1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
34 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
41 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
42 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use crate::prelude::*;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
50 use crate::sync::Mutex;
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelReady.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
277 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
278 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub mon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
443 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
563 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
565 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
567 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
568 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
569 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
570 // HTLCs with similar state.
571 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
572 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
573 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
574 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
575 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
576 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
577 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
578 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
579 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
582 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
583 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
584 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
586 update_time_counter: u32,
588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
589 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
590 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
593 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
595 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
596 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
598 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
599 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
600 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
601 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
603 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
604 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
606 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
610 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
611 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
612 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
613 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
614 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
615 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
617 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
618 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
619 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
620 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
621 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
623 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
624 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
625 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
626 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
627 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
628 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
629 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
630 channel_creation_height: u32,
632 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
649 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
653 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
664 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
666 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
668 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
669 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
671 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
673 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
675 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
677 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
679 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
680 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
681 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
682 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
684 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
685 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
686 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
688 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
689 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
690 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
692 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
693 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
694 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
695 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
699 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
702 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
703 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
704 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
705 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
707 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
708 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
712 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
713 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
714 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
715 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
716 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
717 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
719 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
720 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
722 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
723 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
724 // the channel's funding UTXO.
726 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
727 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
728 // associated channel mapping.
730 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
731 // to store all of them.
732 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
734 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
735 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
736 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
737 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
738 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
740 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
741 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
744 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
745 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
747 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
748 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
749 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
753 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
755 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
756 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
757 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
758 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
762 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
764 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
766 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
768 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
769 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
770 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
771 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
772 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
774 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
775 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
777 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
779 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
780 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
782 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
783 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
784 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
785 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
786 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
787 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
789 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
790 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
792 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
793 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
794 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
795 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
796 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
798 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
799 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
801 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
802 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
804 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
805 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
806 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
807 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
813 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
814 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
816 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
817 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
818 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
823 macro_rules! secp_check {
824 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
827 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
832 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
833 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
834 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
835 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
837 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
839 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
840 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
841 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
843 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
846 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
848 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
851 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
852 /// required by us according to the configured or default
853 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
855 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
857 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
858 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
859 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
860 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
861 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
864 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
865 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
866 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
867 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
868 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
869 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
870 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
873 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
874 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
877 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
878 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
879 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
880 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
881 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
882 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
883 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
884 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
889 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
890 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
891 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
892 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
893 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
894 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
895 // We've exhausted our options
898 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
899 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
903 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
904 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
905 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
906 outbound_scid_alias: u64
907 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
908 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
909 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
911 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
913 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
914 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
915 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
917 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
920 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
921 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
923 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
924 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
927 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
928 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
930 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
931 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
932 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
933 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
934 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
937 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
939 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
940 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
941 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
942 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
945 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
946 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
948 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
949 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
952 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
953 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
954 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
961 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
962 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
963 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
964 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
969 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
971 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
972 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
973 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
975 channel_value_satoshis,
977 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
980 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
981 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
983 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
984 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
987 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
988 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
989 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
990 pending_update_fee: None,
991 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
992 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
993 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
994 update_time_counter: 1,
996 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
998 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
999 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1000 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1001 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1002 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1003 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1005 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1006 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1007 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1008 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1010 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1011 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1012 closing_fee_limits: None,
1013 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1015 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1017 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1018 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1019 short_channel_id: None,
1020 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1022 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1023 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1024 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1025 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1026 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1027 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1028 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1029 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1030 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1031 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1032 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1034 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1036 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1037 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1038 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1039 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1040 counterparty_parameters: None,
1041 funding_outpoint: None,
1042 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1044 funding_transaction: None,
1046 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1047 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1048 counterparty_node_id,
1050 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1052 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1054 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1055 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1057 announcement_sigs: None,
1059 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1060 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1061 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1062 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1064 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1066 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1067 outbound_scid_alias,
1069 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1071 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1072 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1074 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1078 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1079 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1081 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1082 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1083 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1084 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1085 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1086 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1087 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1090 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1091 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1092 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1093 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1094 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1095 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1096 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1101 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1102 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1103 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1104 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1105 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1106 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1107 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1108 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1109 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1112 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1113 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1115 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1116 // support this channel type.
1117 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1118 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1119 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1122 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1126 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1127 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1128 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1129 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1130 // publicly announced.
1131 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1132 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1136 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1140 channel_type.clone()
1142 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1144 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1148 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1149 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1150 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1151 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1152 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1153 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1154 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1155 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1158 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1162 // Check sanity of message fields:
1163 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1164 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1166 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1169 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1170 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1172 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1173 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1176 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1179 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1182 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
1184 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1185 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1188 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1191 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1195 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1196 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1199 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1202 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1205 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1208 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1211 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1214 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1218 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1220 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1221 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1226 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1227 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1228 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1229 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1232 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1235 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1236 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1237 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1239 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1243 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1244 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1245 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1246 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1247 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1251 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1252 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1253 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1254 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1258 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1259 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1260 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1261 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1262 if script.len() == 0 {
1265 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1268 Some(script.clone())
1271 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1272 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1278 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1279 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1282 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1283 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1288 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1289 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1291 let chan = Channel {
1294 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1295 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1297 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1302 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1304 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1305 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1306 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1309 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1312 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1313 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1315 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1316 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1317 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1319 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1320 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1321 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1322 pending_update_fee: None,
1323 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1324 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1325 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1326 update_time_counter: 1,
1328 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1330 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1331 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1332 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1333 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1334 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1335 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1337 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1338 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1339 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1340 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1342 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1343 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1344 closing_fee_limits: None,
1345 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1347 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1349 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1350 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1351 short_channel_id: None,
1352 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1354 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1355 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1356 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1357 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1358 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1359 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1360 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1361 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1362 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1363 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1364 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1365 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1367 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1369 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1370 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1371 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1372 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1373 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1374 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1375 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1377 funding_outpoint: None,
1378 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1380 funding_transaction: None,
1382 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1383 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1384 counterparty_node_id,
1386 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1388 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1390 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1391 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1393 announcement_sigs: None,
1395 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1396 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1397 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1398 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1400 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1402 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1403 outbound_scid_alias,
1405 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1407 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1408 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1416 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1417 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1418 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1419 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1420 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1422 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1423 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1424 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1425 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1426 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1427 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1428 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1430 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1431 where L::Target: Logger
1433 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1434 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1435 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1437 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1438 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1439 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1440 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1442 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1443 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1444 if match update_state {
1445 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1446 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1447 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1448 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1449 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1451 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1455 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1456 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1457 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1458 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1460 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1461 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1462 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1464 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1465 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1466 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1467 transaction_output_index: None
1472 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1473 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1474 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1475 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1476 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1479 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1481 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1482 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1483 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1485 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1486 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1489 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1490 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1493 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1495 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1496 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1497 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1499 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1500 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1506 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1507 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1508 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1509 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1510 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1511 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1512 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1516 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1517 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1519 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1521 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1522 if generated_by_local {
1523 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1524 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1533 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1535 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1536 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1537 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1538 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1539 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1540 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1541 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1544 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1545 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1546 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1547 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1551 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1552 preimages.push(preimage);
1556 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1557 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1559 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1561 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1562 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1564 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1565 if !generated_by_local {
1566 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1574 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1575 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1576 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1577 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1578 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1579 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1580 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1581 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1583 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1585 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1586 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1587 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1588 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1590 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1592 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1593 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1594 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1595 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1598 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1599 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1600 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1601 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1603 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1606 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1607 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1608 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1609 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1611 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1614 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1615 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1620 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1621 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1626 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1628 let channel_parameters =
1629 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1630 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1631 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1634 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1639 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1642 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1643 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1644 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1645 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1647 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1648 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1649 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1657 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1658 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1664 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1665 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1666 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1667 // outside of those situations will fail.
1668 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1672 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1677 1 + // script length (0)
1681 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1682 2 + // witness marker and flag
1683 1 + // witness element count
1684 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1685 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1686 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1687 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1688 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1689 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1691 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1692 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1693 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1699 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1700 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1701 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1702 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1704 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1705 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1706 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1708 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1709 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1710 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1711 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1712 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1713 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1716 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1717 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1720 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1721 value_to_holder = 0;
1724 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1725 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1726 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1727 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1729 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1730 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1733 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1734 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1738 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1739 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1740 /// our counterparty!)
1741 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1742 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1743 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1744 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1745 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1746 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1747 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1749 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1753 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1754 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1755 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1756 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1757 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1758 //may see payments to it!
1759 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1760 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1761 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1763 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1766 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1767 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1768 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1769 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1770 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1773 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1776 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1777 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1779 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1781 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1782 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1783 where L::Target: Logger {
1784 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1785 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1786 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1787 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1788 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1789 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1790 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1791 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1795 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1796 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1797 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1798 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1800 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1801 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1803 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1805 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1807 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1808 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1809 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1811 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1812 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1813 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1814 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1815 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1817 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1818 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1819 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1821 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1822 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1824 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1827 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1828 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1832 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1836 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1837 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1838 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1839 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1840 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1841 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1844 // Now update local state:
1846 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1847 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1848 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1849 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1850 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1851 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1852 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1856 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1857 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1858 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1859 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1860 // do not not get into this branch.
1861 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1862 match pending_update {
1863 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1864 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1865 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1866 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1867 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1868 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1869 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1872 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1873 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1874 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1875 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1876 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1877 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1878 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1884 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1885 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1886 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1888 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1889 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1890 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1893 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1896 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1897 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1899 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1900 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1902 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1903 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1906 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1909 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1910 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1911 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1912 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1917 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1918 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1919 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1920 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1921 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1924 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1925 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1926 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1927 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1928 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1930 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1931 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1932 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1936 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1937 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1938 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1939 /// before we fail backwards.
1940 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1941 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1942 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1943 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1944 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1946 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1948 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1949 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1950 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1952 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1953 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1954 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1956 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1957 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1958 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1960 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1965 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1966 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1972 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1973 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1974 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1975 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1976 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1980 // Now update local state:
1981 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1982 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1983 match pending_update {
1984 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1985 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1986 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1987 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1991 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1992 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1993 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1994 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2000 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2001 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2002 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2008 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2010 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2011 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2014 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2015 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2016 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2021 // Message handlers:
2023 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2024 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2026 // Check sanity of message fields:
2027 if !self.is_outbound() {
2028 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2030 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2031 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2033 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2034 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2036 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2039 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2042 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2044 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2046 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2047 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2050 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2051 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2052 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2054 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2057 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2058 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2061 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2062 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2063 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2065 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2066 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2068 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2071 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2074 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2077 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2080 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2084 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2085 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2088 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2089 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2091 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2094 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2095 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2096 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2097 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2098 if script.len() == 0 {
2101 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2102 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2104 Some(script.clone())
2107 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2108 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2114 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2115 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2116 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2117 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2118 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2120 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2121 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2123 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2126 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2127 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2128 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2129 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2130 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2131 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2134 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2135 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2136 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2139 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2140 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2142 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2143 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2148 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2149 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2151 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2152 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2154 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2155 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2156 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2157 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2158 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2159 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2160 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2161 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2162 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2165 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2166 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2168 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2169 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2170 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2171 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2173 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2174 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2176 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2177 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2180 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2181 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2184 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2185 if self.is_outbound() {
2186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2188 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2189 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2190 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2192 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2194 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2197 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2198 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2199 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2200 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2203 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2204 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2205 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2206 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2207 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2209 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2211 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2212 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2216 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2217 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2218 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2222 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2223 initial_commitment_tx,
2226 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2227 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2230 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2231 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2233 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2235 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2236 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2237 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2238 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2239 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2240 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2241 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2242 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2243 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2245 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2247 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2249 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2250 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2251 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2252 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2254 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2256 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2257 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2259 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2262 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2263 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2264 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2265 if !self.is_outbound() {
2266 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2268 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2271 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2272 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2273 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2274 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2277 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2279 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2280 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2281 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2282 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2284 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2285 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2287 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2288 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2290 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2291 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2292 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2293 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2294 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2299 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2300 initial_commitment_tx,
2303 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2304 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2307 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2308 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2311 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2312 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2313 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2314 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2315 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2316 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2317 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2318 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2319 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2320 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2322 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2324 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2326 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2327 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2328 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2329 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2331 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2333 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2336 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2337 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2339 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2340 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2341 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2342 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2345 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2346 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2347 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2348 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2349 // when routing outbound payments.
2350 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2354 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2356 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2357 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2358 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2359 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2360 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2361 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2362 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2363 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2364 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2366 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2367 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2368 let expected_point =
2369 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2370 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2372 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2374 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2375 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2376 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2377 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2378 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2380 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2381 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2388 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2389 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2391 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2393 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2396 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2397 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2398 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2399 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2405 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2406 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2407 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2408 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2409 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2410 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2411 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2412 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2413 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2416 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2419 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2420 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2421 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2423 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2424 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2425 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2426 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2427 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2428 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2430 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2431 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2437 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2438 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2439 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2440 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2441 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2442 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2443 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2444 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2445 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2448 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2451 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2452 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2453 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2455 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2456 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2457 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2458 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2459 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2460 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2462 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2463 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2467 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2468 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2469 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2470 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2471 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2472 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2473 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2475 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2476 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2478 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2485 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2486 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2487 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2488 /// corner case properly.
2489 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2490 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2491 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2493 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2494 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2495 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2496 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2499 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2501 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2502 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2503 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2506 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2507 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2508 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2509 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2511 outbound_capacity_msat,
2512 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2513 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2514 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2520 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2521 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2524 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2525 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2526 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2527 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2528 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2529 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2532 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2533 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2535 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2536 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2539 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2540 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2541 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2543 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2544 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2546 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2549 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2550 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2552 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2553 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2555 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2556 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2558 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2559 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2563 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2564 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2570 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2571 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2572 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2575 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2576 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2577 included_htlcs += 1;
2580 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2581 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2585 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2586 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2587 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2588 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2589 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2590 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2595 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2597 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2598 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2603 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2604 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2608 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2609 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2610 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2613 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2614 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2616 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2617 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2618 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2620 total_pending_htlcs,
2621 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2622 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2623 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2625 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2626 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2627 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2629 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2631 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2636 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2637 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2638 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2640 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2641 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2643 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2646 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2647 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2649 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2650 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2652 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2653 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2655 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2656 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2660 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2661 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2667 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2668 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2669 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2670 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2671 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2672 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2675 included_htlcs += 1;
2678 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2679 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2682 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2683 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2685 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2686 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2687 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2692 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2693 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2697 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2698 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2700 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2701 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2703 total_pending_htlcs,
2704 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2705 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2706 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2708 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2709 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2710 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2712 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2714 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2719 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2720 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2721 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2722 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2723 if local_sent_shutdown {
2724 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2726 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2727 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2728 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2731 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2732 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2734 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2735 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2737 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2740 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2741 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2744 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2745 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2746 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2747 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2749 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2752 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2753 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2754 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2755 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2756 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2757 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2758 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2759 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2760 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2761 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2762 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2764 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2765 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2766 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2767 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2768 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2769 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2773 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2776 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2777 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2778 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2780 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2781 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2782 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2783 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2784 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2785 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2786 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2790 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2791 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2792 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2793 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2794 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2795 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2796 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2800 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2801 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2802 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2803 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2804 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2805 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2808 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2809 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2810 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2811 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2812 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2814 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2818 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2819 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2822 if !self.is_outbound() {
2823 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2824 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2825 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2826 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2827 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2828 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2829 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2830 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2831 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2832 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2833 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2834 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2835 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2836 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2837 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2840 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2841 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2842 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2843 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2847 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2850 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2854 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2855 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2856 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2860 // Now update local state:
2861 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2862 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2863 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2864 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2865 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2866 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2867 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2872 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2874 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2875 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2876 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2877 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2878 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2879 None => fail_reason.into(),
2880 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2881 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2882 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2885 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2889 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2891 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2892 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2894 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2900 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2903 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2904 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2907 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2908 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2911 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2914 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2915 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2918 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2922 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2926 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2927 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2930 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2934 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2938 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2939 where L::Target: Logger
2941 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2942 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2944 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2945 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2947 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2948 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2951 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2953 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2955 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2956 let commitment_txid = {
2957 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2958 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2959 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2961 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2962 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2963 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2964 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2965 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2966 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2970 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2972 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2973 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2974 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2975 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2978 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2979 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2980 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2981 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2984 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2986 if self.is_outbound() {
2987 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2988 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2989 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2990 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2991 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2992 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2993 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2994 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2995 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2996 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3002 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3003 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3006 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3007 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3008 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3009 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3010 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3011 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3012 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3014 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3015 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3016 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3017 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3018 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3019 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3020 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3021 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3023 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3025 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3029 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3030 commitment_stats.tx,
3032 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3033 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3034 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3037 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3038 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3039 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3040 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3042 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3043 let mut need_commitment = false;
3044 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3045 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3046 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3047 need_commitment = true;
3051 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3052 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3053 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3054 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3055 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3056 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3060 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3061 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3062 Some(forward_info.clone())
3064 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3065 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3066 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3067 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3068 need_commitment = true;
3071 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3072 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3073 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3074 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3075 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3076 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3077 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3078 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3079 need_commitment = true;
3083 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3084 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3085 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3086 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3088 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3089 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3090 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3091 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3092 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3093 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3094 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3095 // includes the right HTLCs.
3096 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3097 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3098 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3099 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3100 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3101 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3103 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3104 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3105 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3108 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3109 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3110 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3111 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3112 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3113 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3114 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3115 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3116 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3120 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3121 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3123 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3124 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3125 per_commitment_secret,
3126 next_per_commitment_point,
3127 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3130 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3131 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3132 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3133 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3134 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3135 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3136 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3137 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3140 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3141 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3142 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3143 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3144 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3145 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3146 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3148 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3149 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3150 updates: Vec::new(),
3153 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3154 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3155 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3156 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3157 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3158 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3159 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3160 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3161 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3162 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3163 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3164 // to rebalance channels.
3165 match &htlc_update {
3166 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3167 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3168 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3171 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3172 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3173 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3174 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3175 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3176 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3177 // into the holding cell without ever being
3178 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3179 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3180 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3183 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3189 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3190 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3191 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3192 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3193 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3194 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3195 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3196 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3197 (msg, monitor_update)
3198 } else { unreachable!() };
3199 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3200 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3202 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3203 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3204 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3205 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3206 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3207 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3208 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3209 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3210 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3213 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3215 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3222 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3223 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3225 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3226 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3231 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3232 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3233 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3234 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3235 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3237 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3238 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3239 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3241 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3243 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3245 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3248 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3250 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3254 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3255 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3256 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3257 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3258 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3259 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3260 where L::Target: Logger,
3262 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3263 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3265 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3266 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3268 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3272 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3274 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3275 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3280 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3281 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3282 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3283 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3284 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3285 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3286 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3287 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3291 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3293 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3294 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3297 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3298 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3300 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3302 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3303 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3304 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3305 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3306 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3307 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3308 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3309 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3313 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3314 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3315 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3316 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3317 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3318 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3319 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3320 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3322 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3323 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3326 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3327 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3328 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3329 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3330 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3331 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3332 let mut require_commitment = false;
3333 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3336 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3337 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3338 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3340 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3341 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3342 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3343 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3344 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3345 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3350 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3351 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3352 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3353 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3354 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3356 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3357 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3358 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3363 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3364 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3366 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3370 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3371 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3373 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3374 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3375 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3376 require_commitment = true;
3377 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3378 match forward_info {
3379 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3380 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3381 require_commitment = true;
3383 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3384 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3385 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3387 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3388 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3389 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3393 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3394 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3395 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3396 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3402 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3403 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3404 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3405 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3407 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3408 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3409 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3410 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3411 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3412 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3413 require_commitment = true;
3417 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3419 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3420 match update_state {
3421 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3422 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3423 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3424 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3425 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3427 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3428 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3429 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3430 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3431 require_commitment = true;
3432 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3433 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3438 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3439 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3440 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3441 if require_commitment {
3442 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3443 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3444 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3445 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3446 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3447 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3448 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3449 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3450 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3452 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3453 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3454 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3455 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3456 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3457 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3458 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3460 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3464 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3465 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3466 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3467 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3468 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3470 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3471 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3472 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3475 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3476 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3477 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3478 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3481 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3482 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3483 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3484 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3486 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3489 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3490 if require_commitment {
3491 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3493 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3494 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3495 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3496 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3498 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3499 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3501 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3502 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3503 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3505 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3509 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3510 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3511 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3514 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3516 commitment_update: None,
3517 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3518 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3519 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3526 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3527 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3528 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3529 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3530 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3531 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3532 if !self.is_outbound() {
3533 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3535 if !self.is_usable() {
3536 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3538 if !self.is_live() {
3539 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3542 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3543 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3544 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3545 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3546 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3547 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3548 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3549 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3550 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3551 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3555 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3556 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3557 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3558 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3559 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3562 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3563 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3567 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3568 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3572 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3573 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3575 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3576 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3581 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3582 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3583 Some(update_fee) => {
3584 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3585 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3591 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3592 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3594 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3596 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3597 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3598 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3599 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3603 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3604 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3605 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3609 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3610 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3613 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3614 // will be retransmitted.
3615 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3616 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3617 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3619 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3620 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3622 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3623 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3624 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3625 // this HTLC accordingly
3626 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3629 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3630 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3631 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3632 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3635 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3636 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3637 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3638 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3639 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3640 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3645 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3647 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3648 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3649 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3650 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3654 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3655 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3656 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3657 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3658 // the update upon reconnection.
3659 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3663 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3664 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3667 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3668 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3669 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3670 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3671 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3672 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3674 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3675 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3676 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3677 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3678 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3679 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3681 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3682 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3683 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3684 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3685 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3686 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3687 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3690 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3691 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3692 /// to the remote side.
3693 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3694 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3695 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3697 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3698 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3699 // first received the funding_signed.
3700 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3701 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3702 self.funding_transaction.take()
3704 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3705 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3706 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3707 funding_broadcastable = None;
3710 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3711 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3712 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3713 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3714 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3715 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3716 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3717 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3718 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3719 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3720 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3721 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3722 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3723 next_per_commitment_point,
3724 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3728 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3730 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3731 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3732 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3733 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3734 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3735 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3737 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3738 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3739 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3740 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3741 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3742 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3746 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3747 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3749 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3750 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3753 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3754 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3755 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3756 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3757 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3758 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3759 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3760 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3761 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3765 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3766 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3768 if self.is_outbound() {
3769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3771 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3772 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3774 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3775 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3777 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3778 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3779 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3780 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3781 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3782 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3783 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3784 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3785 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3786 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3787 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3788 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3789 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3791 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3792 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3793 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3799 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3800 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3801 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3802 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3803 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3804 per_commitment_secret,
3805 next_per_commitment_point,
3809 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3810 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3811 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3812 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3813 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3815 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3816 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3817 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3818 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3819 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3820 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3821 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3822 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3823 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3828 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3829 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3831 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3832 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3833 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3834 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3835 reason: err_packet.clone()
3838 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3839 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3840 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3841 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3842 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3843 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3846 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3847 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3848 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3849 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3850 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3857 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3858 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3859 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3860 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3864 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3865 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3866 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3867 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3868 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3869 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3873 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3874 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3876 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3877 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3878 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3879 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3880 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3881 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3882 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3883 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3884 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3885 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3886 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3890 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3891 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3895 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3896 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3897 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3898 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3899 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3900 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3901 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3902 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3904 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3905 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3906 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3907 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3908 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3911 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3912 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3913 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3914 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3915 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3916 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3917 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3918 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3921 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3925 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3926 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3927 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3928 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3930 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3934 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3935 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3936 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3938 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3939 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3940 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3941 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3942 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3946 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3948 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3949 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3950 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3951 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3952 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3953 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3955 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3956 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3957 channel_ready: None,
3958 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3959 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3960 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3961 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3965 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3966 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3967 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3968 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3969 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3970 next_per_commitment_point,
3971 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3973 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3974 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3975 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3976 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3980 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3981 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3982 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3984 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3985 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3986 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3989 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3995 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3996 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3997 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3998 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3999 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4001 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4002 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4003 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4004 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4005 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4006 next_per_commitment_point,
4007 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4011 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4012 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4013 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4015 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4018 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
4019 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
4020 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
4021 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
4023 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
4024 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
4025 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) =>
4026 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
4027 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4028 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4029 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4030 raa: required_revoke,
4031 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
4032 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4033 mon_update: Some(monitor_update),
4034 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4037 Ok((None, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4038 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4039 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4040 raa: required_revoke,
4041 commitment_update: None,
4042 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4044 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4049 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4050 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4051 raa: required_revoke,
4052 commitment_update: None,
4053 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4055 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4058 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4059 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4060 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4062 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4065 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4066 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4067 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4068 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4069 commitment_update: None, raa: None, mon_update: None,
4070 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4071 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4074 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4075 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4076 raa: required_revoke,
4077 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4078 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4080 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4084 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4088 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4089 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4090 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4091 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4093 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4095 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4097 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4098 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4099 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4100 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4101 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4102 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4104 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4105 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4106 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4107 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4108 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4110 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4111 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4112 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4113 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4116 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4117 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4118 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4119 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4120 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4121 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4122 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4123 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4124 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4125 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4126 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4127 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4128 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4129 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4130 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4132 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4135 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4136 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4139 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4140 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4141 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4142 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4143 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4144 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4145 self.channel_state &
4146 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4147 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4148 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4149 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4152 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4153 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4154 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4155 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4156 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4157 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4158 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4160 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4166 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4167 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4168 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4169 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4171 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4172 return Ok((None, None));
4175 if !self.is_outbound() {
4176 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4177 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4179 return Ok((None, None));
4182 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4184 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4185 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4186 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4187 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4189 let sig = self.holder_signer
4190 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4191 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4193 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4194 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4195 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4196 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4198 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4199 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4200 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4205 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4206 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4207 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4208 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
4210 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4213 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4214 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4215 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4216 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4219 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4220 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4224 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4226 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4227 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4230 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4231 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4232 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4235 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4238 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4239 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4240 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4241 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4243 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4246 assert!(send_shutdown);
4247 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4248 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4251 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4256 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4258 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4259 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4261 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4262 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4263 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4264 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4265 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4266 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4270 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4271 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4272 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4273 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4277 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4278 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4279 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4280 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4281 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4282 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4284 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4285 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4292 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4293 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4295 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4298 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4299 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4301 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4303 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4304 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4305 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4306 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4307 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4308 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4309 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4310 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4311 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4313 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4314 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4317 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4321 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4322 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4323 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4324 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4326 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4329 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4332 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4333 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4335 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4339 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4343 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4344 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4345 return Ok((None, None));
4348 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4349 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4350 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4351 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4353 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4355 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4358 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4359 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4360 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4361 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4362 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4366 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4367 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4372 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4373 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4374 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4375 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4376 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4377 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4378 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4382 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4384 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4385 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4386 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4387 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4389 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4392 let sig = self.holder_signer
4393 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4394 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4396 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4397 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4398 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4399 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4403 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4404 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4405 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4406 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4408 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4409 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4410 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4416 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4417 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4420 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4421 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4423 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4424 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4427 if !self.is_outbound() {
4428 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4429 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4430 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4431 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4433 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4434 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4435 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4437 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4438 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4441 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4442 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4443 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4444 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4445 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4446 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4447 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4448 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4450 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4453 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4454 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4455 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4456 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4462 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4463 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4464 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4465 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4467 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4473 // Public utilities:
4475 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4479 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4483 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4484 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4485 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
4489 /// Gets the channel's type
4490 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4494 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4495 /// is_usable() returns true).
4496 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4497 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4498 self.short_channel_id
4501 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4502 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4503 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4506 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4507 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4508 self.outbound_scid_alias
4510 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4511 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4512 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4513 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4514 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4517 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4518 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4519 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4520 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4523 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4524 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4527 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4528 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4531 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4532 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4533 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4536 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4537 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4540 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4541 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4542 self.counterparty_node_id
4545 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4546 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4547 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4550 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4551 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4552 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4555 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4556 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4558 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4559 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4560 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4561 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4563 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4567 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4568 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4569 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4572 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4573 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4574 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4577 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4578 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4579 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4581 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4582 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4587 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4588 self.channel_value_satoshis
4591 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4592 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4595 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4596 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4599 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4600 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4603 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4604 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4605 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4608 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4609 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4610 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4613 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4614 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4615 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4618 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4619 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4620 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4621 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4622 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4625 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4627 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4628 self.prev_config = None;
4632 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4633 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4637 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4638 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4639 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4640 let did_channel_update =
4641 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4642 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4643 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4644 if did_channel_update {
4645 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4646 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4647 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4648 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4650 self.config.options = *config;
4654 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4655 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4656 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4657 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4658 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4659 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4660 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4662 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4663 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4666 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4668 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4669 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4675 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4676 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4677 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4678 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4679 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4680 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4681 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4683 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4684 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4691 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4695 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4696 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4697 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4698 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4699 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4700 // which are near the dust limit.
4701 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4702 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4703 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4704 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4705 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4707 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4708 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4710 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4713 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4714 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4717 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4718 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4721 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4722 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4726 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4731 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4733 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4734 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4735 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4736 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4737 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4738 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4740 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4742 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4750 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4751 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4755 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4756 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4757 self.update_time_counter
4760 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4761 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4764 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4765 self.config.announced_channel
4768 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4769 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4772 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4773 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4774 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4775 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4778 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4779 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4780 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4783 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4784 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4785 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4786 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4787 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4790 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4791 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4792 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4793 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4794 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4797 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4798 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4799 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4800 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4803 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4804 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4805 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4808 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4809 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4810 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4812 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4813 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4814 if self.channel_state &
4815 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4816 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4817 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4818 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4819 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4822 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4823 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4824 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4825 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4826 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4827 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4829 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4830 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4831 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4833 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4834 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4835 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4836 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4837 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4838 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4844 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4845 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4846 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4849 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4850 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4851 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4854 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4855 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4856 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4859 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4860 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4861 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4862 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4863 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4864 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4869 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4870 self.channel_update_status
4873 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4874 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4875 self.channel_update_status = status;
4878 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4880 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4881 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4882 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4886 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4887 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4888 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4891 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4895 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4896 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4897 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4899 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4900 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4901 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4903 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4904 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4907 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4908 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4909 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4910 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4911 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4912 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4913 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4914 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4915 self.channel_state);
4917 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4921 if need_commitment_update {
4922 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4923 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4924 let next_per_commitment_point =
4925 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4926 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4927 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4928 next_per_commitment_point,
4929 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4933 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4939 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4940 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4941 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4942 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4943 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4944 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4945 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4946 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4947 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4948 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4949 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4950 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4951 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4952 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4953 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4954 if self.is_outbound() {
4955 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4956 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4957 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4958 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4959 // channel and move on.
4960 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4961 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4963 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4964 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4965 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4967 if self.is_outbound() {
4968 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4969 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4970 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4971 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4972 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4973 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4977 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4978 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4979 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4980 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4981 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4985 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4986 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4987 // may have already happened for this block).
4988 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4989 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4990 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4991 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4994 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4995 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4996 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4997 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5005 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5006 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5007 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5008 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5010 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5011 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5014 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5016 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5017 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5018 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5021 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5022 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5023 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5024 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5025 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5027 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5028 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5030 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5031 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5032 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5040 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5042 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5043 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5044 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5046 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5047 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5050 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5051 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5052 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5053 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5054 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5055 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5056 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5057 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5058 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5061 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5062 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5063 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5064 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5066 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5067 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5068 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5070 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5071 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5072 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5073 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5075 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5076 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5077 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5078 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5079 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5080 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5081 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5084 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5085 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5087 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5090 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5091 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5092 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5093 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5094 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5095 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5096 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5097 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5098 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5099 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5100 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5101 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5102 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5103 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5104 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5105 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5106 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5112 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5117 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5118 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5120 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5121 if !self.is_outbound() {
5122 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5124 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5125 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5128 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5129 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5132 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5133 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5137 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5138 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5139 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5140 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5141 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5142 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5143 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5144 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5145 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5146 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5147 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5148 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5149 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5150 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5151 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5152 first_per_commitment_point,
5153 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5154 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5155 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5156 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5158 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5162 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5163 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5166 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5167 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5168 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5169 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5172 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5173 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5175 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5176 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u64) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5177 if self.is_outbound() {
5178 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5180 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5181 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5183 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5184 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5186 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5187 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5190 self.user_id = user_id;
5191 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5193 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5196 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5197 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5198 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5200 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5201 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5202 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5203 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5205 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5206 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5207 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5208 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5209 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5210 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5211 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5212 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5213 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5214 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5215 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5216 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5217 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5218 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5219 first_per_commitment_point,
5220 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5221 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5222 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5224 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5228 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5229 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5231 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5233 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5234 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5237 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5238 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5239 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5240 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5241 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5242 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5245 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5246 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5247 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5248 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5249 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5250 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5251 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5252 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5253 if !self.is_outbound() {
5254 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5256 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5257 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5259 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5260 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5261 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5262 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5265 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5266 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5268 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5271 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5272 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5277 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5279 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5281 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5282 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5283 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5285 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5286 temporary_channel_id,
5287 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5288 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5293 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5294 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5295 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5296 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5298 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5301 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5302 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5303 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5304 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5306 if !self.is_usable() {
5307 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5310 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5312 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5313 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5315 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5316 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5317 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5318 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5319 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5320 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5326 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5327 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5328 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5332 if !self.is_usable() {
5336 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5337 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5341 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5345 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5346 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5349 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5353 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5355 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5360 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5362 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5363 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5364 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5365 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5366 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5370 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5372 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5373 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5374 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5376 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5377 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5378 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5379 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5380 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5381 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5382 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5383 contents: announcement,
5386 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5390 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5391 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5392 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5393 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5394 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5396 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5398 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5399 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5400 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5401 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5403 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5404 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5405 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5406 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5409 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5410 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5411 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5412 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5415 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5418 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5419 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5420 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5421 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5424 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5426 Err(_) => return None,
5428 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5429 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5434 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5435 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5436 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5437 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5438 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5439 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5440 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5441 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5442 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5443 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5444 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5445 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5446 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5447 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5448 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5449 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5450 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5451 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5452 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5455 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5456 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5457 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5458 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5461 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5462 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5463 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5464 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5465 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5466 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5467 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5468 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5470 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5471 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5472 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5473 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5474 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5475 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5476 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5477 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5478 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5480 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5486 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5488 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5489 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5491 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5493 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5494 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5496 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5497 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5498 /// regenerate them.
5500 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5502 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5503 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5504 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5505 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5507 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5508 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5509 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5512 if amount_msat == 0 {
5513 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5516 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5517 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5520 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5521 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5522 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5523 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5524 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5525 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5526 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5527 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5530 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5531 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5532 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5533 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5535 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5536 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5537 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5540 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5541 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5542 if !self.is_outbound() {
5543 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5544 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5545 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5546 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5547 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5548 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5552 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5555 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5556 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5557 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5559 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5560 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5561 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5562 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5563 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5564 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5568 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5569 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5570 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5571 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5572 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5573 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5577 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5578 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5579 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5582 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5583 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5584 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5585 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5587 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5588 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5591 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5592 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5593 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5594 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5595 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5598 // Now update local state:
5599 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5600 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5605 onion_routing_packet,
5610 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5611 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5613 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5615 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5619 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5620 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5621 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5625 onion_routing_packet,
5627 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5632 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5633 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5634 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5635 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5636 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5637 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5638 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5640 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5641 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5643 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5644 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5646 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5647 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5649 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5650 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5651 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5652 have_updates = true;
5654 if have_updates { break; }
5656 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5657 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5658 have_updates = true;
5660 if have_updates { break; }
5663 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5665 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5667 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5668 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5669 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5670 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5671 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5673 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5674 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5675 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5677 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5678 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5682 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5683 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5684 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5685 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5686 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5687 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5688 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5691 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5692 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5693 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5694 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5695 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5696 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5699 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5701 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5702 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5703 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5704 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5705 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5706 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5708 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5711 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5712 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5715 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5716 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5717 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5718 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5719 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5720 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5721 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5722 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5725 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5726 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5729 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5730 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5731 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5732 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5733 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5734 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5735 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5737 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5739 if !self.is_outbound() {
5740 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5741 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5742 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5743 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5744 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5745 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5746 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5747 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5748 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5749 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5756 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5757 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5761 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5762 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5764 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5766 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5767 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5768 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5769 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5771 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5772 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5773 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5774 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5775 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5776 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5780 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5781 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5784 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5787 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5788 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5789 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5791 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5792 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5793 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5794 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5795 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5801 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5802 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5803 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5806 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5807 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5808 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5810 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5811 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5812 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5813 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5819 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5820 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5821 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5822 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5823 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5824 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5825 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5826 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5829 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5830 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5831 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5833 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5834 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5837 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5838 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5839 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5842 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5845 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5846 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5847 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5849 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5854 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5855 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5856 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5857 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5859 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5861 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5863 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5864 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5865 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5866 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5867 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5868 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5872 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5873 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5874 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5877 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5878 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5879 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5880 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5881 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5883 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5884 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5891 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5894 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5895 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5896 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5897 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5898 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5899 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5900 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5901 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5902 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5903 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5904 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5906 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5907 // return them to fail the payment.
5908 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5909 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5910 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5912 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5913 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5918 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5919 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5920 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5921 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5922 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5923 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5924 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5925 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5926 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5927 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5928 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5929 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5930 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5935 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5936 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5937 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5941 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5942 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5944 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5950 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5951 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5952 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5953 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5954 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5956 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5957 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5958 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5959 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5965 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5966 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5967 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5968 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5969 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5970 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5975 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5976 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5977 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5978 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5980 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5981 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5982 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5983 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5988 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5989 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5990 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5991 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5992 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5993 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5998 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5999 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6000 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6003 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6005 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
6007 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6008 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6009 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6010 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6012 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6013 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6014 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6016 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6018 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6019 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6020 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6021 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6022 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6023 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6025 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6026 // deserialized from that format.
6027 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6028 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6029 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6031 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6033 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6034 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6035 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6037 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6038 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6039 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6040 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6043 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6044 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6045 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6048 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6049 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6050 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6051 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6053 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6054 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6056 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6058 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6060 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6062 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6065 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6067 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6072 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6074 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6075 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6076 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6077 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6078 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6079 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6080 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6082 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6084 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6086 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6089 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6090 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6091 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6094 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6096 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6097 preimages.push(preimage);
6099 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6100 reason.write(writer)?;
6102 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6104 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6105 preimages.push(preimage);
6107 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6108 reason.write(writer)?;
6113 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6114 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6116 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6118 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6119 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6120 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6121 source.write(writer)?;
6122 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6124 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6126 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6127 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6129 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6131 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6132 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6137 match self.resend_order {
6138 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6139 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6142 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6143 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6144 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6146 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6147 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6148 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6149 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6152 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6153 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6154 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6155 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6156 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6159 if self.is_outbound() {
6160 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6161 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6162 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6164 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6165 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6166 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6168 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6170 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6171 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6172 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6173 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6175 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6176 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6177 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6178 // consider the stale state on reload.
6181 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6182 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6183 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6185 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6186 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6187 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6189 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6190 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6192 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6193 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6194 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6196 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6197 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6199 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6202 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6203 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6204 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6206 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6209 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6210 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6212 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6213 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6214 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6216 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6218 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6220 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6222 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6223 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6224 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6225 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6226 htlc.write(writer)?;
6229 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6230 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6231 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6233 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6234 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6236 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6237 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6238 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6239 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6240 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6241 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6242 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6244 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6245 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6246 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6247 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6248 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6250 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6252 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6253 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6254 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6255 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6256 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6257 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6258 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6260 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6261 (2, chan_type, option),
6262 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6263 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6264 (5, self.config, required),
6265 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6266 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6267 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6268 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6269 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6270 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6271 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6272 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6273 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6274 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6281 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6282 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<Signer>
6283 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
6284 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6285 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6286 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6288 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6290 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6292 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6293 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6294 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6295 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6296 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6298 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6299 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6302 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6303 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6304 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6306 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6308 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6309 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6310 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6311 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6312 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6313 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6314 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6315 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6317 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6319 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6320 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6321 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6324 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6326 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6327 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6328 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6330 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6331 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6332 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6333 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6334 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6335 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6336 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6337 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6338 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6339 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6340 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6341 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6342 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6343 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6348 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6349 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6350 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6351 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6352 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6353 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6354 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6355 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6356 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6357 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6358 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6359 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6361 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6362 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6365 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6366 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6369 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6370 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6372 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6377 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6378 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6379 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6380 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6381 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6382 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6383 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6384 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6385 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6386 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6388 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6389 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6390 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6392 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6393 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6394 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6396 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6400 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6401 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6402 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6403 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6406 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6407 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6408 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6410 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6411 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6412 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6413 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6416 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6417 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6418 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6419 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6422 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6424 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6426 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6427 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6428 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6429 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6431 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6432 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6433 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6434 // consider the stale state on reload.
6435 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6438 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6439 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6440 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6442 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6445 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6446 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6447 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6450 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6451 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6452 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6454 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6455 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6457 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6458 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6460 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6461 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6462 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6464 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6466 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6467 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6469 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6470 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6475 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6476 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6477 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6478 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6480 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6483 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6484 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6491 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6492 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6494 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6496 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6497 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6498 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6500 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6501 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6502 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6506 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6507 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6508 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6510 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6516 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6517 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6518 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6519 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6520 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6521 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6522 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6523 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6524 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6525 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6527 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6528 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6529 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6530 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6531 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6532 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6534 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6535 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6536 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6537 (2, channel_type, option),
6538 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6539 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6540 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6541 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6542 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6543 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6544 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6545 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6546 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6547 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6548 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6549 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6550 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6553 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6554 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6555 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6557 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6558 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6560 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6561 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6566 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6567 if iter.next().is_some() {
6568 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6572 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6573 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6574 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6575 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6576 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6579 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6580 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6581 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6584 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6585 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6590 config: config.unwrap(),
6594 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6595 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6596 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6600 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6602 channel_value_satoshis,
6604 latest_monitor_update_id,
6607 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6610 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6611 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6614 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6615 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6616 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6620 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6621 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6622 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6623 monitor_pending_forwards,
6624 monitor_pending_failures,
6625 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6628 holding_cell_update_fee,
6629 next_holder_htlc_id,
6630 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6631 update_time_counter,
6634 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6635 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6636 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6637 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6639 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6640 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6641 closing_fee_limits: None,
6642 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6644 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6646 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6647 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6649 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6651 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6652 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6653 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6654 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6655 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6656 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6659 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6662 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6664 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6665 funding_transaction,
6667 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6668 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6669 counterparty_node_id,
6671 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6675 channel_update_status,
6676 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6680 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6681 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6682 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6683 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6685 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6687 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6688 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6689 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6691 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6693 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6694 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6696 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6704 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6705 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6706 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6707 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6708 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6710 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6711 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6712 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6713 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6714 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6715 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6716 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6717 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6718 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6719 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6720 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6721 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6722 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6723 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6724 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6725 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6726 use crate::util::test_utils;
6727 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6728 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6729 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6730 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6731 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6732 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6733 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6734 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6735 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6736 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6737 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6738 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6739 use crate::prelude::*;
6741 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6744 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6745 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6751 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6752 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6753 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6754 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6758 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6759 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6760 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6761 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6762 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6763 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator, u32::max_value()).is_err());
6767 signer: InMemorySigner,
6769 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6770 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6772 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6773 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6774 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6775 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6776 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6777 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6778 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6779 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6782 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6783 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6784 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6785 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6788 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6791 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6792 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6793 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6796 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6797 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6798 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6802 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6803 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6804 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6805 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6807 let seed = [42; 32];
6808 let network = Network::Testnet;
6809 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6810 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6811 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6814 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6815 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6816 let config = UserConfig::default();
6817 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6818 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6819 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6821 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6822 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6826 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6827 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6829 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6830 let original_fee = 253;
6831 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6832 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6833 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6834 let seed = [42; 32];
6835 let network = Network::Testnet;
6836 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6838 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6839 let config = UserConfig::default();
6840 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6842 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6843 // same as the old fee.
6844 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6845 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6846 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6850 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6851 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6852 // dust limits are used.
6853 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6854 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6855 let seed = [42; 32];
6856 let network = Network::Testnet;
6857 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6858 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6860 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6861 // they have different dust limits.
6863 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6864 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6865 let config = UserConfig::default();
6866 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6868 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6869 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6870 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6871 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6872 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6874 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6875 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6876 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6877 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6878 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6880 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6881 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6882 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6884 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6885 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6886 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6887 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6890 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6892 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6893 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6894 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6895 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6896 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6898 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6899 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6900 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6901 payment_secret: None,
6902 payment_params: None,
6906 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6907 // the dust limit check.
6908 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6909 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6910 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6911 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6913 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6914 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6915 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6916 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6917 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6918 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6919 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6923 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6924 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6925 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6926 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6927 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6928 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6929 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6930 let seed = [42; 32];
6931 let network = Network::Testnet;
6932 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6934 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6935 let config = UserConfig::default();
6936 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6938 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6939 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6941 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6942 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6943 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6944 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6945 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6946 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6948 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6949 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6950 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6951 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6952 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6954 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6956 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6957 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6958 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6959 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6960 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6962 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6963 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6964 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6965 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6966 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6970 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6971 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6972 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6973 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6974 let seed = [42; 32];
6975 let network = Network::Testnet;
6976 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6977 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6978 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6980 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6982 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6983 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6984 let config = UserConfig::default();
6985 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6987 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6988 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
6989 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6990 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6992 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
6993 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6994 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6996 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
6997 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6998 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6999 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7001 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7002 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7003 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
7005 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7006 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
7008 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7009 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7010 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7011 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7012 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7013 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7014 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7015 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7016 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7021 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7023 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7024 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7025 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7026 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7027 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7028 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7029 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7036 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7037 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7038 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7039 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7040 let seed = [42; 32];
7041 let network = Network::Testnet;
7042 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7043 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7044 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7046 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7047 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7048 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7049 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7050 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7051 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7052 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7053 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7055 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7056 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7057 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7058 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7059 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7060 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7062 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7063 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7064 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7065 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7067 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7069 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7070 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7071 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7072 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7073 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7074 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7076 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7077 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7078 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7079 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7081 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7082 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7083 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7084 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7085 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7087 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7088 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7090 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7091 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7092 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7094 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7095 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7096 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7097 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7098 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7100 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7101 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7103 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7104 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7105 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7109 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7111 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7112 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7113 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7115 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7116 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7117 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7118 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7120 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7121 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7122 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7124 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7126 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7127 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7130 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7131 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7132 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7133 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7134 let seed = [42; 32];
7135 let network = Network::Testnet;
7136 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7137 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7138 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7141 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7142 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7143 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7145 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7146 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7148 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7149 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7150 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7152 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7153 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7155 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7157 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7158 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7160 // Channel Negotiations failed
7161 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7162 assert!(result.is_err());
7167 fn channel_update() {
7168 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7169 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7170 let seed = [42; 32];
7171 let network = Network::Testnet;
7172 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7173 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7175 // Create a channel.
7176 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7177 let config = UserConfig::default();
7178 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7179 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7180 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7181 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7183 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7184 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7185 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7187 short_channel_id: 0,
7190 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7191 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7192 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7194 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7195 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7197 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7199 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7201 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7202 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7203 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7204 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7206 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7207 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7208 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7210 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7214 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7216 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7217 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7218 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7219 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7220 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7221 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7222 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7223 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7224 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7225 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7226 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7227 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7228 use crate::sync::Arc;
7230 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7231 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7232 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7233 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7235 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7237 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7238 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7239 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7240 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7241 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7242 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7244 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7245 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7250 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7251 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7252 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7254 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7255 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7256 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7257 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7258 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7259 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7261 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7263 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7264 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7265 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7266 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7267 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7268 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7270 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7271 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7272 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7273 selected_contest_delay: 144
7275 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7276 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7278 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7279 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7281 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7282 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7284 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7285 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7287 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7288 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7289 // build_commitment_transaction.
7290 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7291 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7292 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7293 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7294 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7296 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7297 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7298 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7299 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7303 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7304 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7305 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7306 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7310 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7311 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7312 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7314 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7315 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7317 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7318 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7320 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7322 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7323 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7324 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7325 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7326 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7327 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7328 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7330 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7331 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7332 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7333 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7335 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7336 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7337 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7339 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7341 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7342 commitment_tx.clone(),
7343 counterparty_signature,
7344 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7345 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7346 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7348 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7349 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7351 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7352 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7353 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7355 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7356 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7359 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7360 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7362 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7363 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7364 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7365 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7366 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7367 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7368 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7369 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7371 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7374 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7375 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7376 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7380 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7383 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7384 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7385 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7387 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7388 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7389 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7390 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7391 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7392 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7393 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7394 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7396 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7400 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7401 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7403 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7404 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7405 "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", {});
7407 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7408 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7409 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7410 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7412 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7413 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7415 amount_msat: 1000000,
7417 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7418 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7420 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7423 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7424 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7426 amount_msat: 2000000,
7428 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7429 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7431 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7434 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7435 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7437 amount_msat: 2000000,
7439 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7440 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7441 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7443 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7446 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7447 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7449 amount_msat: 3000000,
7451 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7452 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7453 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7455 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7458 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7459 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7461 amount_msat: 4000000,
7463 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7464 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7466 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7470 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7471 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7472 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7474 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7475 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7476 "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", {
7479 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7480 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7481 "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" },
7484 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7485 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7486 "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" },
7489 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7490 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7491 "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" },
7494 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7495 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7496 "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" },
7499 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7500 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7501 "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" }
7504 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7505 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7506 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7508 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7509 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7510 "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", {
7513 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7514 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7515 "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" },
7518 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7519 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7520 "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" },
7523 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7524 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7525 "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" },
7528 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7529 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7530 "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" },
7533 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7534 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7535 "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" }
7538 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7539 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7540 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7542 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7543 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7544 "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", {
7547 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7548 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7549 "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" },
7552 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7553 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7554 "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" },
7557 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7558 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7559 "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" },
7562 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7563 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7564 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7567 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7568 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7569 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7570 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7572 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7573 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7574 "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", {
7577 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7578 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7579 "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" },
7582 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7583 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7584 "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" },
7587 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7588 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7589 "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" },
7592 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7593 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7594 "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" }
7597 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7598 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7599 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7600 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7602 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7603 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7604 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7607 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7608 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7609 "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" },
7612 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7613 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7614 "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" },
7617 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7618 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7619 "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" },
7622 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7623 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7624 "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" }
7627 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7628 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7629 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7631 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7632 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7633 "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", {
7636 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7637 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7638 "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" },
7641 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7642 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7643 "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" },
7646 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7647 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7648 "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" }
7651 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7652 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7653 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7655 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7656 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7657 "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", {
7660 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7661 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7662 "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" },
7665 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7666 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7667 "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" },
7670 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7671 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7672 "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" }
7675 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7676 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7677 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7679 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7680 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7681 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7684 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7685 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7686 "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" },
7689 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7690 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7691 "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" }
7694 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7695 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7696 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7697 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7699 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7700 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7701 "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", {
7704 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7705 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7706 "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" },
7709 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7710 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7711 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7714 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7715 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7716 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7717 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7719 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7720 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7721 "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", {
7724 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7725 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7726 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7729 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7730 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7731 "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" }
7734 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7735 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7736 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7738 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7739 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7740 "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", {
7743 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7744 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7745 "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" }
7748 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7749 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7750 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7751 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7753 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7754 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7755 "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", {
7758 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7759 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7760 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7763 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7764 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7765 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7766 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7768 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7769 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7770 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484ae8f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c1901483045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c9524401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7773 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7774 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7775 "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" }
7778 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7779 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7780 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7781 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7783 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7784 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7785 "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", {});
7787 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7788 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7789 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7790 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7792 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7793 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7794 "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", {});
7796 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7797 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7798 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7799 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7801 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7802 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7803 "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", {});
7805 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7806 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7807 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7809 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7810 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7811 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7813 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7814 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7815 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7816 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7818 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7819 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7820 "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", {});
7822 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7823 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7824 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7825 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7827 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7828 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7829 "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", {});
7831 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7832 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7833 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7834 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7835 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7836 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7838 amount_msat: 2000000,
7840 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7841 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7843 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7846 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7847 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7848 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7850 amount_msat: 5000000,
7852 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7853 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7854 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7856 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7859 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7860 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7862 amount_msat: 5000000,
7864 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7865 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7866 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7868 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7872 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7873 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7874 "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", {
7877 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7878 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7879 "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" },
7881 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7882 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7883 "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" },
7885 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7886 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7887 "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" }
7890 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7891 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7892 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aae9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e4501483045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a6894801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7895 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7896 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7897 "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" },
7899 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7900 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7901 "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" },
7903 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7904 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7905 "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" }
7910 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7911 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7913 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7914 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7915 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7916 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7918 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7919 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7920 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7922 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7923 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7925 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7926 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7928 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7929 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7930 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7934 fn test_key_derivation() {
7935 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7936 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7938 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7939 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7941 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7942 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7944 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7945 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7947 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7948 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7950 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7951 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7953 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7954 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7956 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7957 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7961 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7962 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7963 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7964 let seed = [42; 32];
7965 let network = Network::Testnet;
7966 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7967 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7969 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7970 let config = UserConfig::default();
7971 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7972 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7974 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7975 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
7977 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7978 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
7979 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7980 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7981 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7982 assert!(res.is_ok());