1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
53 use crate::sync::Mutex;
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
59 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
66 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
69 pub struct AvailableBalances {
70 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
71 pub balance_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
73 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
75 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
76 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
79 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
82 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
84 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
86 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
87 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
88 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
89 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
90 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
91 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
93 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
97 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
98 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
99 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
100 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
103 enum InboundHTLCState {
104 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
105 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
106 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
107 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
108 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
109 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
110 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
111 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
112 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
113 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
114 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
115 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
116 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
117 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
118 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
120 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
124 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
125 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
126 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
128 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
129 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
130 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
131 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
132 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
133 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
135 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
136 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
137 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
138 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
139 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
140 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
141 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
142 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
144 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
145 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
147 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
148 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
149 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
150 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
151 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
152 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
153 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
154 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
157 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
161 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
162 state: InboundHTLCState,
165 enum OutboundHTLCState {
166 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
167 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
168 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
169 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
170 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
171 /// money back (though we won't), and,
172 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
173 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
174 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
175 /// we'll never get out of sync).
176 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
177 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
178 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
180 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
181 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
182 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
187 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
188 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
189 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
190 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
191 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
192 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
193 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
194 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
198 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
200 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
201 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
204 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
207 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
208 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
213 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
214 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
222 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
226 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
233 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
234 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
238 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
241 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
242 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
245 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
250 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
255 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
256 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
257 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
258 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
259 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
260 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
262 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
263 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
264 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
265 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
266 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
267 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
268 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
270 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
271 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
272 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
282 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
284 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
286 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
287 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
288 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
289 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
290 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
291 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
292 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
294 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
295 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
297 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
298 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
299 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
301 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
302 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
303 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
304 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
305 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
306 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
307 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
308 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
309 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
311 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
312 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
313 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
314 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
315 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
316 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
317 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
318 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
320 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
323 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
325 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
327 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
329 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
332 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
338 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
340 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
342 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
343 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
344 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
345 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
346 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
348 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
349 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
351 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
353 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
354 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
356 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
357 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
358 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
359 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
360 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
361 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
363 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
364 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
366 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
367 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
368 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
369 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
370 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
372 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
373 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
375 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
376 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
378 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
379 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
380 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
381 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
388 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
390 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
397 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
417 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
418 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
419 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
420 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
421 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
422 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
423 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
425 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
427 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
429 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
433 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
435 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
436 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
437 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
439 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
440 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
442 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
443 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
444 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
445 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
449 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
453 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
459 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 holding_cell_msat: u64,
466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
469 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
470 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
471 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
472 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
473 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
474 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
475 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
476 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
481 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
482 struct HTLCCandidate {
484 origin: HTLCInitiator,
488 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
496 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
498 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
500 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
501 htlc_value_msat: u64,
502 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
507 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
508 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
509 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
510 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
511 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
513 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
514 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
515 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
516 htlc_value_msat: u64,
518 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
519 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
523 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
524 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
525 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
526 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
527 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
528 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
529 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
530 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
531 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
532 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
533 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
536 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
537 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
538 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
539 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
540 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
541 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
542 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
543 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
546 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
548 /// Contains a tuple with the following:
549 /// - An optional (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
550 /// - A list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this channel's
551 /// counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
552 /// - An optional transaction id identifying a corresponding batch funding transaction.
553 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
554 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
555 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
559 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
560 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
561 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
562 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
563 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
564 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
565 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
566 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
567 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
568 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
569 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
570 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
571 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
572 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
573 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
575 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
576 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
577 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
578 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
580 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
581 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
582 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
583 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
585 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
586 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
587 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
588 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
589 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
591 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
592 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
593 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
594 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
596 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
597 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
598 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
600 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
601 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
602 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
603 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
604 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
606 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
607 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
610 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
611 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
613 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
614 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
615 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
616 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
618 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
619 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
621 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
622 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
625 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
626 (0, update, required),
629 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
630 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
631 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
632 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
633 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
637 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
638 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
639 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
641 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
643 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
644 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
645 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
649 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
651 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
658 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
659 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
660 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
661 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
662 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
664 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
665 /// in a timely manner.
666 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
669 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
670 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
671 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
673 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
674 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
675 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
676 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
680 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
681 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
682 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
684 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
685 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
686 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
687 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
689 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
693 /// The current channel ID.
694 channel_id: ChannelId,
695 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
696 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
697 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
700 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
701 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
703 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
704 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
705 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
707 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
708 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
709 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
710 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
712 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
713 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
715 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
717 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
718 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
719 destination_script: Script,
721 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
722 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
723 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
725 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
726 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
727 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
728 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
729 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
730 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
732 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
733 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
734 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
735 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
736 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
737 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
739 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
741 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
742 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
743 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
745 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
746 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
747 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
748 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
749 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
750 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
751 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
753 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
755 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
756 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
757 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
758 // HTLCs with similar state.
759 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
760 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
761 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
762 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
763 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
764 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
765 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
766 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
767 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
770 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
771 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
772 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
774 update_time_counter: u32,
776 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
777 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
778 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
779 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
780 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
781 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
783 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
784 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
786 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
787 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
788 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
789 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
791 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
792 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
794 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
796 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
798 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
799 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
800 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
801 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
802 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
803 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
804 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
805 channel_creation_height: u32,
807 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
810 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
812 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
815 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
817 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
820 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
822 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
824 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
825 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
828 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
830 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
832 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
833 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
835 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
837 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
838 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
839 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
841 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
843 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
844 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
845 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
847 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
848 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
849 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
851 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
853 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
855 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
856 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
857 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
858 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
860 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
861 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
862 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
864 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
865 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
866 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
868 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
869 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
870 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
871 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
872 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
873 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
874 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
875 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
877 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
878 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
879 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
880 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
881 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
883 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
884 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
886 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
887 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
888 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
889 /// unblock the state machine.
891 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
892 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
893 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
895 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
896 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
897 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
899 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
900 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
901 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
902 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
903 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
904 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
905 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
906 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
908 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
909 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
911 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
912 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
913 // the channel's funding UTXO.
915 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
916 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
917 // associated channel mapping.
919 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
920 // to store all of them.
921 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
923 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
924 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
925 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
926 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
927 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
929 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
930 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
932 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
933 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
935 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
936 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
937 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
939 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
940 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
941 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
944 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
945 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
946 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
947 self.update_time_counter
950 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
951 self.latest_monitor_update_id
954 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
955 self.config.announced_channel
958 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
959 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
962 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
963 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
964 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
965 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
968 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
969 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
970 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
973 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
974 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
975 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
976 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
977 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
980 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
981 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
982 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
983 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
985 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
986 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
988 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
989 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
991 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
992 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
994 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
997 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
998 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
999 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1000 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1001 self.channel_state &
1002 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1003 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1004 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1005 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1008 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1009 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1010 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1011 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1012 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1015 // Public utilities:
1017 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1021 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1023 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1024 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1025 self.temporary_channel_id
1028 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1032 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1033 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1034 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1038 /// Gets the channel's type
1039 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1043 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1045 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1046 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.short_channel_id
1050 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1051 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1052 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1055 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1056 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1057 self.outbound_scid_alias
1060 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1061 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1062 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1063 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1064 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1065 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1068 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1069 /// get_funding_created.
1070 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1071 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1074 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1075 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1076 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1079 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1080 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1081 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1082 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1086 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1089 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1090 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1093 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1094 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1097 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1098 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1099 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1102 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1103 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1106 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1107 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1108 self.counterparty_node_id
1111 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1112 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1113 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1116 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1117 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1118 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1121 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1122 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1124 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1125 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1126 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1127 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1129 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1133 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1134 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1135 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1138 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1139 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1140 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1143 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1144 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1145 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1147 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1148 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1153 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1154 self.channel_value_satoshis
1157 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1158 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1161 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1162 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1165 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1166 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1167 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1169 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1170 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1171 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1172 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
1173 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1175 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1179 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1180 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1181 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1184 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1185 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1186 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1189 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1190 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1191 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1194 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1195 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1196 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1199 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1200 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1201 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1204 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1205 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1206 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1209 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1210 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1211 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1212 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1213 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1216 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1218 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1219 self.prev_config = None;
1223 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1224 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1228 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1229 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1230 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1231 let did_channel_update =
1232 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1233 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1234 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1235 if did_channel_update {
1236 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1237 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1238 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1239 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1241 self.config.options = *config;
1245 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1246 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1247 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1248 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1249 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1252 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1253 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1254 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1255 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1256 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1258 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1259 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1260 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1261 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1262 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1263 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1264 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1266 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1267 where L::Target: Logger
1269 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1270 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1271 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1273 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1274 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1275 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1276 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1278 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1279 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1280 if match update_state {
1281 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1282 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1283 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1284 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1285 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1287 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1291 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1292 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1293 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1295 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1297 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1298 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1299 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1301 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1302 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1303 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1304 transaction_output_index: None
1309 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1310 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1311 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1312 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1313 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1316 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1318 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1319 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1320 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1322 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1323 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1326 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1327 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1330 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1332 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1333 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1334 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1337 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1343 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1344 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1345 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1346 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1347 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1348 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1349 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1353 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1354 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1356 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1358 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1359 if generated_by_local {
1360 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1361 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1370 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1372 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1373 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1374 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1375 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1376 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1377 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1378 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1381 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1382 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1384 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1388 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1389 preimages.push(preimage);
1393 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1394 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1396 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1398 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1399 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1401 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1402 if !generated_by_local {
1403 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1411 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1412 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1413 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1414 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1415 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1416 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1417 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1418 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1420 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1422 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1423 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1424 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1425 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1427 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1429 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1430 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1431 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1432 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1435 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1436 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1437 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1438 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1440 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1443 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1444 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1445 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1446 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1448 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1451 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1452 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1457 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1458 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1463 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1465 let channel_parameters =
1466 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1467 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1468 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1475 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1478 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1479 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1480 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1481 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1483 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1484 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1485 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1493 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1494 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1500 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1501 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1502 /// our counterparty!)
1503 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1504 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1505 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1506 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1507 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1508 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1509 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1511 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1515 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1516 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1517 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1518 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1519 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1520 //may see payments to it!
1521 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1522 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1523 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1525 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1528 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1529 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1530 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1531 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1532 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1535 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1536 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1539 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1543 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1544 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1545 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1546 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1547 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1548 // which are near the dust limit.
1549 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1550 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1551 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1552 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1553 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1555 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1556 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1558 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1561 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1562 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1563 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1566 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1567 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1569 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1570 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1571 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1572 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1573 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1574 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1575 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1578 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1581 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1582 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1583 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1585 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1586 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1587 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1588 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1589 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1590 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1592 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1593 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1599 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1600 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1602 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1603 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1604 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1605 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1606 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1607 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1608 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1611 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1614 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1615 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1616 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1618 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1619 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1620 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1621 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1622 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1623 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1625 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1626 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1630 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1631 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1632 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1633 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1634 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1635 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1636 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1638 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1639 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1641 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1648 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1649 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1650 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1651 /// corner case properly.
1652 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1653 -> AvailableBalances
1654 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1656 let context = &self;
1657 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1658 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1659 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1661 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1662 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1663 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1664 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1667 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1669 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1670 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1672 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1674 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1676 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1677 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1681 if context.is_outbound() {
1682 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1683 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1685 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1686 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1688 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1689 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1690 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1691 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1694 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1695 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1696 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1697 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1699 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1700 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1701 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1702 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1703 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1704 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1705 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1706 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1707 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1708 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1709 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1711 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1714 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1715 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1716 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1717 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1718 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1721 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1722 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1724 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1725 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1726 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1728 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1729 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1730 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1731 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1735 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1737 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1738 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1739 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1740 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1741 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1742 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1743 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1745 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1746 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1748 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1749 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1750 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1752 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1753 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1754 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1755 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1756 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1759 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1760 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1761 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1762 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1763 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1764 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1767 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1768 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1769 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1771 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1775 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1776 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1778 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1779 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1783 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1784 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1785 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1786 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1788 outbound_capacity_msat,
1789 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1790 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1795 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1796 let context = &self;
1797 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1800 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1801 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1803 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1804 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1806 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1807 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1809 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1810 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1811 let context = &self;
1812 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1814 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1817 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1818 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1820 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1821 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1823 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1824 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1826 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1827 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1831 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1832 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1838 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1839 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1840 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1843 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1844 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1845 included_htlcs += 1;
1848 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1849 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1853 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1854 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1855 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1856 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1857 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1858 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1863 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1865 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1866 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1871 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1872 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1876 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1877 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1878 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1881 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1882 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1884 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1885 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1886 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1888 total_pending_htlcs,
1889 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1890 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1891 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1893 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1894 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1895 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1897 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1899 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1904 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1905 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1907 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1908 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1910 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1911 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1913 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1914 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1915 let context = &self;
1916 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1918 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1921 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1922 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1924 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1925 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1927 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1928 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1930 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1931 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1935 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1936 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1942 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1943 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1944 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1945 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1946 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1947 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1950 included_htlcs += 1;
1953 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1954 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1957 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1958 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1960 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1961 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1962 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1967 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1968 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1969 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1972 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1973 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1975 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1976 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1978 total_pending_htlcs,
1979 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1980 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1981 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1983 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1984 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1985 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1987 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1989 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1994 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
1995 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
1996 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
1997 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2004 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2006 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2007 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2010 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2012 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2013 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2014 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2018 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2019 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2020 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2023 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2025 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2026 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2029 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2030 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2031 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2032 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2033 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2034 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2035 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2036 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2037 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2038 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2039 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2041 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2042 // return them to fail the payment.
2043 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2044 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2045 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2047 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2048 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2053 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2054 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2055 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2056 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2057 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2058 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2059 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2060 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2061 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2062 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2063 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2064 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2065 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2069 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2071 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2072 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2073 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)
2077 // Internal utility functions for channels
2079 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2080 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2081 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2083 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2085 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2086 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2087 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2089 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2092 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2094 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2097 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2098 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2099 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2101 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2103 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2104 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2105 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2106 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2107 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2110 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2111 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2112 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2113 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2114 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2115 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2116 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2119 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2120 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2122 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2123 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2126 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2127 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2128 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2129 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2130 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2131 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2134 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2135 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2136 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2137 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2140 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2141 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2143 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2144 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2145 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2149 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2150 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2151 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2153 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2154 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2155 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2156 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2158 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2159 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2160 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2161 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2162 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2163 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2164 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2166 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2167 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2172 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2173 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2175 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2177 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2178 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2179 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2180 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2182 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2183 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2193 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2194 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2195 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2196 // outside of those situations will fail.
2197 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2201 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2206 1 + // script length (0)
2210 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2211 2 + // witness marker and flag
2212 1 + // witness element count
2213 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2214 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2215 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2216 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2217 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2218 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2220 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2221 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2222 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2228 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2229 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2230 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2231 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2233 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2234 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2235 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2237 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2238 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2239 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2240 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2241 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2242 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2245 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2246 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2249 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2250 value_to_holder = 0;
2253 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2254 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2255 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2256 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2258 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2259 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2262 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2263 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2266 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2269 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2270 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2272 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2274 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2275 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2276 where L::Target: Logger {
2277 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2278 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2279 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2280 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2281 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2282 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2283 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2284 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2288 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2289 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2290 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2291 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2293 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2294 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2296 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2298 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2299 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2300 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2302 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2303 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2304 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2305 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2306 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2307 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2308 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2310 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2311 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2312 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2314 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2315 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2317 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2320 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2321 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2325 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2329 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2330 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2331 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2332 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2333 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2334 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2337 // Now update local state:
2339 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2340 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2341 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2342 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2343 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2344 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2345 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2349 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2350 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2351 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2352 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2353 // do not not get into this branch.
2354 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2355 match pending_update {
2356 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2357 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2358 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2359 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2360 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2361 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2362 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2365 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2366 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2367 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2368 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2369 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2370 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2371 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2377 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2378 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2379 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2381 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2382 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2383 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2385 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2386 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2389 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2390 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2392 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2393 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2395 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2396 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2399 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2402 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2403 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2404 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2405 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2410 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2411 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2412 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2413 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2414 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2415 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2416 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2417 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2418 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2419 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2420 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2421 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2422 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2423 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2424 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2426 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2427 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2428 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2429 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2430 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2433 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2434 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2435 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2441 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2442 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2444 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2448 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2449 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2450 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2451 /// before we fail backwards.
2453 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2454 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2455 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2456 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2457 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2458 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2459 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2462 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2463 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2464 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2465 /// before we fail backwards.
2467 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2468 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2469 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2470 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2471 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2472 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2473 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2475 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2477 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2478 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2479 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2481 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2482 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2483 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2485 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2486 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2487 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2489 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2494 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2495 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2501 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2502 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2503 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2504 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2505 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2509 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2510 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2511 force_holding_cell = true;
2514 // Now update local state:
2515 if force_holding_cell {
2516 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2517 match pending_update {
2518 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2519 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2520 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2521 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2525 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2526 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2527 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2528 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2534 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2535 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2536 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2542 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2544 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2545 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2548 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2549 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2550 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2555 // Message handlers:
2557 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2558 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2559 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2560 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2561 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2565 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2566 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2568 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2569 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2571 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2572 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2573 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2574 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2577 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2579 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2580 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2581 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2582 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2584 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2585 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2587 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2588 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2590 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2591 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2592 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2593 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2594 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2599 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2600 initial_commitment_tx,
2603 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2604 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2607 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2608 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2611 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2612 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2613 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2614 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2615 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2616 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2617 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2618 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2619 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2620 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2621 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2622 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2624 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2626 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2627 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2628 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2629 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2630 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2631 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2632 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2634 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2635 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2636 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2638 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2640 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2641 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2643 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2645 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2646 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2650 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2651 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2652 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2653 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2654 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2655 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2656 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2659 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2660 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2662 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2663 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2664 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2665 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2667 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2670 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2671 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2672 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2675 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2676 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2677 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2678 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2679 // when routing outbound payments.
2680 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2684 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2686 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2687 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2689 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2690 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2692 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2693 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2694 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2695 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2696 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2697 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2698 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2699 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2700 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2702 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2703 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2704 let expected_point =
2705 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2706 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2708 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2709 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2710 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2711 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2712 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2713 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2715 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2716 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2717 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2718 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2719 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2721 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2726 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2729 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2730 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2732 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2734 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2737 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2738 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2739 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2740 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2741 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2742 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2744 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2745 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2746 if local_sent_shutdown {
2747 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2749 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2750 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2751 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2752 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2754 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2755 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2757 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2760 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2761 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2763 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2764 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2767 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2768 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2769 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2770 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2772 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2773 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2776 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2777 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2778 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2779 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2780 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2781 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2782 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2783 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2784 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2785 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2786 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2788 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2789 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2790 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2791 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2792 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2793 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2797 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2798 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2801 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2802 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2803 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2805 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2806 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2807 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2808 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2809 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2810 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2811 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2815 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2816 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2817 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2818 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2819 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2820 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2821 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2825 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2826 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2827 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2828 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2829 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2830 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2833 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2834 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2836 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2837 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2838 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2840 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2841 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2845 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2848 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2853 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2854 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2858 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2859 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2860 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2861 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2862 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2863 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2864 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2865 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2866 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2867 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2868 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2869 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2870 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2871 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2872 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2873 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2876 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2877 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2878 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2879 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2883 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2884 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2886 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2890 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2891 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2892 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2896 // Now update local state:
2897 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2898 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2899 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2900 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2901 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2902 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2903 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2908 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2910 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2911 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2912 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2913 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2914 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2915 None => fail_reason.into(),
2916 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2917 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2918 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2919 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2921 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2925 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2926 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2927 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2928 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2930 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2931 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2936 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2939 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2940 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2941 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2943 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2944 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2947 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2950 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2951 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2954 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2955 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2958 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2962 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2963 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2966 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2967 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2970 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2974 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2975 where L::Target: Logger
2977 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2980 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2981 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2983 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2987 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2989 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2991 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2992 let commitment_txid = {
2993 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2994 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2995 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2997 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2998 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2999 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3000 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3001 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3002 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3006 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3008 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3009 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3010 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3011 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3014 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3015 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3016 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3017 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3020 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3022 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3023 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3024 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3025 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3026 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3027 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3028 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3029 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3030 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3031 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3032 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3038 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3039 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3042 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3043 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3044 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3045 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3046 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3047 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3048 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3049 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3050 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3051 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3052 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3053 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3054 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3057 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3058 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3059 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3060 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3061 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3062 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3063 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3065 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3066 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3067 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3068 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3069 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3070 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3071 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3074 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3075 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3078 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3080 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3081 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3082 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3085 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3088 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3089 commitment_stats.tx,
3091 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3092 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3093 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3096 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3097 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3099 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3100 let mut need_commitment = false;
3101 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3102 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3103 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3104 need_commitment = true;
3108 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3109 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3110 Some(forward_info.clone())
3112 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3113 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3114 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3115 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3116 need_commitment = true;
3119 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3120 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3121 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3122 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3123 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3124 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3125 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3126 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3127 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3128 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3129 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3130 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3131 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3132 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3134 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3136 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3137 need_commitment = true;
3141 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3142 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3143 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3144 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3145 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3146 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3148 nondust_htlc_sources,
3152 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3153 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3154 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3155 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3157 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3158 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3159 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3160 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3161 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3162 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3163 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3164 // includes the right HTLCs.
3165 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3166 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3167 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3168 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3169 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3170 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3172 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3173 &self.context.channel_id);
3174 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3177 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3178 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3179 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3180 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3181 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3182 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3183 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3184 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3185 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3189 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3190 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3191 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3192 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3195 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3196 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3197 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3198 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3199 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3200 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3201 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3203 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3204 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3205 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3206 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3209 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3210 /// for our counterparty.
3211 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3212 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3213 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3214 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3216 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3217 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3218 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3219 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3221 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3222 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3223 updates: Vec::new(),
3226 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3227 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3228 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3229 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3230 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3231 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3232 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3233 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3234 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3235 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3236 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3237 // to rebalance channels.
3238 match &htlc_update {
3239 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3240 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3241 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3243 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3244 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3246 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3249 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3250 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3251 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3252 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3253 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3254 // into the holding cell without ever being
3255 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3256 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3257 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3260 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3266 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3267 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3268 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3269 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3270 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3271 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3272 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3273 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3274 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3275 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3276 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3277 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3279 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3280 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3281 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3282 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3283 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3284 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3285 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3286 // for a full revocation before failing.
3287 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3288 update_fail_count += 1;
3291 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3293 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3300 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3301 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3303 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3304 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3309 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3310 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3311 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3312 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3313 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3315 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3316 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3317 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3319 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3320 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3326 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3327 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3328 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3329 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3330 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3331 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3332 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3333 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3334 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3336 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3337 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3339 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3342 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3346 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3348 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3349 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3350 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3354 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3355 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3356 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3357 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3358 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3359 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3360 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3361 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3365 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3367 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3368 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3371 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3372 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3373 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3374 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3376 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3380 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3381 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3382 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3383 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3384 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3385 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3386 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3387 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3391 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3392 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3393 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3394 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3395 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3396 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3397 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3398 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3399 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3401 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3402 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3405 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3406 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3407 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3408 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3409 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3410 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3411 let mut require_commitment = false;
3412 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3415 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3416 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3417 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3419 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3420 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3421 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3422 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3423 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3424 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3429 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3430 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3431 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3432 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3433 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3435 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3436 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3437 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3442 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3443 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3445 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3449 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3450 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3452 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3453 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3454 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3455 require_commitment = true;
3456 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3457 match forward_info {
3458 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3459 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3460 require_commitment = true;
3462 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3463 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3464 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3466 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3467 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3468 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3472 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3473 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3474 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3475 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3481 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3482 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3483 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3484 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3486 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3487 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3488 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3489 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3490 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3491 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3492 require_commitment = true;
3496 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3498 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3499 match update_state {
3500 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3501 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3502 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3503 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3504 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3506 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3507 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3508 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3509 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3510 require_commitment = true;
3511 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3512 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3517 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3518 let release_state_str =
3519 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3520 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3521 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3522 if !release_monitor {
3523 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3524 update: monitor_update,
3526 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3528 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3533 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3534 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3535 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3536 if require_commitment {
3537 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3538 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3539 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3540 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3541 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3542 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3543 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3544 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3545 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3547 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3548 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3549 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3550 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3551 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3554 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3555 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3556 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3557 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3558 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3559 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3561 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3562 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3564 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3565 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3567 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3568 if require_commitment {
3569 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3571 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3572 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3573 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3574 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3576 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3577 &self.context.channel_id(),
3578 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3581 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3582 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3584 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3585 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3587 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3588 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3594 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3595 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3596 /// commitment update.
3597 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3598 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3599 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3601 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3602 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3605 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3606 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3607 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3608 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3610 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3611 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3612 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3613 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3614 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3615 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3616 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3618 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3619 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3621 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3622 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3624 if !self.context.is_live() {
3625 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3628 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3629 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3630 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3631 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3632 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3633 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3634 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3635 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3636 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3637 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3641 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3642 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3643 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3644 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3645 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3646 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3649 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3650 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3654 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3655 force_holding_cell = true;
3658 if force_holding_cell {
3659 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3663 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3664 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3666 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3667 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3672 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3673 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3675 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3677 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3678 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3679 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3680 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3684 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3685 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3686 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3690 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3691 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3694 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3695 // will be retransmitted.
3696 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3697 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3698 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3700 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3701 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3703 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3704 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3705 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3706 // this HTLC accordingly
3707 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3710 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3711 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3712 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3713 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3716 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3717 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3718 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3719 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3720 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3721 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3726 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3728 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3729 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3730 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3731 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3735 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3736 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3737 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3738 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3739 // the update upon reconnection.
3740 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3744 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3746 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3747 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3751 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3752 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3753 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3754 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3755 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3756 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3757 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3759 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3760 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3761 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3762 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3763 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3764 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3765 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3767 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3768 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3769 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3770 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3771 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3772 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3773 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3776 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3777 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3778 /// to the remote side.
3779 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3780 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3781 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3782 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3785 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3787 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3788 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3790 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3791 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3792 // first received the funding_signed.
3793 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3794 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3795 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3797 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3798 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3799 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3800 funding_broadcastable = None;
3803 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3804 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3805 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3806 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3807 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3808 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3809 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3810 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3811 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3812 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3813 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3814 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3815 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3816 next_per_commitment_point,
3817 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3821 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3823 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3824 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3825 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3826 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3827 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3828 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3830 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3831 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3832 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3833 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3834 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3835 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3839 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3840 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3842 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3843 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3844 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3847 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3848 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3849 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3850 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3851 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3852 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3853 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3854 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3855 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3859 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3860 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3862 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3863 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3865 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3868 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3869 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3871 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3872 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3873 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3874 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3875 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3876 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3877 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3878 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3879 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3880 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3881 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3882 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3884 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3886 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3887 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3888 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3894 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3895 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3896 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3897 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3898 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3899 per_commitment_secret,
3900 next_per_commitment_point,
3902 next_local_nonce: None,
3906 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3907 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3908 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3909 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3910 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3912 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3913 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3914 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3915 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3916 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3917 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3918 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3919 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3920 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3921 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3926 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3927 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3929 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3930 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3931 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3932 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3933 reason: err_packet.clone()
3936 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3937 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3938 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3939 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3940 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3941 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3944 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3945 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3946 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3947 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3948 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3955 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3956 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3957 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3958 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3962 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3963 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3964 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3965 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3966 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3967 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3971 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3972 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3973 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3974 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3975 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3976 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3977 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3982 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3983 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3985 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3986 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3987 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3988 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3989 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3990 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3991 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3992 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3995 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3997 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3998 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3999 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4000 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4001 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4004 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4005 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4006 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4009 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4010 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4011 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4012 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4013 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4014 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4016 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4017 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4018 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4019 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4020 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4023 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4024 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4025 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4026 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4027 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4028 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4029 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4030 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4034 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4035 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4036 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4037 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4039 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4043 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4044 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4045 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4046 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4048 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4050 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4052 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4053 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4054 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4055 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4056 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4057 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4059 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4060 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4061 channel_ready: None,
4062 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4063 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4064 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4068 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4069 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4070 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4071 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4072 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4073 next_per_commitment_point,
4074 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4076 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4077 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4078 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4082 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4083 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4084 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4086 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4087 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4088 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4091 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4094 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4097 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4098 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4099 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4100 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4101 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4102 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4103 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4105 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4107 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4108 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4109 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4110 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4111 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4112 next_per_commitment_point,
4113 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4117 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4118 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4119 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4121 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4124 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4125 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4126 raa: required_revoke,
4127 commitment_update: None,
4128 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4130 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4131 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4132 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4134 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4137 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4138 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4139 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4140 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4141 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4142 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4145 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4146 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4147 raa: required_revoke,
4148 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4149 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4153 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4157 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4158 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4159 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4160 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4162 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4164 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4166 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4167 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4168 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4169 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4170 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4171 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4172 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4173 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4175 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4176 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4177 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4178 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4179 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4181 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4182 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4183 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4184 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4187 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4188 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4189 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4190 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4191 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4192 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4193 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4194 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4195 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4196 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4197 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4198 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4199 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4200 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4201 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4203 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4206 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4207 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4210 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4211 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4212 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4213 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4214 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4215 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4218 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4219 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4220 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4221 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4222 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4223 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4226 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4232 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4233 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4234 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4235 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4237 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4238 return Ok((None, None));
4241 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4242 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4243 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4245 return Ok((None, None));
4248 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4250 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4251 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4252 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4253 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4255 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4256 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4258 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4259 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4261 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4262 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4263 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4264 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4266 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4267 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4268 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4275 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4276 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4278 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4279 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4282 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4283 /// within our expected timeframe.
4285 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4286 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4287 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4290 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4293 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4294 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4298 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4299 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4301 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4304 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4305 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4306 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4307 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4310 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4311 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4315 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4317 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4318 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4321 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4322 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4326 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4329 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4330 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4331 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4332 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4334 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4337 assert!(send_shutdown);
4338 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4339 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4340 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4342 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4343 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4345 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4350 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4352 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4353 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4355 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4356 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4357 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4358 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4359 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4360 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4363 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4364 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4366 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4367 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4368 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4369 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4373 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4374 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4375 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4376 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4377 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4378 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4380 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4381 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4388 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4389 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4391 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4394 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4395 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4397 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4399 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4400 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4401 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4402 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4403 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4404 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4405 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4406 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4407 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4409 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4410 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4413 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4417 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4418 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4419 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4420 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4422 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4423 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4425 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4426 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4428 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4429 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4431 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4432 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4435 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4439 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4440 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4441 return Ok((None, None));
4444 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4445 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4446 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4447 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4449 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4451 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4454 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4455 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4456 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4457 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4458 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4462 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4463 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4464 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4468 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4469 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4470 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4471 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4472 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4473 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4474 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4478 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4480 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4481 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4482 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4483 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4485 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4488 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4489 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4491 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4492 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4494 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4495 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4496 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4497 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4501 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4502 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4503 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4504 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4506 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4507 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4508 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4516 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4517 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4518 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4520 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4521 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4523 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4524 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4527 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4528 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4529 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4530 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4531 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4533 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4534 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4535 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4537 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4538 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4541 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4542 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4543 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4544 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4545 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4546 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4547 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4548 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4550 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4553 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4554 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4555 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4556 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4558 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4562 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4563 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4564 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4565 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4567 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4573 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4574 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4575 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4576 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4577 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4578 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4579 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4581 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4582 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4585 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4587 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4588 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4594 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4595 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4596 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4597 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4598 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4599 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4600 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4602 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4603 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4610 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4611 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4614 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4615 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4618 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4619 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4623 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4624 &self.context.holder_signer
4628 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4630 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4631 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4632 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4633 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4634 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4635 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4637 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4639 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4647 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4648 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4652 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4653 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4654 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4655 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4658 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4659 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4660 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4661 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4664 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4665 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4666 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4667 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4668 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4669 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4672 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4673 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4674 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4675 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4676 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4677 if !release_monitor {
4678 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4687 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4688 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4691 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4692 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4693 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4695 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4696 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4697 if self.context.channel_state &
4698 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4699 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4700 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4701 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4702 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4705 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4706 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4707 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4708 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4709 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4710 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4712 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4713 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4714 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4716 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4717 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4718 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4719 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4720 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4721 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4727 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4728 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4729 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4732 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4733 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4734 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4737 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4738 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4739 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4742 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4743 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4744 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4745 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4746 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4747 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4752 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4753 self.context.channel_update_status
4756 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4757 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4758 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4761 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4763 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4764 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4765 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4769 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4770 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4771 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4774 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4778 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4779 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4780 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4781 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4782 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4784 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4785 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4786 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4788 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4789 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4792 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4793 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4794 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4795 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4796 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4797 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4798 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4799 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4800 self.context.channel_state);
4802 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4806 if need_commitment_update {
4807 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4808 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4809 let next_per_commitment_point =
4810 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4811 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4812 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4813 next_per_commitment_point,
4814 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4818 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4824 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4825 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4826 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4827 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4828 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4829 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4830 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4832 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4835 let mut msgs = (None, None);
4836 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4837 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4838 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4839 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4840 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4841 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4842 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4843 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4844 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4845 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4846 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4847 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4848 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4849 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4850 // channel and move on.
4851 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4852 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4854 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4855 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4856 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4858 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4859 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4860 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4861 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4862 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4863 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4864 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4865 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4870 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4871 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4872 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4873 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4874 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4877 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4878 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4879 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4880 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4881 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4882 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4885 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4886 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4887 // may have already happened for this block).
4888 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4889 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4890 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4891 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
4894 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4895 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4896 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4897 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4905 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4906 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4907 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4908 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4910 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4911 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4914 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4916 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4917 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4918 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4919 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4921 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4924 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4927 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4928 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4929 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4930 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4932 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4935 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4936 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4937 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4939 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4940 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4942 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4943 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4944 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4952 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4954 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4955 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
4956 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4958 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4959 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4962 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4963 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4964 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4965 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4966 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4967 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4968 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4969 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4970 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4973 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4974 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4975 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4976 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4978 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4979 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4980 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4982 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4983 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4984 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4985 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4987 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4988 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4989 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4990 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4991 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4992 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4993 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4996 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
4997 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4999 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5002 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5003 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5004 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5005 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5006 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5007 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5008 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5009 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5010 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5011 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5012 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5013 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5014 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5015 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5016 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5017 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5018 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5024 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5029 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5030 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5032 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5033 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5034 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5035 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5037 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5040 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5042 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5043 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5044 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5045 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5046 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5047 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5049 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5050 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5053 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5054 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5055 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5056 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5057 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5058 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5060 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5061 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5064 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5065 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5066 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5067 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5068 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5074 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5075 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5076 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5077 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5079 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5082 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5086 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5090 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5091 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5095 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5099 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5100 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5103 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5107 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5109 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5114 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5115 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5116 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5118 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5123 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5125 None => return None,
5128 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5130 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5131 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5133 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5134 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5140 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5142 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5143 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5144 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5145 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5146 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5147 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5148 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5150 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5151 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5152 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5153 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5154 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5155 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5156 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5157 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5158 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5159 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5160 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5161 contents: announcement,
5166 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5170 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5171 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5172 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5173 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5174 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5175 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5176 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5177 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5179 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5181 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5183 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5184 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5186 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5188 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5189 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5192 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5193 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5194 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5195 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5198 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5201 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5202 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5203 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5204 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5205 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5206 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5209 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5211 Err(_) => return None,
5213 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5214 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5219 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5220 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5221 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5222 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5223 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5224 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5225 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5226 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5227 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5228 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5229 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5230 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5231 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5232 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5233 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5234 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5237 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5240 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5241 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5242 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5243 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5244 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5245 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5246 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5247 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5248 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5250 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5251 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5252 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5253 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5254 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5255 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5256 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5257 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5258 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5260 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5261 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5262 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5263 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5264 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5265 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5266 next_funding_txid: None,
5271 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5273 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5274 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5275 /// commitment update.
5277 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5278 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5279 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5280 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5281 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5282 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5283 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5286 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5287 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5288 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5290 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5291 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5296 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5297 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5299 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5301 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5302 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5304 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5305 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5306 /// regenerate them.
5308 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5309 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5311 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5312 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5313 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5314 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5315 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5316 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5317 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5319 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5320 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5322 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5323 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5324 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5327 if amount_msat == 0 {
5328 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5331 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5332 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5333 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5334 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5337 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5338 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5339 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5342 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5343 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5344 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5345 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5346 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5347 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5348 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5349 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5352 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5353 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5354 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5355 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5356 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5357 else { "to peer" });
5359 if need_holding_cell {
5360 force_holding_cell = true;
5363 // Now update local state:
5364 if force_holding_cell {
5365 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5370 onion_routing_packet,
5376 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5377 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5379 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5381 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5386 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5387 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5388 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5392 onion_routing_packet,
5395 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5400 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5401 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5402 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5403 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5405 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5406 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5407 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5409 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5410 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5414 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5415 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5416 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5417 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5418 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5419 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5420 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5423 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5424 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5425 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5426 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5427 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5428 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5431 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5433 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5434 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5435 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5436 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5437 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5439 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5440 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5443 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5444 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5445 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5446 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5447 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5448 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5449 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5450 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5451 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5452 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5453 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5456 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5460 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5461 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5462 where L::Target: Logger
5464 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5465 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5466 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5468 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5470 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5471 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5472 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5473 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5474 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5475 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5476 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5477 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5478 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5479 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5480 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5486 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5489 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5490 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5491 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5492 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5493 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5494 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5496 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5497 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5498 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5500 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5501 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5502 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5505 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5506 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5510 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5511 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5513 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5515 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5516 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5517 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5518 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5520 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5521 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5522 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5523 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5524 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5525 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5529 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5530 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5534 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5535 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5540 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5541 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5543 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5544 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5545 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5546 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5547 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5548 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5549 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5550 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5552 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5553 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5554 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5557 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5558 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5559 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5565 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5567 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5568 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5569 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5570 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5571 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5573 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5575 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5581 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5582 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5584 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5585 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5586 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5587 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5588 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5590 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5591 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5595 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5596 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5597 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5599 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5600 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5603 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5604 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5606 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5607 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5608 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5611 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5612 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5613 let mut chan_closed = false;
5614 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5618 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5620 None if !chan_closed => {
5621 // use override shutdown script if provided
5622 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5623 Some(script) => script,
5625 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5626 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5627 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5628 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5632 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5633 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5635 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5641 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5642 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5643 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5644 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5646 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5648 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5650 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5651 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5652 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5653 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5654 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5655 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5658 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5659 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5661 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5662 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5663 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5666 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5667 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5668 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5669 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5670 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5672 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5673 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5680 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5681 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5683 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5686 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5687 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5688 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5690 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5691 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5695 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5699 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5700 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5701 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5702 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5705 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5706 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5707 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5708 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5709 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5710 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5711 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5712 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5714 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5715 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5716 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5717 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5719 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5720 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5722 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5723 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5725 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5726 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5727 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5729 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5730 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5732 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5733 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5734 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5735 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5736 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5739 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5740 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5742 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5743 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5745 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5747 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5749 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5750 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5751 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5752 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5755 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5756 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5758 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5759 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5760 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5761 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5765 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5766 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5767 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5771 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5772 Ok(script) => script,
5773 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5776 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5779 context: ChannelContext {
5782 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5783 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5784 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5785 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5790 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5792 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5793 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5794 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5795 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5797 channel_value_satoshis,
5799 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5801 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5802 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5805 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5806 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5809 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5810 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5811 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5812 pending_update_fee: None,
5813 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5814 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5815 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5816 update_time_counter: 1,
5818 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5820 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5821 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5822 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5823 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5824 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5825 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5827 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5828 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5829 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5830 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5832 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5833 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5834 closing_fee_limits: None,
5835 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5837 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5838 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5839 short_channel_id: None,
5840 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5842 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5843 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5844 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5845 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5846 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5847 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5848 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5849 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5850 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5851 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5852 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5853 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5855 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5857 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5858 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5859 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5860 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5861 counterparty_parameters: None,
5862 funding_outpoint: None,
5863 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5865 funding_transaction: None,
5866 is_batch_funding: None,
5868 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5869 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5870 counterparty_node_id,
5872 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5874 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5876 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5877 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5879 announcement_sigs: None,
5881 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5882 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5883 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5884 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5886 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5887 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5889 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5890 outbound_scid_alias,
5892 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5893 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5895 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5896 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5901 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5903 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5907 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5908 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5909 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5910 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5911 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5912 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5913 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5914 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5915 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5920 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5921 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5922 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5923 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5924 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5925 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5926 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5927 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
5928 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5929 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5930 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5932 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5933 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5935 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5936 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5937 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5938 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5941 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5942 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5944 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5947 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5948 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5949 return Err((self, e));
5953 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5955 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5957 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5958 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5960 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5961 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5962 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5963 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5964 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5965 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5968 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5969 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
5971 let channel = Channel {
5972 context: self.context,
5975 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5976 temporary_channel_id,
5977 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5978 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5981 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5983 next_local_nonce: None,
5987 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5988 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5989 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5990 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5991 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5992 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5993 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5994 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5995 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5996 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5999 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6000 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6001 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6002 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6003 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6004 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6010 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6011 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6012 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6013 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6014 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6015 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6017 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6019 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6020 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6021 // We've exhausted our options
6024 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6025 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6028 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6029 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6030 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6031 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6033 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6034 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6035 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6036 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6037 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6038 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6040 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6042 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6043 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6046 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6047 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6048 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6050 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6051 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6054 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6055 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6058 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6059 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6063 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6064 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6065 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6066 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6067 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6068 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6069 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6070 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6071 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6072 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6073 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6074 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6075 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6076 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6077 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6078 first_per_commitment_point,
6079 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6080 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6081 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6082 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6084 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6089 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6090 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6092 // Check sanity of message fields:
6093 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6094 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6096 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6099 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6102 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6103 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6105 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6108 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6110 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6112 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6113 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6114 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6116 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6117 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6120 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6123 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6127 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6128 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6131 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6134 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6137 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6138 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6140 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6141 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6143 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6146 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6147 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6150 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6151 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6154 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6155 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6157 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6158 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6161 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6162 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6165 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6166 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6167 &Some(ref script) => {
6168 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6169 if script.len() == 0 {
6172 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6175 Some(script.clone())
6178 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6185 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6186 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6187 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6188 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6189 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6191 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6192 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6194 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6197 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6198 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6199 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6200 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6201 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6202 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6205 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6206 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6207 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6210 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6211 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6213 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6214 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6220 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6221 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6222 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6223 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6226 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6227 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6228 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6229 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6230 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6231 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6232 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6233 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6234 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6235 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6236 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6239 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6241 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6242 // support this channel type.
6243 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6244 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6248 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6249 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6250 // `static_remote_key`.
6251 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6254 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6255 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6258 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6261 channel_type.clone()
6263 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6264 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6270 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6271 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6272 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6273 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6274 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6275 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6276 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6277 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6278 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6281 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6285 // Check sanity of message fields:
6286 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6289 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6292 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6295 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6296 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6299 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6302 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6305 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6307 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6308 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6309 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6311 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6314 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6318 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6319 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6322 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6325 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6328 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6329 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6331 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6334 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6335 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6337 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6338 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6341 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6343 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6344 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6349 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6350 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6351 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6352 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6353 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6355 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6356 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6358 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6359 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6360 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6362 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6363 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6366 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6367 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6368 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6369 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6373 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6374 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6375 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6376 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6379 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6380 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6381 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6382 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6383 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6386 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6387 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6388 &Some(ref script) => {
6389 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6390 if script.len() == 0 {
6393 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6394 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6396 Some(script.clone())
6399 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6401 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6406 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6407 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6408 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6409 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6413 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6414 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6415 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6419 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6420 Ok(script) => script,
6421 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6424 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6425 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6427 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6430 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6434 context: ChannelContext {
6437 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6438 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6440 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6445 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6447 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6448 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6449 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6450 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6453 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6455 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6456 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6459 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6460 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6461 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6463 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6464 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6465 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6466 pending_update_fee: None,
6467 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6468 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6469 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6470 update_time_counter: 1,
6472 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6474 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6475 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6476 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6477 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6478 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6479 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6481 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6482 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6483 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6484 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6486 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6487 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6488 closing_fee_limits: None,
6489 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6491 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6492 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6493 short_channel_id: None,
6494 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6496 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6497 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6498 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6499 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6500 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6501 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6502 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6503 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6504 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6505 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6506 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6507 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6510 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6512 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6513 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6514 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6515 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6516 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6517 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6518 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6520 funding_outpoint: None,
6521 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6523 funding_transaction: None,
6524 is_batch_funding: None,
6526 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6527 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6528 counterparty_node_id,
6530 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6532 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6534 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6535 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6537 announcement_sigs: None,
6539 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6540 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6541 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6542 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6544 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6545 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6547 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6548 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6550 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6551 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6553 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6554 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6559 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6561 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6567 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6568 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6570 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6571 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6572 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6573 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6575 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6576 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6578 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6579 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6582 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6585 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6586 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6587 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6589 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6590 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6591 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6592 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6594 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6595 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6596 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6597 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6598 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6599 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6600 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6601 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6602 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6603 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6604 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6605 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6606 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6607 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6608 first_per_commitment_point,
6609 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6610 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6611 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6613 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6615 next_local_nonce: None,
6619 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6620 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6622 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6624 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6625 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6628 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6629 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6631 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6632 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6634 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6635 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6636 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6637 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6638 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6639 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6640 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6641 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6642 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6645 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6646 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6648 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6649 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6650 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6651 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6653 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6654 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6655 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6656 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6657 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6659 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6660 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6665 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6666 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6667 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6671 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6672 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6674 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6675 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6676 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6678 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6680 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6681 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6682 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6683 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6686 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6687 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6688 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6689 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6690 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6692 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6694 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6695 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6696 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6699 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6700 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6701 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6705 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6706 initial_commitment_tx,
6709 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6710 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6713 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6714 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6717 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6719 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6720 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6721 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6722 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6723 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6724 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6725 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6726 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6727 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6728 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6729 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6731 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6733 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6734 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6735 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6736 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6737 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6738 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6740 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6741 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6742 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6743 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6745 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6747 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6748 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6749 let mut channel = Channel {
6750 context: self.context,
6752 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6753 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6754 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6756 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6760 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6761 }, channel_monitor))
6765 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6766 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6768 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6774 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6775 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6776 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6777 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6778 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6780 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6781 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6782 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6783 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6789 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6790 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6791 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6792 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6793 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6794 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6799 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6800 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6801 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6802 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6804 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6805 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6806 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6807 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6812 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6813 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6814 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6815 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6816 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6817 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6822 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6823 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6824 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6827 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6829 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6830 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6831 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6832 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6833 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6835 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6836 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6837 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6838 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6840 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6841 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6842 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6844 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6846 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6847 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6848 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6849 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6850 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6851 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6852 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6854 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6855 // deserialized from that format.
6856 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6857 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6858 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6860 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6862 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6863 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6864 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6866 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6867 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6868 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6869 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6872 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6873 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6874 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6877 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6878 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6879 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6880 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6882 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6883 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6885 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6887 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6889 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6891 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6894 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6896 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6901 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6902 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6904 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6905 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6906 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6907 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6908 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6909 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6910 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6912 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6914 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6916 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6919 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6920 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6921 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6924 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6926 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6927 preimages.push(preimage);
6929 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6930 reason.write(writer)?;
6932 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6934 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6935 preimages.push(preimage);
6937 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6938 reason.write(writer)?;
6941 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6942 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6943 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6945 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6946 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6947 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6951 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6952 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6953 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6955 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6956 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6960 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6961 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6962 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6963 source.write(writer)?;
6964 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6966 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6967 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6968 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6970 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6971 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6973 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6975 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6976 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6978 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6980 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6981 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6986 match self.context.resend_order {
6987 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6988 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6991 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6992 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6993 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6995 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6996 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6997 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6998 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7001 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7002 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7003 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7004 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7005 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7008 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7009 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7010 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7011 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7013 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7014 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7015 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7017 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7019 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7020 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7021 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7022 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7024 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7025 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7026 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7027 // consider the stale state on reload.
7030 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7031 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7032 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7034 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7035 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7036 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7038 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7039 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7041 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7042 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7043 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7045 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7046 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7048 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7051 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7052 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7053 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7055 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7058 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7059 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7061 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7062 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7063 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7065 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7067 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7069 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7071 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7072 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7073 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7074 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7075 htlc.write(writer)?;
7078 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7079 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7080 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7082 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7083 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7085 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7086 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7087 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7088 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7089 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7090 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7091 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7093 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7094 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7095 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7096 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7097 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7099 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7100 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7102 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7103 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7104 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7105 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7107 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7109 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7110 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7111 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7112 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7113 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7114 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7115 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7117 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7118 (2, chan_type, option),
7119 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7120 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7121 (5, self.context.config, required),
7122 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7123 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7124 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7125 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7126 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7127 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7128 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7129 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7130 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7131 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7132 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7133 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7134 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7135 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7136 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7137 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7138 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7139 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7140 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7147 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7148 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7150 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7151 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7153 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7154 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7155 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7157 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7158 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7159 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7160 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7162 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7164 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7165 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7166 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7167 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7168 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7170 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7171 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7174 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7175 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7176 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7178 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7180 let mut keys_data = None;
7182 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7183 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7184 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7186 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7187 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7188 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7189 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7190 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7191 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7195 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7196 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7197 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7200 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7202 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7203 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7204 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7206 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7208 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7209 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7210 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7211 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7212 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7213 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7214 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7215 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7216 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7217 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7218 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7219 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7220 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7225 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7226 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7227 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7228 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7229 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7230 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7231 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7232 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7233 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7234 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7235 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7236 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7238 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7239 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7242 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7243 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7246 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7247 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7249 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7251 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7255 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7256 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7257 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7258 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7259 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7260 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7261 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7262 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7263 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7264 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7265 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7267 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7268 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7269 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7271 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7272 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7273 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7275 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7279 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7280 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7281 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7282 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7285 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7286 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7287 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7289 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7290 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7291 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7292 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7295 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7296 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7297 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7298 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7301 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7303 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7305 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7306 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7307 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7308 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7310 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7311 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7312 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7313 // consider the stale state on reload.
7314 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7317 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7318 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7319 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7321 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7324 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7325 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7328 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7329 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7330 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7331 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7333 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7334 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7336 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7337 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7339 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7340 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7341 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7345 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7346 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7348 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7349 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7352 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7354 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7355 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7356 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7357 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7359 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7362 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7363 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7365 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7367 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7368 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7370 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7371 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7373 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7375 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7376 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7377 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7379 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7380 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7381 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7385 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7386 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7387 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7389 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7395 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7396 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7397 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7398 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7399 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7400 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7401 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7402 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7403 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7404 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7406 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7407 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7408 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7409 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7410 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7411 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7412 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7414 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7415 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7416 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7417 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7419 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7421 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7422 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7424 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7426 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7427 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7428 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7429 (2, channel_type, option),
7430 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7431 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7432 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7433 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7434 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7435 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7436 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7437 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7438 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7439 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7440 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7441 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7442 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7443 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7444 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7445 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7446 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7447 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7448 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7449 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7450 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7451 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7454 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7455 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7456 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7457 // required channel parameters.
7458 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7459 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7460 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7462 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7464 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7465 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7466 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7467 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7470 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7471 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7472 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7474 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7475 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7477 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7478 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7483 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7484 if iter.next().is_some() {
7485 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7489 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7490 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7491 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7492 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7493 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7496 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7497 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7498 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7500 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7501 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7503 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7504 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7505 // separate u64 values.
7506 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7508 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7510 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7511 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7512 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7513 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7515 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7516 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7518 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7519 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7520 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7521 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7522 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7525 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7526 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7530 context: ChannelContext {
7533 config: config.unwrap(),
7537 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7538 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7539 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7542 temporary_channel_id,
7544 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7546 channel_value_satoshis,
7548 latest_monitor_update_id,
7550 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7551 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7554 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7555 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7558 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7559 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7560 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7561 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7565 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7566 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7567 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7568 monitor_pending_forwards,
7569 monitor_pending_failures,
7570 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7573 holding_cell_update_fee,
7574 next_holder_htlc_id,
7575 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7576 update_time_counter,
7579 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7580 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7581 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7582 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7584 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7585 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7586 closing_fee_limits: None,
7587 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7589 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7590 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7592 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7594 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7595 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7596 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7597 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7598 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7599 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7600 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7601 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7602 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7605 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7607 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7608 funding_transaction,
7611 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7612 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7613 counterparty_node_id,
7615 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7619 channel_update_status,
7620 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7624 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7625 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7626 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7627 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7629 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7630 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7632 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7633 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7634 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7636 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7637 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7639 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7640 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7642 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7645 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7654 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7655 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7656 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7657 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7658 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7660 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7661 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7662 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7663 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7664 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7665 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7666 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7667 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7668 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7669 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7670 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7671 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7672 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7673 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7674 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7675 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7676 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7677 use crate::util::test_utils;
7678 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7679 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7680 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7681 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7682 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7683 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7684 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7685 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7686 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7687 use crate::prelude::*;
7689 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7692 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7693 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7699 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7700 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7701 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7702 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7706 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7707 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7708 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7709 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7710 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7711 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7712 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7713 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7717 signer: InMemorySigner,
7720 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7721 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7724 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7725 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7727 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7728 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7731 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7735 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7737 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7738 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7739 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7740 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7741 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7744 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7745 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7746 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7747 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7751 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7752 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7753 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7757 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7758 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7759 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7760 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7762 let seed = [42; 32];
7763 let network = Network::Testnet;
7764 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7765 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7766 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7769 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7770 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7771 let config = UserConfig::default();
7772 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7773 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7774 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7776 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7777 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7781 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7782 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7784 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7785 let original_fee = 253;
7786 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7787 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7788 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7789 let seed = [42; 32];
7790 let network = Network::Testnet;
7791 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7793 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7794 let config = UserConfig::default();
7795 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7797 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7798 // same as the old fee.
7799 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7800 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7801 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7805 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7806 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7807 // dust limits are used.
7808 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7809 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7810 let seed = [42; 32];
7811 let network = Network::Testnet;
7812 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7813 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7814 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7816 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7817 // they have different dust limits.
7819 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7820 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7821 let config = UserConfig::default();
7822 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7824 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7825 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7826 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7827 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7828 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7830 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7831 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7832 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7833 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7834 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7836 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7837 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7838 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7839 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7841 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7842 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7843 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7845 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7846 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7848 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7849 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7850 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7852 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7853 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7854 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7855 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7858 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7860 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7861 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7862 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7863 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7864 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7865 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7866 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7867 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7868 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7870 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7873 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7874 // the dust limit check.
7875 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7876 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7877 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7878 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7880 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7881 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7882 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7883 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7884 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7885 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7886 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7890 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7891 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7892 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7893 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7894 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7895 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7896 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7897 let seed = [42; 32];
7898 let network = Network::Testnet;
7899 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7901 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7902 let config = UserConfig::default();
7903 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7905 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7906 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7908 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7909 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7910 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7911 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7912 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7913 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7915 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7916 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7917 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7918 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7919 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7921 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7923 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7924 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7925 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7926 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7927 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7929 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7930 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7931 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7932 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7933 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7937 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7938 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7939 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7940 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7941 let seed = [42; 32];
7942 let network = Network::Testnet;
7943 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7944 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
7945 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7947 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7949 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7950 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7951 let config = UserConfig::default();
7952 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7954 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7955 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7956 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7957 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7959 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7960 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7961 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7963 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7964 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7965 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7966 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7968 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7969 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7970 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7972 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7973 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7975 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7976 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7977 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7978 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7979 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7980 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7981 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7983 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7985 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7986 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7987 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7988 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7989 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7993 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7994 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7995 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7996 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7997 let seed = [42; 32];
7998 let network = Network::Testnet;
7999 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8000 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8001 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8003 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8004 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8005 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8006 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8007 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8008 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8009 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8010 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8012 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8013 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8014 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8015 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8016 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8017 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8019 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8020 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8021 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8022 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8024 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8026 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8027 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8028 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8029 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8030 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8031 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8033 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8034 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8035 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8036 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8038 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8039 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8040 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8041 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8042 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8044 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8045 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8047 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8048 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8049 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8051 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8052 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8053 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8054 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8055 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8057 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8058 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8060 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8061 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8062 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8066 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8068 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8069 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8070 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8072 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8073 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8074 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8075 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8077 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8078 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8079 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8081 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8083 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8084 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8087 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8088 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8089 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8090 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8091 let seed = [42; 32];
8092 let network = Network::Testnet;
8093 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8094 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8095 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8098 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8099 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8100 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8102 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8103 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8105 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8106 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8107 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8109 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8110 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8112 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8114 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8115 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8117 // Channel Negotiations failed
8118 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8119 assert!(result.is_err());
8124 fn channel_update() {
8125 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8126 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8127 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8128 let seed = [42; 32];
8129 let network = Network::Testnet;
8130 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8131 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8132 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8134 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8135 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8136 let config = UserConfig::default();
8137 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8139 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8140 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8141 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8142 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8143 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8145 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8146 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8147 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8148 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8149 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8151 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8152 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8153 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8154 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8156 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8157 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8158 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8160 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8161 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8163 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8164 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8165 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8167 short_channel_id: 0,
8170 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8171 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8172 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8174 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8175 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8177 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8179 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8181 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8182 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8183 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8184 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8186 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8187 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8188 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8190 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8193 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8196 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8198 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8199 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8200 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8201 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8202 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8203 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8204 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8205 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8206 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8207 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8208 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8209 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8210 use crate::sync::Arc;
8212 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8213 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8214 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8215 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8217 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8219 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8220 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8221 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8222 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8223 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8225 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8226 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8232 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8233 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8234 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8236 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8237 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8238 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8239 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8240 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8241 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8243 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8245 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8246 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8247 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8248 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8249 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8250 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8252 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8253 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8254 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8255 selected_contest_delay: 144
8257 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8258 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8260 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8261 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8263 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8264 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8266 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8267 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8269 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8270 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8271 // build_commitment_transaction.
8272 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8273 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8274 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8275 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8276 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8278 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8279 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8280 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8281 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8285 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8286 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8287 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8288 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8292 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8293 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8294 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8296 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8297 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8299 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8300 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8302 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8304 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8305 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8306 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8307 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8308 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8309 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8310 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8312 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8313 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8314 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8315 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8317 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8318 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8319 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8321 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8323 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8324 commitment_tx.clone(),
8325 counterparty_signature,
8326 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8327 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8328 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8330 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8331 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8333 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8334 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8335 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8337 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8338 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8341 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8342 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8344 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8345 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8346 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8347 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8348 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8349 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8350 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8351 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8353 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8356 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8357 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8358 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8362 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8365 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8366 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8367 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8369 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8370 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8371 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8372 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8373 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8374 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8375 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8376 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8378 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8382 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8383 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8384 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8385 "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", {});
8387 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8388 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8390 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8391 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8392 "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", {});
8394 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8395 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8396 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8397 "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", {});
8399 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8400 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8402 amount_msat: 1000000,
8404 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8405 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8407 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8410 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8411 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8413 amount_msat: 2000000,
8415 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8416 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8418 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8421 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8422 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8424 amount_msat: 2000000,
8426 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8427 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8428 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8429 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8431 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8434 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8435 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8437 amount_msat: 3000000,
8439 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8440 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8441 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8442 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8444 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8447 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8448 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8450 amount_msat: 4000000,
8452 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8453 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8455 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8459 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8460 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8461 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8463 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8464 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8465 "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", {
8468 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8469 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8470 "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" },
8473 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8474 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8475 "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" },
8478 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8479 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8480 "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" },
8483 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8484 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8485 "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" },
8488 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8489 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8490 "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" }
8493 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8494 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8495 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8497 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8498 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8499 "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", {
8502 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8503 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8504 "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" },
8507 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8508 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8509 "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" },
8512 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8513 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8514 "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" },
8517 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8518 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8519 "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" },
8522 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8523 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8524 "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" }
8527 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8528 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8529 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8531 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8532 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8533 "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", {
8536 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8537 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8538 "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" },
8541 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8542 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8543 "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" },
8546 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8547 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8548 "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" },
8551 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8552 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8553 "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" }
8556 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8557 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8558 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8559 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8561 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8562 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8563 "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", {
8566 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8567 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8568 "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" },
8571 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8572 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8573 "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" },
8576 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8577 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8578 "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" },
8581 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8582 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8583 "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" }
8586 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8587 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8588 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8589 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8591 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8592 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8593 "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", {
8596 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8597 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8598 "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" },
8601 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8602 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8603 "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" },
8606 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8607 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8608 "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" },
8611 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8612 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8613 "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" }
8616 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8617 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8618 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8620 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8621 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8622 "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", {
8625 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8626 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8627 "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" },
8630 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8631 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8632 "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" },
8635 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8636 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8637 "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" }
8640 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8641 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8642 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8644 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8645 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8646 "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", {
8649 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8650 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8651 "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" },
8654 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8655 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8656 "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" },
8659 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8660 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8661 "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" }
8664 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8665 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8666 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8668 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8669 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8670 "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", {
8673 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8674 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8675 "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" },
8678 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8679 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8680 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8683 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8684 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8685 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8686 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8687 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8688 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8690 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8691 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8692 "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", {
8695 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8696 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8697 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8700 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8701 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8702 "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" }
8705 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8706 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8707 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8708 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8709 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8711 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8712 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8713 "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", {
8716 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8717 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8718 "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" },
8721 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8722 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8723 "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" }
8726 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8727 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8728 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8730 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8731 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8732 "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", {
8735 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8736 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8737 "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" }
8740 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8741 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8742 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8743 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8744 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8746 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8747 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8748 "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", {
8751 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8752 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8753 "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" }
8756 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8757 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8758 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8759 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8760 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8762 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8763 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8764 "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", {
8767 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8768 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8769 "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" }
8772 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8773 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8774 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8775 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8777 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8778 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8779 "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", {});
8781 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8782 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8783 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8784 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8785 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8787 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8788 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8789 "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", {});
8791 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8792 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8793 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8794 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8795 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8797 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8798 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8799 "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", {});
8801 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8802 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8803 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8805 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8806 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8807 "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", {});
8809 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8810 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8811 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8812 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8813 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8815 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8816 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8817 "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", {});
8819 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8820 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8821 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8822 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8823 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8825 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8826 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8827 "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", {});
8829 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8830 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8831 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8832 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8833 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8834 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8836 amount_msat: 2000000,
8838 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8839 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8841 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8844 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8845 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8846 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8848 amount_msat: 5000001,
8850 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8851 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8852 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8853 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8855 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8858 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8859 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8861 amount_msat: 5000000,
8863 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8864 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8865 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8866 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8868 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8872 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8873 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8874 "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", {
8877 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8878 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8879 "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" },
8881 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8882 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8883 "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" },
8885 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8886 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8887 "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" }
8890 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8891 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8892 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8893 "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", {
8896 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8897 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8898 "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" },
8900 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8901 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8902 "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" },
8904 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8905 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8906 "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" }
8911 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8912 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8914 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8915 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8916 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8917 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8919 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8920 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8921 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8923 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8924 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8926 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8927 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8929 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8930 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8931 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8935 fn test_key_derivation() {
8936 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8937 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8939 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8940 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8942 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8943 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8945 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8946 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8948 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8949 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8951 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8952 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8954 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8955 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8957 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8958 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8962 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8963 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8964 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8965 let seed = [42; 32];
8966 let network = Network::Testnet;
8967 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8968 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8970 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8971 let config = UserConfig::default();
8972 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8973 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8975 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8976 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8978 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8979 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8980 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8981 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8982 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8983 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8984 assert!(res.is_ok());
8988 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8989 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8990 // resulting `channel_type`.
8991 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8992 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8993 let network = Network::Testnet;
8994 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8995 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8997 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8998 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9000 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9001 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9003 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9004 // need to signal it.
9005 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9006 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9007 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9010 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9012 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9013 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9014 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9016 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9017 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9018 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9021 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9022 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9023 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9024 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9025 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9028 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9029 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9033 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9034 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9035 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9036 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9037 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9038 let network = Network::Testnet;
9039 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9040 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9042 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9043 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9045 let config = UserConfig::default();
9047 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9048 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9049 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9050 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9051 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9053 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9054 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9055 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9058 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9059 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9060 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9062 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9063 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9064 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9065 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9066 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9067 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9069 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9073 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9074 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9076 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9077 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9078 let network = Network::Testnet;
9079 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9080 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9082 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9083 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9085 let config = UserConfig::default();
9087 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9088 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9089 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9090 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9091 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9092 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9093 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9094 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9096 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9097 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9098 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9099 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9100 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9101 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9104 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9105 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9107 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9108 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9109 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9110 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9112 assert!(res.is_err());
9114 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9115 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9116 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9118 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9119 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9120 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9123 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9125 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9126 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9127 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9128 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9131 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9132 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9134 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9135 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9137 assert!(res.is_err());
9141 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9142 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9143 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9144 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9145 let seed = [42; 32];
9146 let network = Network::Testnet;
9147 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9148 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9149 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9151 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9152 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9153 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9154 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9156 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9157 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9158 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9163 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9172 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9173 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9174 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9179 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9180 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9186 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9189 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9190 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9191 &accept_channel_msg,
9192 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9193 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9196 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9197 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9198 let tx = Transaction {
9200 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9204 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9207 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9210 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9211 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9216 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9217 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9218 &funding_created_msg,
9222 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9223 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9231 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9232 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9233 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9234 &funding_signed_msg,
9239 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9246 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9247 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9248 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9249 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9251 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9252 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9253 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9256 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9257 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9258 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9266 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9267 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9268 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9269 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9272 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9273 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9275 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9276 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9277 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9279 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());