9662 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9663 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9664 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9665 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9666 let seed = [42; 32];
9667 let network = Network::Testnet;
9668 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9669 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9670 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9673 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9674 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9675 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9677 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9678 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9680 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9681 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9682 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9684 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9685 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9687 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9689 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9690 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9692 // Channel Negotiations failed
9693 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9694 assert!(result.is_err());
9699 fn channel_update() {
9700 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9701 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9702 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9703 let seed = [42; 32];
9704 let network = Network::Testnet;
9705 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9706 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9707 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9709 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9710 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9711 let config = UserConfig::default();
9712 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9714 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9715 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9716 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9717 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9718 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9720 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9721 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9722 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9723 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9724 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9726 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9727 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9728 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9729 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9731 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9732 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9733 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9735 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9736 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9737 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9739 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9740 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9741 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9743 short_channel_id: 0,
9746 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9747 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9748 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9750 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9751 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9753 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9755 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9757 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9758 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9759 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9760 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9762 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9763 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9764 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9766 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9769 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9773 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9774 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9776 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9777 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9778 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9779 let seed = [42; 32];
9780 let network = Network::Testnet;
9781 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9782 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9784 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9785 let config = UserConfig::default();
9786 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9787 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9788 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9790 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9791 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9792 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9794 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9795 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9796 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9798 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9799 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9800 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9801 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9802 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9805 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9807 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9808 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9809 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9810 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9814 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9815 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9816 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9818 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9821 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9823 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9824 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9825 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9826 blinding_point: None,
9828 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9829 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9831 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9834 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9837 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9839 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9842 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9843 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9844 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9846 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9847 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9850 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9851 blinding_point: None,
9853 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9854 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9857 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9858 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9860 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9861 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9863 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9866 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9867 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9868 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9869 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9870 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9871 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9872 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9873 } = &mut dummy_add {
9874 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9875 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9877 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9878 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9879 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9881 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9884 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9886 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9887 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9888 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9889 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9890 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9891 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9892 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9893 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9896 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9898 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9899 use bitcoin::sighash;
9900 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9901 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9902 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9903 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9904 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9905 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9906 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9907 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9908 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9909 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9910 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9911 use crate::sync::Arc;
9912 use core::str::FromStr;
9913 use hex::DisplayHex;
9915 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9916 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9917 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9918 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9920 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9922 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9923 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9924 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9925 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9926 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9928 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9929 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9935 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9936 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9937 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9939 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9940 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9941 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9942 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9943 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9944 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9946 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9948 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9949 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9950 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9951 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9952 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9953 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9955 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9956 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9957 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9958 selected_contest_delay: 144
9960 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9961 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9963 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9964 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9966 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9967 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9969 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9970 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9972 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9973 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9974 // build_commitment_transaction.
9975 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9976 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9977 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9978 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9979 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9981 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9982 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9983 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9984 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9988 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9989 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9990 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9991 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9995 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9996 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9997 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9999 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10000 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10002 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10003 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10005 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10007 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10008 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10009 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10010 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10011 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10012 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10013 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10015 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10016 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10017 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10018 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10020 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10021 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10022 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10024 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10026 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10027 commitment_tx.clone(),
10028 counterparty_signature,
10029 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10030 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10031 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10033 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10034 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10036 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10037 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10038 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10040 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10041 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10044 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10045 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10047 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10048 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10049 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10050 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10051 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10052 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10053 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_digest(sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap().as_raw_hash().to_byte_array());
10054 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10056 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10059 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10060 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10061 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10065 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10068 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10069 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10070 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10071 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10072 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10073 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10075 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10076 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10077 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10078 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10079 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10080 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10081 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10082 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10083 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10084 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10086 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10087 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10088 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10089 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10090 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10091 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10093 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10097 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10098 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10099 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10100 "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", {});
10102 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10103 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10105 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10106 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10107 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10109 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10110 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10111 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10112 "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", {});
10114 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10115 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10117 amount_msat: 1000000,
10119 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10120 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10122 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10125 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10126 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10128 amount_msat: 2000000,
10130 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10131 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10133 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10136 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10137 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10139 amount_msat: 2000000,
10141 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10142 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10143 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10144 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10145 blinding_point: None,
10147 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10150 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10151 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10153 amount_msat: 3000000,
10155 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10156 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10157 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10158 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10159 blinding_point: None,
10161 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10164 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10165 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10167 amount_msat: 4000000,
10169 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10170 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10172 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10176 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10177 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10178 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10180 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10181 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10182 "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", {
10185 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10186 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10187 "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" },
10190 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10191 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10192 "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" },
10195 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10196 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10197 "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" },
10200 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10201 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10202 "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" },
10205 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10206 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10207 "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" }
10210 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10211 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10212 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10214 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10215 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10216 "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", {
10219 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10220 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10221 "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" },
10224 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10225 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10226 "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" },
10229 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10230 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10231 "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" },
10234 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10235 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10236 "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" },
10239 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10240 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10241 "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" }
10244 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10245 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10246 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10248 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10249 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10250 "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", {
10253 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10254 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10255 "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" },
10258 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10259 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10260 "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" },
10263 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10264 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10265 "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" },
10268 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10269 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10270 "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" }
10273 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10274 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10275 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10276 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10278 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10279 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10280 "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", {
10283 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10284 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10285 "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" },
10288 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10289 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10290 "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" },
10293 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10294 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10295 "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" },
10298 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10299 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10300 "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" }
10303 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10304 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10305 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10306 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10308 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10309 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10310 "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", {
10313 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10314 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10315 "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" },
10318 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10319 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10320 "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" },
10323 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10324 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10325 "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" },
10328 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10329 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10330 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10333 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10334 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10335 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10337 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10338 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10339 "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", {
10342 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10343 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10344 "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" },
10347 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10348 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10349 "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" },
10352 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10353 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10354 "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" }
10357 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10358 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10359 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10361 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10362 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10363 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10366 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10367 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10368 "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" },
10371 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10372 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10373 "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" },
10376 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10377 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10378 "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" }
10381 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10382 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10383 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10385 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10386 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10387 "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", {
10390 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10391 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10392 "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" },
10395 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10396 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10397 "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" }
10400 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10401 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10402 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10403 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10404 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10405 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10407 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10408 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10409 "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", {
10412 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10413 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10414 "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" },
10417 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10418 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10419 "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" }
10422 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10423 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10424 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10425 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10426 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10428 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10429 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10430 "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", {
10433 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10434 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10435 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10438 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10439 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10440 "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" }
10443 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10444 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10445 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10447 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10448 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10449 "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", {
10452 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10453 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10454 "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" }
10457 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10458 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10459 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10460 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10461 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10463 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10464 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10465 "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", {
10468 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10469 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10470 "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" }
10473 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10474 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10475 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10476 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10477 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10479 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10480 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10481 "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", {
10484 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10485 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10486 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10489 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10490 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10491 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10492 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10494 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10495 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10496 "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", {});
10498 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10499 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10500 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10501 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10502 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10504 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10505 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10506 "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", {});
10508 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10509 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10510 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10511 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10512 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10514 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10515 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10516 "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", {});
10518 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10519 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10520 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10522 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10523 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10524 "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", {});
10526 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10527 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10528 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10529 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10530 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10532 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10533 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10534 "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", {});
10536 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10537 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10538 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10539 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10540 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10542 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10543 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10544 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10546 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10547 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10548 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10549 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10550 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10551 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10553 amount_msat: 2000000,
10555 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10556 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10558 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10561 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10562 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10563 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10565 amount_msat: 5000001,
10567 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10568 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10569 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10570 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10571 blinding_point: None,
10573 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10576 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10577 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10579 amount_msat: 5000000,
10581 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10582 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10583 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10584 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10585 blinding_point: None,
10587 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10591 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10592 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10593 "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", {
10596 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10597 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10598 "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" },
10600 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10601 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10602 "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" },
10604 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10605 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10606 "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" }
10609 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10610 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10611 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10612 "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", {
10615 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10616 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10617 "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" },
10619 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10620 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10621 "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" },
10623 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10624 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10625 "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" }
10630 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10631 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10633 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10634 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10635 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10636 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10638 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10639 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10640 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10642 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10643 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10645 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10646 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10648 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10649 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10650 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10654 fn test_key_derivation() {
10655 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10656 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10658 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10659 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10661 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10662 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10664 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10665 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10667 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10668 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10670 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10671 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10673 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10674 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10678 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10679 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10680 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10681 let seed = [42; 32];
10682 let network = Network::Testnet;
10683 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10684 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10686 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10687 let config = UserConfig::default();
10688 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10689 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10691 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10692 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10694 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10695 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10696 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10697 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10698 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10699 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10700 assert!(res.is_ok());
10704 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10705 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10706 // resulting `channel_type`.
10707 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10708 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10709 let network = Network::Testnet;
10710 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10711 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10713 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10714 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10716 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10717 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10719 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10720 // need to signal it.
10721 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10722 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10723 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10724 &config, 0, 42, None
10726 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10728 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10729 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10730 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10732 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10733 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10734 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10738 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10739 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10740 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10741 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10742 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10745 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10746 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10750 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10751 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10752 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10753 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10754 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10755 let network = Network::Testnet;
10756 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10757 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10759 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10760 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10762 let config = UserConfig::default();
10764 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10765 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10766 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10767 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10768 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10770 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10771 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10772 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10776 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10777 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10778 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10780 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10781 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10782 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10783 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10784 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10785 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10787 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10791 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10792 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10794 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10795 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10796 let network = Network::Testnet;
10797 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10798 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10800 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10801 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10803 let config = UserConfig::default();
10805 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10806 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10807 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10808 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10809 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10810 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10811 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10812 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10814 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10815 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10816 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10817 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10818 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10819 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10823 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10824 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10826 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10827 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10828 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10829 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10831 assert!(res.is_err());
10833 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10834 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10835 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10837 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10838 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10839 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10842 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10844 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10845 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10846 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10847 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10850 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10851 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10853 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10854 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10856 assert!(res.is_err());
10860 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10861 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10862 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10863 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10864 let seed = [42; 32];
10865 let network = Network::Testnet;
10866 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10867 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10868 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10870 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10871 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10872 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10873 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10875 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10876 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10877 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10882 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10892 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10893 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10894 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10899 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10900 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10906 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10909 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10910 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10911 &accept_channel_msg,
10912 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10913 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10916 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10917 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10918 let tx = Transaction {
10919 version: Version::ONE,
10920 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10924 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10927 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10930 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10931 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10932 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10933 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10934 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10935 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10939 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10940 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10948 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10949 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10950 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10951 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10953 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10954 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10961 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10962 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10963 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10964 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10965 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10967 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10968 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10969 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10977 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10978 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10981 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10982 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10983 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10984 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());