1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
40 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
483 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
484 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
487 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
488 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
489 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
490 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
492 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
493 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
494 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
495 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
497 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
501 channel_id: [u8; 32],
504 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
505 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
507 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
508 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
509 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
511 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
512 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
513 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
514 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
516 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
517 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
519 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
521 holder_signer: Signer,
522 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
523 destination_script: Script,
525 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
526 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
527 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
529 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
530 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
531 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
532 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
533 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
534 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
536 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
537 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
538 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
539 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
540 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
541 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
543 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
545 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
546 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
547 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
549 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
550 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
551 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
552 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
553 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
554 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
555 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
557 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
559 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
560 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
561 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
562 // HTLCs with similar state.
563 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
564 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
565 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
566 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
567 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
568 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
569 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
570 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
571 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
574 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
575 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
576 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
578 update_time_counter: u32,
580 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
581 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
582 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
583 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
584 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
585 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
587 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
588 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
590 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
591 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
592 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
593 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
595 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
596 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
598 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
600 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
602 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
603 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
604 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
605 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
606 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
607 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
609 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
610 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
611 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
612 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
613 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
615 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
616 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
617 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
618 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
619 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
620 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
621 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
622 channel_creation_height: u32,
624 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
627 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
629 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
632 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
634 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
637 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
639 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
642 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
645 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
647 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
649 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
650 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
652 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
654 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
656 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
658 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
660 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
661 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
663 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
664 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
665 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
667 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
669 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
671 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
672 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
673 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
674 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
676 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
677 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
678 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
680 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
681 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
682 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
684 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
685 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
686 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
687 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
688 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
689 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
690 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
691 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
693 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
694 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
695 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
696 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
697 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
699 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
700 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
702 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
703 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
704 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
705 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
706 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
707 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
708 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
709 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
711 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
712 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
714 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
715 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
716 // the channel's funding UTXO.
718 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
719 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
720 // associated channel mapping.
722 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
723 // to store all of them.
724 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
726 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
727 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
728 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
729 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
730 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
732 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
733 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
735 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
736 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
737 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
739 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
740 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
741 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
742 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
743 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
747 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
749 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
750 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
751 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
755 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
757 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
758 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
760 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
764 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
766 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
768 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
770 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
771 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
772 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
773 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
774 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
776 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
777 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
779 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
781 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
782 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
784 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
785 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
786 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
787 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
788 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
789 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
791 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
792 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
794 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
795 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
796 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
797 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
798 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
800 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
801 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
803 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
804 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
806 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
807 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
808 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
809 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
815 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
816 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
818 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
819 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
825 macro_rules! secp_check {
826 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
829 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
834 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
835 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
836 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
839 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
842 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
843 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
845 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
848 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
850 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
853 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
854 /// required by us according to the configured or default
855 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
857 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
859 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
860 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
861 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
862 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
863 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
866 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
867 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
868 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
869 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
870 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
871 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
872 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
875 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
876 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
879 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
880 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
881 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
882 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
883 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
884 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
885 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
886 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
887 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
888 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
891 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
892 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
893 // `only_static_remotekey`.
895 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
896 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
897 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
898 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
905 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
906 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
907 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
908 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
909 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
910 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
911 // We've exhausted our options
914 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
915 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
918 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
919 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
920 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
921 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
923 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
924 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
925 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
926 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
927 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
928 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
930 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
932 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
936 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
937 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
938 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
939 outbound_scid_alias: u64
940 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
941 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
942 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
943 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
945 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
946 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
947 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
948 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
950 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
951 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
953 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
956 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
957 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
960 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
961 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
963 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
964 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
965 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
966 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
970 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
971 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
973 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
975 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
976 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
977 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
978 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
981 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
982 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
984 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
985 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
988 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
989 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
990 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
997 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
998 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
999 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1000 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1005 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1007 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1008 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1009 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1011 channel_value_satoshis,
1013 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1016 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1017 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1019 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1020 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1023 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1024 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1025 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1026 pending_update_fee: None,
1027 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1028 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1029 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1030 update_time_counter: 1,
1032 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1034 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1035 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1036 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1037 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1038 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1039 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1041 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1042 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1043 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1044 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1046 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1047 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1048 closing_fee_limits: None,
1049 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1051 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1053 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1054 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1055 short_channel_id: None,
1056 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1058 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1059 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1060 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1061 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1062 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1063 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1064 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1065 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1066 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1067 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1068 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1070 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1072 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1073 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1074 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1075 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1076 counterparty_parameters: None,
1077 funding_outpoint: None,
1078 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1079 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1081 funding_transaction: None,
1083 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1084 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1085 counterparty_node_id,
1087 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1089 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1091 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1092 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1094 announcement_sigs: None,
1096 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1097 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1099 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1101 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1103 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1104 outbound_scid_alias,
1106 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1108 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1109 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1114 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1118 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1119 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1120 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1122 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1123 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1124 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1125 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1126 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1127 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1128 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1131 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1132 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1133 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1134 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1135 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1136 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1137 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1138 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1140 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1141 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1150 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1151 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1152 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1153 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1154 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1155 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1156 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1157 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1158 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1159 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1163 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1165 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1166 // support this channel type.
1167 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1168 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1172 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1173 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1174 // `static_remote_key`.
1175 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1178 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1179 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1182 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1185 channel_type.clone()
1187 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1188 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1193 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1195 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1196 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1197 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1198 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1199 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1200 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1201 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1202 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1203 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1206 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1210 // Check sanity of message fields:
1211 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1214 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1217 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1220 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1221 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1224 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1227 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1230 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1232 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1233 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1236 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1239 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1243 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1244 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1247 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1250 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1253 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1256 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1259 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1262 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1266 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1268 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1269 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1274 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1275 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1276 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1277 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1280 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1283 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1284 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1285 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1287 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1291 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1292 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1293 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1294 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1295 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1299 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1300 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1301 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1302 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1306 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1307 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1308 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1309 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1310 if script.len() == 0 {
1313 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1316 Some(script.clone())
1319 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1320 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1326 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1327 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1330 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1331 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1336 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1337 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1339 let chan = Channel {
1342 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1343 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1345 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1350 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1352 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1353 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1354 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1357 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1360 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1361 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1363 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1364 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1365 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1367 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1369 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1370 pending_update_fee: None,
1371 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1372 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1373 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1374 update_time_counter: 1,
1376 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1378 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1379 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1380 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1381 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1382 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1383 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1385 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1386 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1387 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1388 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1390 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1391 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1392 closing_fee_limits: None,
1393 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1395 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1397 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1398 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1399 short_channel_id: None,
1400 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1402 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1403 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1404 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1405 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1406 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1407 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1408 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1409 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1410 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1411 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1412 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1413 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1415 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1417 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1418 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1419 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1420 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1421 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1422 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1423 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1425 funding_outpoint: None,
1426 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1427 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1429 funding_transaction: None,
1431 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1432 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1433 counterparty_node_id,
1435 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1437 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1439 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1440 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1442 announcement_sigs: None,
1444 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1445 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1446 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1447 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1449 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1451 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1452 outbound_scid_alias,
1454 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1456 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1457 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1462 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1468 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1469 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1470 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1471 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1472 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1474 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1475 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1476 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1477 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1478 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1479 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1480 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1482 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1483 where L::Target: Logger
1485 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1486 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1487 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1489 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1490 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1491 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1492 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1494 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1495 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1496 if match update_state {
1497 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1498 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1499 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1500 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1501 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1503 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1507 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1508 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1509 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1510 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1512 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1513 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1514 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1516 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1517 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1518 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1519 transaction_output_index: None
1524 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1525 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1526 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1527 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1528 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1531 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1533 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1534 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1535 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1537 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1538 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1541 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1542 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1545 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1547 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1548 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1549 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1551 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1552 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1558 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1559 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1560 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1561 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1562 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1563 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1564 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1568 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1569 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1571 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1573 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1574 if generated_by_local {
1575 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1576 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1585 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1587 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1588 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1589 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1590 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1591 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1592 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1593 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1596 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1597 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1598 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1599 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1603 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1604 preimages.push(preimage);
1608 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1609 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1611 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1613 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1614 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1616 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1617 if !generated_by_local {
1618 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1626 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1627 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1628 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1629 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1630 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1631 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1632 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1633 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1635 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1637 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1638 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1639 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1640 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1642 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1644 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1645 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1646 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1647 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1650 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1651 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1652 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1653 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1655 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1658 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1659 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1660 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1661 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1663 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1666 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1667 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1672 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1673 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1678 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1680 let channel_parameters =
1681 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1682 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1683 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1686 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1691 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1694 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1695 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1696 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1697 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1699 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1700 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1701 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1709 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1710 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1716 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1717 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1718 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1719 // outside of those situations will fail.
1720 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1724 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1729 1 + // script length (0)
1733 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1734 2 + // witness marker and flag
1735 1 + // witness element count
1736 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1737 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1738 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1739 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1740 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1741 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1743 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1744 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1745 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1751 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1752 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1753 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1754 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1756 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1757 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1758 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1760 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1761 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1762 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1763 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1764 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1765 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1768 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1769 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1772 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1773 value_to_holder = 0;
1776 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1777 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1778 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1779 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1781 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1782 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1785 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1786 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1790 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1791 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1792 /// our counterparty!)
1793 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1794 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1795 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1796 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1797 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1798 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1799 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1801 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1805 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1806 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1807 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1808 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1809 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1810 //may see payments to it!
1811 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1812 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1813 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1815 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1818 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1819 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1820 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1821 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1822 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1825 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1828 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1829 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1831 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1833 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1834 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1835 where L::Target: Logger {
1836 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1837 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1838 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1839 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1840 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1841 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1842 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1843 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1847 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1848 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1849 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1850 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1852 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1853 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1855 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1857 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1859 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1860 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1861 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1863 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1864 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1865 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1866 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1867 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1869 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1870 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1871 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1873 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1874 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1876 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1879 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1880 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1884 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1888 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1889 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1890 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1891 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1892 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1893 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1896 // Now update local state:
1898 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1899 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1900 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1901 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1902 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1903 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1904 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1908 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1909 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1910 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1911 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1912 // do not not get into this branch.
1913 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1914 match pending_update {
1915 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1916 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1917 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1918 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1920 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1921 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1924 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1925 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1926 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1927 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1928 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1929 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1930 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1936 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1937 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1938 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1940 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1941 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1942 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1944 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1945 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1948 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1949 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1951 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1952 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1954 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1955 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1958 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1961 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1962 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1963 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1964 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1969 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1970 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1971 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1972 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1973 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1974 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1975 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1976 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1977 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1978 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1979 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1980 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1984 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1985 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1986 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1987 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1988 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1992 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
1996 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1997 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1998 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1999 /// before we fail backwards.
2001 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2002 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2003 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2004 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2005 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2006 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2007 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2010 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2011 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2012 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2013 /// before we fail backwards.
2015 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2016 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2017 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2018 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2019 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2020 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2021 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2023 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2025 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2026 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2027 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2029 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2030 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2031 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2033 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2034 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2035 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2037 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2042 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2049 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2050 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2051 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2052 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2053 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2057 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2058 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2059 force_holding_cell = true;
2062 // Now update local state:
2063 if force_holding_cell {
2064 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2065 match pending_update {
2066 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2067 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2068 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2069 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2073 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2074 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2075 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2082 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2083 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2084 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2090 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2092 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2093 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2096 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2097 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2098 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2103 // Message handlers:
2105 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2106 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2108 // Check sanity of message fields:
2109 if !self.is_outbound() {
2110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2112 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2115 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2118 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2121 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2124 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2125 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2126 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2128 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2129 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2132 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2133 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2136 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2139 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2143 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2144 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2147 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2150 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2153 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2156 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2157 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2159 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2160 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2162 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2166 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2167 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2170 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2171 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2173 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2174 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2177 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2180 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2181 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2182 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2183 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2184 if script.len() == 0 {
2187 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2190 Some(script.clone())
2193 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2194 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2200 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2201 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2202 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2203 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2204 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2206 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2207 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2209 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2212 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2213 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2214 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2215 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2216 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2217 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2220 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2221 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2222 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2225 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2226 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2228 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2229 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2234 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2235 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2237 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2238 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2240 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2241 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2242 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2243 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2244 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2245 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2246 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2247 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2248 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2251 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2252 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2254 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2255 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2256 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2257 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2259 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2260 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2262 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2263 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2266 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2267 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2270 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2271 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2272 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2274 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2277 if self.is_outbound() {
2278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2280 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2281 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2282 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2286 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2289 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2290 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2291 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2292 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2295 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2296 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2297 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2298 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2299 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2301 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2303 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2304 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2308 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2309 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2310 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2314 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2315 initial_commitment_tx,
2318 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2319 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2322 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2323 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2325 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2327 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2328 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2329 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2330 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2331 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2332 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2333 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2334 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2335 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2336 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2337 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2339 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2341 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2343 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2344 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2345 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2346 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2348 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2350 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2351 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2353 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2354 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2356 }, channel_monitor))
2359 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2360 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2361 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2362 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2363 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2365 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2368 if !self.is_outbound() {
2369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2371 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2374 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2375 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2376 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2377 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2380 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2382 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2383 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2384 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2385 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2387 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2388 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2390 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2391 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2393 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2394 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2395 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2396 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2397 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2398 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2402 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2403 initial_commitment_tx,
2406 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2407 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2410 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2411 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2414 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2415 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2416 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2417 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2418 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2419 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2420 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2421 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2422 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2423 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2424 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2425 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2427 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2429 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2431 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2432 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2433 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2434 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2436 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2438 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2439 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2443 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2444 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2446 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2447 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2448 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2449 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2454 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2455 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2456 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2459 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2460 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2461 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2462 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2463 // when routing outbound payments.
2464 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2468 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2470 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2471 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2472 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2473 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2474 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2475 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2476 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2477 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2478 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2480 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2481 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2482 let expected_point =
2483 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2484 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2486 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2487 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2488 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2489 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2490 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2491 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2493 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2494 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2495 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2496 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2497 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2499 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2500 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2504 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2507 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2508 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2510 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2512 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2515 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2516 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2517 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2518 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2524 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2525 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2526 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2527 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2528 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2529 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2530 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2531 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2532 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2535 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2538 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2539 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2540 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2542 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2543 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2544 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2545 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2546 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2547 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2549 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2550 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2556 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2557 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2558 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2559 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2560 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2561 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2562 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2563 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2564 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2567 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2570 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2571 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2572 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2574 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2575 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2576 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2577 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2578 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2579 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2581 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2582 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2586 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2587 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2588 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2589 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2590 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2591 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2592 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2594 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2595 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2597 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2604 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2605 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2606 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2607 /// corner case properly.
2608 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2609 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2610 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2612 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2613 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2614 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2615 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2618 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2620 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2621 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2622 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2625 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2626 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2627 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2628 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2630 outbound_capacity_msat,
2631 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2632 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2633 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2639 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2640 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2643 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2644 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2645 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2646 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2647 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2648 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2651 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2652 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2654 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2655 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2658 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2659 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2660 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2662 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2663 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2665 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2668 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2669 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2671 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2672 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2674 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2675 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2677 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2678 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2682 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2683 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2689 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2690 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2691 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2694 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2695 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2696 included_htlcs += 1;
2699 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2700 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2704 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2705 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2706 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2707 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2708 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2709 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2714 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2716 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2717 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2722 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2723 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2727 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2728 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2729 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2732 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2733 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2735 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2736 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2737 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2739 total_pending_htlcs,
2740 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2741 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2742 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2744 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2745 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2746 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2748 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2750 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2755 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2756 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2757 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2759 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2760 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2762 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2765 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2766 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2768 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2769 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2771 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2772 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2774 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2775 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2779 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2780 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2786 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2787 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2788 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2789 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2790 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2791 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2794 included_htlcs += 1;
2797 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2798 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2801 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2802 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2804 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2805 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2806 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2811 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2812 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2813 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2816 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2817 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2819 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2820 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2822 total_pending_htlcs,
2823 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2824 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2825 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2827 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2828 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2829 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2831 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2833 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2838 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2839 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2840 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2841 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2842 if local_sent_shutdown {
2843 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2845 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2846 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2847 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2850 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2853 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2856 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2859 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2860 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2863 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2864 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2865 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2868 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2871 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2872 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2873 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2874 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2875 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2876 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2877 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2878 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2879 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2880 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2881 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2883 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2884 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2885 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2886 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2887 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2888 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2892 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2895 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2896 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2897 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2899 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2900 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2901 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2902 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2903 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2904 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2905 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2909 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2910 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2911 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2912 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2913 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2914 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2915 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2919 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2920 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2921 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2922 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2923 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2927 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2928 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2929 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2930 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2931 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2933 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2934 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2937 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2938 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2941 if !self.is_outbound() {
2942 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2943 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2944 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2945 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2946 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2947 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2948 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2949 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2950 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2951 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2952 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2953 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2954 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2955 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2956 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2959 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2960 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2961 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2962 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2963 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2966 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2967 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2969 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2970 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2973 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2974 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2975 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2979 // Now update local state:
2980 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2981 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2982 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2983 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2984 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2985 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2986 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2991 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2993 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2994 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2995 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2996 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2997 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2998 None => fail_reason.into(),
2999 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3000 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3001 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3004 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3008 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3010 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3011 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3013 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3014 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3019 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3022 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3023 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3024 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3026 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3027 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3030 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3033 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3034 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3035 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3037 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3041 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3045 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3046 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3047 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3049 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3053 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3057 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3058 where L::Target: Logger
3060 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3061 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3063 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3066 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3070 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3072 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3074 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3075 let commitment_txid = {
3076 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3077 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3078 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3080 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3081 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3082 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3083 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3084 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3085 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3089 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3091 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3092 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3093 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3094 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3097 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3098 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3099 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3103 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3105 if self.is_outbound() {
3106 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3107 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3108 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3109 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3110 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3111 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3112 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3113 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3114 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3115 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3121 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3125 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3126 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3127 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3128 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3129 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3130 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3131 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3133 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3134 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3135 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3136 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3137 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3138 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3139 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3142 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3144 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3148 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3149 commitment_stats.tx,
3151 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3152 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3153 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3156 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3157 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3159 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3160 let mut need_commitment = false;
3161 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3162 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3163 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3164 need_commitment = true;
3168 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3169 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3170 Some(forward_info.clone())
3172 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3173 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3174 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3175 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3176 need_commitment = true;
3179 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3180 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3181 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3182 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3183 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3184 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3185 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3186 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3187 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3188 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3189 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3190 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3191 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3192 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3194 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3196 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3197 need_commitment = true;
3201 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3202 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3203 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3204 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3205 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3206 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3211 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3212 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3213 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3214 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3216 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3217 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3218 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3219 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3220 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3221 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3222 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3223 // includes the right HTLCs.
3224 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3225 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3226 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3227 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3228 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3229 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3231 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3232 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3233 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3234 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3237 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3238 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3239 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3240 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3241 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3242 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3243 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3244 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3245 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3249 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3250 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3251 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3252 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3253 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3256 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3257 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3258 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3259 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3260 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3261 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3262 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3263 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3266 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3267 /// for our counterparty.
3268 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3269 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3270 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3271 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3272 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3274 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3275 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3276 updates: Vec::new(),
3279 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3280 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3281 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3282 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3283 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3284 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3285 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3286 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3287 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3288 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3289 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3290 // to rebalance channels.
3291 match &htlc_update {
3292 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3293 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3294 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3297 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3298 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3299 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3300 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3301 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3302 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3303 // into the holding cell without ever being
3304 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3305 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3306 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3309 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3315 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3316 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3317 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3318 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3319 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3320 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3321 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3322 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3323 (msg, monitor_update)
3324 } else { unreachable!() };
3325 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3326 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3328 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3329 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3330 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3331 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3332 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3333 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3334 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3335 // for a full revocation before failing.
3336 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3339 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3341 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3348 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3349 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3351 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3352 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3357 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3358 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3359 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3360 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3361 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3363 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3364 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3365 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3367 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3368 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3369 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3375 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3376 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3377 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3378 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3379 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3380 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3381 where L::Target: Logger,
3383 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3386 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3389 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3393 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3395 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3396 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3401 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3402 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3403 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3404 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3405 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3406 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3407 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3408 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3409 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3412 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3414 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3415 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3418 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3419 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3421 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3423 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3424 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3425 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3426 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3427 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3428 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3429 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3430 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3434 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3435 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3436 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3437 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3438 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3439 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3440 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3441 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3443 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3444 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3447 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3448 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3449 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3450 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3451 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3452 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3453 let mut require_commitment = false;
3454 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3457 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3458 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3459 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3461 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3462 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3463 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3464 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3465 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3466 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3471 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3472 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3473 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3474 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3475 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3477 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3478 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3479 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3484 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3485 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3487 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3491 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3492 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3494 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3495 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3496 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3497 require_commitment = true;
3498 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3499 match forward_info {
3500 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3501 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3502 require_commitment = true;
3504 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3505 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3506 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3508 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3509 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3510 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3514 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3515 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3516 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3517 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3523 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3524 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3525 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3526 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3528 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3529 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3530 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3531 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3532 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3533 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3534 require_commitment = true;
3538 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3540 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3541 match update_state {
3542 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3543 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3544 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3545 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3546 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3548 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3549 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3550 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3551 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3552 require_commitment = true;
3553 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3554 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3559 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3560 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3561 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3562 if require_commitment {
3563 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3564 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3565 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3566 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3567 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3568 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3569 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3570 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3571 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3573 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3574 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3575 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3576 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3577 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3578 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3581 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3582 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3583 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3584 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3585 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3586 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3587 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3589 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3590 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3591 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3593 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3594 if require_commitment {
3595 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3597 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3598 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3599 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3600 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3602 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3603 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3604 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3605 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3606 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3608 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3609 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3610 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3611 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3617 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3618 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3619 /// commitment update.
3620 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3621 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3622 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3625 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3626 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3627 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3628 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3630 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3631 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3632 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3633 if !self.is_outbound() {
3634 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3636 if !self.is_usable() {
3637 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3639 if !self.is_live() {
3640 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3643 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3644 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3645 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3646 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3647 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3648 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3649 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3650 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3651 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3652 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3656 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3657 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3658 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3659 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3660 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3663 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3664 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3668 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3669 force_holding_cell = true;
3672 if force_holding_cell {
3673 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3677 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3678 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3680 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3681 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3686 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3687 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3689 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3691 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3692 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3693 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3694 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3698 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3699 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3700 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3704 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3705 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3708 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3709 // will be retransmitted.
3710 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3711 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3712 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3714 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3715 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3717 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3718 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3719 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3720 // this HTLC accordingly
3721 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3724 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3725 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3726 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3727 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3730 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3731 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3732 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3733 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3734 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3735 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3740 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3742 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3743 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3744 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3745 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3749 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3750 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3751 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3752 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3753 // the update upon reconnection.
3754 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3758 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3759 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3762 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3763 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3764 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3765 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3766 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3767 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3768 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3770 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3771 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3772 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3773 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3774 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3775 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3776 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3778 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3779 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3780 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3781 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3782 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3783 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3784 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3787 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3788 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3789 /// to the remote side.
3790 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3791 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3792 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3793 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3796 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3798 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3799 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3800 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3802 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3803 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3804 // first received the funding_signed.
3805 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3806 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3807 self.funding_transaction.take()
3809 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3810 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3811 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3812 funding_broadcastable = None;
3815 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3816 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3817 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3818 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3819 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3820 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3821 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3822 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3823 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3824 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3825 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3826 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3827 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3828 next_per_commitment_point,
3829 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3833 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3835 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3836 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3837 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3838 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3839 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3840 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3842 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3843 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3844 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3845 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3846 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3847 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3851 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3852 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3854 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3855 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3858 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3859 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3860 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3861 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3862 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3863 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3864 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3865 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3866 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3870 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3871 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3873 if self.is_outbound() {
3874 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3876 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3879 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3880 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3882 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3883 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3884 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3885 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3886 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3887 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3888 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3889 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3890 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3891 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3892 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3893 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3894 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3896 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3897 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3898 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3904 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3905 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3906 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3907 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3908 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3909 per_commitment_secret,
3910 next_per_commitment_point,
3914 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3915 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3916 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3917 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3918 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3920 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3921 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3922 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3923 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3924 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3925 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3926 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3927 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3928 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3933 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3934 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3936 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3937 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3938 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3939 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3940 reason: err_packet.clone()
3943 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3944 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3945 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3946 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3947 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3948 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3951 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3952 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3953 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3954 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3955 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3962 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3963 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3964 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3965 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3969 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3970 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3971 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3972 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3973 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3974 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3978 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3979 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3981 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3982 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3983 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3984 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3985 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3986 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3987 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3988 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3991 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3993 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3994 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3995 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3996 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4000 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4001 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4002 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4005 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4006 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4007 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4008 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4009 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4010 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4011 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4012 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4014 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4015 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4016 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4017 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4018 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4021 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4022 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4023 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4024 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4025 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4026 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4027 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4028 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4031 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4035 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4036 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4037 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4038 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4040 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4044 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4045 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4046 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4048 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4049 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4050 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4051 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4052 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4056 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4058 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4059 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4060 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4061 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4062 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4065 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4066 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4067 channel_ready: None,
4068 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4069 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4070 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4074 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4075 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4076 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4077 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4078 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4079 next_per_commitment_point,
4080 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4082 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4083 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4084 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4088 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4089 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4090 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4092 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4093 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4094 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4097 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4103 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4104 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4105 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4106 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4107 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4109 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4110 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4111 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4112 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4113 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4114 next_per_commitment_point,
4115 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4119 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4120 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4121 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4123 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4126 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4127 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4128 raa: required_revoke,
4129 commitment_update: None,
4130 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4132 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4133 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4134 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4136 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4139 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4140 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4141 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4142 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4143 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4144 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4147 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4148 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4149 raa: required_revoke,
4150 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4151 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4155 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4159 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4160 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4161 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4162 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4164 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4166 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4168 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4169 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4170 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4171 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4172 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4173 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4175 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4176 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4177 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4178 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4179 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4181 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4182 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4183 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4184 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4187 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4188 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4189 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4190 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4191 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4192 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4193 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4194 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4195 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4196 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4197 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4198 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4199 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4200 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4201 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4203 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4206 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4207 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4210 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4211 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4212 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4213 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4214 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4215 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4216 self.channel_state &
4217 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4218 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4219 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4220 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4223 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4224 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4225 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4226 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4227 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4228 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4229 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4231 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4237 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4238 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4239 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4240 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4242 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4243 return Ok((None, None));
4246 if !self.is_outbound() {
4247 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4248 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4250 return Ok((None, None));
4253 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4255 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4256 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4257 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4258 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4260 let sig = self.holder_signer
4261 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4262 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4264 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4265 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4266 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4267 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4269 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4270 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4271 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4276 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4277 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4278 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4279 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4281 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4284 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4285 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4286 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4287 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4290 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4291 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4292 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4295 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4297 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4298 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4301 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4302 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4306 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4309 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4310 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4311 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4312 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4314 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4317 assert!(send_shutdown);
4318 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4319 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4322 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4327 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4329 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4330 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4332 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4333 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4334 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4335 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4336 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4337 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4340 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4341 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4342 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4344 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4345 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4346 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4347 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4351 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4352 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4353 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4354 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4355 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4356 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4358 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4359 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4366 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4367 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4369 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4372 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4373 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4375 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4377 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4378 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4379 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4380 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4381 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4382 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4383 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4384 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4385 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4387 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4388 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4391 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4395 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4396 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4397 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4398 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4400 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4401 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4403 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4404 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4406 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4409 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4413 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4417 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4418 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4419 return Ok((None, None));
4422 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4423 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4424 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4425 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4427 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4429 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4432 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4433 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4434 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4435 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4436 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4440 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4441 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4446 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4447 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4448 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4449 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4450 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4451 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4452 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4456 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4458 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4459 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4460 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4461 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4463 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4466 let sig = self.holder_signer
4467 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4468 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4470 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4471 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4472 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4473 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4477 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4478 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4479 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4480 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4482 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4483 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4484 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4490 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4491 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4492 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4494 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4495 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4497 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4498 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4501 if !self.is_outbound() {
4502 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4503 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4504 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4505 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4507 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4508 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4509 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4511 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4512 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4515 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4516 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4517 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4518 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4519 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4520 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4521 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4522 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4524 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4527 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4528 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4529 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4530 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4532 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4536 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4537 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4538 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4539 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4541 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4547 // Public utilities:
4549 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4553 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4557 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4558 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4559 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4563 /// Gets the channel's type
4564 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4568 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4569 /// is_usable() returns true).
4570 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4571 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4572 self.short_channel_id
4575 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4576 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4577 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4580 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4581 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4582 self.outbound_scid_alias
4584 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4585 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4586 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4587 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4588 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4591 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4592 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4593 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4594 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4597 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4598 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4599 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4602 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4603 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4604 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4605 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4609 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4612 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4613 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4616 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4617 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4620 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4621 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4622 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4625 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4626 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4629 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4630 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4631 self.counterparty_node_id
4634 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4635 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4636 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4639 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4640 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4641 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4644 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4645 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4647 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4648 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4649 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4650 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4652 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4656 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4657 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4658 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4661 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4662 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4663 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4666 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4667 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4668 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4670 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4671 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4676 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4677 self.channel_value_satoshis
4680 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4681 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4684 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4685 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4688 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4689 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4692 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4693 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4694 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4697 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4698 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4699 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4702 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4703 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4704 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4707 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4708 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4709 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4710 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4711 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4714 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4716 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4717 self.prev_config = None;
4721 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4722 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4726 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4727 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4728 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4729 let did_channel_update =
4730 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4731 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4732 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4733 if did_channel_update {
4734 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4735 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4736 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4737 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4739 self.config.options = *config;
4743 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4744 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4745 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4746 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4747 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4748 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4749 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4751 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4752 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4755 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4757 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4758 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4764 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4765 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4766 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4767 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4768 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4769 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4770 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4772 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4773 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4780 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4784 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4785 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4786 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4787 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4788 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4789 // which are near the dust limit.
4790 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4791 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4792 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4793 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4794 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4796 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4797 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4799 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4802 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4803 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4806 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4807 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4810 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4811 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4815 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4820 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4822 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4823 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4824 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4825 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4826 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4827 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4829 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4831 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4839 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4840 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4844 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4845 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4846 self.update_time_counter
4849 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4850 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4853 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4854 self.config.announced_channel
4857 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4858 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4861 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4862 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4863 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4864 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4867 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4868 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4869 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4872 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4873 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4874 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4875 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4876 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4879 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4880 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4881 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4882 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4883 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4886 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4887 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4888 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4889 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4892 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4893 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4896 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4897 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4898 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4901 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4902 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4903 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4905 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4906 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4907 if self.channel_state &
4908 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4909 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4910 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4911 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4912 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4915 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4916 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4917 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4918 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4919 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4920 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4922 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4923 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4924 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4926 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4927 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4928 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4929 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4930 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4931 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4937 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4938 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4939 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4942 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4943 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4944 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4947 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4948 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4949 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4952 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4953 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4954 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4955 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4956 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4957 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4962 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4963 self.channel_update_status
4966 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4967 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4968 self.channel_update_status = status;
4971 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4973 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4974 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4975 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4979 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4980 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4981 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4984 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4988 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4989 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4990 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4992 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4993 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4994 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4996 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4997 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5000 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5001 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5002 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5003 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5004 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5005 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5006 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5007 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5008 self.channel_state);
5010 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5014 if need_commitment_update {
5015 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5016 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5017 let next_per_commitment_point =
5018 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5019 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5020 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5021 next_per_commitment_point,
5022 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5026 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5032 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5033 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5034 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5035 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5036 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5037 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5038 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5040 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5043 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5044 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5045 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5046 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5047 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5048 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5049 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5050 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5051 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5052 if self.is_outbound() {
5053 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5054 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5055 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5056 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5057 // channel and move on.
5058 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5059 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5061 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5062 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5063 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5065 if self.is_outbound() {
5066 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5067 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5068 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5069 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5070 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5071 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5075 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5076 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5077 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5078 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5079 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5083 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5084 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5085 // may have already happened for this block).
5086 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5087 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5088 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5089 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5092 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5093 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5094 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5095 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5103 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5104 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5105 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5106 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5108 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5109 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5112 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5114 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5115 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5116 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5117 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5119 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5122 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5125 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5126 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5127 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5128 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5130 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5133 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5134 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5135 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5137 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5138 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5140 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5141 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5142 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5150 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5152 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5153 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5154 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5156 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5157 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5160 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5161 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5162 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5163 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5164 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5165 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5166 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5167 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5168 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5171 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5172 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5173 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5174 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5176 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5177 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5178 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5180 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5181 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5182 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5183 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5185 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5186 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5187 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5188 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5189 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5190 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5191 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5194 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5195 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5197 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5200 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5201 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5202 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5203 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5204 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5205 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5206 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5207 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5208 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5209 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5210 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5211 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5212 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5213 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5214 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5215 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5216 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5222 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5227 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5228 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5230 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5231 if !self.is_outbound() {
5232 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5234 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5235 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5238 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5239 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5242 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5243 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5247 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5248 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5249 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5250 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5251 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5252 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5253 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5254 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5255 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5256 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5257 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5258 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5259 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5260 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5261 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5262 first_per_commitment_point,
5263 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5264 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5265 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5266 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5268 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5272 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5273 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5276 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5277 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5278 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5279 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5282 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5283 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5285 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5286 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5287 if self.is_outbound() {
5288 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5290 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5291 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5293 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5294 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5296 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5297 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5300 self.user_id = user_id;
5301 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5303 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5306 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5307 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5308 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5310 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5311 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5312 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5313 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5315 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5316 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5317 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5318 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5319 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5320 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5321 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5322 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5323 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5324 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5325 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5326 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5327 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5328 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5329 first_per_commitment_point,
5330 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5331 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5332 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5334 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5338 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5339 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5341 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5343 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5344 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5347 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5348 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5349 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5350 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5351 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5352 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5355 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5356 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5357 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5358 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5359 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5360 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5361 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5362 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5363 if !self.is_outbound() {
5364 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5366 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5367 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5369 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5370 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5371 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5372 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5375 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5376 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5378 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5381 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5382 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5387 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5389 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5391 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5392 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5393 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5395 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5396 temporary_channel_id,
5397 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5398 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5403 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5404 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5405 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5406 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5408 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5411 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5412 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5413 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5414 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5415 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5416 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5418 if !self.is_usable() {
5419 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5422 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5423 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5424 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5425 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5427 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5428 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5430 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5431 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5432 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5433 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5434 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5435 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5441 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5442 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5443 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5444 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5446 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5449 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5453 if !self.is_usable() {
5457 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5458 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5462 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5466 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5467 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5470 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5474 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5476 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5481 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5483 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5488 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5490 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5491 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5492 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5493 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5494 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5498 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5500 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5501 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5502 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5503 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5504 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5505 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5506 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5508 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5509 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5510 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5511 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5512 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5513 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5514 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5515 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5516 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5517 contents: announcement,
5520 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5524 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5525 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5526 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5527 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5528 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5529 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5530 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5531 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5533 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5535 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5536 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5537 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5538 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5540 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5541 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5542 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5543 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5546 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5547 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5548 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5549 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5552 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5555 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5556 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5557 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5558 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5559 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5560 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5563 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5565 Err(_) => return None,
5567 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5568 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5573 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5574 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5575 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5576 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5577 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5578 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5579 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5580 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5581 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5582 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5583 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5584 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5585 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5586 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5587 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5588 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5589 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5590 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5591 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5594 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5595 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5596 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5597 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5600 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5601 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5602 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5603 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5604 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5605 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5606 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5607 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5609 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5610 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5611 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5612 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5613 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5614 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5615 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5616 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5617 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5619 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5625 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5627 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5628 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5629 /// commitment update.
5631 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5632 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5633 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5634 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5636 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5637 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5639 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5640 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5645 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5646 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5648 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5650 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5651 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5653 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5654 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5655 /// regenerate them.
5657 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5658 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5660 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5661 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5662 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5663 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5664 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5665 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5667 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5668 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5669 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5672 if amount_msat == 0 {
5673 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5676 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5677 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5680 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5681 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5682 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5683 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5684 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5685 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5686 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5687 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5690 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5691 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5692 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5693 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5695 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5696 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5697 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5700 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5701 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5702 if !self.is_outbound() {
5703 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5704 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5705 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5706 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5707 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5708 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5712 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5715 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5716 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5717 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5719 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5720 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5721 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5722 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5723 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5724 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5728 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5729 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5730 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5731 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5732 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5733 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5737 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5738 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5739 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5742 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5743 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5744 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5745 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5747 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5748 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5751 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5752 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5753 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5754 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5755 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5758 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5759 force_holding_cell = true;
5762 // Now update local state:
5763 if force_holding_cell {
5764 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5769 onion_routing_packet,
5774 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5775 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5777 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5779 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5783 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5784 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5785 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5789 onion_routing_packet,
5791 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5796 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5797 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5798 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5799 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5801 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5802 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5803 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5805 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5806 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5810 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5811 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5812 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5813 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5814 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5815 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5816 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5819 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5820 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5821 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5822 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5823 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5824 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5827 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5829 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5830 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5831 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5833 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5834 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5837 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5838 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5839 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5840 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5841 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5842 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5843 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5844 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5847 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5851 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5852 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5853 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5854 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5856 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5858 if !self.is_outbound() {
5859 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5860 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5861 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5862 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5863 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5864 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5865 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5866 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5867 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5868 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5874 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5877 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5878 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5879 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5880 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5881 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5882 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5884 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5885 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5886 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5887 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5890 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5891 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5895 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5896 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5898 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5900 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5901 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5902 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5903 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5905 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5906 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5907 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5908 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5909 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5910 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5914 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5915 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5918 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5921 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5922 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5924 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5925 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5926 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5927 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5928 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5931 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5932 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5933 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5934 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
5940 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5941 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5942 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5945 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5946 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5947 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5949 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5950 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5951 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5952 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5958 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5959 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5961 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5962 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5963 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5964 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5965 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5966 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5967 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5968 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5969 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5972 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5973 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5974 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5976 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5977 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5980 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5981 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5982 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5985 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5986 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5987 let mut chan_closed = false;
5988 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5992 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5994 None if !chan_closed => {
5995 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5996 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5997 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5999 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6005 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6006 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6007 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6008 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6010 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6012 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6014 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6015 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6016 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6017 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6018 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6019 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6022 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6023 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6024 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
6026 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6027 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6028 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6031 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6032 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6033 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6034 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6035 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6037 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6038 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6045 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6046 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6048 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6051 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6052 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6053 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6054 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6055 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6056 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6057 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6058 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6059 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6060 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6061 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6063 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6064 // return them to fail the payment.
6065 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6066 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6067 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6069 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6070 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6075 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6076 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6077 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6078 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6079 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6080 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6081 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6082 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6083 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6084 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6085 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6086 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6087 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6092 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6093 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6094 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6097 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6098 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6099 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6101 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6102 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6106 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6110 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6111 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6113 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6119 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6120 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6121 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6122 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6123 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6125 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6126 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6127 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6128 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6134 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6135 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6136 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6137 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6138 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6139 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6144 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6145 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6146 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6147 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6149 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6150 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6151 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6152 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6157 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6158 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6159 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6160 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6161 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6162 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6167 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6168 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6169 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6172 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6174 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6175 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6176 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6177 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6178 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6180 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6181 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6182 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6183 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6185 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6186 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6187 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6189 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6191 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6192 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6193 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6194 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6195 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6196 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6198 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6199 // deserialized from that format.
6200 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6201 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6202 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6204 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6206 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6207 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6208 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6210 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6211 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6212 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6213 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6216 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6217 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6218 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6221 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6222 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6223 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6224 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6226 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6227 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6229 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6231 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6233 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6235 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6238 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6240 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6245 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6247 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6248 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6249 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6250 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6251 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6252 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6253 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6255 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6257 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6259 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6262 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6263 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6264 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6267 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6269 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6270 preimages.push(preimage);
6272 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6273 reason.write(writer)?;
6275 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6277 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6278 preimages.push(preimage);
6280 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6281 reason.write(writer)?;
6286 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6287 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6289 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6291 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6292 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6293 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6294 source.write(writer)?;
6295 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6297 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6299 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6300 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6302 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6304 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6305 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6310 match self.resend_order {
6311 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6312 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6315 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6316 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6317 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6319 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6320 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6321 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6322 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6325 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6326 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6327 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6328 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6329 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6332 if self.is_outbound() {
6333 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6334 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6335 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6337 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6338 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6339 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6341 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6343 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6344 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6345 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6346 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6348 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6349 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6350 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6351 // consider the stale state on reload.
6354 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6355 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6356 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6358 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6359 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6360 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6362 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6363 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6365 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6366 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6367 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6369 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6370 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6372 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6375 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6376 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6377 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6379 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6382 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6383 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6385 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6386 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6387 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6389 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6391 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6393 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6395 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6396 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6397 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6398 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6399 htlc.write(writer)?;
6402 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6403 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6404 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6406 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6407 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6409 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6410 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6411 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6412 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6413 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6414 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6415 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6417 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6418 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6419 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6420 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6421 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6423 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6425 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6426 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6427 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6428 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6430 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6431 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6432 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6433 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6434 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6435 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6436 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6438 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6439 (2, chan_type, option),
6440 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6441 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6442 (5, self.config, required),
6443 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6444 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6445 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6446 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6447 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6448 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6449 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6450 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6451 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6452 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6453 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6454 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6461 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6462 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6464 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6465 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6467 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6468 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6469 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6471 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6472 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6473 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6474 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6476 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6478 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6479 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6480 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6481 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6482 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6484 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6485 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6492 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6494 let mut keys_data = None;
6496 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6497 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6498 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6499 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6500 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6501 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6502 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6503 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6504 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6505 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6509 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6510 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6511 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6514 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6516 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6517 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6518 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6520 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6521 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6522 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6523 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6524 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6525 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6526 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6527 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6528 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6529 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6530 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6531 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6532 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6533 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6538 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6539 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6540 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6541 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6542 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6543 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6544 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6545 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6546 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6547 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6548 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6549 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6551 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6552 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6555 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6556 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6559 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6560 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6562 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6567 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6568 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6569 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6570 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6571 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6572 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6573 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6574 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6575 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6576 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6578 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6579 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6580 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6582 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6583 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6584 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6586 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6590 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6591 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6592 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6593 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6596 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6597 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6598 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6600 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6601 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6602 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6603 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6606 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6607 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6608 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6609 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6612 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6614 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6616 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6617 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6619 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6621 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6622 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6623 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6624 // consider the stale state on reload.
6625 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6628 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6629 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6630 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6632 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6635 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6636 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6637 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6639 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6640 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6641 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6642 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6644 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6645 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6647 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6648 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6650 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6651 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6652 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6656 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6657 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6659 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6660 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6663 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6665 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6666 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6667 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6668 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6670 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6673 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6674 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6676 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6678 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6679 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6681 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6682 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6684 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6686 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6687 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6688 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6690 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6691 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6692 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6696 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6697 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6698 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6700 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6706 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6707 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6708 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6709 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6710 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6711 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6712 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6713 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6714 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6715 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6717 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6718 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6719 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6720 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6721 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6722 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6724 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6725 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6727 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6728 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6729 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6730 (2, channel_type, option),
6731 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6732 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6733 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6734 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6735 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6736 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6737 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6738 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6739 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6740 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6741 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6742 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6743 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6744 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6745 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6748 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6749 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6750 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6751 // required channel parameters.
6752 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6753 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6754 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6756 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6758 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6759 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6760 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6761 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6764 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6765 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6766 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6768 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6769 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6771 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6772 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6777 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6778 if iter.next().is_some() {
6779 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6783 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6784 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6785 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6786 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6787 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6790 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6791 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6793 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6794 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6795 // separate u64 values.
6796 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6801 config: config.unwrap(),
6805 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6806 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6807 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6811 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6813 channel_value_satoshis,
6815 latest_monitor_update_id,
6818 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6821 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6822 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6825 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6826 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6827 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6831 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6832 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6833 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6834 monitor_pending_forwards,
6835 monitor_pending_failures,
6836 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6839 holding_cell_update_fee,
6840 next_holder_htlc_id,
6841 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6842 update_time_counter,
6845 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6846 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6847 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6848 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6850 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6851 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6852 closing_fee_limits: None,
6853 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6855 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6857 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6858 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6860 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6862 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6863 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6864 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6865 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6866 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6867 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6868 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6869 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6870 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6873 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6875 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6876 funding_transaction,
6878 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6879 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6880 counterparty_node_id,
6882 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6886 channel_update_status,
6887 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6891 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6892 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6893 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6894 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6896 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6898 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6899 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6900 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6902 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6904 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6905 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6907 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6910 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6918 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6919 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6920 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6921 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6922 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6924 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6925 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6927 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6928 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6929 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6930 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6931 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6932 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6933 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6934 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6935 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6936 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6937 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6938 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6939 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6940 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6941 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6942 use crate::util::test_utils;
6943 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6944 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6945 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6946 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6947 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6948 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6949 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6950 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6951 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6952 use crate::prelude::*;
6954 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6957 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6958 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6964 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6965 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6966 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6967 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6971 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6972 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6973 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6974 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6975 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6976 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6977 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6981 signer: InMemorySigner,
6984 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6985 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6988 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6989 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6991 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6992 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6995 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6999 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7001 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7002 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7003 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7004 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7005 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7008 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7009 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7010 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7011 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7015 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7016 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7017 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7021 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7022 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7023 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7024 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7026 let seed = [42; 32];
7027 let network = Network::Testnet;
7028 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7029 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7030 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7033 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7034 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7035 let config = UserConfig::default();
7036 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7037 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7038 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7040 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7041 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7045 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7046 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7048 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7049 let original_fee = 253;
7050 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7051 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7052 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7053 let seed = [42; 32];
7054 let network = Network::Testnet;
7055 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7057 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7058 let config = UserConfig::default();
7059 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7061 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7062 // same as the old fee.
7063 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7064 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7065 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7069 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7070 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7071 // dust limits are used.
7072 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7073 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7074 let seed = [42; 32];
7075 let network = Network::Testnet;
7076 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7077 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7079 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7080 // they have different dust limits.
7082 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7083 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7084 let config = UserConfig::default();
7085 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7087 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7088 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7089 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7090 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7091 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7093 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7094 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7095 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7096 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7097 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7099 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7100 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7101 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7103 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7104 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7105 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7106 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7109 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7111 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7112 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7113 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7114 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7115 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7119 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7120 payment_secret: None,
7124 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7125 // the dust limit check.
7126 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7127 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7128 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7129 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7131 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7132 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7133 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7134 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7135 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7136 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7137 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7141 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7142 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7143 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7144 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7145 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7146 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7147 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7148 let seed = [42; 32];
7149 let network = Network::Testnet;
7150 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7152 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7153 let config = UserConfig::default();
7154 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7156 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7157 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7159 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7160 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7161 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7162 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7163 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7164 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7166 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7167 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7168 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7169 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7170 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7172 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7174 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7175 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7176 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7177 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7178 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7180 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7181 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7182 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7183 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7184 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7188 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7189 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7190 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7191 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7192 let seed = [42; 32];
7193 let network = Network::Testnet;
7194 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7195 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7196 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7198 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7200 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7201 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7202 let config = UserConfig::default();
7203 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7205 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7206 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7207 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7208 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7210 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7211 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7212 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7214 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7215 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7216 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7217 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7219 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7220 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7221 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7223 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7224 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7226 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7227 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7228 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7229 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7230 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7231 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7232 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7233 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7234 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7239 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7241 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7242 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7243 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7244 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7245 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7246 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7247 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7254 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7255 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7256 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7257 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7258 let seed = [42; 32];
7259 let network = Network::Testnet;
7260 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7261 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7262 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7264 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7265 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7266 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7267 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7268 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7269 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7270 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7271 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7273 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7274 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7275 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7276 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7277 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7278 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7280 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7281 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7282 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7283 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7285 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7287 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7288 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7289 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7290 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7291 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7292 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7294 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7295 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7296 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7297 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7299 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7300 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7301 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7302 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7303 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7305 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7306 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7308 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7309 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7310 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7312 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7313 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7314 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7315 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7316 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7318 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7319 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7321 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7322 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7323 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7327 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7329 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7330 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7331 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7333 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7334 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7335 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7336 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7338 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7339 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7340 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7342 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7344 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7345 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7348 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7349 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7350 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7351 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7352 let seed = [42; 32];
7353 let network = Network::Testnet;
7354 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7355 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7356 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7359 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7360 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7361 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7363 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7364 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7366 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7367 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7368 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7370 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7371 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7373 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7375 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7376 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7378 // Channel Negotiations failed
7379 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7380 assert!(result.is_err());
7385 fn channel_update() {
7386 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7387 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7388 let seed = [42; 32];
7389 let network = Network::Testnet;
7390 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7391 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7393 // Create a channel.
7394 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7395 let config = UserConfig::default();
7396 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7397 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7398 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7399 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7401 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7402 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7403 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7405 short_channel_id: 0,
7408 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7409 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7410 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7412 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7413 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7415 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7417 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7419 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7420 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7421 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7422 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7424 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7425 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7426 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7428 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7432 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7434 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7435 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7436 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7437 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7438 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7439 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7440 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7441 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7442 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7443 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7444 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7445 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7446 use crate::sync::Arc;
7448 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7449 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7450 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7451 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7453 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7455 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7456 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7457 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7458 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7459 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7461 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7462 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7467 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7468 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7469 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7471 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7472 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7473 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7474 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7475 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7476 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7478 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7480 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7481 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7482 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7483 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7484 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7485 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7487 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7488 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7489 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7490 selected_contest_delay: 144
7492 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7493 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7495 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7496 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7498 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7499 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7501 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7502 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7504 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7505 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7506 // build_commitment_transaction.
7507 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7508 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7509 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7510 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7511 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7513 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7514 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7515 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7516 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7520 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7521 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7522 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7523 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7527 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7528 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7529 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7531 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7532 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7534 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7535 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7537 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7539 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7540 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7541 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7542 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7543 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7544 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7545 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7547 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7548 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7549 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7550 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7552 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7553 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7554 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7556 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7558 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7559 commitment_tx.clone(),
7560 counterparty_signature,
7561 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7562 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7563 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7565 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7566 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7568 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7569 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7570 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7572 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7573 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7576 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7577 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7579 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7580 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7581 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7582 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7583 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7584 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7585 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7586 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7588 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7591 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7592 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7593 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7597 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7600 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7601 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7602 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7604 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7605 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7606 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7607 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7608 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7609 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7610 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7611 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7613 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7617 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7618 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7619 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7620 "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", {});
7622 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7623 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7625 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7626 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7627 "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", {});
7629 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7630 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7631 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7632 "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", {});
7634 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7635 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7637 amount_msat: 1000000,
7639 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7640 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7642 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7645 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7646 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7648 amount_msat: 2000000,
7650 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7651 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7653 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7656 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7657 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7659 amount_msat: 2000000,
7661 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7662 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7663 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7665 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7668 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7669 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7671 amount_msat: 3000000,
7673 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7674 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7675 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7677 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7680 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7681 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7683 amount_msat: 4000000,
7685 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7686 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7688 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7692 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7693 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7694 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7696 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7697 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7698 "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", {
7701 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7702 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7703 "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" },
7706 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7707 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7708 "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" },
7711 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7712 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7713 "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" },
7716 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7717 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7718 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7721 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7722 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7723 "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" }
7726 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7727 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7728 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7730 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7731 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7732 "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", {
7735 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7736 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7737 "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" },
7740 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7741 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7742 "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" },
7745 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7746 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7747 "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" },
7750 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7751 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7752 "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" },
7755 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7756 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7757 "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" }
7760 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7761 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7762 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7764 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7765 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7766 "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", {
7769 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7770 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7771 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7774 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7775 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7776 "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" },
7779 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7780 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7781 "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" },
7784 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7785 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7786 "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" }
7789 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7790 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7791 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7792 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7794 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7795 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7796 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7799 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7800 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7801 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
7804 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7805 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7806 "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" },
7809 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7810 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7811 "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" },
7814 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7815 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7816 "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" }
7819 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7820 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7821 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7822 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7824 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7825 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7826 "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", {
7829 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7830 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7831 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7834 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7835 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7836 "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" },
7839 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7840 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7841 "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" },
7844 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7845 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7846 "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" }
7849 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7850 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7851 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7853 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7854 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7855 "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", {
7858 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7859 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7860 "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" },
7863 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7864 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7865 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7868 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7869 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7870 "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" }
7873 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7874 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7875 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7877 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7878 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7879 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7882 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7883 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7884 "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" },
7887 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7888 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7889 "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" },
7892 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7893 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7894 "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" }
7897 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7898 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7899 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7901 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7902 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7903 "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", {
7906 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7907 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7908 "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" },
7911 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7912 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7913 "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" }
7916 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7917 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7918 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7919 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7921 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7922 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7923 "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", {
7926 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7927 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7928 "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" },
7931 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7932 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7933 "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" }
7936 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7937 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7938 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7939 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7941 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7942 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7943 "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", {
7946 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7947 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7948 "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" },
7951 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7952 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7953 "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" }
7956 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7957 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7958 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7960 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7961 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7962 "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", {
7965 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7966 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7967 "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" }
7970 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7971 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7972 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7973 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7975 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7976 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7977 "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", {
7980 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7981 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7982 "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" }
7985 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7986 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7987 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7988 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7990 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7991 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7992 "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", {
7995 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7996 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7997 "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" }
8000 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8001 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8002 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8003 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8005 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8006 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8007 "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", {});
8009 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8010 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8011 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8012 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8014 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8015 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8016 "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", {});
8018 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8019 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8020 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8021 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8023 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8024 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8025 "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", {});
8027 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8028 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8029 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8031 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8032 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8033 "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", {});
8035 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8036 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8037 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8038 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8040 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8041 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8042 "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", {});
8044 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8045 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8046 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8047 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8049 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8050 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8051 "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", {});
8053 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8054 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8055 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8056 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8057 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8058 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8060 amount_msat: 2000000,
8062 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8063 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8065 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8068 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8069 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8070 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8072 amount_msat: 5000001,
8074 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8075 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8076 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8078 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8081 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8082 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8084 amount_msat: 5000000,
8086 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8087 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8088 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8090 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8094 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8095 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8096 "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", {
8099 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8100 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8101 "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" },
8103 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8104 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8105 "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" },
8107 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8108 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8109 "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" }
8112 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8113 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8114 "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", {
8117 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8118 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8119 "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" },
8121 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8122 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8123 "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" },
8125 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8126 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8127 "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" }
8132 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8133 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8135 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8136 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8137 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8138 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8140 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8141 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8142 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8144 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8145 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8147 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8148 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8150 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8151 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8152 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8156 fn test_key_derivation() {
8157 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8158 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8160 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8161 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8163 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8164 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8166 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8167 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8169 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8170 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8172 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8173 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8175 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8176 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8178 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8179 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8183 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8184 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8185 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8186 let seed = [42; 32];
8187 let network = Network::Testnet;
8188 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8189 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8191 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8192 let config = UserConfig::default();
8193 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8194 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8196 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8197 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8199 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8200 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8201 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8202 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8203 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8204 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8205 assert!(res.is_ok());
8210 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8211 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8212 // resulting `channel_type`.
8213 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8214 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8215 let network = Network::Testnet;
8216 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8217 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8219 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8220 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8222 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8223 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8225 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8226 // need to signal it.
8227 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8228 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8229 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8232 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8234 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8235 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8236 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8238 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8239 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8240 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8243 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8244 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8245 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8246 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8247 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8250 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8251 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8256 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8257 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8258 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8259 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8260 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8261 let network = Network::Testnet;
8262 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8263 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8265 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8266 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8268 let config = UserConfig::default();
8270 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8271 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8272 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8273 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8274 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8276 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8277 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8278 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8281 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8282 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8283 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8285 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8286 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8287 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8288 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8289 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8290 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8292 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8297 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8298 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8300 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8301 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8302 let network = Network::Testnet;
8303 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8304 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8306 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8307 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8309 let config = UserConfig::default();
8311 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8312 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8313 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8314 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8315 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8316 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8317 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8318 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8320 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8321 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8322 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8323 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8324 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8325 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8328 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8329 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8331 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8332 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8333 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8334 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8336 assert!(res.is_err());
8338 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8339 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8340 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8342 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8343 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8344 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8347 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8349 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8350 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8351 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8352 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8355 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8356 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8358 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8359 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8361 assert!(res.is_err());